m 


American  Statesmen: 


EDITED   BY 


JOHN  T.  MORSE,  JR. 


Stmcricmt  J>tatc£men 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN 


BY 


JOHN  T.  MORSE,  JR. 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 


1894 


Copyright,  1893, 
BY  JOHN  T.  MORSE,  JR. 

All  rights  reserved. 


The  Riverside  Press,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  U.  S.  A. 
Electrotyped  and  Printed  by  H.  O.  Houghton  &  Company. 


mrivsRsiTT, 

V!  -  * 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   I. 

PAGE 

THE  RAW  MATERIAL I 

CHAPTER  II. 
THE  START  IN  LIFE .        .      35 

CHAPTER  III. 
LOVE;   A  DUEL;   LAW,  AND  CONGRESS     .        .        .        .62 

CHAPTER  IV. 
NORTH  AND  SOUTH 82 

CHAPTER  V. 
THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE      .        .        .        .Ill 

CHAPTER  VI. 
ELECTION 101 

CHAPTER  VII. 
INTERREGNUM 180 

CHAPTER   VIII. 
THE  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    .  .    229 


CHAPTER   IX»V 
A  REAL  PRESIDENT,  AND  NOT  A  REAL  BATTLE      '•L     •    2^ 


vi  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  X. 
THE  FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  MCCLELLAN  DRAMA    .        .        .    303 

CHAPTER  XI. 

MILITARY  MATTERS  OUTSIDE  OF  VIRGINIA         .        .        .    34G 

CHAPTER  XII. 
FOREIGN  AFFAIRS •  368 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   RAW    MATERIAL. 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  knew  little  concerning  his 
progenitors,  and  rested  well  content  with  the  scan 
tiness  of  his  knowledge.  The  character  and  con 
dition  of  his  father,  of  whom  alone  upon  that  side 
of  the  house  he  had  personal  cognizance,  did  not 
encourage  him  to  pry  into  the  obscurity  behind 
that  luckless  rover.  He  was  sensitive  on  the  sub 
ject;  and  when  he  was  applied  to  for  information, 
a  brief  paragraph  conveyed  all  that  he  knew  or  de 
sired  to  know.  Without  doubt  he  would  have 
been  best  pleased  to  have  the  world  take  him  solely 
for  himself,  with  no  inquiry  as  to  whence  he  came, 
—  as  if  he  had  dropped  upon  the  planet  like  a 
meteorite;  as,  indeed,  many  did  piously  hold  that 
he  came  a  direct  gift  from  heaven.  The  fullest 
statement  which  he  ever  made  was  given  in  Decem 
ber,  1859,  to  Mr.  Fell,  who  had  interrogated  him 
with  an  eye  "to  the  possibilities  of  his  being  an 
available  candidate  for  the  presidency  in  1860 : " 
"My  parents  were  both  born  in  Virginia,  of  un- 


2  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

distinguished  families,  —  second  families,  perhaps 
I  should  say.  My  mother  .  .  .  was  of  a  family 
of  the  name  of  Hanks,  some  of  whom  now  remain 
in  Adams,  some  others  in  Macon,  counties,  Illi 
nois.  My  paternal  grandfather,  Abraham  Lin 
coln,  emigrated  from  Rockingham  County,  Vir 
ginia,  to  Kentucky,  about  1781  or  1782.  .  .  . 
His  ancestors,  who  were  Quakers,  went  to  Virginia 
from  Berks  County,  Pennsylvania.  An  effort  to 
identify  them  with  the  New  England  family  of  the 
same  name  ended  in  nothing  more  definite  than  a 
similarity  of  Christian  names  in  both  families, 
such  as  Enoch,  Levi,  Mordecai,  Solomon,  Abra 
ham,  and  the  like." 

This  effort  to  connect  the  president  with  the 
Lincolns  of  Massachusetts  was  afterward  carried 
forward  by  others,  who  felt  an  interest  greater 
than  his  own  in  establishing  the  fact.  Yet  if  he 
had  expected  the  quest  to  result  satisfactorily,  he 
would  probably  have  been  less  indifferent  about  it ; 
for  it  is  obvious  that,  in  common  with  all  Ameri 
cans  of  the  old  native  stock,  he  had  a  strenuous 
desire  to  come  of  "respectable  people;"  and  his 
very  reluctance  to  have  his  apparently  low  extrac 
tion  investigated  is  evidence  that  he  would  have 
been  glad  to  learn  that  he  belonged  to  an  ancient 
and  historical  family  of  the  old  Puritan  Common 
wealth,  settlers  not  far  from  Plymouth  Rock,  and 
immigrants  not  long  after  the  arrival  of  the  May 
flower.  This  descent  has  at  last  been  traced  by 
the  patient  genealogist. 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  3 

So  early  as  1848  the  first  useful  step  was  taken 
by  Hon.  Solomon  Lincoln  of  Hingliam,  Massa 
chusetts,  who  was  struck  by  a  speech  delivered  by 
Abraham  Lincoln  in  the  national  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  and  wrote  to  ask  facts  as  to  his  parent 
age.  The  response  1  stated  substantially  what  was 
afterward  sent  to  Mr.  Fell,  above  quoted.  Mr. 
Solomon  Lincoln,  however,  pursued  the  search 
further,  and  printed  the  results.2  Later,  Mr. 
Samuel  Shackford  of  Chicago,  Illinois,  himself  a 
descendant  from  the  same  original  stock,  pushed 
the  investigation  more  persistently.3  The  chain, 
as  put  together  by  these  two  gentlemen,  is  as  fol 
lows:  Hingham,  Massachusetts,  was  settled  in 
1635.  In  1636  house-lots  were  set  off  to  Thomas 
Lincoln,  the  miller,  Thomas  Lincoln,  the  weaver, 
and  Thomas  Lincoln,  the  cooper.  In  1638  other 
lots  were  set  off  to  Thomas  Lincoln,  the  husband 
man,  and  to  Stephen,  his  brother.  In  1637  Sam 
uel  Lincoln,  aged  eighteen,  came  from  England  to 
Salem,  Massachusetts,  and  three  years  later  went 
to  Hingham ;  he  also  was  a  weaver,  and  a  brother 
of  Thomas,  the  weaver.  In  1644  there  was  a 
Daniel  Lincoln  in  the  place.  All  these  Lincolns 
are  believed  to  have  come  from  the  County  of  Nor 
folk  in  England,4  though  what  kinship  existed  be- 

1  Two  letters,  now  in  the  possession  of  Mr.  Francis  H.  Lincoln, 
of  Boston,  Mass. 

2  New  England  Hist,  and  Gen.  Register,  Oct.,  1865.        ^r^^rT 

3  Ibid.,  April,  1887,  vol.  xli.  p.  153. 

4  See  articles  in  N.  E.  H.  and  G.  Reg.  above  cited.     Mr.  Lin 
coln's  article  states  that  in  Norwich,  Norfolk  County,  Eng\,  thfere 


4  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

tween  them  is  not  known.  It  is  from  Samuel  that 
the  president  appears  to  have  been  descended. 
Samuel's  fourth  son,  Mordecai,  a  blacksmith, 
married  a  daughter  of  Abraham  Jones,  of  Hull ; J 
about  1704  he  moved  to  the  neighboring  town  of 
Scituate,  and  there  set  up  a  furnace  for  smelting 
iron  ore.  This  couple  had  six  children,  of  whom 
two  were  named  respectively  Mordecai  and  Abra 
ham  ;  and  these  two  are  believed  to  have  gone  to 
Monmouth  County,  New  Jersey.  There  Mordecai 
seems  to  have  continued  in  the  iron  business,  and 
later  to  have  made  another  move  to  Chester 
County,  Pennsylvania,  still  continuing  in  the  same 
business,  until,  in  1725,  he  sold  out  all  his  "Mynes 
&  Minerals,  Forges,  etc."2  Then,  migrating 
again,  he  settled  in  Amity,  Philadelphia  County, 
Pennsylvania,  where,  at  last,  death  caught  up  with 
him.  By  his  will,  February  22,  1735-36,  he  be 
queathed  his  land  in  New  Jersey  to  John,  his  eld 
est  son ;  and  gave  other  property  to  his  sons  Mor 
decai  and  Thomas.  He  belied  the  old  motto,  for 
in  spite  of  more  than  three  removes  he  left  a  fair 
estate,  and  in  the  probate  proceedings  he  is  de 
scribed  as  "gentleman."3  In  1748  John  sold  all 

is  a  "  curious  chased  copper  box  with  the  inscription  '  Abraham 
Lincoln,  Norwich,  1731 ;  '  "  also  in  St.  Andrew's  church  in  the 
same  place  a  mural  tablet :  "  In  memory  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  of 
this  parish,  who  died  July  13,  1798,  aged  79  years."  Similarities 
of  name  are  also  noted. 

1  A  town  adjoining  Hingham,  Mass. 

2  His  brother  Abraham  also  resided  in  Chester  County,  and  died 
there,  April,  1745. 

3  N.  and  H.,  i.  3. 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  5 

he  had  in  New  Jersey,  and  in  1758  moved  into 
Virginia,  settling  in  that  part  of  Augusta  County 
which  was  afterward  set  off  as  Buckingham 
County.  Though  his  will  has  not  been  found, 
there  is  "ample  proof,"  says  Mr.  Shackford,  that 
he  had  five  sons  named  Abraham,  Isaac,  Jacob, 
Thomas  and  John.  Of  these,  Abraham  went  to 
North  Carolina,  there  married  Mary  Shipley,  and 
by  her  had  sons  Mordecai,  Josiah,  and  Thomas, 
who  was  born  in  1778.  In  1780  or  1782,  as  it  is 
variously  stated,  this  family  moved  to  Kentucky. 
There,  one  day  in  1784,  the  father,  at  his  labor  in 
the  field,  was  shot  by  lurking  Indians.  His  oldest 
son,  working  hard  by,  ran  to  the  house  for  a  gun ; 
returning  toward  the  spot  where  lay  his  father's 
body,  he  saw  an  Indian  in  the  act  of  seizing  his 
brother,  the  little  boy  named  Thomas.  He  fired, 
with  happy  aim ;  the  Indian  fell  dead,  and  Thomas 
escaped  to  the  house.  This  Thomas  it  was  who 
afterward  became  the  father  of  Abraham  Lincoln.1 
Of  the  other  sons  of  Mordecai  (great- uncles  of  the 
President),  Thomas  also  went  to  Kentucky,  Isaac 
went  to  Tennessee,  while  Jacob  and  John  stayed 
in  Virginia,  and  begat  progeny  who  became  in 
later  time  ferocious  rebels,  and  of  whom  one  wrote 
a  very  comical  blustering  letter  to  his  relative  the 
President;2  and  probably  another,  bearing  oddly 

1  A  different  pedigree,  published  in  the  Lancaster  Intelligencer, 
Sept.  24,  1870,  by  David  J.  Lincoln,  of  Birdsboro,  Berks  County, 
Penn.,  is  refuted  by  George  Lincoln,  of  Hingham,  Mass.,  in  the 
Hingham  Journal,  Oct.  10,  1879. 

2  N.  and  H.,  i.  4  note. 


6  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

enough  the  name  of  Abraham,  was  a  noted  fighter.1 
It  is  curious  to  observe  of  what  migratory  stock  we 
have  here  the  sketch.  Mr.  Shackford  calls  atten 
tion  to  the  fact  that  through  six  successive  genera 
tions  all  save  one  were  "pioneers  in  the  settlement 
of  new  countries,"  thus:  1.  Samuel  came  from 
England  to  Hingham,  Massachusetts.  2*  Mor- 
decai  lived  and  died  at  Scituate,  close  by  the  place 
of  his  birth.  3.  Mordecai  moved,  and  settled  in 
Pennsylvania,  in  the  neighborhood  which  after 
ward  became  Berks  County,  while  it  was  still  wil 
derness.  4.  John  moved  into  the  wilds  of  Vir 
ginia.  5.  Abraham  went  to  the  backwoods  of 
Kentucky,  shortly  after  Boone's  settlement.  6. 
Thomas  moved  first  into  the  sparsely  settled  parts 
of  Indiana,  and  thence  went  onward  to  a  similar 
region  in  Illinois. 

Thus  in  time  was  corroborate/1  what  Abraham 
Lincoln  wrote  in  1848  in  one  of  the  above-men 
tioned  letters  to  Hon.  Solomon  Lincoln:  "We 
have  a  vague  tradition  that  my  great-grandfather 
went  from  Pennsylvania  to  Virginia,  and  that  he 
was  a  Quaker."  It  is  of  little  consequence  that 
this  "vague  tradition  "  was  stoutly  contradicted  by 
the  President's  father,  the  ignorant  Thomas,  who 
indignantly  denied  that  either  a 'Puritan  or  a 
Quaker  could  be  found  in  the  line  of  his  forbears, 
and  who  certainly  seemed  to  set  heredity  at  de 
fiance  if  such  were  the  case.  But  while  thus  repu 
diating  others,  Thomas  himself  was  in  some  danger 

1  N.  and  H.,  i.  4  note. 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  7 

of  being  repudiated ;  for  so  pained  have  some  per 
sons  been  by  the  necessity  of  recognizing  Thomas 
Lincoln  as  the  father  of  the  President,  that  they 
have  welcomed,  as  a  happy  escape  from  this  so 
miserable  paternity,  a  bit  of  gratuitous  and  unsup 
ported  gossip,  published,  though  perhaps  with 
more  of  malice  than  of  faith,  by  Mr.  Herndon,  to 
the  effect  that  Abraham  Lincoln  was  the  illegiti 
mate  son  of  some  person  unknown,  presumably 
some  tolerably  well-to-do  Kentuckian,  who  induced 
Thomas  to  assume  the  role  of  parent. 

Upon  the  mother's  side  the  ancestral  showing  is 
meagre,  and  fortunately  so,  since  the  case  seems 
to  be  a  bad  one  beyond  reasonable  hope.  Her 
name  was  Nancy  Hanks.  She  was  born  in  Vir 
ginia,  and  was  the  illegitimate  child  of  one  Lucy 
Hanks.1  Nor  was  she  the  only  instance  of  illegi 
timacy2  in  a  family  which,  by  all  accounts,  seems 
to  have  been  very  low  in  the  social  scale.  Mr. 
Herndon  calls  them  by  the  dread  name  of  "poor 
whites,"  and  gives  an  unappetizing  sketch  of 
them.3  Throughout  his  pages  and  those  of  La- 
mon  there  is  abundant  and  disagreeable  evidence 
to  show  the  correctness  of  his  estimate.  Nancy 
Hanks  herself,  who  certainly  was  not  to  blame  for 
her  parentage,'-  and  perhaps  may  have  improved 
matters  by  an  infusion  of  better  blood  from  her 

1  Herndon,  3. 

2  The  unpleasant  Dennis  Hanks  was  an  illegitimate  son  of  an 
"  aunt  of  the  President's  mother."    Herndon,  13  ;  and  see  Larnon. 
12. 

3  Herndon,  14. 


$        .  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

unknown  father,  is  described  by  some  as  a  very 
rare  flower  to  have  bloomed  amid  the  bed  of  ugly 
weeds  which  surrounded  her.  These  friendly 
writers  make  her  a  gentle,  lovely,  Christian  crea 
ture,  too  delicate  long  to  survive  the  roughness 
of  frontier  life  and  the  fellowship  of  the  shift 
less  rover  to  whom  she  was  unfittingly  wedded.1 
Whatever  she  may  have  been,  her  picture  is  ex 
ceeding  dim  and  has  been  made  upon  scant  and 
not  unquestionable  evidence.  Mr.  Lincoln  seems 
not  often  to  have  referred  to  her;  but  when  he  did 
so  it  was  with  expressions  of  affection  for  her  char 
acter  and  respect  for  her  mental  qualities,  provided 
at  least  that  it  was  really  of  her,  and  not  of  his 
step-mother  that  he  was  speaking,  —  a  matter  not 
clear  from  doubt.2 

On  June  10,  1806,  Thomas  Lincoln  gave  bond 
in  the  "just  and  full  sum  of  fifty  pounds"  to 
marry  Nancy  Hanks,  and  two*  days  later,  June 
12,  he  did  so,  in  Washington  County,  Kentucky.8 
She  was  then  twenty-three  years  old.  February 
12,  1807,  their  daughter  Sarah  was  born,  who 
was  married  and  died  leaving  no  issue.  February 
12,  1809,  Abraham  Lincoln  was  born;  no  other 
children  came  save  a  boy  who  lived  only  a  few 
days. 

The  domestic  surroundings  amid  which  the  babe 

1  Holland,  23;  Lamon,  11;  N.  and  H.,  i.  24;  Herndon,  13,  28; 
Raymond,  20 ;    but   Raymond   is   no   authority    as   to   Lincoln's 
youth ;  and  Holland  is  little  more  valuable  for  the  same  period. 

2  Lamon,  32.     But  see  Herndon,  13. 

3  N.  and  H.,  i.  23 ;  Herndon,  5 ;  but  see  Lamon,  10. 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  9 

came  into  life  were  wretched  in  the  extreme.  All 
the  trustworthy  evidence  depicts  a  condition  of 
what  civilized  people  call  misery.  It  is  just  as 
well  to  acknowledge  a  fact  which  cannot  now  be 
obscured  by  any  amount  of  euphemism.  Yet  very 
many  of  Lincoln's  biographers  have  been  greatly 
concerned  to  color  this  truth,  which  he  himself, 
with  his  honest  nature,  was  never  willing  to  mis 
represent,  however  much  he  resisted  efforts  to  give 
it  a  general  publicity.  He  met  curious  inquiry 
with  reticence,  but  with  no  attempt  to  mislead. 
Some  of  his  biographers,  however,  while  shunning 
direct  false  statements,  have  used  alleviating  ad 
jectives  with  literary  skill,  and  have  drawn  fanci 
ful  pictures  of  a  pious  frugal  household,  of  a  gal 
lant  frontiersman  endowed  with  a  long  catalogue 
of  noble  qualities,  and  of  a  mother  like  a  Madonna 
in  the  wilderness.1  Yet  all  the  evidence  that  there 
is  goes  to  show  that  this  romantic  coloring  is  purely 
illusive.  Rough,  coarse,  low,  ignorant,  and  pov 
erty-stricken  surroundings  were  about  the  child  : 
and  though  we  may  gladly  avail  ourselves  of  the 
possibility  of  believing  his  mother  to  have  been 
superior  to  all  the  rest  of  it,  yet  she  could  by  no 
means  leaven  the  mass.  The  father2  was  by  call-. 

1  For  instance,  see  the  pages  of  the  first  chapter  of  the  Life  by 
Arnold,  a  book  which  becomes  excellent  after  the  author  has  got 
free  from  the  farcied  necessities  of  creating  an  appropriate  back 
ground  for  the  origin  and  childhood  of  the  hero.  So,  more  briefly, 
Raymond,  who  gives  no  authority  to  support  the  faith  which  is  in 
him. 

2  For  description  of  him,  see  Lamou,  8,  9 ;  Herndon,  11. 


10  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

ing  a  carpenter,  but  not  good  at  his  trade,  a  shift 
less  migratory  squatter  by  invincible  tendency, 
and  a  very  ignorant  man,  for  a  long  while  able 
only  to  form  the  letters  which  made  his  signature, 
though  later  he  extended  his  accomplishments  a 
little.  He  rested  not  much  above  the  very  botiom 
of  existence  in  the  pioneer  settlements,  apparently 
without  capacity  or  desire  to  do  better.  The  fam 
ily  was  imbued  with  the  peculiar,  intense,  but  un 
enlightened  form  of  Christianity,  mingled  with 
curious  superstition,  prevalent  in  the  backwoods, 
and  begotten  by  the  influence  of  the  vast  wilder 
ness  upon  illiterate  men  of  a  rude  native  force. 
It  interests  scholars  to  trace  the  evolutions  of  re 
ligious  faiths,  but  it  might  be  not  less  suggestive 
to  study  the  retrogression  of  religion  into  super 
stition.  Thomas  was  as  restless  in  matters  of 
creed  as  of  residence,  and  made  various  changes 
in  both  during  his  life.  These  were,  however, 
changes  without  improvement,  and,  so  far  as  he 
was  concerned,  his  son  Abraham  might  have 
grown  up  to  be  what  he  himself  was  contented  to 
remain. 

It  was  in  the  second  year  after  his  marriage 
that  Thomas  Lincoln  made  his  first  removal. 
Four  years  later  he  made  another.  Two  or  three 
years  afterwards,  in  the  autumn  of  1816,  he  aban 
doned  Kentucky  and  went  into  Indiana.  Some 
writers  have  given  to  this  migration  the  interesting 
character  of  a  flight  from  a  slave-cursed  society  to 
a  land  of  freedom,  but  whatever  poetic  fitness  there 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  11 

might  be  in  such  a  motive  the  suggestion  is  en 
tirely  gratuitous  and  without  the  slightest  foun 
dation.1  In  making  this  move,  Thomas's  outfit 
consisted  of  a  trifling  parcel  of  tools  and  cooking 
utensils,  with  ever  so  little  bedding,  and  four  hun 
dred  gallons  of  whiskey.  At  his  new  quarters  he 
built  a  "half -faced  camp"  fourteen  feet  square, 
that  is  to  say,  a  covered  shed  of  three  sides,  the 
fourth  side  being  left  open  to  the  weather.  In 
this,  less  snug  than  the  winter's  cave  of  a  bear, 
the  family  dwelt  for  a  year,  and  then  were  trans 
lated  to  the  luxury  of  a  "cabin,"  four-walled  in 
deed,  but  which  for  a  long  while  had  neither 
floor,  door,  nor  window.  Amid  this  hardship  and 
wretchedness  Nancy  Lincoln  passed  away,  Octo 
ber  5,  1818,  of  that  dread  and  mysterious  dis 
ease,  the  scourge  of  those  pioneer  communities, 
known  as  the  "milk-sickness."  2  In  a  rough  coffin, 
fashioned  by  her  husband  "out  of  green  lumber 
cut  with  a  whip-saw,"  she  was  laid  away  in  the 
forest  clearing,  and  a  few  months  afterward  an 
itinerant  preacher  performed  some  funeral  rites 
over  the  poor  woman's  humble  grave. 

For  a  year  Thomas  Lincoln  was  a  widower. 
Then  he  went  back  to  Kentucky,  and  found  there 
Mrs.  Sally  Johnston,  a  widow,  whom,  when  she 
was  the  maiden  Sarah  Bush,  he  had  loved  and 
courted,  and  by  whom  he  had  been  refused.  He 
now  asked  again,  and  with  better  success.  The 

1  Herndon,  19 ;  Lamon,  16 ;  Holland,  25. 

2  Herndon,  25-28 ;  Lamon,  26-28. 


12  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

marriage  was  a  little  inroad  of  good  luck  into 
his  career;  for  the  new  wife  was  thrifty  and  in 
dustrious,  with  the  ambition  and  the  capacity  to 
improve  the  squalid  condition  of  her  husband's 
household.  She  had,  too,  worldly  possessions  of 
bedding  and  furniture,  enough  to  fill  a  four-horse 
wagon.  She  made  her  husband  put  a  floor,  a 
door,  and  windows  to  his  cabin.  From  the  day  of 
her  advent  a  new  spirit  made  itself  felt  amid  the 
belongings  of  the  inefficient  Thomas.  Her  imme 
diate  effort  was  to  make  her  new  husband's  chil 
dren  "look  a  little  more  human,"  and  the  youthful 
Abraham  began  to  get  crude  notions  of  the  simpler 
comforts  and  decencies  of  life.  All  agree  that  she 
was  a  step-mother  to  whose  credit  it  is  to  be  said 
that  she  manifested  an  intelligent  kindness  towards 
Abraham. 

The  opportunities  for  education  were  scant 
enough  in  that  day  and  place.  In  his  childhood 
in  Kentucky  Abraham  got  a  few  weeks  with  one 
teacher,  and  then  a  few  weeks  with  another. 
Later,  in  Indiana,  he  studied  a  few  months,  in  a 
scattered  way.  Probably  he  had  instruction  at 
home,  for  the  sum  of  all  the  schooling  which  he 
had  in  his  whole  life  was  hardly  one  year ; l  a  sin 
gular  start  upon  the  road  to  the  presidency  of  the 
United  States!  The  books  which  he  saw  were 
few,  but  a  little  later  he  laid  hands  upon  them  all 
and  read  and  re-read  them  till  he  must  have  ab 
sorbed  all  their  strong  juice  into  his  own  nature. 

1  Herndon,  34-37,  41 ;  Lamon,  34-36 ;  Holland,  28. 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  13 

Nicolay  and  Hay  give  the  list:  The  Bible; 
"^Esop's  Fables;"  "Robinson  Crusoe;"  "The 
Pilgrim's  Progress;"  a  history  of  the  United 
States;  Weems's  "Washington."  He  was  doubt 
less  much  older  when  he  devoured  the  Revised 
Statutes  of  Indiana  in  the  office  of  the  town  con 
stable.  Dr.  Holland  adds  Lives  of  Henry  Clay, 
and  of  Franklin  (probably  the  famous  autobiogra 
phy),  and  Ramsay's  "Washington;"  and  Arnold 
names  Shakespeare  and  Burns.  It  was  a  small 
library,  but  nourishing.  He  used  to  write  and  to 
do  sums  in  arithmetic  on  the  wooden  shovel  by  the 
fireside,  and  to  shave  off  the  surface  in  order  to 
renew  the  labor. 

As  he  passed  from  boyhood  to  youth  his  mental 
development  took  its  characteristics  from  the  pop 
ular  demand  of  the  neighborhood.  He  scribbled 
verses  and  satirical  prose,  wherein  the  coarse  wit 
was  adapted  to  the  taste  of  the  comrades  whom  it 
was  designed  to  please;  and  it  must  be  admitted 
that,  after  giving  due  weight  to  all  ameliorating 
considerations,  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  disappoint 
ment  at  the  grossness  of  the  jesting.  No  thought, 
no  word  raised  it  above  the  low  level  of  the  audi 
ence  made  up  of  the  laborers  on  the  farms  and  the 
loungers  in  the  groceries.  The  biographer  who 
has  made  public  "The  First  Chronicles  of  Reu 
ben"  deserves  to  be  held  in  detestation.1 

A  more  satisfactory  form  of  intellectual  efferves- 

1  Mr.  Herndon  did  this  ill  deed ;  50-54.     Lamon  prefers  to  say 
that  most  of  this  literature  is  "too  indecent  for  publication,"  63. 


14  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

cence  consisted  in  writing  articles  on  the  American 
Government,  Temperance,  etc.,  and  in  speech- 
making  to  any  who  were  near  at  the  moment  of 
inspiration.  There  is  abundant  evidence,  also, 
that  already  Lincoln  was  regarded  as  a  witty  fel 
low,  a  rare  mimic,  and  teller  of  jokes  and  stories; 
and  therefore  was  the  champion  of  the  fields  and 
the  favorite  of  all  the  primitive  social  gatherings. 
This  sort  of  life  and  popularity  had  its  perils ;  for 
in  that  day  and  region  men  seldom  met  without 
drinking  together;  but  all  authorities  are  agreed 
that  Lincoln,  while  the  greatest  talker,  was  the 
smallest  drinker. 

The  stories  told  of  his  physical  strength  rival 
those  which  decorate  the  memory  of  Hercules. 
Others,  which  show  his  kindly  and  humane  nature, 
are  more  valuable.  Any  or  all  of  these  may  or 
may  not  be  true,  and  though  they  are  not  so  poeti 
cal  or  marvelous  as  the  myths  which  lend  an  an 
tique  charm  to  the  heroes  of  classic  and  romantic 
lore,  yet  they  compare  fairly  well  wita  those  which 
Weems  l*ts  twined  about  the  figure  of  the  youthful 
Washington.  There  is  a  tale  of  the  rescue  of  a 
pig  from  a  quagmire,  and  another  of  the  saving  of 
a  drunken  man  from  freezing.  There  are  many 
stories  of  fights ;  others  of  the  lifting  of  enormous 
weights ;  and  even  some  of  the  doing  of  great  feats 
of  labor  in  a  day,  though  for  such  tasks  Lincoln 
had  no  love.  These  are  not  worth  recounting ;  there 
is  store  of  such  in  every  village  about  the  popular 
local  hero;  and  though  historians  by  such  folk-lore 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  15 

may  throw  a  glamour  about  Lincoln's  daily  life, 
he  himself,  at  the  time,  could  hardly  have  seen 
much  that  was  romantic  or  poetical  in  the  routine 
of  ill-paid  labor  and  hard  living.  Until  he  came 
of  age  his  "time"  belonged  to  his  father,  who  let 
him  out  to  the  neighbors  for  any  job  that  offered, 
making  him  a  man-of-all-work,  without-doors  and 
within.  In  1825  he  was  thus  earning  six  dollars 
a  month,  presumably  besides  board  and  lodging. 
Sometimes  he  slaughtered  hogs,  at  thirty-one  cents 
a  day;  and  in  this  "rough  work"  he  was  esteemed 
especially  efficient.  Such  was  the  making  of  a 
President  in  the  United  States  in  this  nineteenth 
century ! 

Thomas  Lincoln,  like  most  men  of  his  stamp, 
had  the  cheerful  habit  of  laying  the  results  of  his 
own  worthlessness  to  the  charge  of  the  conditions 
about  him,  which,  naturally,  he  constantly  sought 
to  change,  since  it  seemed  that  no  change  could 
bring  him  to  a  lower  level  than  he  had  already 
found.  As  Abraham  approached  his  "freedom- 
day,"  his  luckless  parent  conceived  the  notion  that 
he  might  do  better  in  Illinois  than  he  had  done  in 
Indiana.  So  he  shuffled  off  the  farm,  for  which 
he  had  never  paid,  and  about  the  middle  of  Feb 
ruary  the  family  caravan,  with  their  scanty  house 
hold  wares  packed  in  an  ox  team,  began  a  march 
which  lasted  fourteen  days  and  entailed  no  small 
measure  of  hardship.  They  finally  stopped  at  a 
bluff  on  the  north  bank  of  the  north  fork  of  the 
Sangamon,  a  stream  which  empties  into  the  Ohio. 


16  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Here  Thomas  Lincoln  renewed  the  familiar  process 
of  "starting  in  life,"  and  with  an  axe,  a  saw  and 
a  knife  built  a  rough  cabin  of  hewed  logs,  with  a 
smoke-house  and  "stable."  Abraham,  aided  by 
John  Hanks,  cleared  ten  or  fifteen  acres  of  land, 
split  the  rails  and  fenced  it,  planted  it  with  corn, 
and  made  it  over  to  Thomas  as  a  sort  of  bequest  at 
the  close  of  his  term  of  legal  infancy.  His  subse 
quent  relationship  with  his  parents,  especially  with 
his  father,  seems  to  have  been  slight,  involving  an 
occasional  gift  of  money,  a  very  rare  visit,  and 
finally  a  commonplace  letter  of  Christian  comfort 
when  the  old  man  was  on  his  death-bed.1 

At  first  Abraham's  coming  of  age  made  no  es 
pecial  change  in  his  condition;  he  continued  to 
find  such  jobs  as  he  could,  as  an  example  of  which 
is  mentioned  his  bargain  with  Mrs.  Nancy  Miller 
"to  split  four  hundred  rails  for  every  yard  of 
brown  jeans  dyed  with  white  walnut  bark  that 
would  be  necessary  to  make  him  a  pair  of  trou 
sers."  After  many  months  there  arrived  in  the 
neighborhood  one  Denton  Offut,  one  of  those 
scheming,  talkative,  evanescent  busy-bodies  who 
skim  vaguely  over  new  territories.  This  adven 
turer  had  a  cargo  of  hogs,  pork,  and  corn,  which 
he  wanted  to  send  to  New  Orleans,  and  the  en 
gagement  fell  to  Lincoln  and  two  comrades  at  the 
wage  of  fifty  cents  per  day  and  a  bonus  of  $60  for 
the  three.  It  has  been  said  that  this  and  a  pre 
ceding  trip  down  the  Mississippi  first  gave  Lincoln 

1  Thomas  Lincoln  died  Jan.  17,  1851. 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  17 

a  glimpse  of  slavery  in  concrete  form,  and  that  the 
spectacle  of  negroes  "in  chains,  whipped  and 
scourged,"  and  of  a  slave  auction,  implanted  in  his 
mind  an  "unconquerable  hate"  towards  the  insti 
tution,  so  that  he  exclaimed:  "If  ever  I  get  a 
chance  to  hit  that  thing,  I  '11  hit  it  hard."  So 
the  loquacious  myth-maker  John  Hanks  asserts ; l 
but  Lincoln  himself  refers  his  first  vivid  impres 
sion  to  a  later  trip,  made  in  1841,  when  there 
were  "on  board  ten  or  a  dozen  slaves  shackled  to 
gether  with  irons."  Of  this  subsequent  incident 
he  wrote,  fourteen  years  later,  to  his  friend, 
Joshua  Speed:  "That  sight  was  a  continual  tor 
ment  to  me;  and  I  see  something  like  it  every 
time  I  touch  the  Ohio  or  any  other  slave  border. 
It  is  not  fair  for  you  to  assume  that  I  have  no  in 
terest  in  a  thing  which  has,  and  continually  exer 
cises,  the  power  of  making  me  miserable."2 

Of  more  immediate  consequence  was  the  notion 
which  the  rattle -brained  Offut  conceived  of  Lin 
coln's  general  ability.  This  lively  patron  now 
proposed  to  build  a  river  steamboat,  with  "run 
ners  for  ice  and  rollers  for  shoals  and  dams,"  of 
which  his  redoubtable  young  employee  was  to  be 
captain.  But  this  strange  scheme  gave  way  to  an 
other  for  opening  in  New  Salem  a  "general  store" 
of  all  goods.  This  small  town  had  been  born  only 
a  few  months  before  this  summer  of  1831,  and  was 
destined  to  a  brief  but  riotous  life  of  some  seven 

1  Herndon,  75,  76 ;  Lamon,  82  ;  Arnold,  30;  N.  and  H.,  i.  72. 

2  N.  a»d  H.,  i.  74. 


\ 


18  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

years'  duration.  Now  it  had  a  dozen  or  fifteen 
"houses,"  of  which  some  had  cost  only  ten  dollars 
for  the  building ;  yet  to  the  sanguine  Offut  it  pre 
sented  a  fair  field  for  retail  commerce.  He  accord 
ingly  equipped  his  "store,"  and,  being  himself  en 
gaged  in  other  enterprises,  he  installed  Lincoln  as 
manager.  Soon  he  also  gave  Lincoln  a  mill  to 
run. 

Besides  all  this  patronage,  Offut  went  about  the 
region  bragging  in  his  extravagant  way  that  his 
clerk  "knew  more  than  any  man  in  the  United 
States,"  would  some  day  be  President,  and  could 
now  throw  or  thrash  any  man  in  those  parts.  Now 
it  so  happened  that  some  three  miles  out  from  New 
Salem  lay  Clary's  Grove,  the  haunt  of  a  gang  of 
frontier  ruffians  of  the  familiar  type,  among  whom 
one  Jack  Armstrong  was  champion  bully.  Off  lit 's 
boasting  soon  rendered  an  encounter  between  Lin 
coln  and  Armstrong  inevitable,  though  Lincoln  did 
his  best  to  avoid  it,  and  declared  his  aversion  to 
"this  woolling  and  pulling."  The  wrestling  match 
was  arranged  and  the  settlers  flocked  to  it  like 
Spaniards  to  a  bull-fight.  Battle  was  joined  and 
Lincoln  was  getting  the  better  of  Armstrong, 
whereupon  the  "Clary's  Grove  boys,"  with  fine 
chivalry,  were  about  to  rush  in  upon  Lincoln  and 
maim  him,  or  worse,  when  the  timely  intervention 
of  a  prominent  citizen  possibly  saved  even  the  life 
of  the  future  President.1  Some  of  the  bioa'ra- 

O 

pliers,  borrowing  the  license  of  poets,  have  chosen 

1  Lamon,  92,  93,  has  the  best  account  of  this  famous  encounter. 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  19 

to  tell  about  the  "boys"  and  the  wrestling  match 
with  such  picturesque  epithets  that  the  combat 
bids  fair  to  appear  to  posterity  as  romantic  as  that 
of  Friar  Tuck  and  Robin  Hood.  Its  consequence 
was  that  Armstrong  and  Lincoln  were  fast  friends 
ever  after.  Wherever  Lincoln  was  at  work,  Arm 
strong  used  to  "do  his  loafing,"  and  Lincoln  made 
visits  to  Claiy's  Grove,  and  long  afterward  did  a 
friendly  service  to  "old  Hannah,"  Armstrong's 
wife,  by  saving  one  of  her  vicious  race  from  the 
gallows,  which  upon  that  especial  occasion  he  did 
not  happen  to  deserve.  Also  Armstrong  and  his 
gang  gave  Lincoln  hearty  political  support,  and  an 
assistance  at  the  polls  which  was  very  effective,  for 
success  generally  smiled  on  that  candidate  who  had 
as  his  constituency1  "the  butcher-knife  boys," 
"the  bare-footed  boys,"  the  "half -horse,  half -alli 
gator  men,"  and  the  "huge-pawed  boys." 

An  item  less  susceptible  of  a  poetic  coloring  is 
that  about  this  time  Lincoln  ransacked  the  neigh 
borhood  in  search  of  an  English  grammar,  and 
getting  trace  of  one  six  miles  out  from  the  settle 
ment,  he  walked  over  to  borrow  or  to  buy  it.  He 
brought  it  back  in  triumph,  and  studied  it  exhaus 
tively. 

There  are  also  some  tales  of  his  honesty  which 
may  stand  without  disgrace  beside  that  of  Wash 
ington  and  the  cherry-tree,  and  may  be  better  en 
titled  to  credit.  It  is  said  that,  while  he  was 
"keeping  shop"  for  Offut,  a  woman  one  day  acci- 
1  Ford,  Hist,  of  Illinois,  88. 


20  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

dentally  overpaid  him  by  the  sum  of  fourpence,  and 
that  he  walked  several  miles  that  night  to  restore 
the  sum  to  her  before  he  slept.  On  another  occa 
sion,  discovering  that  in  selling  half  a  pound  of  tea 
he  had  used  too  small  a  weight,  he  started  instantly 
forth  to  make  good  the  deficiency.  Perhaps  this 
integrity  does  not  so  much  differentiate  Lincoln 
from  his  fellows  as  it  may  seem  to  do,  for  it  is  said 
that  honesty  was  the  one  distinguishing  virtue  of 
that  queer  society.  None  the  less  these  legends 
are  exponents,  which  the  numerous  fighting  stories 
are  not,  of  the  genuine  nature  of  the  man.  His 
chief  trait  all  his  life  long  was  honesty  of  all  kinds 
and  in  all  things ;  not  only  commonplace,  material 
honesty  in  dealings,  but  honesty  in  language,  in 
purpose,  in  thought;  honesty  of  mind,  so  that  he 
could  never  even  practice  the  most  tempting  of  all 
deceits,  a  deceit  against  himself.  This  pervasive 
honesty  was  the  trait  of  his  identity,  which  stayed 
with  him  from  beginning  to  end,  when  other  traits 
seemed  to  be  changing,  appearing  or  disappearing, 
and  bewildering  the  observer  of  his  career.  All 
the  while  the  universal  honesty  was  there. 

It  took  less  than  a  year  for  Offut's  shop  to  come 
to  ruin,  for  the  proprietor  to  wander  off  into  the 
unknown  void  from  which  he  had  come,  and  for 
Lincoln  to  find  himself  again  without  occupation. 
He  won  some  local  reputation  by  navigating  the 
steamboat  "Talisman"  up  the  Sangamon  River  to 
Springfield ;  but  nothing  came  of  it. 

The   foregoing  narrative  ought   to  have  given 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  21 

some  idea  of  the  moral  and  physical  surroundings 
of  Lincoln's  early  days.  Americans  need  to  carry 
their  memories  hardly  fifty  years  back,  in  order  to 
have  a  lively  conception  of  that  peculiar  body  of 
men  which  for  many  years  was  pushed  out  in 
front  of  civilization  in  the  West.  Waifs  and 
strays  from  highly  civilized  communities,  these 
wanderers  had  not  civilization  to  learn,  but  rather 
they  had  shuffled  off  much  that  belonged  to  civili 
zation,  and  afterwards  they  had  to  acquire  it 
afresh.  Among  them  crudity  in  thought  and  un- 
couthness  in  habits  were  intertwined  in  odd,  incon 
gruous  crossings  with  the  remnants  of  the  more 
respectable  customs  with  which  they  had  once  been 
familiar.  Much  they  forgot  and  much  they  put 
away  as  being  no  longer  useful ;  many  of  them  — 
not  all  —  became  very  ignorant  without  being 
stupid,  very  brutal  without  being  barbarous. 
Finding  life  hard,  they  helped  each  other  with  a 
general  kindliness  which  is  impracticable  among 
the  complexities  of  elaborate  social  organizations. 
Those  who  were  born  on  the  land,  among  whom 
Lincoln  belonged,  were  peculiar  in  having  no 
reminiscences,  no  antecedent  ideas  derived  from 
their  own  past,  whereby  to  modify  the  influences 
of  the  immediate  present.  What  they  should 
think  about  men  and  things  they  gathered  from 
what  they  saw  and  heard  around  them.  Even  the 
modification  to  be  got  from  reading  was  of  the 
slightest,  for  very  little  reading  was  possible, 
if  desired.  An  important  trait  of  these 


22  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

communities  was  the  closeness  of  personal  inter 
course  in  them,  and  the  utter  lack  of  any  kind  of 
barriers  establishing  strata  of  society.  Individ 
uals  might  differ  ever  so  widely;  but  the  wisest 
and  the  dullest,  the  most  worthless  and  the  most 
enterprising,  had  to  rub  shoulder  to  shoulder  in 
daily  life.  Yet  the  variety  was  considerable : 
hardy  and  danger  -  loving  pioneers  fulfilling  the 
requirements  of  romance ;  shiftless  vagrants  curi 
ously  combining  utter  inefficiency  with  a  sort  of 
bastard  contempt  for  hardship ;  ruffians  who  could 
only  offset  against  every  brutal  vice  an  ignoble 
physical  courage ;  intelligent  men  whose  observant 
eyes  ranged  over  the  whole  region  in  a  shrewd 
search  after  enterprise  and  profit ;  a  few  educated 
men,  decent  in  apparel  and  bearing,  useful  in  legis 
lation  and  in  preventing  the  ideal  from  becoming 
altogether  vulgarized  and  debased;  and  others 
whose  energy  was  chiefly  of  the  tongue,  the  class 
imbued  with  a  taste  for  small  politics  and  the  pub 
lic  business.  All  these  and  many  other  varieties 
were  like  ingredients  cast  together  into  a  caldron ; 
they  could  not  keep  apart,  each  with  his  own  kind, 
to  the  degree  which  is  customaiy  in  old  established 
communities ;  but  they  all  ceaselessly  crossed  and 
mingled  and  met,  and  talked,  and  dealt,  and 
helped  and  hustled  each  other,  and  exerted  upon 
each  other  that  subtle  inevitable  influence  resulting 
from  such  constant  intercourse;  and  so  they  inocu 
lated  each  other  with  certain  characteristics  which 
became  common  to  all  and  formed  the  type  of  the 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  23 

early  settler.  Thus  was  made  "the  new  West," 
"the  great  West,"  which  was  pushed  ever  onward, 
and  endured  along  each  successive  frontier  for 
about  a  generation.  An  eternal  movement,  a 
tireless  coming  and  going  pervaded  these  men; 
they  passed  hither  and  thither  without  pause, 
phantasmagorically ;  they  seemed  to  be  forever 
"moving  on,"  some  because  they  were  real  pio 
neers  and  natural  rovers,  others  because  they  were 
mere  vagrants  generally  drifting  away  from  credi 
tors,  others  because  the  better  chance  seemed  ever 
in  the  newer  place,  and  all  because  they  had  struck 
no  roots,  gathered  no  associations,  no  home  ties, 
no  local  belongings.  The  shopkeeper  "moved 
on"  when  his  notes  became  too  pressing;  the 
schoolmaster,  after  a  short  stay,  left  his  school  to 
some  successor  whose  accomplishments  could  hardly 
be  less  than  his  own ;  clergymen  ranged  vaguely 
through  the  country,  to  preach,  to  pray,  to  bury, 
to  marry,  as  the  case  might  be ;  farmers  heard  of 
a  more  fruitful  soil,  and  went  to  seek  it.  Men 
certainly  had  at  times  to  work  hard  in  order  to  live 
at  all,  yet  it  was  perfectly  possible  for  the  natural 
idler  to  rove,  to  loaf,  and  to  be  shiftless  at  inter 
vals,  and  to  become  as  demoralized  as  the  tramp 
for  whom  a  shirt  and  trousers  are  the  sum  of 
worldly  possessions.  Books  were  scarce  ;  many 
teachers  hardly  had  as  much  book-learning  as  lads 
of  thirteen  years  now  have  among  ourselves.  Men 
who  could  neither  read  nor  write  abounded,  and 
a  deficiency  so  common  could  hardly  imply  much 


24  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

disgrace  or  a  marked  inferiority;  many  learned 
these  difficult  arts  only  in  mature  years.  Fighting 
was  a  common  pastime,  and  when  these  rough  fel 
lows  fought,  they  fought  like  savages;  Lincoln's 
father  bit  off  his  adversary's  nose  in  a  fight,  and 
a  cousin  lost  the  same  feature  in  the  same  way ; 
the  "gouging"  of  eyes  was  a  legitimate  resource. 
The  necessity  of  fighting  might  at  any  moment 
come  to  any  one ;  even  the  combination  of  a  peace 
able  disposition  with  formidable  strength  did  not 
save  Lincoln  from  numerous  personal  affrays,  of 
which  many  are  remembered,  and  not  improbably 
many  more  have  been  forgotten.  In  spite  of  the 
picturesque  adjectives  which  have  been  so  decora- 
tively  used  in  describing  the  ruffian  of  the  fron 
tier,  he  seems  to  have  been  about  what  his  class 
always  is;  and  when  these  fellows  had  forced  a 
fight,  or  "set  up"  a  match,  their  chivalry  never 
prevented  any  unfairness  or  brutality.  A  tale 
illustrative  of  the  times  is  told  of  a  closely  con 
tested  election  in  the  legislature  for  the  office  of 
State  Treasurer.  The  worsted  candidate  strode 
into  the  hall  of  the  Assembly  and  gallantly  select 
ing  four  of  the  largest  and  strongest  of  those  who 
had  voted  against  him,  thrashed  them  soundly. 
The  other  legislators  ran  away.  But  before  the 
close  of  the  session  this  pugilist,  who  so  well  un 
derstood  practical  politics,  was  appointed  Clerk  of 
the  Circuit  Court  and  County  Recorder.1 

Corn  bread  was  the  chief  article  of  diet;  pota- 

1  Ford,  Hist,  of  Illinois,  81. 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  25 

toes  were  a  luxury  and  were  often  eaten  raw,  like 
apples.  To  the  people  at  large  whiskey  "straight " 
seemed  the  natural  drink  of  man,  and  whiskey 
toddy  was  not  distasteful  to  woman.  To  refuse 
to  drink  was  to  subject  one's  self  to  abuse  and  sus 
picion;1  Lincoln's  notorious  lack  of  liking  for  it 
passed  for  an  eccentricity,  or  a  physical  peculiar 
ity.  The  customary  social  gatherings  were  at 
horse  -  racings,  at  corn  -  shuckings,  at  political 
speech-makings,  at  weddings,  whereat  the  coarse 
proceedings  would  not  nowadays  bear  recital;  at 
log-rollings,  where  the  neighbors  gathered  to  col 
lect  the  logs  of  a  newly  cleared  lot  for  burning, 
and  at  house-raisings,  where  they  kindly  aided  to 
set  up  the  frame  of  a  cabin  for  a  new-comer;  at 
camp-meetings,  where  the  hysterical  excitement  of 
a  community  whose  religion  was  more  than  half 
superstition  found  clamorous  and  painful  vent;2 
or  perchance  at  a  hanging,  which,  if  it  met  public 
approbation,  would  be  sanctioned  by  the  gathering 
of  the  neighbors  within  a  day's  journey  of  the 
scene.  At  dancing-parties  men  and  women  danced 
barefoot;  indeed,  they  could  hardly  do  better, 
since  their  foot  wear  was  apt  to  be  either  mocca 
sins,  or  such  boots  as  they  themselves  could  make 
from  the  hides  which  they  themselves  had  cured. 
In  Lincoln's  boyhood  the  hunting-shirt  and  leg- 
gins  made  of  skins  were  a  sufficiently  respectable 

1  See  anecdote  in  The  Good  Old  Times  in  McLean  County,  48. 

2  "  The  jerks  "  was  the  graphic  name  of  an  attack  not  uncom 
mon  at  these  religious  meetings. 


26  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

+ 

garb;  and  buckskin  breeches  dyed  green  were 
enough  to  captivate  the  heart  of  any  girl  who 
wished  a  fashionable  lover;  but  by  the  time  that 
he  had  become  a  young  man,  most  self-respecting 
men  had  suits  of  jeans.  The  ugly  butcher's  knife 
and  tomahawk,  which  had  been  essential  as  was 
the  rapier  to  the  costume  of  gentlemen  two  centu 
ries  earlier,  began  now  to  be  more  rarely  seen  at 
the  belt  about  the  waist.  The  women  wore  linsey- 
woolsey  gowns,  of  home  manufacture,  and  dyed 
according  to  the  taste  or  skill  of  the  wearer  in 
stripes  and  bars  with  the  brown  juice  of  the  but 
ternut.  In  the  towns  it  was  not  long  before  calico 
was  seen,  and  calfskin  shoes;  and  in  such  popu 
lous  centres  bonnets  decorated  the  heads  of  the 
fair  sex.  Amid  these  advances  in  the  art  of  dress 
Lincoln  was  a  laggard,  being  usually  one  of  the 
worst  attired  men  of  the  neighborhood;  not  from 
affectation  but  from  a  natural  indifference  to  such 
matters.  The  sketch  is  likely  to  become  classical 
in  American  history  of  the  appearance  which  he 
presented  with  his  scant  pair  of  trousers,  "hitched  " 
by  a  single  suspender  over  his  shirt,  and  so  short 
as  to  expose,  at  the  lower  end,  half  a  dozen  inches 
of  "shinbone,  sharp,  blue  and  narrow." 

In  the  clearings  the  dwellings  of  these  men  were 
the  "half -faced  camp"  open  upon  one  side  to  the 
weather,  or  the  dooiiess,  floorless  and  window- 
less  cabin,  which,  with  prosperity,  might  be  made 
luxurious  by  greased  paper  in  the  windows,  and 
"puncheon  "  floors.  The  furniture  was  in  keeping 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  27 

with  this  exterior.  At  a  corner  the  bed  was  con 
structed  by  driving  into  the  ground  crotched 
sticks,  whence  poles  extended  to  the  crevices  of 
the  walls ;  upon  these  poles  were  laid  boards,  and 
upon  these  boards  were  tossed  leaves  and  skins 
and  such  other  alleviating  material  as  could  be 
found.  Three-legged  stools  and  a  table  were 
hewed  from  the  felled  trees  with  an  axe,  which 
was  often  the  settler's  only  and  invaluable  tool, 
and  which  he  would  travel  long  miles  to  sharpen. 
If  a  woman  wanted  a  looking-glass,  she  scoured  a 
tin  pan,  but  the  temptation  to  inspect  one's  self 
must  have  been  feeble.  A  very  few  kitchen 
utensils  completed  the  outfit.  Troughs  served  for 
washtubs,  when  washtubs  were  used;  and  wooden 
ploughs  broke  up  the  virgin  soil.  The  whole  was 
little,  if  at  all,  more  comfortable  than  the  red 
man's  wigwam.  In  "towns,"  so-called,  there  was 
of  course  somewhat  more  of  civilization  than  in  the 
clearings.  But  one  must  not  be  misled  by  a  name; 
a  "town"  might  signify  only  a  score  of  houses, 
and  the  length  of  its  life  was  wholly  problematical ; 
a  few  days  sufficed  to  build  the  wooden  huts, 
which  in  a  few  years  might  be  abandoned.  In 
the  early  days  there  was  almost  no  money  among 
the  people ;  sometimes  barter  was  resorted  to ;  one 
lover  paid  for  his  marriage  license  with  maple 
sugar,  another  with  wolf -scalps.  More  often  a 
promise  sufficed ;  credit  was  a  system  well  under 
stood,  and  promissory  notes  constituted  an  unques 
tioned  and  popular  method  of  payment  that  would 


28  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

have  made  a  millennium  for  Mr.  Micawber.  But 
however  scant  might  be  cash  and  houses,  each  town 
had  its  grocery,  and  these  famous  "stores"  were 
by  far  the  chief  influence  in  shaping  the  ideas  of 
the  Westerner.  There  all  congregated,  the  idlers 
all  day  long,  the  busy  men  in  the  evening;  and 
there,  stimulated  by  the  whiskey  of  the  proprietor, 
they  gossiped  about  everybody's  affairs,  talked 
about  business  and  the  prospects  of  the  neighbor 
hood,  and  argued  about  the  politics  of  the  county, 
the  state,  and  even  of  the  nation.  Jokes  and 
stories,  often  most  uncouth  and  gross,  whiled  away 
the  time.  It  was  in  these  groceries,  and  in  the 
rough  crucible  of  such  talk,  wherein  grotesque 
imagery  and  extravagant  phrases  were  used  to  ridi 
cule  pretension  and  to  bring  every  man  to  his  place, 
sometimes  also  to  escape  taking  a  hard  fact  too 
hardly,  that  what  we  now  call  "American  humor," 
with  its  peculiar  native  flavor,  was  born.  To  this 
it  is  matter  of  tradition  that  Lincoln  contributed 
liberally.  He  liked  neighborly  chat  and  discus 
sion;  and  his  fondness  for  political  debate,  and 
his  gifts  in  tale  and  jest  made  him  the  most  popu 
lar  man  in  every  "store"  that  he  entered.  It  is 
commonly  believed  that  the  effect  of  this  familiar 
ity  with  coarse  talk  did  not  afterward  disappear, 
so  that  he  never  became  fastidious  in  language  or  in 
story.  But  apologists  of  this  habit  are  doubtless 
correct  in  saying  that  vulgarity  in  itself  had  no 
attraction  for  him;  it  simply  did  not  repel  him, 
when  with  it  there  was  a  flavor  of  humor  or  a  use- 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  29 

ful  point.  Apparently  it  simply  meant  nothing  to 
him;  a  mental  attitude  which  is  not  difficult  of 
comprehension  in  view  of  its  origin.1 

Some  of  the  most  picturesque  and  amusing  pages 
of  Ford's  "History  of  Illinois  "  describe  the  condi 
tion  of  the  bench  and  bar  of  these  times.2  "Boys, 
come  in,  our  John  is  going  to  hold  court,"  pro 
claimed  the  sheriff;  and  the  "boys"  loitered  into 
the  bar-room  of  the  tavern,  or  into  a  log  cabin 
where  the  judge  sat  on  the  bed  and  thus,  really 
from  the  woolsack,  administered  "law"  mixed  with 
equity  as  best  he  knew  it.  Usually  these  magis 
trates  were  prudent  in  guiding  the  course  of  prac 
tical  justice,  and  rarely  summed  up  the  facts  lest 
they  should  make  dangerous  enemies,  especially  in 
criminal  cases ;  they  often  refused  to  state  the  law, 
and  generally  for  a  very  good  reason.  They  liked 
best  to  turn  the  whole  matter  over  to  the  jurors, 
who  doubtless  "understood  the  case,  and  would  do 
justice  between  the  parties."  The  books  of  the 
science  were  scarce,  and  lawyers  who  studied  them 
were  perhaps  scarcer.  But  probably  substantial 
fairness  in  decision  did  not  suffer  by  reason  of 
lack  of  sheepskin  learning. 

Politics  for  a  long  while  were  strictly  personal; 
the  elections  did  not  turn  upon  principles  or  mea 
sures,  but  upon  the  popular  estimate  of  the  candi- 

1  See  Herndon,  104,  113 ;  Holland  has  some  singular  remarks 
on  this  subject,  p.  83 ;  N.  and  H.,  i.  121,  say  that  Lincoln  was 
"  clean  of  speech,"  —  an  agreeable  statement,  for  which  one  would 
like  to  have  some  authority. 

2  Ford,  Hist,  of  Illinois,  82-86. 


30  ABRAHAM   LINCOLN. 

dates  individually.  Political  discussion  meant  un 
stinted  praise  and  unbounded  vilification.  A  man 
might,  if  he  chose,  resent  a  vote  against  himself  as 
a  personal  insult,  and  hence  arose  much  secrecy 
and  the  "keep  dark"  system.  Stump-speaking, 
whiskey  and  fighting  were  the  chief  elements  of  a 
campaign,  and  the  worst  class  in  society  furnished 
the  most  efficient  backing.1 

Such  was  the  condition  of  men  and  things  in  the 
neighborhood  where  Abraham  Lincoln  was  shap 
ing  in  the  days  of  his  youth.  Yet  it  wras  a  con 
dition  which  did  not  last  long;  Illinois  herself 
changed  and  grew  as  rapidly  as  any  youngster 
within  her  borders.  The  rate  of  advance  in  all 
that  goes  to  make  up  what  we  now  regard  as  a  civ 
ilized  society  was  astonishing.  Between  the  time 
when  Lincoln  was  fifteen  and  when  he  was  twenty- 
five,  the  alteration  was  so  great  as  to  be  confus 
ing.  One  hardly  became  familiar  with  a  condition 
before  it  had  vanished.  Some  towns  began  to  ac 
quire  an  aspect  of  permanence ;  clothes  and  man 
ners  became  like  those  prevalent  in  older  commu 
nities  ;  many  men  were  settling  down  in  established 
residence,  identifying  themselves  with  the  fortunes 
of  their  neighborhood.  Young  persons  were  grow 
ing  up  and  staying  where  they  had  been  "raised," 
as  the  phrase  of  a  farming  community  had  it. 
Comfortable  and  presentable  two-story  houses  lent 
an  air  of  prosperity  and  stimulated  ambition ;  law- 

1  Ford,  Hist,  of  Illinois,  55,  86,  88,  104;  Herndon,  103;  N.  and 
H.;  i.  107 ;  Lamon,  124,  230. 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  31 

books  began  to  be  collected  in  small  numbers;  and 
debts  were  occasionally  paid  in  money,  and  could 
often  be  collected  by  legal  process.  These  im 
provements  were  largely  due  to  the  swelling  tide 
of  immigration  which  brought  men  of  a  better  type 
to  push  their  enterprises  in  a  country  presumably 
emerging  from  its  disagreeable  stage.  But  the 
chief  educational  influence  was  to  be  found  in  the 
Anglo-American  passion  for  an  argument  and  a 
speech.  Hand  in  hand,  as  has  so  long  been  the 
custom  in  our  country,  law  and  politics  moved 
among  the  people,  who  had  an  inborn,  inherited 
taste  for  both ;  these  stimulated  and  educated  the 
settlers  in  a  way  that  only  Americans  can  appre 
ciate.  When  Lincoln,  as  is  soon  to  be  seen, 
turned  to  them,  he  turned  to  what  then  and  there 
appeared  the  highest  callings  which  could  tempt 
intellect  and  ambition. 

The  preeminently  striking  feature  in  Lincoln's 
nature  —  not  a  trait  of  character,  but  a  character 
istic  of  the  man  —  which  is  noteworthy  in  these 
early  days,  and  grew  more  so  to  the  very  latest, 
was  the  extraordinary  degree  to  which  he  always  | 
appeared  to  be  in  close  and  sympathetic  touch  with 
the  people,  that  is  to  say,  the  people  in  the  mass 
wherein  he  was  imbedded,  the  social  body  amid 
which  he  dwelt,  which  pressed  upon  him  on  all 
sides,  which  for  him  formed  "the  public."  First 
this  group  or  body  was  only  the  population  of  the 
frontier  settlement ;  then  it  widened  to  include  the 
State  of  Illinois;  then  it  expanded  to  the  popula- 


32  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

tion  of  the  entire  North ;  and  such  had  come  to  be 
the  popular  appreciation  of  this  remarkably  devel 
oped  quality  that,  at  the  time  of  his  death,  his  ad 
mirers  even  dared  to  believe  that  it  would  be  able 
to  make  itself  one  with  all  the  heterogeneous,  dis 
cordant,  antagonistic  elements  which  then  com 
posed  the  very  disunited  United  States.  It  is  by 
reason  of  this  quality  that  it  has  seemed  necessary 
to  depict  so  far  as  possible  that  peculiar,  transi 
tory  phase  of  society  which  surrounded  his  early 
days.  This  quality  in  him  caused  him  to  be  ex 
ceptionally  susceptible  to  the  peculiar  influences 
of  the  people  among  whom  his  lot  was  cast.  This 
quality  for  awhile  prevented  his  differentiating 
himself  from  them,  prevented  his  accepting  stand 
ards  and  purposes  unlike  theirs  either  in  speech 
or  action,  prevented  his  rising  rapidly  to  a  higher 
moral  plane  than  theirs.  This  quality  kept  him  es 
sentially  one  of  them,  until  his  "people"  and  his 
"public  "  expanded  beyond  them.  It  has  been  the 
fashion  of  his  admirers  to  manifest  an  extreme  dis 
taste  for  a  truthful  presentation  of  his  earlier  days. 
Some  writers  have  passed  very  lightly  over  them ; 
others,  stating  plain  facts  with  a  formal  accuracy, 
have  used  their  skill  to  give  to  the  picture  an  un 
truthful  iniscoloring ;  two  or  three,  instinct  with 
the  spirit  of  Zola,  have  made  their  sketch  with 
plain  unsparing  realism  in  color  as  well  as  in  lines, 
and  so  have  brought  upon  themselves  abuse,  and 
perhaps  have  deserved  much  of  it,  by  reason  of 
a  lack  of  skill  in  doing  an  unwelcome  thing,  or 


THE  RAW  MATERIAL.  33 

rather  by  reason  of  over-doing  it.  The  feeling 
which  has  led  to  suppression  or  to  a  falsely  ro 
mantic  description  seems  to  me  unreasonable  and 
wrong.  The  very  quality  which  made  Lincoln,  as 
a  young  man,  not  much  superior  to  his  coarse  sur 
roundings  was  precisely  the  same  quality  which, 
ripening  and  expanding  rapidly  and  grandly  with 
maturing  years  and  a  greater  circle  of  humanity, 
made  him  what  he  was  in  later  life.  It  is  through 
this  quality  that  we  get  continuity  in  him;  with 
out  it,  we  cannot  evade  the  insoluble  problem  of 
two  men, — two  lives, — one  following  the  other 
with  no  visible  link  of  connection  between  them; 
without  it  we  have  physically  one  creature,  morally 
and  mentally  two  beings.  If  we  reject  this  trait, 
we  throw  away  the  only  key  which  unlocks  the 
problem  of  the  most  singular  life,  taken  from  end 
to  end,  which  has  ever  been  witnessed  among  men, 
a  life  which  many  have  been  content  to  regard  as 
an  unsolved  enigma.  But  if  we  admit  and  really 
perceive  and  feel  the  full  force  of  this  trait,  devel 
oped  in  him  in  a  degree  probably  unequalled  in  the 
annals  of  men,  then,  besides  the  enlightenment 
which  it  brings,  we  have  the  great  satisfaction  of 
eliminating  much  of  the  disagreeableness  attendant 
upon  his  youthful  days.  Even  the  commonness 
and  painful  coarseness  of  his  foolish  written  ex 
pressions  become  actually  an  exponent  of  his  chief 
and  crowning  quality,  his  receptiveness  and  his 
expression  of  humanity,  —  that  is  to  say,  of  all  the 
humanity  he  then  knew.  At  first  he  expressed 


34  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

what  lie  could  discern  with  the  limited,  inexpe 
rienced  vision  of  the  ignorant  son  of  a  wretched 
vagrant  pioneer;  later  he  gave  expression  to  the 
humanity  of  a  people  engaged  in  a  purpose  physi 
cally  and  morally  as  vast  and  as  grand  as  any  enter 
prise  which  the  world  has  seen.  Thus,  with  perfect 
fairness,  without  wrenching  or  misrepresentation  or 
sophistry,  the  ugliness  of  his  youth  ceases  to  be  his 
own  and  becomes  only  the  presentation  of  a  curious 
social  condition.  In  his  youth  he  expressed  a  low 
condition,  in  later  life  a  noble  one;  at  each  period 
he  expressed  correctly  what  he  found.  His  day 
and  generation  uttered  itself  through  him.  With 
such  thoughts,  and  from  this  point  of  view,  it  is 
possible  to  contemplate  Lincoln's  early  days,  amid 
all  their  degraded  surroundings  and  influences  and 
unmarked  by  apparent  antagonism  or  obvious 
superiority  on  his  part,  without  serious  dismay. 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE   START   IN   LIFE. 

IN  Illinois  during  the  years  of  Lincoln's  boy 
hood  the  red  man  was  retiring  sullenly  before  the 
fatal  advance  of  the  white  man's  frontier.  Shoot 
ing,  scalping,  and  plundering  forays  still  occurred, 
and  in  the  self-complaisant  reminiscences  of  the 
old  settlers  of  that  day  the  merciless  and  mysteri 
ous  savage  is  apt  to  lend  to  the  narrative  the  lively 
coloring  of  mortal  danger.1  In  the  spring  of  1832 
a  noted  chief  of  the  Sacs  led  a  campaign  of  such 
importance  that  it  lives  in  history  under  the 
dignified  title  of  "the  Black  Hawk  war."  The 
Indians  gathered  in  numbers  so  formidable  that 
Governor  Eeynolds  issued  a  call  for  volunteers  to 
aid  the  national  forces.  Lincoln,  left  unemployed 
by  the  failure  of  Offut,  at  once  enlisted.  The 
custom  then  was,  so  soon  as  there  were  enough  re 
cruits  for  a  company,  to  elect  a  captain  by  vote. 
The  method  was  simple:  each  candidate  stood  at 
some  point  in  the  field  and  the  men  went  over  to 
one  or  another  according  to  their  several  prefer 
ences.  Three  fourths  of  the  company  to  which 
Lincoln  belonged  ranged  themselves  with  him,  and 

1   The  Good  Old  Times  in  McLean  County,  passim. 


36  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

long  afterward  he  used  to  say  that  no  other  success 
in  life  had  given  him  such  pleasure  as  did  this  one. 
The  company  was  attached  to  the  Fourth  Illinois 
Regiment,  commanded  by  Colonel  Samuel  Thomp 
son,  in  the  brigade  of  General  Samuel  Whiteside. 
On  April  27  they  started  for  the  scene  of  conflict, 
and  for  many  days  endured  much  hardship  of  hun 
ger  and  rough  marching.  But  thereby  they  es 
caped  serious  danger,  for  they  were  too  fatigued 
to  go  forward  on  May  12,  when  the  cavalry  battal 
ions  rode  out  gallantly,  recklessly,  perhaps  a  little 
stupidly,  into  ambush  and  death.  It  so  happened 
that  Lincoln  never  came  nearer  to  any  engagement 
than  he  did  to  this,  one  of  "Stillman's  Run;"  so 
that,  in  place  of  military  glory,  he  had  to  be  con 
tent  with  the  reputation  of  being  the  best  comrade 
and  story-teller  at  the  camp  fire.  He  had,  how 
ever,  an  opportunity  to  do  one  honorable  act :  the 
brief  term  of  service  of  the  volunteers  expired  on 
May  27,  and  most  of  them  eagerly  hastened  away 
from  an  irksome  task,  without  regard  to  the  fact 
that  their  services  were  still  much  needed,  whereas 
Lincoln  and  some  other  officers  reeiilisted  as  pri 
vates.  They  were  made  the  "Independent  Spy 
Battalion"  of  mounted  volunteers,  were  given 
many  special  privileges,  but  were  concerned  in  no 
engagement,  and  erelong  were  mustered  out  of 
service.  Lincoln's  certificate  of  discharge  was 
signed  by  Robert  Anderson,  who  afterward  was  in 
command  at  Fort  Sumter  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
rebellion.  Thus,  late  in  June,  Lincoln  was  again 


TIIE  START  IN  LIFE.  37 

a  civilian  in  New  Salem,  and  was   passing  from 
war  to  politics. 

Nomination  by  caucus  had  not  yet  been  intro 
duced  into  Illinois,1  and  any  person  who  wished  to 
be  a  candidate  for  an  elective  office  simply  made 
public  announcement  of  the  fact  and  then  con 
ducted  his  campaign  as  best  he  could.2  On  March 
9,  1832,  shortly  before  his  enlistment,  Lincoln 
issued  a  manifesto,  "To  the  People  of  Sangamon 
County,"  in  which  he  informed  them  that  he 
should  run  as  a  candidate  for  the  State  Legislature 
at  the  autumn  elections,  and  told  them  his  political 
principles.3  He  was  in  favor  of  internal  improve 
ments,  such  as  opening  roads,  clearing  streams, 
building  a  railroad  across  Sangamon  County,  and 
making  the  Sangamon  River  straight  and  naviga 
ble.  He  advocated  a  usury  law,  and  hazarded  the 
extraordinary  argument  that  "in  cases  of  extreme 
necessity,  there  could  always  be  means  found  to 
cheat  the  law;  while  in  all  other  cases  it  would 
have  its  intended  effect."  A  law  ameliorated  by 
infractions  is  no  uncommon  thing,  but  this  is  per 
haps  the  only  instance  in  which  a  law  has  been 
befriended  on  the  ground  that  it  can  be  circum- 

1  It  was  first  advocated  in  1835-36,  and  was  adopted  by  slow  de 
grees  thereafter.     Ford,  Hist,  of  Illinois,  204. 

2  Ibid.,  201. 

3  Lamon,  120,  where  is  given  the  text  of  the  manifesto ;  Hern- 
don,  101 ;  N.  and  H.,  i.  101,  105 ;  Holland,  53,  says  that  after  his 
return  from  the  Black  Hawk  campaign,  Lincoln  "  was  applied  to  " 
to  become  a  candidate,  and  that  the  "  application  was  a  great  sur 
prise  to  him."     This  seems  an  obvious  error,  in  view  of  the  mani 
festo  ;  yet  see  Lamon,  122. 


38  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

vented.  He  believed  that  every  man  should  "re 
ceive  at  least  a  moderate  education."  He  depre 
cated  changes  in  existing  laws;  for,  he  said,  "con 
sidering  the  great  probability  that  the  framers  of 
those  laws  were  wiser  than  myself,  I  should  pre 
fer  not  meddling  with  them."  The  clumsy  phrase 
ology  of  his  closing  paragraph  coupled  not  badly  a 
frank  avowal  of  ambition  with  an  ingenuous  expres 
sion  of  personal  modesty.  The  principles  thus  set 
forth  were  those  of  Clay  and  the  Whigs,  and  at 
this  time  the  "best  people"  in  Sangamon  County 
belonged  to  this  party.  The  Democrats,  on  the 
other  hand,  did  not  much  concern  themselves  with 
principles,  but  accepted  General  Jackson  in  place 
thereof,  as  constituting  in  himself  a  party  plat 
form.  In  the  rough-and-tumble  pioneer  commun 
ity  they  could  not  do  better,  and  for  many  years 
they  had  controlled  the  State;  indeed,  Lincoln 
himself  had  felt  no  small  loyalty  towards  a  presi 
dent  who  admirably  expressed  Western  civilization. 
Now,  however,  he  considered  himself  "an  avowed 
Clay  man,"  J  and  besides  the  internal  improvement 
system  he  spoke  also  for  a  national  bank,  and  a 
high  protective  tariff ;  probably  he  knew  very  little 
about  either,  but  his  partisanship  was  perfect,  for 
if  there  was  any  distinguishing  badge  of  an  anti- 
Jacksoii  Whig,  it  certainly  was  advocacy  of  a 
national  bank. 

1  N.  and  H.,  i.  102.  Lamon  regards  him  as  "  a  nominal  Jack 
son  man  "  in  contradistinction  to  a  "  whole-hog1  Jackson  man ;  "  as 
"  Whiggish  "  rather  than  actually  a  Whig.  Lamon,  123,  126. 


THE  START  IN  LIFE.  39 

After  his  return  from  the  "war,"  Lincoln  set 
about  electioneering  with  a  good  show  of  energy. 
He  hardly  anticipated  success,  but  at  least  upon 
this  trial  trip  he  expected  to  make  himself  known 
to  the  people  and  to  gain  useful  experience.  He 
"stumped"  his  own  county  thoroughly,  and  is  said 
to  have  made  speeches  which  were  blunt,  crude, 
and  inartificial,  but  not  displeasing  to  his  audi 
ences.  A  story  goes  that  once  "a  general  fight" 
broke  out  among  his  hearers,  and  one  of  his  friends 
was  getting  roughly  handled,  whereupon  Lincoln, 
descending  from  the  rostrum,  took  a  hand  in  the 
affray,  tossed  one  of  the  assailants  "ten  or  twelve 
feet,  easily,"  and  then  continued  his  harangue. 
Yet  not  even  thus  could  he  win,  and  another  was 
chosen  over  his  head.  He  had,  however,  more 
reason  to  be  gratified  than  disappointed  with  the 
result ;  for,  though  in  plain  fact  he  was  a  raw  and 
unknown  youngster,  he  stood  third  upon  a  list  of 
eight  candidates,  receiving  657  votes;  and  out  of 
208  votes  cast  in  his  own  county,  he  scored  205. 1 
In  this  there  was  ample  encouragement  for  the 
future. 

The  political  campaign  being  over,  and  legisla 
tive  functions  postponed,  Lincoln  was  brought 
face  to  face  with  the  pecuniary  problem.  He  con 
templated,  not  without  approbation,  the  calling  of 
the  blacksmith;  but  the  chance  to  obtain  a  part 
interest  in  a  grocery  "store"  tempted  him  into  an 
occupation  for  which  he  was  little  fitted.  He  be- 
1  Herndon,  105.  But  see  N.  and  H.,  i.  109. 


40  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

came  junior  partner  in  the  firm  of  Berry  &  Lin 
coln,  which,  by  executing  and  delivering  sundry 
notes  of  hand,  absorbed  the  whole  grocery  business 
of  the  town.  But  Lincoln  was  hopelessly  ineffi 
cient  behind  the  counter,  and  Berry  was  a  tippler. 
So  in  a  year's  time  the  store  "winked  out,"  leav 
ing  as  its  only  important  trace  those  ill-starred 
scraps  of  paper  by  which  it  had  been  founded. 
Berry  "moved  on  "from  the  inconvenient  neigh 
borhood,  and  soon  afterward  died,  contributing 
nothing  to  reduce  the  indebtedness.  Lincoln 
patiently  continued  to  make  payments  during  sev 
eral  years  to  come,  until  he  had  discharged  the 
whole  amount.  It  was  only  a  few  hundred  dollars, 
but  to  him  it  seemed  so  enormous  that  betwixt 
jest  and  earnest  he  called  it  "the  national  debt." 
So  late  as  in  1848,  when  he  was  a  member  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  at  Washington,  he  ap 
plied  part  of  his  salary  to  this  old  indebtedness. 

During  this  "store  "-keeping  episode  he  had  be 
gun  to  study  law,  and  while  "keeping  shop  "he 
was  with  greater  diligence  reading  Blackstone  and 
such  other  elementary  classics  of  the  profession 
as  he  could  borrow.  He  studied  with  zeal  and 
became  absorbed  in  his  books.  Perched  upon 
a  woodpile,  or  lying  under  a  tree  with  his  feet 
thrust  upwards  against  the  trunk  and  "grinding 
around  with  the  shade,"  he  caused  some  neighbors 
to  laugh  uproariously,  and  others  to  say  that  he 
was  daft.  In  fact,  he  was  in  grim  earnest,  and 
held  on  his  way  with  much  persistence. 


THE   START  IN  LIFE.  41 

May  7,  1833,  Lincoln  was  commissioned  as  post 
master  at  New  Salem.  His  method  of  distribut 
ing  the  scanty  mail  was  to  put  all  the  letters  in 
his  hat,  and  to  hand  them  out  as  he  happened  to 
meet  the  persons  to  whom  they  were  addressed. 
The  emoluments  could  hardly  have  gone  far 
towards  the  discharge  of  "the  national  debt."  His 
incumbency  in  this  office  led  to  a  story  worth  tell 
ing.  When  New  Salem,  and  by  necessity  also  the 
post-office,  like  the  grocery  shop,  "winked  out,"  in 
1836,  there  was  a  trifling  balance  of  sixteen  or 
eighteen  dollars  due  from  Lincoln  to  the  govern 
ment.  Several  years  afterward,  when  he  was  prac 
ticing  law  in  Springfield,  the  government  agent 
at  last  appeared  to  demand  a  settlement.  Lincoln 
went  to  his  trunk  and  drew  forth  "an  old  blue 
sock  with  a  quantity  of  silver  and  copper  coin  tied 
up  in  it,"  the  identical  bits  of  money  which  he  had 
gathered  from  the  people  at  New  Salem,  and 
which,  through  many  days  of  need  in  the  long  in 
tervening  period,  he  had  not  once  touched. 

Fortunately  an  occupation  now  offered  itself 
which  was  more  lucrative,  and  possessed  also  the 
valuable  quality  of  leaving  niches  of  leisure  for 
the  study  of  the  law.  The  mania  for  speculation 
in  land  had  begun  in  Illinois;  great  tracts  were 
being  cut  up  into  "town  lots,"  and  there  was  as 
lively  a  market  for  real  estate  as  the  world  has 
ever  seen.  The  official  surveyor  of  the  county, 
John  Calhoun,  had  more  work  than  he  could  do, 
and  offered  to  appoint  Lincoln  as  a  deputy.  A 


42  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

little  study  made  him  competent  for  the  work, 
which  he  performed  for  some  time  with  admirable 
accuracy,  if  the  stories  are  to  be  believed.  But 
he  had  not  long  enjoyed  the  mild  prosperity  of 
this  new  career  ere  an  untoward  interruption  came 
from  a  creditor  of  the  extinct  grocery  firm.  This 
man  held  one  of  the  notes  representing  "the 
national  debt,"  and  now  levied  execution  upon 
Lincoln's  horse  and  surveying  instruments.  Two 
friends,  however,  were  at  hand  in  this  hour  of  need, 
and  Bolin  Greene  and  James  Short  are  gratefully 
remembered  as  the  men  who  generously  furnished, 
in  that  actual  cash  which  was  so  scarce  in  Illinois, 
the  sums  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  dollars 
and  one  hundred  and  twenty  dollars  respectively, 
to  redeem  these  essential  implements  of  Lincoln's 
business. 

The  summer  of  1834  found  Lincoln  again  a  can 
didate  for  the  legislature.  He  ran  as  a  Whig, 
but  he  received  and  accepted  offers  of  aid  from  the 
Democrats,  and  their  votes  swelled  the  flattering 
measure  of  his  success.  It  has  usually  been  stated 
that  he  led  the  four  successful  candidates,  the  poll 
standing:  Lincoln,  1,376;  Dawson,  1,370;  Car 
penter,  1,170;  Stuart,  1,164.  But  Mr.  Herndoii 
adduces  evidence  that  Dawson's  number  was  1,390, 
whereby  Lincoln  is  relegated  to  the  second  place. 
Holland  tells  us  that  he  "shouldered  his  pack,  and 
on  foot  trudged  to  Vandalia,  then  the  capital  of 
the  State,  about  a  hundred  miles,  to  make  his  en 
trance  into  public  life."  But  the  correcting  pen 


THE  START  IN  LIFE.  43 

of  the  later  biographer  interferes  with  this  dra 
matic  incident  also.  For  it  seems  that  after  the 
result  of  the  election  was  known  Lincoln  visited  a 
friend,  Coleman  Smoot,  and  said:  "Did  you  vote 
for  me? "  "I  did,"  replied  Smoot.  "Then,"  said 
Lincoln,  "you  must  lend  me  two  hundred  dollars !  " 
This  seemed  a  peculiar  sequitur,  for  ordinary  polit 
ical  logic  would  have  made  any  money  that  was  to 
pass  between  voter  and  candidate  move  the  other 
way.  Yet  Smoot  accepted  the  consequence  en 
tailed  in  part  by  his  own  act,  and  furnished  the 
money,  whereby  Lincoln  was  able  to  purchase  a 
new  suit  of  clothes  and  to  ride  in  the  stage  to 
Vandalia. 

The  records  of  this  legislature  show  nothing 
noteworthy.  Lincoln  was  very  inappropriately 
placed  on  the  Committee  on  Public  Accounts  and 
Expenditures;  also  it  is  recorded  that  he  intro 
duced  a  resolution  to  obtain  for  the  State  a  part  of 
the  proceeds  of  the  public  lands  sold  within  it. 
What  has  chiefly  interested  the  chroniclers  is,  that 
at  this  session  he  first  saw  Stephen  A.  Douglas, 
then  a  lobbyist,  and  said  of  him:  "He  is  the  least 
man  I  ever  saw."  Lincoln's  part  seems  to  have 
been  rather  that  of  an  observer  than  of  an  actor. 
The  account  given  is  that  he  was  watching.,  learn 
ing,  making  acquaintances,  prudently  preparing 
for  future  success,  rather  than  endeavoring  to  seize 
it  too  greedily.  In  fact,  there  is  reason  to  believe 
that  his  thoughts  were  intent  on  far  other  matter 
than  the  shaping  of  laws  and  statutes.  For  to  this 


44  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

period  belongs  the  episode  of  Ann  Rutledge.  The 
two  biographers  whose  personal  knowledge  is  the 
best  regard  this  as  the  one  real  romance  of  Lin 
coln's  life.  Heretofore  he  had  held  himself  shyly 
aloof  from  women's  society,  bnt  this  maiden  won 
his  heart.  She  comes  before  posterity  amid  a 
glamour  of  rhetorical  description,  which  attributes 
to  her  every  grace  of  form  and  feature,  every  charm 
of  character  and  intellect.  She  was  but  a  school 
girl  of  seventeen  years  when  two  men  became  her 
lovers ;  a  year  or  more  afterward  she  became  en 
gaged  to  one  of  them,  but  before  they  could  be 
married,  he  made  a  somewhat  singular  excuse  for 
going  to  New  York  on  family  affairs.  His  absence 
was  prolonged  and  his  letters  became  few.  People 
said  that  the  girl  had  been  deceived,  and  Lincoln 
began  to  hope  that  the  way  was  clearing  for  him. 
But  under  the  prolonged  strain  Miss  Rutledge 's 
health  broke  down,  and  on  August  25,  1835,  she 
died  of  brain  fever.  Lincoln  was  allowed  to  see 
her  as  she  lay  near  her  end.  The  effect  upon  him 
was  grievous.  Many  declared  him  crazy,  and  his 
friends  feared  that  he  might  go  so  far  as  to  take 
his  own  life ;  they  watched  him  closely,  and  one  of 
them  at  last  kindly  took  him  away  from  the  scene 
of  his  sufferings  for  a  while,  and  bore  him  constant 
and  cheering  company.  In  time  the  cloud  passed, 
but  it  seems  certain  that  on  only  one  or  two  other 
occasions  in  his  life  did  that  deep  melancholy, 
which  formed  a  permanent  background  to  his  tem 
perament,  take  such  overmastering,  such  alarming, 


THE  START  I-N  LIFE.  45 

and  merciless  possession  of  him.  He  was  afflicted 
sorely  with  a  constitutional  tendency  to  gloom, 
and  the  evil  haunted  him  all  his  life  long.  Like  a 
dark  fog-bank  it  hung,  always  dull  and  threaten 
ing,  on  the  verge  of  his  horizon,  sometimes  rolling 
heavily  down  upon  him,  sometimes  drawing  off  into 
a  more  or  less  remote  distance,  but  never  wholly 
disappearing.  Every  one  saw  it  in  his  face  and 
often  felt  it  in  his  manner,  and  few  pictures  of  him 
have  been  made  so  bad  as  not  in  some  degree  to 
present  it.  The  access  of  it  which  was  brought 
on  by  this  unhappy  love  affair  was  somewhat  odd 
and  uncouth  in  its  manifestations,  but  was  so  gen 
uine  and  sincere  that  one  feels  that  he  was  truly 
undergoing  the  baptism  of  a  great  sorrow. 

At  no  other  point  is  there  more  occasion  to  note 
this  trait  of  character,  which  presents  a  curious 
and  interesting  subject  for  study.  Probably  no 
exhaustive  solution  is  possible.  One  wanders  off 
into  the  mystery  of  human  nature,  loses  his  way  in 
the  dimness  of  that  which  can  be  felt  but  cannot 
be  expressed,  and  becomes  aware  of  even  dimmer 
regions  beyond  in  which  it  is  vain  to  grope.  It  is 
well  known  that  the  coarse  and  rough  side  of  life 
among  the  pioneers  had  its  reaction  in  a  reserved 
and  at  times  morose  habit,  nearly  akin  to  sadness, 
at  least  in  those  who  frequented  the  wilderness;  it 
was  the  expression  of  the  influence  of  the  vast, 
desolate  and  lonely  nature  amid  which  they  passed 
their  lives.  It  is  true  that  Lincoln  was  never  a 
backwoodsman,  and  never  roved  alone  for  long 


46  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

periods  among  the  shadowy  forests  and  the  limit 
less  prairies,  so  that  their  powerful  and  weird  in 
fluences,  though  not  altogether  remote,  never  bore 
upon  him  in  full  force;  yet  their  effect  was  every 
where  around  him,  and  through  others  he  imbibed 
it,  for  his  disposition  was  sensitive  and  sympa 
thetic  for  such  purposes.  That  there  was  also  a 
simple  prosaic  physical  inducement  cannot  be  de 
nied.  Hardship  and  daily  discomfort  in  all  the 
arrangements  of  life  counted  for  something,  and 
especially  so  the  bad  food,  greasy,  unwholesome, 
horribly  cooked,  enough  to  afflict  an  ostrich  with 
the  blue  devils  of  dyspepsia.  The  denizen  of  the 
town  devoured  messes  vastly  worse  than  the  simple 
meal  of  the  hunter  and  trapper,  and  did  not  coun 
teract  the  ill  effect  by  hard  exercise  in  the  free, 
inspiring  air.  Such  facts  must  be  considered, 
though  they  diminish  the  poetry  which  rhetori 
cians  and  sentimentalists  have  cast  over  the  melan 
choly  of  Lincoln's  temperament.  Yet  they  fall 
far  short  of  wholly  accounting  for  a  gloom  which 
many  have  loved  to  attribute  to  the  mysticism  of  a 
great  destiny,  as  though  the  awful  weight  of  his 
immense  task  was  making  itself  felt  in  his  strange, 
brooding  nature  long  years  before  any  human 
prophet  could  have  forecast  any  part  of  that  which 
was  to  come.  In  this  apparent  vague  conscious 
ness  of  the  oppression  of  a  great  burden  of  toil, 
duty,  and  responsibility,  casting  its  shadow  so  far 
before,  there  is  something  so  fascinating  to  the 
imagination  of  man,  that  we  cannot  quite  forego 


THE  START  IN  LIFE.  47 

it,  or  accept  any  explanation  which  would  compel 
us  altogether  to  part  with  it.  The  shuddering  awe 
and  terrible  sense  of  fate,  which  the  grandeur  of 
the  Greek  tragedies  so  powerfully  expresses,  come 
to  us  when  we  contemplate  this  strange  cloud 
which  never  left  Lincoln  in  any  year  after  his  ear 
liest  youth,  although  some  traits  in  his  character 
seemed  often  incomprehensibly  to  violate  it,  and 
like  rebellious  spirits,  to  do  outrage  to  it,  while, 
in  fact,  they  only  made  it  the  more  striking,  pic 
turesque,  and  mysterious.  But,  after  all  explana 
tions  have  been  made,  the  conclusion  must  be  that 
there  is  no  one  and  only  thread  to  guide  us  through 
the  labyrinth  to  the  heart  of  this  singular  trait, 
and  each  of  us  must  follow  that  which  his  own  na 
ture  renders  intelligible  or  congenial  for  him.  To 
us,  who  know  the  awful  closing  acts  of  his  life- 
drama,  it  seems  so  appropriate  that  there  should 
be  an  impressive  unity,  and  so  an  inevitable  back 
ward  influence  working  from  the  end  towards  the 
beginning,  that  we  cannot  avoid,  nor  would  avoid, 
an  instinctive  belief  that  an  occult  moral  and  men 
tal  condition  already  existed  in  the  years  of  Lin 
coln's  life  which  we  are  now  observing,  although 
the  profound  cause  of  that  condition  lay  wholly  in 
the  future,  in  the  years  which  were  still  far  away. 
There  is  a  charm  in  the  very  unreason  and  mysti 
cism  of  such  a  faith,  and  mankind  will  never  quite 
fail  to  fancy,  if  not  actually  to  believe,  that  the 
life  which  Lincoln^fefl^t^Kve  in  the  future 
wrought  in  sj^MftSplfeaWe-^^y  upon  the  life 


T 


48  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

which  he  was  living  in  the  present.     The  explana 
tion  is  not  more  strange  than  the  enigma. 

Returning  now  to  the  narrative,  an  unpleasant 
necessity  is  encountered.  It  must  be  confessed 
that  the  atmosphere  of  romance  which  lingers 
around  this  love -tale  of  the  fair  and  sweet  Ann 
Rutledge,  so  untimely  taken  away,  is  somewhat 
attenuated  by  the  fact  that  only  some  fifteen 
months  rolled  by  after  she  was  laid  in  the  ground 
before  Lincoln  was  again  intent  upon  matrimony. 
In  the  autumn  of  1836  Miss  Mary  Owens,  of  Ken 
tucky,  appeared  in  New  Salem,  —  a  comely  lass, 
with  "large  blue  eyes,"  "fine  trimmings,"  and  a 
long  and  varied  list  of  attractions.  Lincoln  imme 
diately  began  to  pay  court  to  her,  but  in  an  un 
gainly  and  morbid  fashion.  It  is  impossible  to 
avoid  feeling  that  his  mind  was  not  yet  in  a  natural 
and  healthy  condition.  While  offering  to  marry 
her,  he  advised  her  not  to  have  him.  Upon  her 
part  she  found  him  "deficient  in  those  little  links 
which  make  up  the  chain  of  woman's  happiness." 
So  she  would  none  of  him,  but  wedded  another  and 
became  the  mother  of  some  Confederate  soldiers. 
Lincoln  did  not  suffer  on  this  second  occasion  as 
he  had  done  on  the  first;  and  in  the  spring  of 
1838  he  wrote  upon  the  subject  one  of  the  most 
unfortunate  epistles  ever  penned,  in  which  he 
turned  the  whole  affair  into  coarse  and  almost  ri 
bald  ridicule.  In  fact  he  seems  as  much  out  of 
place  in  dealing  with  women  and  with  love,  as  he 
was  in  place  in  dealing  with  politicians  and  with 


THE  START  IN  LIFE.  49 

politics,   and   it   is  pleasant   to   return   from   the 
former  to  the  latter  topics.1 

The  spring  of  1836  found  Lincoln  again  nomi 
nating  himself  before  the  citizens  of  Sangamon 
County,  but  for  the  last  time.  His  party  de 
nounced  the  caucus  system  as  a  "Yankee  con 
trivance,  intended  to  abridge  the  liberties  of  the 
people; "  but  they  soon  found  that  it  would  be  as 
sensible  to  do  battle  with  pikes  and  bows  after  the 
invention  of  muskets  and  cannon,  as  to  continue 
to  oppose  free  self-nomination  to  the  Jacksonian 
method  of  nomination  by  convention.  In  enjoying 
this  last  opportunity,  not  only  of  presenting  him 
self,  but  also  of  constructing  his  own  "platform," 
Lincoln  published  the  following  card :  — 

1  The  whole  story  of  these  two  love  affairs  is  given  at  great 
length  by  Herndon  and  by  Lamon.  Other  biographers  deal 
lightly  with  these  episodes.  Nicolay  and  Hay  scantly  refer  to 
them,  and,  in  their  admiration  for  Mr.  Lincoln,  even  permit  them 
selves  to  speak  of  that  most  abominable  letter  to  Mrs.  Browning 
as  "grotesquely  comic."  (Vol.  i.  p.  192.)  It  is  certainly  true 
that  the  revelations  of  Messrs.  Herndon  and  Lamon  are  painful, 
and  in  part  even  humiliating ;  and  it  would  be  most  satisfactory 
to  give  these  things  the  go-by.  But  this  seems  impossible  ;  if  one 
wishes  to  study  and  comprehend  the  character  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  the 
strange  and  morbid  condition  in  which  he  was  for  some  years  at 
this  time  cannot  possibly  be  passed  over.  It  may  even  be  said 
that  it  would  be  unfair  to  him  to  do  so ;  and  a  truthful  idea  of 
him,  on  the  whole,  redounds  more  to  his  credit  than  a  maimed 
and  mutilated  one,  even  though  the  mutilation  seems  to  consist  in 
lopping  off  and  casting  out  of  sight  a  deformity.  Psychologically, 
perhaps  physiologically,  these  episodes  are  interesting,  and  as  aid 
ing  a  comprehension  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  nature,  they  are  indispen 
sable  ;  but  historically  they  are  of  no  consequence,  and  I  am  glad 
that  the  historical  character  of  this  work  gives  me  the  right  to 
dwell  upon  them  lightly. 


50  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

NEW  SALEM,  June  13,  1830. 
To  THE  EDITOR  OF  THE  JOURNAL  :  — 

In  your  paper  of  last  Saturday  I  see  a  communica 
tion  over  the  signature  of  "  Many  Voters  "  in  which 
the  candidates  who  are  announced  in  the  "  Journal "  are 
called  upon  to  "  show  their  hands."  Agreed.  Here  's 
mine. 

I  go  for  all  sharing  the  privileges  of  the  government 
who  assist  in  bearing  its  burdens.  Consequently,  I  go 
for  admitting  all  whites  to  the  right  of  suffrage  who  pay 
taxes  or  bear  arms  (by  no  means  excluding  females). 

If  elected,  I  shall  consider  the  whole  people  of  San- 
gamon  my  constituents,  as  well  those  that  oppose  as  those 
that  support  me. 

While  acting  as  their  representative,  I  shall  be  gov 
erned  by  their  will  on  all  subjects  upon  which  I  have  the 
means  of  knowing  what  their  will  is  ;  and  upon  all  others 
I  shall  do  what  my  own  judgment  teaches  me  will  best 
advance  their  interests.  Whether  elected  or  not,  I  go 
for  distributing  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  public  lands 
to  the  several  States  to  enable  our  State,  in  common  with 
others,  to  dig  canals  and  construct  railroads  without  bor 
rowing  money  and  paying  the  interest  on  it. 

If  alive  on  the  first  Monday  in  November,  I  shall 
vote  for  Hugh  L.  White  for  President. 

Very  respectfully,  A.  LINCOLN. 

The  canvass  was  conducted  after  the  usual  fash 
ion,  with  stump-speaking,  fighting  and  drinking. 
Western  voters  especially  fancied  the  joint  debate 
between  rivals,  and  on  such  exciting  occasions  were 
apt  to  come  to  the  arbitrament  of  fists  and  knives. 
But  it  is  pleasant  to  hear  that  Lincoln  calmed 


THE  START  IN  LIFE.  51 

rather  than  excited  such  affrays,  and  that  once, 
when  Ninian  W.  Edwards  climbed  upon  a  table 
and  screamed  at  his  opponent  the  lie  direct,  Lin 
coln  replied  by  "so  fair  a  speech"  that  it  quelled 
the  discord.  Henceforward  he  practiced  a  calm, 
carefully -weighed,  dispassionate  style  in  present 
ing  facts  and  arguments.  Even  if  he  cultivated  it 
from  appreciation  of  its  efficiency,  at  least  his  skill 
in  it  was  due  to  the  fact  that  it  was  congenial  to 
his  nature,  and  that  his  mind  worked  instinctively 
along  these  lines.  His  mental  constitution,  his 
way  of  thinking,  were  so  honest  that  he  always 
seemed  to  be  a  man  sincerely  engaged  in  seeking 
the  truth,  and  who,  when  he  believed  that  he  had 
found  it,  would  tell  it  precisely  as  he  saw  it,  and 
tell  it  all.  This  was  the  distinguishing  trait  or 
habit  which  differentiates  Lincoln  from  too  many 
other  political  speakers  and  writers  in  the  country. 
Yet  with  it  he  combined  the  character  of  a  practi 
cal  politician  and  a  stanch  party  man.  No  party 
has  a  monopoly  of  truth  and  is  always  in  the  right ; 
but  Lincoln,  with  the  advantage  of  being  natu 
rally  fair-minded  to  a  rare  degree,  understood  that 
the  best  ingenuity  is  fairness,  and  that  the  second 
best  ingenuity  is  the  appearance  of  fairness. 

A  pleasant  touch  of  his  humor  illumined  this 
campaign.  George  Forquer,  once  a  Whig  but 
now  a  Democrat  and  an  office-holder,  had  lately 
built  for  himself  the  finest  house  in  Springfield, 
and  had  decorated  it  with  the  first  lightning-rod 
ever  seen  in  the  neighborhood.  One  day,  after 


52  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Forquer  had  been  berating  Lincoln  as  a  young 
man  who  must  "be  taken  down,"  Lincoln  turned 
to  the  audience  with  a  few  words :  "  It  is  for  you, 
not  for  me,  to  say  whether  I  am  up  or  down.  The 
gentleman  has  alluded  to  my  being  a  young  man ; a 
I  am  older  in  years  than  I  am  in  the  tricks  and 
trades  of  politicians.  I  desire  to  live,  and  I  desire 
place  and  distinction  as  a  politician;  but  I  would 
rather  die  now  than,  like  the  gentleman,  live  to 
see  the  day  when  I  should  have  to  erect  a  light 
ning-rod  to  protect  a  guilty  conscience  from  an 
offended  God." 

There  are  other  stories  of  this  campaign,  amus 
ing  and  characteristic  of  the  region  and  the  times, 
but  which  there  is  not  room  to  repeat.  The  result 
of  it  was  that  Sangamon  County,  hitherto  Demo 
cratic,  was  now  won  by  the  Whigs,  and  that  Lin 
coln  had  the  personal  satisfaction  of  leading  the 
poll.  The  County  had  in  the  legislature  nine  repre 
sentatives,  tall  fellows  all,  not  one  of  them  stand 
ing  less  than  six  feet,  so  that  they  were  nicknamed 
"the  Long  Nine."  Such  was  their  authority,  that 
one  of  them  afterward  said:  "All  the  bad  or  objec 
tionable  laws  passed  at  that  session  of  the  legisla 
ture,  and  for  many  years  afterward,  were  charge 
able  to  the  management  and  influence  of  the 
'Long  Nine.''  This  was  a  damning  confession, 

1  It  is  amusing  to  compare  this  Western  oratory  with  the  fa 
mous  outburst  of  the  younger  Pitt  which  he  opened  with  those 
familiar  words :  "  The  atrocious  crime  of  being  a  young  man 
which  the  honorable  gentleman  has  with  such  spirit  and  decency 
charged  upon  me,"  etc.,  etc. 


THE  START  IN  LIFE.  53 

for  the  "bad  and  objectionable"  laws  of  that  ses 
sion  were  numerous.  A  mania  possessed  the  peo 
ple.  The  whole  State  was  being  cut  up  into  towns 
and  cities  and  house-lots,  so  that  town-lots  were 
said  to  be  the  only  article  of  export.1  A  system 
of  internal  improvements  at  the  public  expense  was 
pushed  forward  with  incredible  recklessness.  The 
State  was  to  be  "  gridironed "  with  thirteen  hun 
dred  miles  of  railroad;  the  courses  of  the  rivers 
were  to  be  straightened;  and  where  nature  had 
neglected  to  supply  rivers,  canals  were  to  be  dug. 
A  loan  of  twelve  millions  of  dollars  was  authorized, 
and  the  counties  not  benefited  thereby  received 
gifts  of  cash.  The  bonds  were  issued  and  sent  to 
the  bankers  of  New  York  and  of  Europe,  and  work 
was  vigorously  begun.  The  terrible  financial 
panic  of  1837  ought  to  have  administered  an  early 
check  to  this  madness.  But  it  did  not.  Resolu 
tions  of  popular  conventions  instructed  legislators 
to  institute  "a  general  system  of  internal  improve 
ments,"  which  should  be  "commensurate  with  the 
wants  of  the  people;"  and  the  law-givers  obeyed 
as  implicitly  as  if  each  delegate  was  lighting  his 
steps  by  an  Aladdin's  lamp. 

With  this  mad  current  Lincoln  swam  as  wildly 
and  as  ignorantly  as  did  any  of  his  comrades.  He 
was  absurdly  misplaced  as  a  member  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  Finance.  Never  in  his  life  did  he  show 
the  slightest  measure  of  "money  sense."  He  had, 

1  For  the  whole  history  of  the  rise,  progress,  and  downfall  of 
this  mania,  see  Ford,  Hist,  of  Illinois,  ch.  vi. 


54  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

however,  declared  his  purpose  to  be  governed  by 
the  will  of  his  constituents  in  all  matters  in  which 
he  knew  that  will,  and  at  this  time  he  apparently 
held  the  American  theory  that  the  multitude  prob 
ably  possesses  the  highest  wisdom,  and  that  at 
any  rate  the  majority  is  entitled  to  have  its  way. 
Therefore,  in  this  ambitious  enterprise  of  putting 
Illinois  at  the  very  forefront  of  the  civilized  world 
by  an  outburst  of  fine  American  energy,  his  ardor 
was  as  warm  as  that  of  the  warmest,  and  his  intel 
ligence  was  as  utterly  misled  as  that  of  the  most 
ignorant.  He  declared  his  ambition  to  be  "the 
DeWitt  Clinton  of  Illinois."  After  the  inevitable 
crash  had  come,  amid  the  perplexity  of  general 
ruin  and  distress,  he  honestly  acknowledged  that 
he  had  blundered  very  badly.  Nevertheless,  no 
vengeance  was  exacted  of  him  by  the  people ;  which 
led  Governor  Ford  to  say  that  it  is  safer  for  a  pol 
itician  to  be  wrong  with  his  constituents  than  to 
be  right  against  them,  and  to  illustrate  this  pro 
found  truth  by  naming  Lincoln  among  the  "  spared 
monuments  of  popular  wrath." 

"The  Long  Nine"  had  in  this  legislature  a  task 
peculiarly  their  own :  to  divide  Sangamon  County, 
and  to  make  Springfield  instead  of  Vandalia  the 
State  capital.  Amid  all  the  whirl  of  the  legisla 
tion  concerning  improvements  Lincoln  kept  this 
especial  purpose  always  in  view.  It  is  said  that 
his  skill  was  infinite,  and  that  he  never  lost  heart. 
He  gained  the  reputation  of  being  the  best  "  log- 
roller  "  in  the  legislature,  and  no  measure  got  the 


THE  START  IN  LIFE.  55 

support  of  the  "Long  Nine"  without  a  contract 
for  votes  to  be  given  in  return  for  the  removal  of 
the  State  capital.  It  is  unfortunate  that  such 
methods  should  enjoy  the  prestige  of  having  been 
conspicuously  practiced  by  Abraham  Lincoln,  but 
the  evidence  seems  to  establish  the  fact.  That 
there  was  anything  objectionable  in  the  skillful 
performance  of  such  common  transactions  as  the 
trading  of  votes  probably  never  occurred  to  him, 
being  a  professional  politician,  any  more  than  it 
did  to  his  constituents,  who  triumphed  noisily  in 
this  success,  and  welcomed  their  candidates  home 
with  great  popular  demonstrations  of  approval.1 

A  more  agreeable  occurrence  at  this  session  is 
the  position  taken  by  Lincoln  concerning  slavery, 
a  position  which  was  looked  upon  with  extreme 
disfavor  in  those  days  in  that  State,  and  which  he 
voluntarily  assumed  when  he  was  not  called  upon 
to  act  or  commit  himself  in  any  way  concerning 
the  matter.  During  the  session  sundry  resolutions 
were  passed,  disapproving  abolition  societies  and 
doctrines,  asserting  the  sacredness  of  the  right  of 
property  in  slaves  in  the  slave  States,  and  alleging 
that  it  would  be  against  good  faith  to  abolish  slav 
ery  in  the  District  of  Columbia  without  the  consent 
of  the  citizens  of  the  District.  Two  days  before 
the  end  of  the  session,  March  3,  1837,  Lincoln 

1  Ford,  Hist,  of  Illinois,  186;  Lamon,  198-201 ;  Herndon,  176, 
180.  N.  and  H.,  i.  137-139,  endeavor  to  give  a  different  color  to 
this  transaction,  but  they  make  out  no  case  as  against  the  state 
ments  of  writers  who  had  such  opportunities  to  know  the  truth  as 
had  Gov.  Ford,  Lamon  and  Herndon, 


56  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

introduced  a  strenuous  protest.  It  bore  only  one 
signature  besides  his  own,  and  doubtless  this  fact 
was  fortunate  for  Lincoln,  since  it  probably  pre 
vented  the  document  from  attracting  the  attention 
and  resentment  of  a  community  which,  at  the 
time,  by  no  means  held  the  opinion  that  there  was 
either  "injustice"  or  "bad  policy"  in  the  great 
"institution"  of  the  South.  It  was  within  a  few 
months  after  this  very  time  that  the  atrocious  per 
secution  and  murder  of  Love  joy  took  place  in  the 
neighboring  town  of  Alton. 

In  such  hours  as  he  could  snatch  from  politics 
and  bread- winning  Lincoln  had  continued  to  study 
law,  and  in  March,  1837,  he  was  admitted  to  the 
bar.  He  decided  to  establish  himself  in  Spring 
field,  where  certainly  he  deserved  a  kindly  wel 
come  in  return  for  what  he  had  done  towards  mak 
ing  it  the  capital.  It  was  a  little  town  of  only 
between  one  and  two  thousand  inhabitants;  but  to 
Lincoln  it  seemed  a  metropolis.  "There  is  a 
great  deal  of  flourishing  about  in  carriages  here," 
he  wrote;  there  were  also  social  distinctions,  and 
real  aristocrats,  who  wore  ruffled  shirts,  and  even 
adventured  "fair  top-boots"  in  the  "unfathom 
able  "  mud  of  streets  which  knew  neither  sidewalks 
nor  pavements. 

Lincoln  came  into  the  place  bringing  all  his 
worldly  belongings  in  a  pair  of  saddle-bags.  He 
found  there  John  T.  Stuart,  his  comrade  in  the 
Black  Hawk  campaign,  engaged  in  the  practice  of 
the  law.  The  two  promptly  arranged  a  partner- 


THE  START  IN  LIFE.  57 

ship.  But  Stuart  was  immersed  in  that  too  com 
mon  mixture  of  law  and  politics  in  which  the 
former  jealous  mistress  is  apt  to  take  the  tradi 
tional  revenge  upon  her  half-hearted  suitor.  Such 
happened  in  this  case;  and  these  two  partners, 
both  making  the  same  blunder  of  yielding  imper 
fect  allegiance  to  their*profession,  paid  the  inevi 
table  penalty;  they  got  perhaps  work  enough  in 
mere  point  of  quantity,  but  it  was  neither  interest 
ing  nor  lucrative.  Such  business,  during  the  four 
years  which  he  passed  with  Stuart,  did  not  wean 
Lincoln  from  his  natural  fondness  for  matters 
political.  At  the  same  time  he  was  a  member  of 
sundry  literary  gatherings  and  debating  societies. 
Such  of  his  work  as  has  been  preserved  does  not 
transcend  the  ordinary  productions  of  a  young 
man  trying  his  wings  in  clumsy  flights  of  oratory ; 
but  he  had  the  excuse  that  the  thunderous  de 
clamatory  style  was  then  regarded  in  the  West  as 
the  only  true  eloquence.  He  learned  better,  in 
course  of  time,  and  so  did  the  West ;  and  it  was 
really  good  fortune  that  he  passed  through  the 
hobbledehoy  period  in  the  presence  of  audiences 
whose  taste  was  no  better  than  his  own. 

Occasionally  amid  the  tedium  of  these  high-flown 
commonplaces  there  opens  a  fissure  through  which 
the  inner  spirit  of  the  man  looks  out  for  an  instant. 
It  is  well  known  that  Lincoln  was  politically  am 
bitious  ;  his  friends  knew  it,  his  biographers  have 
said  it,  he  himself  avowed  it.  Now  and  again,  in 
these  early  days,  when  his  horizon  could  hardly 


58  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

have  ranged  beyond  the  State  Legislature  and  the 
lower  house  of  Congress,  he  uttered  some  sentences 
which  betrayed  longings  of  a  high  moral  grade, 
and  indicated  that  office  and  power  were  already 
regarded  by  him  as  the  opportunities  for  great 
actions.  Strenuous  as  ought  to  be  the  objection 
to  that  tone  in  speaking  ef  Lincoln  which  seems 
to  proceed  from  beneath  the  sounding-board  of  the 
pulpit,  and  which  uses  him  as  a  Sunday-school 
figure  to  edify  a  piously  admiring  world,  yet  it 
certainly  seems  a  plain  fact  that  his  day-dreams  at 
this  period  foreshadowed  the  acts  of  his  later  years, 
and  that  what  he  pleased  himself  with  imagining 
was  not  the  acquirement  of  official  position  but  the 
achievement  of  some  great  benefit  for  mankind. 
He  did  not,  of  course,  expect  to  do  this  as  a  phil 
anthropist;  for  he  understood  himself  sufficiently 
to  know  that  his  road  lay  in  the  public  service. 
Accordingly  he  talks  not  as  Clarkson  or  Wilber- 
force,  but  as  a  public  man,  of  "emancipating 
slaves,"  of  eliminating  slavery  and  drunkenness 
from  the  land;  at  the  same  time  he  speaks  thus 
not  as  a  politician  shrewdly  anticipating  the  com 
ing  popular  impulse,  but  as  one  desiring  to  stir 
that  impulse.  When  he  said,  in  his  manifesto  in 
1832,  that  he  had  "no  other  ambition  so  great  as 
that  of  being  truly  esteemed  by  his  fellow-men," 
he  uttered  words  which  in  the  mouths  of  most  poli 
ticians  have  the  irritating  effect  of  the  dreariest  and 
cheapest  of  platitudes;  but  he  obviously  uttered 
them  with  the  sincerity  of  a  deep  inward  ambition, 


THE  START  IN  LIFE.  59 

that  kind  of  an  ambition  which  is  often  kept  sacred 
from  one's  nearest  intimates.  Many  side  glimpses 
show  him  in  this  light,  and  it  seems  to  be  the  gen- 
uine  and  uncolored  one. 

In  1838  Lincoln  was  again  elected  a  member  of 
the  lower  house  of  the  legislature,  and  many  are 
the  amusing  stories  told  of  the  canvass.  It  was  in 
this  year  that  he  made  sudden  onslaught  on  the 
demagogue  Dick  Taylor,  and,  opening  with  a  sud 
den  jerk  the  artful  colonel's  waistcoat,  displayed  a 
glittering  wealth  of  jewelry  hidden  temporarily 
beneath  it.  There  is  also  the  tale  of  his  friend 
Baker  haranguing  a  crowd  in  the  store  beneath 
Lincoln's  office.  The  audience  differed  with  Baker, 
and  was  about  to  punish  him  severely  for  the  differ 
ence,  when  Lincoln  dangled  down  through  a  trap 
door  in  the  ceiling,  intimated  his  intention  to  share 
in  the  fight  if  there  was  to  be  one,  and  brought 
the  audience  to  a  more  pacific  frame  of  mind. 
Such  amenities  of  political  debate  at  least  tested 
some  of  the  qualities  of  the  individual.  The  Whig 
party  made  him  their  candidate  for  the  speaker  ship 
and  he  came  within  one  vote  of  being  elected.1 
He  was  again  a  member  of  the  Finance  Committee ; 
but  financiering  by  those  wise  law-givers  was  no 
longer  so  lightsome  and  exuberant  a  task  as  it  had 
been.  The  hour  of  reckoning  had  come;  and  the 
business  proved  to  be  chiefly  a  series  of  humiliat 
ing  and  futile  efforts  to  undo  the  follies  of  the 

1  N.  and  H.,  i.  160;  Holland,  74;  Lamon,  212;  but  see  Hern- 
don,  193. 


60  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

preceding  two  and  a  half  years.  Lincoln  shared 
in  this  disagreeable  labor,  as  he  had  shared  in  the 
mania  which  had  made  it  necessary.  He  admitted 
that  he  was  "no  financier,"  and  gave  evidence  of 
the  fact  by  submitting  a  bill  which  did  not  deserve 
to  be  passed,  and  was  not.  It  can,  however,  be 
said  for  him  that  he  never  favored  repudiation,  as 
some  of  his  comrades  did. 

In  1840  l  Lincoln  was  again  elected,  again  was 
the  nominee  of  the  Whig  party  for  the  speakership, 
and  again  was  beaten  by  Ewing,  the  Democratic 
candidate,  who  mustered  4G  votes  against  36  for 
Lincoln.  This  legislature  held  only  one  session, 
and  apparently  Holland's  statement,  that  "no  im 
portant  business  of  general  interest  was  trans 
acted,"  is  a  fair  summary.  Lincoln  did  only  one 
memorable  thing,  and  that  unfortunately  was  dis 
creditable.  In  a  close  and  exciting  contest,  he, 
with  two  other  Whigs,  jumped  out  of  the  window 
in  order  to  break  a  quorum.  It  is  gratifying  to 
hear  from  the  chronicler  of  the  event,  who  was  one 
of  the  parties  concerned,  that  "Mr.  Lincoln  always 
regretted  that  he  entered  into  that  arrangement,  as 
he  deprecated  everything  that  savored  of  the  revo 
lutionary."2 

The  year  1840  was  made  lively  throughout  the 

1  For  the  story  of  The  Skinning  of  Thouias,  belonging-  to  this 
campaign,  see  Herndon,  197 ;  Lamon,  231 ;  and  for  the  Radford 
story,  see  N.  and  H.,  i.  172 ;  Lamon,  230. 

2  Lamon,  216,  217.    N.  and  H.,  i.  162,  speak  of  "a  number"  of 
the  members,  among  whom  Lincoln  was   "prominent,"  making 
this  exit ;  but  there  seem  to  have  been  only  two  besides  him. 


THE   START  IN  LIFE.  61 

country  by  the  spirited  and  rollicking  campaign 
which  the  Whigs  made  on  behalf  of  General  Har 
rison.  In  that  famous  struggle  for  "Tippecanoe 
and  Tyler  too,"  the  log  cabin,  hard  cider,  and  the 
'coon  skin  were  the  popular  emblems  which  seemed 
to  lend  picturesqueness  and  enthusiasm  and  a  kind 
of  Western  spirit  to  the  electioneering  everywhere 
in  the  land.  In  Illinois  Lincoln  was  a  candidate 
on  the  Whig  electoral  ticket,  and  threw  himself 
with  great  zeal  into  the  congenial  task  of  "stump 
ing  "  the  State.  Douglas  was  doing  the  same  duty 
on  the  other  side,  and  the  two  had  many  encoun 
ters.  Of  Lincoln's  speeches  only  one  has  been  pre 
served,1  and  it  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  nothing 
of  value  was  lost  when  the  others  perished.  The 
effusion  was  in  the  worst  style  of  the  effervescent 
and  exuberant  school  of  that  region  and  generation. 
Nevertheless,  it  may  have  had  the  greatest  merit 
which  oratory  can  possess,  in  being  perfectly 
adapted  to  the  audience  to  which  it  was  addressed. 
But  rhetoric  could  not  carry  Illinois  for  the  Whigs ; 
the  Democrats  cast  the  vote  of  the  State. 

1  N.  and  H.,  i.  173-177. 


.  CHAPTER  III. 

LOVE;  A  DUEL;  LAW,  AND  CONGRESS. 

COLLATERALLY  with  law  and  politics,  Lincoln 
was  at  this  time  engaged  with  that  almost  grotesque 
courtship  which  led  to  his  marriage.  The  story  is 
a  long  and  strange  one ;  in  its  best  gloss  it  is  not 
agreeable,  and  in  its  worst  version  it  is  exceed 
ingly  disagreeable.  In  any  form  it  is  inexplica 
bly  save  so  far  as  the  apparent  fact  that  his  mind 
was  somewhat  disordered  can  be  taken  as  an  ex 
planation.  In  1839  Miss  Mary  Todd,  who  had 
been  born  in  Lexington,  Kentucky,  December  13, 
1818,  came  to  Springfield  to  stay  with  her  sister, 
Mrs.  Ninian  W.  Edwards.  The  Western  bio 
graphers  describe  her  as  "gifted  with  rare  talents," 
as  "high-bred,  proud,  brilliant,  witty,"  as  "aris 
tocratic  "  and  "accomplished,"  and  as  coming  from 
a  "long  and  distinguished  ancestral  line."  Later 
in  her  career  critics  with  more  exacting  standards 
gave  other  descriptions.  There  is,  however,  no 
doubt  that  in  point  of  social  position  and  acquire 
ments  she  stood  at  this  time  much  above  Lincoln. 

Upon  Lincoln's  part  it  was  a  peculiar  wooing,  a 
series  of  'morbid  misgivings  as  to  the  force  of  his 
affection,  of  alternate  ardor  and  coldness,  advances 


LOVE;   A   DUEL;   LAW,    AND    CONGRESS.         63 

and  withdrawals,  and  every  variety  of  strange  lan 
guage  and  freakish  behavior.  In  the  course  of  it, 
oddly  enough,  his  omnipresent  competitor,  Doug 
las,  crossed  his  path,  his  rival  in  love  as  well  as  in 
politics,  and  ultimately  outstripped  by  him  in  each 
alike.  After  many  months  of  this  queer  uncertain 
zigzag  progress,  it  was  arranged  that  the  marriage 
should  take  place  on  January  1,  1841.  At  the 
appointed  hour  the  company  gathered,  the  supper 
was  set  out,  and  the  bride,  "bedecked  in  veil  and 
silken  gown,  and  nervously  toying  with  the  flowers 
in  her  hair,"  according  to  the  graphic  description 
of  Mr.  Herndon,  sat  in  her  sister's  house  awaiting 
the  coming  of  her  lover.  She  waited,  but  he  came 
not,  and  soon  his  friends  were  searching  the  town 
for  him.  Towards  morning  they  found  him. 
Some  said  that  he  was  insane ;  if  he  was  not,  he 
was  at  least  suffering  from  such  a  terrible  access 
of  his  constitutional  gloom  that  for  some  time  to 
come  it  was  considered  necessary  to  watch  him 
closely.  His  friend  Speed  took  him  away  upon  a 
long  visit  to  Kentucky,  from  which  he  returned  in 
a  much  improved  mental  condition,  but  soon  again 
came  under  the  influence  of  Miss  Todd's  attrac 
tions. 

The  memory  of  the  absurd  result  of  the  recent 
effort  at  marriage  naturally  led  to  the  avoidance  of 
publicity  concerning  the  second  undertaking.  So 
nothing  was  said  till  the  last  moment;  then  the 
license  was  procured,  a  few  friends  were  ha'stily 
notified,  and  the  ceremony  was  performed,  all 


64  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

within  a  few  hours,  on  November  4,  1842,  A 
courtship  marked  by  so  many  singularities  was  in 
evitably  prolific  of  gossip;  and  by  all  this  tittle- 
tattle,  in  which  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  sepa 
rate  probably  a  little  truth  from  much  fiction,  the 
bride  suffered  more  than  the  groom.  Among 
other  things  it  was  asserted  that  Lincoln  at  last 
came  to  the  altar  most  reluctantly.  One  says  that 
he  was  "pale  and  trembling,  as  if  being  driven  to 
slaughter;  "  another  relates  that  the  little  son  of  a 
friend,  noticing  that  his  toilet  had  been  more  care 
fully  made  than  usual,  asked  him  where  he  was 
going,  and  that  he  gloomily  responded :  "  To  hell, 
I  suppose."  Probably  enough,  however,  these 
anecdotes  are  apocryphal;  for  why  the  proud  and 
high  -  tempered  Miss  Todd  should  have  held  so 
fast  to  an  unwilling  lover,  who  had  behaved  so 
strangely  and  seemed  to  offer  her  so  little,  is  a 
conundrum  which  has  been  answered  by  no  better 
explanation  than  the  very  lame  one,  that  she  fore 
saw  his  future  distinction.  It  was  her  misfortune 
that  she  failed  to  make  herself  popular,  so  that  no 
one  has  cared  in  how  disagreeable  or  foolish  a 
position  any  story  places  her.  She  was  charged 
with  having  a  sharp  tongue,  a  sarcastic  wit,  and  a 
shrewish  temper,  over  which  perilous  traits  she 
had  no  control.  It  is  related  that  her  sister,  Mrs. 
Edwards,  opposed  the  match,  from  a  belief  that 
the  two  were  utterly  uncongenial,  and  later  on  this 
came  to  be  the  accepted  belief  of  the  people  at 
large.  That  Mrs.  Lincoln  often  severely  harassed 


LOVE;   A   DUEL;   LAW,   AND    CONGRESS.         65 

lier  husband  always  lias  been,  and  always  will  be 
believed.  One  would  gladly  leave  the  whole  topic 
veiled  in  that  privacy  which  ought  always  to  be 
accorded  to  domestic  relations  which  are  supposed 
to  be  only  imperfectly  happy ;  but  his  countrymen 
have  not  shown  any  such  respect  to  Mr.  Lincoln, 
and  it  no  longer  is  possible  wholly  to  omit  mention 
of  a  matter  about  which  so  much  has  been  said  and 
written.  Moreover,  it  has  usually  been  supposed 
that  the  influence  of  Mrs.  Lincoln  upon  her  hus 
band  was  unceasing  and  powerful,  and  that  her 
moods  and  her  words  constituted  a  very  important 
element  in  his  life.1 

Another  disagreeable  incident  of  this  period 
was  the  quarrel  with  James  A.  Shields.  In  the 
summer  of  1842  sundry  coarse  assaults  upon 

1  Lamon,  pp.  238-252,  tells  the  story  of  Lincoln's  marriage  at 
great  length,  sparing  nothing ;  he  liberally  sets  forth  the  gossip 
and  the  stories ;  he  quotes  the  statements  of  witnesses  who  knew 
both  parties  at  the  time,  and  he  gives  in  full  much  correspondence. 
The  spirit  and  the  letter  of  his  account  find  substantial  corrobora- 
tion  in  the  narrative  of  Herndon,  pp.  206-231.  So  much  original 
material  and  evidence  of  acquaintances  have  been  gathered  by 
these  two  writers,  and  their  own  opportunities  of  knowing  the 
truth  were  so  good;  that  one  seems  not  at  liberty  to  reject  the 
Mibstantial  correctness  of  their  version.  Messrs.  Nicolay  and  Hay, 
vol.  i.  ch.  11,  give  a  narrative  for  the  most  part  in  their  own 
language.  Their  attempt  throughout  to  mitigate  all  that  is  dis 
agreeable  is  so  obvious,  not  only  in  substance  but  in  the  turn  of 
every  phrase,  that  it  is  impossible  to  accept  their  chapter  as  a 
picture  either  free  from  obscurity  or  true  in  color,  glad  as  one 
might  be  to  do  so.  Arnold,  pp.  68,  72,  and  Holland,  p.  90,  simply 
mention  the  marriage,  and  other  biographers  would  have  done 
well  to  imitate  this  forbearance ;  but  too  much  has  been  said  to 
leave  this  course  now  open. 


66  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Shields,  attributed  in  great  part,  or  wholly,  to  the 
so-called  trenchant  and  witty  pen  of  Miss  Todd, 
appeared  in  the  Springfield  "Journal."  Lincoln 
accepted  the  responsibility  for  them,  received  and 
reluctantly  accepted  a  challenge,  and  selected 
broadswords  as  the  weapons!  "Friends,"  how 
ever,  brought  about  an  "explanation,"  and  the 
conflict  was  avoided.  But  ink  flowed  in  place  of 
blood,  and  the  newspapers  were  filled  with  a  mass 
of  silly,  grandiloquent,  blustering,  insolent,  and 
altogether  pitiable  stuff.  All  the  parties  con 
cerned  were  placed  in  a  most  humiliating  light, 
and  it  is  gratifying  to  hear  that  Lincoln  had  at 
least  the  good  feeling  to  be  heartily  ashamed  of 
the  affair,  so  that  he  "always  seemed  willing  to 
forget  "  it.  But  every  veil  which  he  ever  sought  to 
throw  over  anything  concerning  himself  has  had 
the  effect  of  an  irresistible  provocation  to  drag  the 
subject  into  the  strongest  glare  of  publicity.1 
All  the  while,  amid  so  many  distractions,  Lin- 

1  It  is  fair  to  say  that  my  view  of  this  "  duel ' '  is  not  that  of 
other  writers.  Lainon,  p.  200,  says  that  ' '  the  scene  is  one  of 
transcendent  interest."  Herndon,  p.  260,  calls  it  a  "serio-comic 
affair."  Holland,  pp.  S7-89,  gives  a  brief,  deprecatory  account 
of  what  he  calls  "certainly  a  boyish  affair."  Arnold,  pp.  09- 
72,  treats  it  simply  enough,  but  puts  the  whole  load  of  the  ridi 
cule  upon  Shields.  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  i.  ch.  12,  deal  with  it 
gravely,  and  in  the  same  way  in  which,  in  the  preceding  chapter, 
they  deal  Avith  the  marriage  ;  that  is  to  say,  they  eschew  the  pro 
duction  of  original  documents  and,  by  their  own  gloss,  make  a 
good  story  for  Lincoln  and  a  very  bad  one  for  Shields ;  they  speak 
lightly  of  the  "  ludicrousness "  of  the  affair.  To  my  mind  the 
opinion  which  Lincoln  himself  held  is  far  more  correct  than  that 
expressed  by  any  of  his  biographers. 


LOVE;  A  DUEL;  LAW,    AND    CONGRESS.         67 

coin  was  seeking-  a  livelihood  at  the  bar.  On 
April  14,  1841,  a  good  step  was  taken  by  dissolv 
ing  the  partnership  with  Stuart  and  the  establish 
ment  of  a  new  partnership  with  Stephen  T.  Logan, 
lately  Judge  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United 
States,  and  whom  Arnold  calls  "the  head  of  the 
bar  at  the  capital."  This  gentleman,  though  not 
averse  to  politics,  was  a  close  student,  assiduous 
in  his  attention  to  business,  and  very  accurate  and 
methodical  in  his  ways.  Thus  he  furnished  a 
shining  example  of  precisely  the  qualities  which 
Lincoln  had  most  need  to  cultivate,  and  his  in 
fluence  upon  Lincoln  was  marked  and  beneficial. 
They  continued  together  until  September  20,  1843, 
when  they  separated,  and  on  the  same  day  Lin 
coln,  heretofore  a  junior,  became  the  senior  in  a 
new  partnership  with  William  H.  Herndon.  This 
firm  was  never  formally  dissolved  up  to  the  day  of 
Lincoln's  death. 

When  Lincoln  was  admitted  to  the  bar  the  prac 
tice  of  the  law  was  in  a  very  crude  condition  in 
Illinois.  General  principles  gathered  from  a  few 
text-books  formed  the  simple  basis  upon  which 
lawyers  tried  cases  and  framed  arguments  in  im 
provised  court-rooms.  But  the  advance  was  rapid 
and  carried  Lincoln  forward  with  it.  The  raw 
material,  if  the  phrase  may  be  pardoned,  was  ex 
cellent;  there  were  many  men  in  the  State  who- 
united  a  natural  aptitude  for  the  profession  with 
high  ability,  ambition  and  a  progressive," spirit. 
Lincoln  was  brought  in  contact  witft'fhem  ,  a'll, 


68  ABRAHAM   LINCOLN. 

whether  they  rode  his  circuit  or  not,  because  the 
federal  courts  were  held  only  in  Springfield. 
Among  them  were  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  Lyman 
Trtimbull,  afterward  for  a  long  while  chairman  of 
the  Judiciary  Committee  of  the  national  Senate, 
David  Davis,  afterward  a  senator,  and  an  associate 
justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States; 
O.  H.  Browning,  Ninian  W.  Edwards,  Edward 
D.  Baker,  Justin  Butter  field,  Judge  Logan,  and 
more.  Precisely  wrhat  position  Lincoln  occupied 
among  these  men  it  is  difficult  to  say  with  accu 
racy,  because  it  is  impossible  to  know  just  how 
much  of  the  praise  which  has  been  bestowed  upon 
him  is  the  language  of  eulogy  or  of  the  brotherly 
courtesy  of  the  bar,  and  how  much  is  a  discriminat 
ing  valuation  of  his  qualities.  That  in  the  fore 
going  list  there  were  better  and  greater  lawyers 
than  he  is  unquestionable;  that  he  was  primarily 
a  politician  and  only  secondarily  a  lawyer  is  equally 
beyond  denial.  He  has  been  described  also  as  "a 
case  lawyer,"  that  is  to  say,  a  lawyer  who  studies 
each  case  as  it  comes  to  him  simply  by  and  for  it 
self,  a  method  which  makes  the  practitioner  rather 
than  the  jurist.  That  Lincoln  was  ever  learned 
in  the  science  is  hardly  pretended.  In  fact  it  was 
not  possible  that  the  divided  allegiance  which  he 
gave  to  his  profession  for  a  score  of  years  could 
have  achieved  such  a  result.1  But  it  is  said,  and 

1  Serious  practice  only  began  with  him  when  he  formed  his 
partnership  with  Judge  Logan  in  1841 ;  in  1860  his  practice  came 
to  an  end  ;  in  the  interval  he  was  for  two  years  a  member  of  Con 
gress. 


LOVE;   A   DUEL;   LAW,    AND    CONGRESS.         69 

the  well-known  manner  of  his  mental  operations 
makes  it  easy  to  believe,  that  his  arguments  had  a 
marvelous  simplicity  and  clearness,  alike  in  thought 
and  in  expression.  To  these  traits  they  owed  their 
great  force;  and  a  legal  argument  can  have  no 
higher  traits;  fine-drawn  subtlety  is  undeniably 
an  inferior  quality.  Noteworthy  above  all  else 
was  his  extraordinary  capacity  for  statement;  all 
agree  that  his  statement  of  his  case  and  his  presen 
tation  of  the  facts  and  the  evidence  were  so  plain 
and  fair  as  to  be  far  more  convincing  than  the  ar 
gument  which  was  built  upon  them.  Again  it  may 
be  said  that  the  power  to  state  in  this  manner  is 
as  high  in  the  order  of  intellectual  achievement  as 
anything  within  forensic  possibilities. 

As  an  advocate  Lincoln  seems  to  have  ranked 
better  than  he  did  in  the  discussion  of  pure  points 
of  law.  When  he  warmed  to  his  work  his  power 
over  the  emotions  of  a  jury  was  very  great.  A 
less  dignified  but  not  less  valuable  capacity  lay  in 
his  humor  and  his  store  of  illustrative  anecdotes. 
But  the  one  trait,  which  all  agree  in  attributing  to 
him  and  which  above  all  others  will  redound  to  his 
honor,  at  least  in  the  mind  of  the  layman,  is,  that 
he  was  only  efficient  when  his  client  was  in  the 
right,  and  that  he  made  but  indifferent  work  in  a 
wrong  cause.  He  was  preeminently  the  honest 
lawyer,  the  counsel  fitted  to  serve  the  litigant  who 
was  justly  entitled  to  win.  His  power  of  lucid 
statement  was  of  little  service  when  the  real  facts 
were  against  him ;  and  his  eloquence  seemed  para- 


70  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

lyzed  when  he  did  not  believe  thoroughly  that  his 
client  had  a  just  cause.  He  generally  refused  to 
take  cases  unless  he  could  see  that  as  matter  of 
genuine  right  he  ought  to  win  them.  People  who 
consulted  him  were  at  times  bluntly  advised  to 
withdraw  from  an  unjust  or  a  hard-hearted  conten 
tion,  or  were  bidden  to  seek  other  counsel.  He 
could  even  go  the  length  of  leaving  a  case,  while 
actually  conducting  it,  if  he  became  satisfied  of 
unfairness  on  the  part  of  his  client;  and  when  a 
coadjutor  won  a  case  from  which  he  had  withdrawn 
in  transitu,  so  to  speak,  he  refused  to  accept  any 
portion  of  the  fee.  Such  habits  may  not  meet 
with  the  same  measure  of  commendation  from  pro 
fessional  men1  which  they  will  command  on  the 
part  of  others;  but  those  who  are  not  members  of 
this  ingenious  profession,  contemning  the  fine  logic 
which  they  fail  to  overcome,  stubbornly  insist 
upon  admiring  the  lawyer  who  refuses  to  subordi 
nate  right  to  law.  In  this  respect  Lincoln  ac 
cepted  the  ideals  of  laymen  rather  than  the  doc 
trines  of  his  profession.2 

In  the  presidential  campaign  of  1844,  in  which 
Henry  Clay  was  the  candidate  of  the  Whig  party, 

1  A  story  is  told  by  Lamon,  p.  821,  which  puts  Lincoln  in  a 
position  absolutely  indefensible  by  any  sound  reasoning1. 

2  For  accounts  of  Lincoln  at  the  bar,  as  also  for  many  illustra 
tive  and  entertaining1  anecdotes  to  which  the  plan  of  this  volume 
does  not  permit  space  to  be  given,  see  Arnold,  pp.  55-59,  66,  73, 
84-91 ;   Holland,  72,  73,  76-83,  89  ;  Lamon,  pp.  223-225,  ch.  xiii. 
311-332 ;  N.  and  H.,  1,  167-171,  213-216,  ch.  xvii.  298-309;  Hern- 
don,  182-184,  186,  264-266,  306  n.,  307-309,  312-319,  323-331, 
ch.  xi.  332-360. 


LOVE;   A   DUEL;   LAW,   AND    CONGRESS.         71 

Lincoln  was  nominated  upon  the  Whig  electoral 
ticket.  He  was  an  ardent  admirer  of  Clay  and  he 
threw  himself  into  this  contest  with  great  zeal. 
Oblivious  of  courts  and  clients,  he  devoted  himself 
to  "stumping"  Illinois  and  a  part  of  Indiana. 
When  Illinois  sent  nine  Democratic  electors  to 
vote  for  James  K.  Polk,  his  disappointment  was 
bitter.  All  the  members  of  the  defeated  party 
had  a  peculiar  sense  of  personal  chagrin  upon  this 
occasion,  and  Lincoln  felt  it  even  more  than  oth 
ers.  It  is  said  that  two  years  later  a  visit  to  Ash 
land  resulted  in  a  disillusionment,  and  that  his 
idol  then  came  down  from  its  pedestal,  or  at  least 
the  pedestal  was  made  much  lower.1 

In  March,  1843,  Lincoln  had  hopes  that  the 
Whigs  would  nominate  him  as  their  candidate  for 
the  national  House  of  Representatives.  In  the 
canvass  he  developed  some  strength,  but  not  quite 
enough,  and  the  result  was  somewhat  ludicrous, 
for  Sangamon  County  made  him  a  delegate  to  the 
nominating  convention  with  instructions  to  vote 
for  one  of  his  own  competitors,  Colonel  Edward 
D.  Baker,  the  gallant  gentleman  and  brilliant 
orator  who  fell  at  Ball's  Bluff.  The  prize  was 
finally  carried  off  by  Colonel  John  J.  Hardin,  who 
afterward  died  at  Buena  Vista.  By  a  change  of 
election  periods  the  next  convention  was  held  in 
1844,  and  this  time  Lincoln  publicly  declined  to 
make  a  contest  for  the  nomination  against  Colonel 
Baker,  who  accordingly  received  it  and  was 

1  Holland,  95  j  butter  contra  see  Herndon,  271. 


72  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

elected.  It  has  been  said  that  an  agreement  was 
made  between  Hardin,  Baker,  Lincoln,  and  Judge 
Logan,  whereby  each  should  be  allowed  one  term 
in  Congress,  without  competition  on  the  part  of 
any  of  the  others;  but  the  story  does  not  seem 
altogether  trustworthy,  nor  wholly  corroborated 
by  the  facts.  Possibly  there  may  have  been  a 
courteous  understanding  between  them.  It  has, 
however,  been  spoken  of  as  a  very  reprehensible 
bargain,  and  Lincoln  has  been  zealously  defended 
against  the  reproach  of  having  entered  into  it. 
Why,  if  indeed  it  ever  was  made,  it  had  this  ob 
jectionable  complexion  is  a  point  in  the  inscruta 
ble  moralities  of  politics  which  is  not  plain  to  those 
uninitiated  in  these  ethical  mysteries. 

In  the  year  1846  Lincoln  again  renewed  his 
pursuit  of  the  coveted  honor,  as  Holland  very 
properly  puts  it.  Nothing  is  more  absurd  than 
statements  to  the  purport  that  he  was  "induced  to 
accept "  the  nomination,  statements  which  he  him 
self  would  have  heard  with  honest  laughter.  Only 
three  years  ago1  he  had  frankly  written  to  a 
friend  :  "Now,  if  you  should  hear  any  one  say  that 
Lincoln  don't  want  to  go  to  Congress,  I  wish  you, 
as  a  personal  friend  of  mine,  would  tell  him  you 
have  reason  to  believe  he  is  mistaken.  The  truth 
is  I  would  [should]  like  to  go  very  much."  Now, 
the  opportunity  being  at  hand,  he  spared  no  pains 
to  compass  it.  In  spite  of  the  alleged  agreement 
Hardin  made  reconnoissances  in  the  district,  which 
1  March,  1843. 


LOVE;  A  DUEL;  LAW,   AND   CONGRESS.         73 

Lincoln  met  with  counter-manifestations  so  vigor 
ous  that  on  February  26  Hardin  withdrew,  and  on 
May  1  Lincoln  was  nominated.  Against  him  the 
Democrats  set  Peter  Cartwright,  the  famous  itin 
erant  preacher  of  the  Methodists,  whose  strenuous 
and  popular  eloquence  had  rung  in  the  ears  of 
every  Western  settler.  Stalwart,  aggressive,  pos 
sessing  all  the  qualities  adapted  to  win  the  good 
will  of  such  a  constituency,  the  Apostle  of  the 
West  was  a  dangerous  antagonist.  But  Lincoln 
had  political  capacity  in  a  rare  degree.  Foresight 
and  insight,  activity  and  the  power  to  organize  and 
to  direct,  were  his.  In  this  campaign  his  eye  was 
upon  every  one;  individuals,  newspaper  editors, 
political  clubs,  got  their  inspiration  and  their  guid 
ance  from  him.1  Such  thoroughness  deserved  and 
achieved  an  extraordinary  success;  and  at  the 
polls,  in  August,  the  district  gave  him  a  majority 
of  1,511.  In  the  latest  presidential  campaign  it 
had  given  Clay  a  majority  of  914 ;  and  two  years 
later  it  gave  Taylor  a  majority  of  1,501.  Sanga- 
mon  County  gave  Lincoln  a  majority  of  690,  the 
largest  given  to  any  candidate  from  1836  to  1850, 
inclusive.  Moreover,  Lincoln  was  the  only  Whig 
who  secured  a  place  in  the  Illinois  delegation. 

Though  elected  in  the  summer  of  1846,  it  was 
not  until  December  6,  1847,  that  the  Thirtieth 
Congress  began  its  first  session.  Robert  C.  Win- 
throp  was  chosen  Speaker  of  the  House,  by  110 

1  By  way  of  example  of  his  methods,  see  letter  to  Herndon, 
June  22,  1848,  Lamon,  299. 


74  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

votes  out  of  218.  The  change  in  the  political 
condition  was  marked;  in  the  previous  House  the 
Democrats  had  numbered  142  and  the  Whigs  only 
75 ;  in  this  House  the  Whigs  were  116,  the  Demo 
crats  108.  Among  the  members  were  John 
Quincy  Adams,  Andrew  Johnson,  Alexander  H. 
Stephens,  Howell  Cobb,  David  Wilmot,  Jacob 
Collamer,  Robert  Toombs,  with  many  more  scarcely 
less  familiar  names.  The  Mexican  War  was  draw 
ing  towards  its  close,1  and  most  of  the  talking 
in  Congress  had  relation  to  it.  The  whole  Whig 
party  denounced  it  at  the  time,  and  the  nation  has 
been  more  than  half  ashamed  of  it  ever  since.  By 
adroit  manoeuvres  Polk  had  forced  the  fight  upon 
a  weak  and  reluctant  nation,  and  had  made  to  his 
own  people  false  statements  as  to  both  the  facts 
and  the  merits  of  the  quarrel.  The  rebuke  which 
they  had  now  administered,  by  changing  the  large 
Democratic  majority  into  a  minority,  "deserves," 
says  von  Hoist,  "to  be  counted  among  the  most 
meritorious  proofs  of  the  sound  and  honorable  feel 
ing  of  the  American  nation."2  But  while  the  ad 
ministration  had  thus  smirched  the  inception  and 
the  whole  character  of  the  war  with  meanness  and 

1  The  treaty  of  peace,  subject  to  some  amendments,  was  ratified 
by  the   Senate   March    10,  1848,  and    officially  promulgated  on 
July  4. 

2  Von  Hoist,  Const.  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  iii.  336.     All  historians  are 
pretty  well  agreed  upon  the  relation  of  the  Polk  administration  to 
the  Mexican  war.     But  the  story  has  never  been  so  clearly  and 
admirably  traced  by  any  other  as  by  von  Hoist  in  the  third  vol 
ume  of  his  history. 


LOVE;  A  DUEL;   LAW,   AND    CONGRESS.        75 

dishonor,  the  generals  and  the  army  were  winning 
abundant  glory  for  the  national  arms.  Good 
strategy  achieved  a  series  of  brilliant  victories, 
and  fortunately  for  the  Whigs  General  Taylor 
and  General  Scott,  together  with  a  large  propor 
tion  of  the  most  distinguished  regimental  officers, 
were  of  their  party.  This  aided  them  essentially 
in  their  policy,  which  was,  to  denounce  the  enter 
ing  into  the  war  but  to  vote  all  necessary  supplies 
for  its  vigorous  prosecution. 

Into  this  scheme  of  his  party  Lincoln  entered 
with  hearty  concurrence.  A  week  after  the  House 
met  he  closed  a  letter  to  his  partner  with  the  re 
mark  :  "  As  you  are  all  so  anxious  for  me  to  dis 
tinguish  myself,  I  have  concluded  to  do  so  before 
long,"  and  what  he  said  humorously  he  probably 
meant  seriously.  Accordingly  he  soon  afterward l 
introduced  a  series  of  resolutions,  which,  under 
the  nickname  of  "The  Spot  Resolutions, "attracted 
some  attention.  Quoting  in  his  preamble  sundry 
paragraphs  of  the  President's  Message  of  May  11, 
1846,  to  the  purport  that  Mexico  had  "invaded 
our  territory,"  and  had  "shed  the  blood  of  our 
citizens  on  our  own  soil,"  he  then  requested  the 
President  to  state  "the  spot "  where  these  and  other 
alleged  occurrences  had  taken  place.  His  first 
"little  speech"  was  on  "a  post-office  question  of 
no  general  interest;  "  and  he  found  himself  "about 
as  badly  scared  and  no  worse  "  than  when  he  spoke 
in  court.  So  a  little  later,  January  12,  1848,  he 
1  Dec.  22,  1847. 


76  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

ventured  to  call  up  his  resolutions  and  to  make 
an  elaborate  speech  upon  them.1  It  was  not  a  very 
great  or  remarkable  speech,  but  it  was  a  good  one, 
and  not  conceived  in  the  fervid  and  florid  style 
which  defaced  his  youthful  efforts ;  he  spoke  sensi 
bly,  clearly,  and  with  precision  of  thought;  he 
sought  his  strength  in  the  facts,  and  went  in 
straight  pursuit  of  the  truth ;  his  best  intellectual 
qualities  were  plainly  visible.  The  resolutions 
were  not  acted  upon,  and  doubtless  their  actual 
passage  had  never  been  expected;  but  they  were  a 
good  shot  well  placed;  and  they  were  sufficiently 
noteworthy  to  save  Lincoln  from  being  left  among 
the  herd  of  the  nobodies  of  the  House. 

In  view  of  his  future  career,  but  for  no  other 
reason,  a  brief  paragraph  is  worth  quoting.  He 
says : — 

"Any  people  anywhere,  being  inclined  and  hav 
ing  the  power,  have  the  right  to  rise  up  and  shake 
off  the  existing  government,  and  form  a  new  one 
that  suits  them  better.  This  is  a  most  valuable,  a 
most  sacred  right,  —  a  right  which,  we  hope  and 
believe,  is  to  liberate  the  world.  Nor  is  this  right 
confined  to  cases  in  which  the  whole  people  of 
an  existing  government  may  choose  to  exercise 
it.  Any  portion  of  such  people,  that  can,  may 
revolutionize,  and  make  their  own  of  so  much  of 
the  territory  as  they  inhabit."  This  doctrine,  so 
comfortably  applied  to  Texas  in  1848,  seemed  un 
suitable  for  the  Confederate  States  in  1861.  But 

1  Printed  by  Lamon,  p.  282.     See  also  Herndon,  277. 


LOVE;  A  DUEL;  LAW,   AND   CONGRESS.         77 

possibly  the  point  lay  in  the  words,  "having  the 
power,"  and  "can,"  for  the  Texans  "had  the 
power"  and  "could,"  and  the  South  had  it  not 
and  could  not;  and  so  Lincoln's  practical  proviso 
saved  his  theoretical  consistency ;  though  he  must 
still  have  explained  how  either  Texas  or  the  South 
could  know  whether  they  "had  the  power,"  and 
"could,"  except  by  trial. 

Lincoln's  course  concerning  the  war  and  the 
administration  did  not  please  his  constituents. 
With  most  of  the  Whigs  he  voted  for  Ashman's 
amendment,  which  declared  that  the  war  had  been 
"unnecessarily  and  unconstitutionally  commenced 
by  the  President."  But  soon  he  heard  that  the 
people  in  Springfield  were  offended  at  a  step  which 
might  weaken  the  administration  in  time  of  stress ; 
and  even  if  the  President  had  transcended  the 
Constitution,  they  preferred  to  deny  rather  than 
to  admit  the  fact.  When  Douglas  afterward 
charged  Lincoln  with  lack  of  patriotism,  Lincoln 
replied  that  he  had  not  chosen  to  "skulk,"  and, 
feeling  obliged  to  vote,  he  had  voted  for  "the 
truth"  rather  than  for  "a  lie."1  He  remarked 
also  that  he,  with  the  Whigs  generally,  always 
voted  for  the  supply  bills.  He  took  and  main 
tained  his  position  with  entire  manliness  and  hon 
esty,  and  stated  his  principles  with  perfect  clear 
ness,  neither  shading  nor  abating  nor  coloring  by 
any  conciliatory  or  politic  phrase.  It  was  a  ques- 

1  Herndon,  281 ;  see  Letters  given  in  full  by  Lamon,  291,  293, 
295  (at  296) ;  N.  and  H.,  i.  274. 


78  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

tion  of  conscience,  and  he  met  it  point-blank. 
Many  of  his  critics  remained  dissatisfied,  and  it  is 
believed  that  his  course  cost  the  next  Whig  candi 
date  in  the  district  votes  which  he  could  not  afford 
to  lose.  It  is  true  that  another  paid  this  penalty, 
yet  Lincoln  himself  would  have  liked  well  to  take 
his  chance  as  the  candidate.  To  those  "who  desire 
that  I  should  be  reflected,"  he  wrote  to  Herndon, 
"I  can  say,  as  Mr.  Clay  said  of  the  annexation  of 
Texas,  that  ''personally  I  would  not  object.'  .  .  . 
If  it  should  so  happen  that  nobody  else  wishes  to 
be  elected,  I  could  not  refuse  the  people  the  right 
of  sending  me  again.  But  to  enter  myself  as  a 
competitor  of  others,  or  to  authorize  any  one  so  to 
enter  me,  is  what  my  word  and  honor  forbid."  It 
did  so  happen  that  Judge  Logan,  whose  turn  it 
seemed  to  be,  wished  the  nomination  and  received 
it.  He  was,  however,  defeated,  and  probably  paid 
the  price  of  Lincoln's  scrupulous  honesty. 

In  the  canvassing  of  the  spring  of  1848  Lincoln 
was  an  ardent  advocate  for  the  nomination  of  Gen 
eral  Taylor  as  the  Whig  candidate  for  the  presi 
dency  ;  for  he  appreciated  how  much  greater  was 
the  strength  of  the  military  hero,  with  all  that 
could  be  said  against  him,  than  was  that  of  Mr. 
Clay,  whose  destiny  was  so  disappointingly  non- 
presidential.  When  the  nomination  went  accord 
ing  to  his  wishes,  he  entered  into  the  campaign 
with  as  much  zeal  as  his  congressional  duties  would 
permit,  —  indeed,  with  somewhat  an  excess  of  zeal, 
for  he  delivered  on  the  floor  of  the  House  an 


LOVE;  A   DUEL;  LAW,   AND   CONGRESS.        79 

harangue  in  favor  of  the  general  which  was  little 
else  than  a  stump  speech,  admirably  adapted  for  a 
backwoods  audience,  but  grossly  out  of  place  where 
it  was  spoken.  He  closed  it  with  an  assault  on 
General  Cass,  as  a  military  man,  which  was  de 
signed  to  be  humorous,  and  has,  therefore,  been 
quoted  with  unfortunate  frequency.  So  soon  as 
Congress  adjourned  he  was  able  to  seek  a  more 
legitimate  arena  in  New  England,  whither  he  went 
at  once  and  delivered  many  speeches,  none  of 
which  have  been  preserved. 

Lincoln's  position  upon  the  slavery  question  in 
this  Congress  was  that  of  moderate  hostility.  In 
the  preceding  Congress,  the  Twenty-ninth,  the 
famous  Wilmot  Proviso,  designed  to  exclude  slav 
ery  from  any  territory  which  the  United  States 
should  acquire  from  Mexico,  had  passed  the  House 
and  had  been  killed  in  the  Senate.  In  the  Thirti 
eth  Congress  efforts  to  the  same  end  were  renewed 
in  various  forms,  always  with  Lincoln's  favor. 
He  once  said  that  he  had  voted  for  the  principle 
of  the  Wilmot  Proviso  "about  forty -two  times," 
which,  if  not  an  accurate  mathematical  computa 
tion,  was  a  vivid  expression  of  his  stanch  adher 
ence  to  the  doctrine.  At  the  second  session  Mr. 
Lincoln  voted  against  a  bill  to  prohibit  the  slave 
trade  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  because  he  did 
not  approve  its  form ;  and  then  introduced  another 
bill,  which  he  himself  had  drawn.  This  prohib 
ited  the  bringing  slaves  into  the  District,  except 
as  household  servants  by  government  officials  who 


80  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

were  citizens  of  slave  States;  it  also  prohibited 
selling  them  to  be  taken  away  from  the  District; 
children  born  of  slave  mothers  after  January  1, 
1850,  were  to  be  subject  to  temporary  apprentice 
ship  and  finally  to  be  made  free ;  owners  of  slaves 
might  collect  from  the  government  their  full  cash 
value  as  the  price  of  their  freedom ;  fugitive  slaves 
escaping  into  Washington  and  Georgetown  were 
to  be  returned ;  finally  the  measure  was  to  be  sub 
mitted  to  popular  vote  in  the  District.  This  was 
by  no  means  a  measure  of  abolitionist  coloring, 
although  Lincoln  obtained  for  it  the  support  of 
Joshua  R.  Giddings,  who  believed  it  "as  good  a 
bill  as  we  could  get  at  this  time,"  and  was  "will 
ing  to  pay  for  slaves  in  order  to  save  them  from 
the  Southern  market."  It  recognized  the  right  of 
property  in  slaves,  which  the  Abolitionists  denied ; 
also  it  might  conceivably  be  practicable,  a  charac 
teristic  which  rarely  marked  the  measures  of  the 
Abolitionists,  who  professed  to  be  pure  moralists 
rather  than  practical  politicians.  From  this  first 
move  to  the  latest  which  he  made  in  this  great 
business,  Lincoln  never  once  broke  connection 
with  practicability.  On  this  occasion  he  had  ac 
tually  succeeded  in  obtaining  from  Mr.  Seaton, 
editor  of  the  "National  Intelligencer  "  and  mayor 
of  Washington,  a  promise  of  support,  which  gave 
him  a  little  prospect  of  success.  Later,  however, 
the  Southern  Congressmen  drew  this  influential 
gentleman  to  their  side,  and  thereby  rendered  the 
passage  of  the  bill  impossible ;  at  the  close  of  the 


LOVE;  A  DUEL;  LAW,  AND   CONGRESS.         81 

session  it  lay  with  the  other  corpses  in  that  grave 
called  "the  table." 

When  his  term  of  service  in  Congress  was  over 
Lincoln  sought,  but  failed  to  obtain,  the  position 
of  Commissioner  of  the  General  Lands  Office.  He 
was  offered  the  governorship  of  the  newly  organ 
ized  Territory  of  Oregon ;  but  this,  controlled  by 
the  sensible  advice  of  his  wife,  he  fortunately  de 
clined. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

NORTH    AND    SOUTH. 

THE  Ordinance  of  1787  established  that  slavery 
should  never  exist  in  any  part  of  that  vast  north 
western  territory  which  had  then  lately  been  ceded 
by  sundry  States  to  the  Confederation.  This  Or 
dinance  could  not  be  construed  otherwise  than  as 
an  integral  part  of  the  transaction  of  cession,  and 
was  forever  unalterable,  because  it  represented  in 
a  certain  way  a  part  of  the  consideration  in  a  con 
tract,  and  was  also  in  the  nature  of  a  declaration 
of  trust  undertaken  by  the  Congress  of  the  Con 
federation  with  the  granting  States.  The  article 
"was  agreed  to  without  opposition;"  but  almost 
contemporaneously,  in  the  sessions  of  that  conven 
tion  which  framed  the  Constitution,  debate  waxed 
hot  upon  the  topic  which  was  then  seen  to  present 
grave  obstacles  to  union.  It  was  true  that  many 
of  the  wisest  Southerners  of  that  generation  re 
garded  the  institution  as  a  menacing  misfortune; 
they  however  could  not  ignore  the  fact  that  it  was 
a  "misfortune"  of  that  peculiar  kind  which  was 
endured  with  much  complacency  by  those  afflicted 
by  it;  and  it  was  equally  certain  that  the  great 
body  of  slave -owners  would  resent  any  effort  to 


NORTH  AND   SOUTH.  83 

relieve  them  of  their  burden.  Hence  there  were 
placed  in  the  Constitution  provisions  in  behalf  of 
slavery  which  involved  an  admission  that  the  insti 
tution  needed  protection,  and  should  receive  it. 
The  idea  of  protection  implied  the  existence  of 
hostility  either  of  men  or  of  circumstances,  or  of 
both.  Thus  by  the  Ordinance  and  the  Constitu 
tion,  taken  together,  there  was  already  indirectly 
recognized  an  antagonism  between  the  institutions, 
interests,  and  opinions  of  the  South  and  those  of 
the  North. 

Slowly  this  feeling  of  opposition  grew.  The 
first  definite  mark  of  the  growth  was  the  struggle 
over  the  admission  of  Missouri,  in  1820.  This 
was  settled  by  the  famous  "Compromise,"  embod 
ied  in  the  Act  of  March  6,  1820,  whereby  the 
people  of  the  Territory  of  Missouri  were  allowed 
to  frame  a  State  government,  with  no  restriction 
against  slavery;  but  a  clause  also  enacted  that 
slavery  should  never  be  permitted  in  any  part  of 
the  remainder  of  the  public  territory  lying  north 
of  the  parallel  of  36°  30'.  By  its  efficiency  dur 
ing  thirty-four  years  of  constantly  increasing  strain 
this  legislation  was  proved  to  be  a  remarkable  po 
litical  achievement ;  and  as  the  people  saw  it  per 
form  so  long  and  so  well  a  service  so  vital  they 
came  to  regard  it  as  only  less  sacred  than  the 
Constitution  itself.  Even  Douglas,  who  after 
ward  led  in  repealing  it,  declared  that  it  had  an 
"origin  akin  to  the  Constitution,"  and  that  it 
was  "canonized  in  the  hearts  of  the  American 


84  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

people  as  a  sacred  thing."  Yet  during  the  long 
quietude  which  it  brought,  each  section  kept  a 
jealous  eye  upon  the  other;  and  especially  was  the 
scrutiny  of  the  South  uneasy,  for  she  saw  ever  more 
and  more  plainly  the  disturbing  truth  that  her  in 
stitution  needed  protection.  Being  in  derogation 
of  natural  right,  it  was  peculiarly  dependent  upon 
artificial  sustention;  the  South  would  not  express 
the  condition  in  this  language,  but  acted  upon  the 
idea  none  the  less.  It  was  true  that  the  North 
was  not  aggressive  towards  slavery,  but  was  ob 
serving  it  with  much  laxity  and  indifference;  that 
the  crusading  spirit  was  sleeping  soundly,  and 
even  the  proselyting  temper  was  feeble.  But  this 
state  of  Northern  feeling  could  not  relieve  the 
South  from  the  harassing  consciousness  that  slav 
ery  needed  not  only  toleration,  but  positive  pro 
tection  at  the  hands  of  a  population  whose  institu 
tions  were  naturally  antagonistic  to  the  slave  idea. 
This  being  the  case,  she  must  be  alarmed  at  seeing 
that  population  steadily  outstripping  her  own  in 
numbers  and  wealth.1  Since  she  could  not  possi 
bly  even  hold  this  disproportion  stationary,  her 
best  resource  seemed  to  be  to  endeavor  to  keep  it 
practically  harmless  by  maintaining  a  balance  of 
power  in  the  government.  Thus  it  became  un 
written  law  that  slave  States  and  free  States  must 
be  equal  in  number,  so  that  the  South  could  not 

1  For  a  striking  comparison  of  the  condition  of  the  South  with 
that  of  the  North  in  1850,  see  von  Hoist's  Const.  Hist,  of  U.  &, 
v.  567-586. 


NORTH  AND   SOUTH.  85 

be  outvoted  in  the  Senate.  This  system  was  prac 
ticable  for  a  while,  yet  not  a  very  long  while ;  for 
the  North  was  filling  up  that  great  northwestern 
region,  which  was  eternally  dedicated  to  freedom, 
and  full-grown  communities  could  not  forever  be 
kept  outside  the  pale  of  statehood.  On  the  other 
hand,  apart  from  any  question  of  numbers,  the 
South  could  make  no  counter-expansion,  because 
she  lay  against  a  foreign  country.  After  a  time, 
however,  Texas  opportunely  rebelled  against  Mex 
ico,  and  then  the  opportunity  for  removing  this 
obstruction  was  too  obvious  and  too  tempting  to 
be  lost.  A  brief  period  of  so-called  independence 
on  the  part  of  Texas  was  followed  by  the  annexa 
tion  of  her  territory  to  the  United  States,1  with 
the  proviso  that  from  her  great  area  might  in  the 
future  be  cut  off  still  four  other  States.  Slavery 
had  been  abolished  in  all  Mexican  territory,  and 
Texas  had  been  properly  a  "free"  country;  but 
in  becoming  a  part  of  the  United  States  she  be 
came  also  a  slave  State. 

Mexico  had  declared  that  annexation  of  Texas 
would  constitute  a  casus  belli,  yet  she  was  wisely 
laggard  in  beginning  vindictive  hostilities  against 
a  power  which  could  so  easily  whip  her,  and  she 
probably  never  would  have  done  so  had  the  United 
States  rested  content  with  an  honest  boundary 
line.  But  this  President  Polk  would  not  do,  and 
by  theft  and  falsehood  he  at  last  fairly  drove  the 
Mexicans  into  a  war,  in  which  they  were  so  exces- 

1  December,  1845. 


86  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

sively  beaten  that  the  administration  found  itself 
able  to  gather  more  plunder  than  it  had  expected. 
By  the  treaty  of  peace  the  United  States  not  only 
extended  unjustly  the  southwestern  boundary  of 
Texas,  but  also  got  New  Mexico  and  California. 
To  forward  this  result,  Polk  had  asked  the  House 
to  place  '12,000,000  at  his  disposal.  Thereupon, 
as  an  amendment  to  the  bill  granting  this  sum, 
Wilmot  introduced  his  famous  proviso,  prohibiting 
slavery  in  any  part  of  the  territory  to  be  acquired. 
Repeatedly  and  in  various  shapes  was  the  substance 
of  this  proviso  voted  upon,  but  always  it  was  voted 
down.  Though  New  Mexico  had  come  out  from 
under  the  rule  of  despised  Mexico  as  "free  "  coun 
try,  a  contrary  destiny  was  marked  out  for  it  in  its 
American  character.  A  plausible  suggestion  was 
made  to  extend  the  sacred  line  of  the  Missouri 
Compromise  westward  to  the  Pacific  Ocean;  and 
very  little  of  the  new  country  lay  north  of  that 
line. 

By  all  these  transactions  the  South  seemed  to 
be  scoring  many  telling  points  in  its  game.  They 
were  definite  points,  which  all  could  see  and  esti 
mate  ;  yet  a  price,  which  was  considerable,  though 
less  definite,  less  easy  to  see  and  to  estimate,  had 
in  fact  been  paid  for  them ;  for  the  antagonism  of 
the  rich  and  teeming  North  to  the  Southern  institu 
tion  and  to  the  Southern  policy  for  protecting  it 
had  been  spread  and  intensified  to  a  degree  which 
involved  a  menace  fully  offsetting  the  Southern 
territorial  gain.  One  of  the  indications  of  this 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH.  87 

state  of  feeling  was  the  organization  of  the  "Free 
Soil "  party. 

Almost  simultaneously  with  this  important  ad 
vancement  of  the  Southern  policy  there  occurred 
an  event,  operative  upon  the  other  side,  which  cer 
tainly  no  statesman  could  have  foreseen.  Gold 
was  discovered  in  California,  and  in  a  few  months 
a  torrent  of  immigrants  poured  over  the  land. 
The  establishment  of  an  efficient  government  be 
came  a  pressing  need.  In  Congress  they  debated 
the  matter  hotly ;  the  friends  of  the  Wilmot  pro 
viso  met  in  bitter  conflict  the  advocates  of  the 
westward  extension  of  the  line  of  36°  30'. 
Neither  side  could  prevail,  and  amid  intense  ex 
citement  the  Thirtieth  Congress  expired.  For  the 
politicians  this  was  well  enough,  but  for-the  Cali- 
fornians  organization  was  such  an  instant  necessity 
that  they  now  had  to  help  themselves  to  it.  So 
they  promptly  elected  a  Constitutional  Convention, 
which  assembled  on  September  1,  1849,  and  ad 
journed  on  October  13.  Though  this  body  held 
fifteen  delegates  who  were  immigrants  from  slave 
States,  yet  it  was  unanimous  in  presenting  a  Con 
stitution  which  prohibited  slavery,  and  which  was 
at  once  accepted  by  a  popular  vote  of  12,066  yeas 
against  811  nays. 

Great  then  was  the  consternation  of  the  South 
ern  leaders  when  Californiaii  delegates  appeared 
immediately  upon  the  assembling  of  the  Thirty- 
first  Congress,  and  asked  for  admission  beneath 
this  unlooked-for  "free"  charter  of  statehood. 


88  ABE  A II  AM  LINCOLN. 

The  shock  was  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  New 
Mexico,  actually  instigated  thereto  by  the  slave- 
holding  President  Taylor  himself,  was  likely  to 
follow  close  in  the  California!!  foot-tracks.  The 
admission  of  Texas  had  for  a  moment  disturbed 
the  senatorial  equilibrium  between  North  and 
South,  which,  however,  had  quickly  been  restored 
by  the  admission  of  Wisconsin.  But  the  South 
had  nothing  to  offer  to  counterbalance  California 
and  New  Mexico,  which  were  being  suddenly 
filched  from  her  confident  expectation.  In  this 
emergency  those  extremists  in  the  South  who  off 
set  the  Abolitionists  at  the  North  fell  back  upon 
the  appalling  threat  of  disunion,  which  could 
hardly  be  regarded  as  an  idle  extravagance  of  the 
"hotspurs,"  since  it  was  substantially  certain  that 
the  Senate  would  never  admit  California  with  her 
anti-slavery  Constitution;  and  thus  a  real  crisis 
seemed  at  hand.  Other  questions  also  were  cast 
into  the  seething  caldron.  Texas,  whose  bounda 
ries  were  as  uncertain  as  the  ethics  of  politicians, 
set  up  a  claim  which  included  nearly  all  New 
Mexico,  and  so  would  have  settled  the  question 
of  slavery  for  that  region  at  least.  Further,  the 
South  called  for  a  Fugitive  Slave  Law  sufficiently 
stringent  to  be  serviceable.  Also,  in  encountering 
the  Wilmot  proviso,  Southern  statesmen  had  as 
serted  the  doctrine,  far-reaching  and  subversive  of 
established  ideas  and  of  enacted  laws,  that  Con 
gress  could  not  constitutionally  interfere  with  the 
property-rights  of  citizens  of  the  United  States 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH.  89 

in  the  Territories,  and  that  slaves  were  property. 
Amid  such  a  confused  and  violent  hurly-burly  the 
perplexed  body  of  order-loving  citizens  were,  with 
reason,  seriously  alarmed. 

To  the  great  relief  of  these  people  and  to  the 
equal  disgust  of  the  extremist  politicians  Henry 
Clay,  the  "great  compromiser,"  was  now  an 
nounced  to  appear  once  more  in  the  role  which  all 
felt  that  he  alone  could  play.  He  came  with  much 
dramatic  effect;  an  aged  and  broken  man,  he 
emerged  from  the  retirement  in  which  he  seemed 
to  have  sought  a  brief  rest  before  death  should  lay 
him  low,  and  it  was  with  an  impressive  air  of  sad 
ness  and  of  earnestness  that  he  devoted  the  last 
remnants  of  his  failing  strength  to  save  a  country 
which  he  had  served  so  long.  His  friends  feared 
that  he  might  not  survive  even  a  few  months  to 
reach  the  end  of  his  patriotic  task.  On  January 
29,  1850,  he  laid  before  the  Senate  his  "compre 
hensive  scheme  of  adjustment."  But  it  came  not 
as  oil  upon  the  angry  waters;  every  one  was 
offended  by  one  or  another  part  of  it,  and  at  once 
there  opened  a  war  of  debate  which  is  among  the 
most  noteworthy  and  momentous  in  American  his 
tory.  Great  men  who  belonged  to  the  past  and 
great  men  who  were  to  belong  to  the  future  shared 
in  the  exciting  controversies,  which  were  prolonged 
over  a  period  of  more  than  half  a  year.  Clay  was 
constantly  on  his  feet,  doing  battle  with  a  voice 
which  gained  rather  than  lost  force  from  its  pa 
thetic  feebleness.  "I  am  here,"  he  solemnly  said, 


90  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

"  expecting  soon  to  go  hence,  and  owing  no  respon 
sibility  but  to  my  own  conscience  and  to  God." 
Jefferson  Davis  spoke  for  the  extension  westward 
of  the  Missouri  Compromise  line  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  with  a  proviso  positively  establishing  slav 
ery  south  of  that  line.  Calhoun,  from  the  edge  of 
the  grave,  into  which  only  a  few  weeks  later  he 
was  to  fall,  once  more  faced  his  old  adversaries. 
On  March  4  he  sat  beside  Mason,  of  Virginia, 
while  that  gentleman  read  for  him  to  a  hushed 
audience  the  speech  which  he  himself  was  too  weak 
to  deliver.  Three  days  later  Webster  uttered  that 
speech  which  made  the  seventh  day  of  March 
almost  as  famous  in  the  history  of  the  United 
States  as  the  Ides  of  the  same  month  had  been 
in  that  of  Eome.  In  the  eyes  of  the  anti-slavery 
men  of  New  England  the  fall  of  Webster  was 
hardly  less  momentous  than  the  fall  of  Ca3sar  had 
appeared  in  the  Eternal  City.  Seward  also  spoke 
a  noteworthy  speech,  bringing  upon  himself  infinite 
abuse  by  his  bold  phrase,  a  higher'  law  than  the 
Constitution.  Salmon  P.  Chase  followed  upon 
the  same  side,  in  an  exalted  and  prophetic  strain. 
In  that  momentous  session  every  man  gave  out 
what  he  felt  to  be  his  best,  while  anxious  and  ex 
cited  millions  devoured  every  word  which  the  news 
papers  reported  to  them. 

Clay  had  imprudently  gathered  the  several  mat 
ters  of  his  Compromise  into  one  bill,  which  was 
soon  sneeringly  nicknamed  "the  Omnibus  Bill." 
It  was  sorely  harassed  by  amendments,  and  when 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH.  91 

at  last,  on  July  31,  the  Omnibus  reached  the  end 
of  its  journey,  it  contained  only  one  passenger, 
viz.,  a  Territorial  government  for  Utah.  Its  trip 
had  apparently  ended  in  utter  failure.  But  a  care 
ful  study  of  individual  proclivities  showed  that  not 
improbably  those  measures  might  be  passed  one  by 
one  which  could  not  be  passed  in  combination.  In 
this  hope,  five  several  bills,  being  all  the  ejected 
contents  of  the  Omnibus,  were  brought  forward, 
and  each  in  turn  had  the  success  which  had  been 
denied  to  them  together.  First:  Texas  received 
110,000,000,  and  for  this  price  magnanimously 
relinquished  her  unfounded  claim  upon  New  Mex 
ico.  Second:  California  was  admitted,  as  a  free 
State.  Third :  New  Mexico  was  organized  as  a  Ter 
ritory,  with  the  proviso  that  when  she  should  form 
a  State  constitution  the  slavery  question  should 
be  determined  by  the  people,  and  that  during  her 
Territorial  existence  the  question  of  property  in  a 
slave  should  be  left  undisturbed  by  congressional 
action,  to  be  determined  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States.  Fourth :  A  more  efficient 
Fugitive  Slave  Law  was  passed.  Fifth:  Slave- 
trading  in  the  District  of  Columbia  was  abolished. 
Such  were  the  terms  of  an  arrangement  in  which 
every  man  saw  so  much  which  he  himself  disliked 
that  he  felt  sure  that  others  must  be  satisfied. 
Each  plumed  himself  on  his  liberality  in  his  con 
cessions  nobly  made  in  behalf  of  public  harmony. 
"The  broad  basis,"  says  von  Hoist,  "on  which  the 
compromise  of  1850  rested,  was  the  conviction  of 


92  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

the  great  majority  of  the  people,  Loth  North  and 
South,  that  it  was  fair,  reasonable,  and  patriotic 
to  come  to  a  friendly  understanding." 

Thus  in  the  midsummer  of  1850  did  the  nation, 
with  intense  relief,  see  the  imminent  disaster  of 
civil  discord  averted,  —  or  was  it  only  postponed? 
It  was  ominous  that  no  men  who  were  deeply  in 
earnest  in  public  affairs  were  sincerely  satisfied. 
The  South  saw  no  gain  which  offset  the  destruction 
of  the  balance  of  power  by  the  admission  of  Cali 
fornia.  Thinking  men  at  the  North  were  alarmed 
at  the  recognition  of  the  principle  of  non-interven 
tion  by  Congress  concerning  slavery  in  the  Terri 
tories,  a  principle  which  soon,  under  the  seductive 
title  of  "popular  sovereignty  "  in  the  Territories, 
threatened  even  that  partial  restriction  heretofore 
given  by  the  Missouri  Compromise.  Neither  party 
felt  sufficiently  secure  of  the  strength  of  its  legal 
position  to  be  altogether  pleased  at  seeing  the  doc 
trine  of  treating  the  slave  in  the  Territories  as 
"property  "  cast  into  the  lottery  of  the  Supreme 
Court.  Lincoln  recognized  the  futility  of  this 
whole  arrangement  and  said  truly  that  the  slavery 
question  could  "never  be  successfully  compro 
mised."  Yet  he  accepted  the  situation,  with  the 
purpose  of  making  of  it  the  best  that  was  possible. 
The  mass  of  the  people,  less  far-sighted,  were 
highly  gratified  at  the  passing  of  the  great  danger ; 
refused  to  recognize  that  a  more  temporary  com 
promise  was  never  patched  up  to  serve  a  turn ;  and 
applauded  it  so  zealously  that  in  preparing  for  the 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH.  93 

presidential  campaign  of  1852  each  party  felt  com 
pelled  to  declare  emphatically  —  what  all  wise 
politicians  knew  to  be  false  —  the  "finality"  of 
the  great  Compromise  of  1850.  Never,  never 
more  was  there  to  be  a  revival  of  the  slavery  agita 
tion  !  Yet,  at  the  same  time,  it  was  instinctively 
felt  that  the  concord  would  cease  at  once  if  the 
nation  should  not  give  to  the  South  a  Democratic 
president !  In  this  campaign  Lincoln  made  a  few 
speeches  in  Illinois  in  favor  of  Scott;  but  Hern- 
don  says  that  they  were  not  very  satisfactory 
efforts.  Franklin  Pierce  was  chosen,  and  slavery 
could  have  had  no  better  man. 

This  doctrine  of  non-intervention  by  Congress 
with  slavery  in  the  territories  lay  as  the  seed  of 
mortal  disease  imbedded  in  the  vitals  of  the  great 
Compromise  even  at  the  hour  of  its  birth.  All 
the  howlings  of  the  political  medicine-men  in  the 
halls  of  Congress  and  in  the  wigwams  where  the 
party  platforms  were  manufactured,  could  not  de 
fer  the  inevitable  dissolution.  The  rapid  peopling 
of  the  Pacific  coast  already  made  it  imperative  to 
provide  some  sort  of  governmental  organization  for 
the  sparsely  inhabited  regions  lying  between  these 
new  lands  and  the  fringe  of  population  near  the 
Mississippi.  Accordingly  bills  were  introduced  to 
establish  as  a  Territory  the  region  which  was  after 
ward  divided  between  Kansas  and  Nebraska;  but 
at  two  successive  sessions  they  failed  to  pass,  more, 
as  it  seemed,  from  lack  of  interest  than  from  any 
open  hostility.  In  the  course  of  debate  it  was  ex- 


94  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

plained,  and  not  contradicted,  that  slavery  was  not 
mentioned  in  the  bills  because  the  Missouri  Com 
promise  controlled  that  matter.  Yet  it  was  well 
known  that  the  Missouri  Compromise  was  no 
longer  a  sure  barrier;  for  one  wing  of  the  pro- 
slavery  party  asserted  that  it  was  unconstitutional 
on  the  ground  that  slaves,  being  property,  could 
not  be  touched  in  the  Territories  by  congressional 
enactments ;  while  another  wing  of  the  party  pre 
ferred  the  plausible  cry  of  "popular  sovereignty," 
than  which  no  words  could  ring  truer  in  American 
ears;  and  no  one  doubted  that,  in  order  to  give 
that  sovereignty  full  sway,  they  would  at  any  con 
venient  moment  vote  to  repeal  even  the  "sacred" 
Compromise.  It  could  not  be  denied  that  this 
was  the  better  course,  if  it  were  practicable ;  and 
accordingly,  January  16,  1854,  Senator  Dixon  of 
Kentucky  offered  an  amendment  to  the  pending 
Nebraska  bill,  which  substantially  embodied  the 
repeal.  In  the  Senate  Douglas  was  chairman  of 
the  Committee  on  Territories,  and  was  induced  to 
cooperate.1  January  23,  1854,  he  introduced  his 
famous  "Kansas-Nebraska  bill,"  establishing  the 
two  Territories  and  declaring  the  Missouri  Com 
promise  "inoperative"  therein.  A  later  amend 
ment  declared  the  Compromise  to  be  "inconsistent 
with  the  principle  of  non-intervention  by  Congress 
with  slavery  in  the  States  and  Territories,  as  re 
cognized  by  the  legislation  of  1850,"  and  therefore 

1  For  a  description  of  Douglas's  state  of  mind,  see  N.  and  H., 
i.  345-351,  quoting  original  authorities. 


NORTH  AND   SOUTH.  95 

''inoperative  and  void;  it  being  the  true  intent  and 
meaning  of  this  Act  not  to  legislate  slavery  into 
any  Territory  or  State,  nor  to  exclude  it  there 
from,  but  to  leave  the  people  thereof  perfectly  free 
to  form  and  regulate  their  domestic  institutions  in 
their  own  way,  subject  only  to  the  Constitution." 
After  a  long  and  hard  fight  the  bill  was  passed 
with  this  clause  in  it,  which  Benton  well  stigma 
tized  as  a  "stump  speech  injected  into  the  belly  of 
the  bill."  The  insertion  of  the  word  State  was  of 
momentous  significance. 

This  repeal  set  the  anti-slavery  party  all  ablaze. 
Among  the  rest  Lincoln  was  fired  with  strenuous 
indignation,  and  roused  from  the  condition  of 
apparent  indifference  to  public  affairs  in  which  he 
had  rested  since  the  close  of  his  term  in  Congress. 
Douglas,  coming  home  in  the  autumn,  was  so  dis 
agreeably  received  by  an  angry  audience  in  Chi 
cago  that  he  felt  it  imperative  to  rehabilitate  his 
stricken  popularity.  This  difficult  task  he  essayed 
at  the  great  gathering  of  the  State  Fair  in  October. 
But  Lincoln  was  put  forward  to  answer  him,  and 
was  brilliantly  successful  in  doing  so,  if  the  highly 
colored  account  of  Mr.  Herndon  may  be  trusted. 
Immediately  after  Lincoln's  close,  Owen  Lovejoy, 
the  Abolitionist  leader,  announced  "a  meeting  in 
the  same  place  that  evening  of  all  the  friends  of 
freedom."  The  scheme  was  to  induce  Lincoln  to 
address  them,  and  thus  publicly  to  commit  him  as 
of  their  faith,  But  the  astute  Herndon,  though 
himself  an  Abolitionist,  felt  that  for  Lincoln  per- 


96  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN, 

sonally  this  was  by  no  means  desirable.  So  he 
hastened  to  Lincoln  and  strenuously  said:  "Go 
home  at  once!  Take  Bob  with  you,  and  drive 
somewhere  into  the  country,  and  stay  till  this  thing 
is  over;"  and  Lincoln  did  take  Bob  and  drove 
away  to  Tazewell  Court  House  "on  business." 
Herndon  congratulates  himself  upon  having  "  saved 
Lincoln,"  since  either  joining,  or  refusing  to  join, 
the  Abolitionists  at  that  time  would  have  been  at 
tended  with  "great  danger."  Lincoln  had  upon 
his  own  part  a  wise  instinct  and  a  strong  purpose 
to  keep  hard  by  Douglas  and  to  close  with  him  as 
often  as  opportunity  offered.  Soon  afterward  the 
two  encountered  again,  and  on  this  occasion  it  is 
narrated  that  Lincoln  gave  Douglas  so  much  trou 
ble  that  Douglas  cried  for  a  truce,  proposing  that 
neither  of  them  should  make  any  more  speeches 
that  autumn,  to  which  Lincoln  good-naturedly  as 
sented. 

During  this  winter  Lincoln  was  elected  to  the 
State  Legislature,  but  contrary  to  his  own  wish. 
For  he  designed  to  be  a  candidate  for  the  United 
States  Senate,  and  there  might  be  a  question  as 
to  his  eligibility  if  he  remained  a  member  of  the 
electing  body.  Accordingly  he  resigned  his  seat, 
which,  to  his  surprise  and  chagrin,  was  immediately 
filled  by  a  Democrat ;  for  there  was  a  reaction 
in  Sangamon  County.  On  February  8,  1855,  the 
Legislature  began  voting  to  elect  a  senator.  The 
"Douglas  Democrats"  wished  to  reelect  Shields, 
the  present  incumbent.  The  first  ballot  stood, 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH.  97 

Lincoln,  45,  Shields,  41,  Lyman  Trumbull,  5, 
scattering,  5  (or,  according  to  other  authority,  8). 
After  several  ballots  Shields  was  thrown  over  in 
favor  of  a  more  "practicable"  candidate,  Gov 
ernor  Matteson,  a  "  quasi  -  independent, "  who, 
upon  the  ninth  ballot,  showed  a  strength  of  47, 
while  Trumbull  had  35,  Lincoln  had  run  down  to 
15,  and  "scattering"  caught  1.  Lincoln's  weak 
ness  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  Abolitionists  had  too 
loudly  praised  him  and  publicly  counted  him  as 
one  of  themselves.  For  this  reason  five  Demo 
crats,  disgusted  with  Douglas  for  his  attack  on  the 
Missouri  Compromise,  but  equally  bitter  against 
Abolitionism,  stubbornly  refused  ever  to  vote  for  a 
Whig,  above  all  a  Whig  smirched  by  Abolitionist 
applause.  So  it  seemed  that  Owen  Lovejoy  and 
his  friends  had  encumbered  Lincoln  with  a  fatal 
handicap.  The  situation  was  this :  Lincoln  could 
count  upon  his  fifteen  adherents  to  the  extremity; 
but  the  five  anti- Douglas  Democrats  were  equally 
stanch  'against  him,  so  that  his  chance  was  evi 
dently  gone.  Trumbull  was  a  Democrat,  but  he 
was  opposed  to  the  policy  of  Douglas's  Kansas- 
Nebraska  bill;  his  following  was  not  altogether 
trustworthy,  and  a  trifling  defection  from  it  seemed 
likely  to  occur  and  to  make  out  Matteson 's  major 
ity.  Lincoln  pondered  briefly;  then,  subjecting 
all  else  to  the  great  principle  of  "anti-Nebraska," 
he  urged  his  friends  to  transfer  their  votes  to 
Trumbull.  With  grumbling  and  reluctance  they 
did  so,  and  by  this  aid,  on  the  tenth  ballot,  Trum- 


98  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

bull  was  elected.  In  a  letter  to  Washburne,  Lin 
coln  wrote:  "I  think  you  would  have  done  the 
same  under  the  circumstances,  though  Judge 
Davis,  who  came  down  this  morning,  declares  he 
never  would  have  consented  to  the  47  men  being 
controlled  by  the  5.  I  regret  my  defeat  moder 
ately,  but  am  not  nervous  about  it."  If  that  was 
true  which  was  afterwards  so  frequently  reiterated 
by  Douglas  during  the  campaign  of  1858,  that  a 
bargain  had  been  struck  between  Lincoln  and 
Trumbull,  whereby  the  former  was  to  succeed 
Shields  and  the  la'tter  was  to  succeed  Douglas  at 
the  election  two  years  later,  then  Lincoln  certainly 
displayed  on  this  occasion  a  "generosity"  which 
deserves  more  than  the  very  moderate  praise  which 
has  been  given  it,  of  being  "above  the  range  of 
the  mere  politician's  vision."1 

An  immediate  effect  of  this  repealing  legislation 
of  1854  was  to  cast  Kansas  into  the  arena  as  booty 
to  be  won  in  fight  between  anti-slavery  and  pro- 
slavery.  For  this  competition  the  North  had  the 
advantage  that  its  population  outnumbered  that  of 
the  South  in  the  ratio  of  three  to  two,  and  emigra 
tion  was  in  accord  with  the  habits  .of  the  people. 
Against  this  the  South  offset  proximity,  of  which 
the  peculiar  usefulness  soon  became  apparent. 
Then  was  quickly  under  way  a  fair  fight,  in  a  cer 
tain  sense,  but  most  unfairly  fought.  Each  side 
contended  after  its  fashion;  Northern  anti-slavery 
merchants  subscribed  money  to  pay  the  expenses 

1  N.  and  H.  ,1.388. 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH.  99 

of  free-state  immigrants.  "Border  ruffians"  and 
members  of  "Blue  Lodges  "  and  of  kindred  fra 
ternities  came  across  the  border  from  Missouri  to 
take  a  hand  in  every  politico  -  belligerent  crisis. 
The  parties  were  not  unequally  matched;  by  tem 
perament  the  free-state  men  were  inclined  to  orderly 
and  legitimate  ways,  yet  they  were  willing  and  able 
to  fight  fire  with  fire.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
slave-state  men  had  a  native  preference  for  the 
bowie-knife  and  the  shot-gun,  yet  showed  a  kind 
of  respect  for  the  ballot-box  by  insisting  that  it 
should  be  stuffed  with  votes  on  their  side.  Thus 
for  a  long  while  was  waged  a  dubious,  savage  and 
peculiar  warfare.  Imprisonments  and  rescues, 
beatings,  shootings,  plunderings,  burnings,  sieges, 
and  lootings  of  towns  were  interspersed  with  elec 
tions  of  civil  officers,  with  legislative  enactments 
in  ordinary  form,  with  trials,  suits  at  law,  legal 
arguments  and  decisions  of  judges.  It  is  impossi 
ble  here  to  sketch  in  detail  this  strange  phantas- 
magory  of  arson,  bloodshed,  politics,  and  law. 

Meantime  other  occurrences  demand  mention. 
In  May,  1854,  the  seizure  in  Boston  of  Anthony 
Burns,  as  an  escaped  slave,  caused  a  riot  in  which 
the  Court  House  was  attacked  by  a  mob,  one  of 
the  assailants  was  killed,  and  the  militia  were 
called  out.  Other  like  seizures  elsewhere  aroused 
the  indignation  of  people  who,  whatever  were  their 
abstract  theories  as  to  the  law,  revolted  at  tj 
actual  spectacle  of  a  man  dragged  back  w<&&' 
freedom  into  slavery.  May  22,  1856,  Preston  S. 


100  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Brooks  strode  suddenly  upon  Charles  Sumner, 
seated  and  unarmed  at  his  desk  in  the  Senate 
Chamber,  and  beat  him  savagely  over  the  head 
with  a  cane,  inflicting  very  serious  injuries.  Had 
it  been  a  fair  fight,  or  had  the  South  repudiated 
the  act,  the  North  might  have  made  little  of  it,  for 
Sumner  was  too  advanced  in  his  views  to  be  politi 
cally  popular.  But,  although  the  onslaught  was 
even  more  offensive  for  its  cowardice  than  for  its 
brutality,  nevertheless  the  South  overwhelmed 
Brooks  with  laudation,  and  by  so  doing  made 
thousands  upon  thousands  of  Republican  votes  at 
the  North.  The  deed,  the  enthusiastic  greeting, 
and  the  angry  resentment  marked  the  alarming 
height  to  which  the  excitement  had  risen. 

The  presidential  campaign  of  the  following  sum 
mer,  1856,  showed  a  striking  disintegration  and 
re-formation  of  political  groups.  Nominally  there 
were  four  parties  in  the  field:  Democrats,  Whigs, 
Native  Americans  or  Know-Nothings,  and  Repub 
licans.  The  Know-Nothings  had  lately  won  some 
State  elections,  but  were  of  little  account  as  a  na 
tional  organization,  for  they  stood  upon  an  issue 
hopelessly  insignificant  in  comparison  with  slavery. 
Already  many  had  gone  over  to  the  Republican 
camp;  those  who  remained  nominated  as  their 
candidates  Millard  Fillmore  and  Andrew  J.  Donel- 
son.  The  Whigs  were  the  feeble  remnant  of  a 
really  dead  party,  held  together  by  affection  for 
the  old  name;  too  few  to  do  anything  by  them 
selves,  they  took  by  adoption  the  Know-Nothing 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH.  101 

candidates.  The  Republican  party  had  been  born 
only  in  1854.  Its  members,  differing  on  other 
matters,  united  upon  the  one  doctrine,  which  they 
accepted  as  a  test:  opposition  to  the  extension  of 
slavery.  They  nominated  John  C.  Fremont  and 
William  L.  Dayton,  and  made  a  platform  whereby 
they  declared  it  to  be  "both  the  right  and  the  duty 
of  Congress  to  prohibit  in  the  Territories  those 
twin  relics  of  barbarism,  polygamy  and  slavery;" 
by  which  vehement  and  abusive  language  they  ex 
cited  the  bitter  resentment  of  the  Southern  Demo 
cracy.  In  this  Convention  110  votes  were  cast  for 
Lincoln  for  the  seconcl  place  on  the  ticket.  La- 
mon  tells  the  little  story  that  when  this  was  told 
to  Lincoln  he  replied  that  he  could  not  have  been 
the  person  designated,  who  was,  doubtless,  "the 
great  Lincoln  from  Massachusetts." l  In  the  Dem 
ocratic  party  there  were  two  factions.  The  favor 
ite  candidate  of  the  South  was  Franklin  Pierce, 
for  reelection,  with  Stephen  A.  Douglas  as  a  sub 
stitute  or  second  choice;  the  North  more  generally 
preferred  James  Buchanan,  who  was  understood 
to  be  displeased  with  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri 
Compromise.  The  struggle  was  sharp,  but  was 
won  by  the  friends  of  Buchanan,  with  whom 
John  C.  Breckenridge  was  coupled.  The  campaign 
was  eager,  for  the  Republicans  soon  developed  a 
strength  beyond  what  had  been  expected  and  which 

1  Thus  when  John  Adams  first  landed  in  Europe,  and  was  asked 
whether  he  was  "the  great  Mr.  Adams,"  he  said:  No,  the  great 
Mr.  Adams  was  his  cousin,  Samuel  Adams,  of  Boston. 


102  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

put  the  Democrats  to  their  best  exertions.     The 
result  was 

Democrats.  Republicans. 


Popular  vote     .     .    1,838,169  1,341,264  874,534 

Electoral  vote  .     .  174  114  8 

Thus  James  Buchanan  became  President  of  the 
United  States,  March  4,  1857,  —  stigmatized  some 
what  too  severely  as  "a  Northern  man  with  South 
ern  principles;  "  in  fact  an  honest  man  and  of  good 
abilities,  who,  in  ordinary  times,  would  have  left 
a  fair  reputation  as  a  statesman  of  the  second  rank  ; 
but  a  man  hopelessly  unfit  alike  in  character  and 
in  mind  either  to  comprehend  the  present  emer 
gency  or  to  rise  to  its  demands.1  Yet,  while  the 
Democrats  triumphed,  the  Republicans  enjoyed  the 
presage  of  the  future  ;  they  had  polled  a  total  num 
ber  of  votes  which  surprised  every  one;  on  the 
other  hand,  the  Democrats  had  lost  ten  States  2 
which  they  had  carried  in  1852  and  had  gained 
only  two  others,3  showing  a  net  loss  of  eight 
States;  and  their  electoral  votes  had  dwindled 
from  254  to  174. 

On  the  day  following  Buchanan's  inauguration 
that  occurred  which  had  been  foreshadowed  with 
ill-advised  plainness  in  his  inaugural  address.  In 

1  For   a  fair   and   discriminating-   estimate    of   Buchanan,  see 
Elaine,    Twenty    Years  of  Congress,  vol.  i.  ch.  x.,  especially  pp. 
239-241. 

2  Maine,   New   Hampshire,    Rhode    Island,   Connecticut,   New 
York,  Ohio,  Michigan,  Wisconsin,  Iowa,  all  for  Fremont  ;  Mary 
land  for  Fillmore. 

3  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH.  103 

the  famous  case  of  Dred  Scott,1  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  established  as  law  the  doc 
trine  lately  advanced  by  the  Southern  Democrats, 
that  a  slave  was  "property,"  and  that  his  owner 
was  entitled  to  be  protected  in  the  possession  of 
him,  as  such,  in  the  Territories.  This  necessarily 
demolished  the  rival  theory  of  "popular  sover 
eignty,"  which  the  Douglas  Democrats  had  adopted, 
not  without  shrewdness,  as  being  far  better  suited 
to  the  Northern  mind.  For  clearly  the  people  en 
joyed  no  sovereignty  where  they  had  no  option. 
Consequently  in  the  Territories  there  was  no  longer 
a  slavery  question.  The  indignation  of  anti-slav 
ery  men  of  all  shades  of  opinion  was  intense,  and 
was  unfortunately  justifiable.  For  wholly  apart 
from  the  controversy  as  to  whether  the  law  was 
better  expounded  by  the  Chief  Justice  or  by  Judge 
Curtis  in  his  dissenting  opinion,  there  remained  a 
main  fact,  undeniable  and  inexcusable,  to  wit: 
that  the  Court,  having  decided  that  the  lower 
court  had  no  jurisdiction,  and  being  therefore  it 
self  unable  to  remand  the  cause  for  a  new  trial, 
had  then  outstepped  its  own  proper  function  and 
outraged  legal  propriety,  by  determining  the  ques 
tions  raised  by  the  rest  of  the  record,  —  questions 
which  no  longer  had  any  real  standing  before  this 
tribunal.  This  course  was  well  known  to  have 
been  pursued  with  the  purpose  on  the  part  of  the 

1  Dred  Scott,  plff.  in  error  vs.  Sandford,  Sup.  Ct.  of  U.  S.  Dec. 
Term,  1850,  19  Howard,  393.  After  the  conclusion  of  this  case 
Scott  was  given  his  freedom  by  his  master. 


104  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

majority  of  the  judges  to  settle  by  judicial  author 
ity,  and  by  a  dictum  conspicuously  obiter,  that 
great  slavery  question  with  which  Congress  had 
grappled  in  vain.  It  was  a  terrible  blunder,  for 
the  people  were  only  incensed  by  a  volunteered  and 
unauthorized  interference.  Moreover,  the  reason 
ing  of  Chief  Justice  Taney  was  such  that  the  Re 
publicans  began  anxiously  to  inquire  why  it  was 
not  as  applicable  to  States  as  to  Territories,  and 
why  it  must  not  be  extended  to  States  when  occa 
sion  should  arrive ;  and  in  this  connection  it  seemed 
now  apparent  why  " States"  had  been  named  in 
the  bill  which  repealed  the  Missouri  Compromise.1 
In  spite  of  this  menace  the  struggle  iii  Kansas 
was  not  slackened.  Time  had  been  counting  heav 
ily  in  favor  of  the  North.  Her  multitudinous  pop 
ulation  ceaselessly  fed  the  stream  of  immigralits, 
and  they  were  stubborn  fellows  who  came  to  stay, 
and  therefore  were  sure  to  wear  out  the  persist 
ence  of  the  boot-and-saddle  men  from  over  the 
Missouri  border.  Accordingly,  in  1857,  the  free- 
state  men  so  vastly  outnumbered  the  slavery  con 
tingent,  that  even  pro -slavery  men  had  to  acknow 
ledge  it.  Then  the  slavery  party  made  its  last 
desperate  effort.  Toward  the  close  of  that  year 
the  Lecompton  Constitution  was  framed  by  a  con 
vention  chosen  at  an  election  in  which  the  free- 
state  men,  perhaps  unwisely,  had  refused  to  take 
part.  When  this  pro  -  slavery  instrument  was 
offered  to  the  people,  they  were  not  allowed  to 
vote  simply  Yea  or  Nay,  but  only  "for  the  Con- 
1  Ante,  pp.  94,  95. 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH.  105 

stitution  with  slavery,"  or  "for  the  Constitution 
with  no  slavery."  Again  the  free-state  men  re 
frained  from  voting,  and  on  December  21,  6,143 
ballots  were  declared  to  have  been  cast  "for  the 
Constitution  with  slavery,"  and  589  "for  the  Con 
stitution  with  no  slavery."  Much  more  than  one 
third  of  the  6,143  were  proved  to  be  fraudulent, 
but  the  residue  far  exceeded  the  requisite  majority. 
January  4,  1858,  State  officers  were  to  be  chosen, 
and  now  the  free-state  men  decided  to  make  an 
irregular  opportunity  to  vote,  in  their  turn,  simply 
for  or  against  the  Lecompton  Constitution.  This 
time  the  pro-slavery  men,  considering  the  matter 
already  lawfully  settled,  refused  to  vote,  and  the 
result  was  that  this  polling  showed  10,226  against 
the  Constitution,  138  for  the  Constitution  with 
slavery,  24  for  the  Constitution  without  slavery. 
It  is  an  instance  of  Lincoln's  political  foresight 
that  nearly  two  years  and  a  half  before  this  condi 
tion  of  affairs  came  about  he  had  written:  "If 
Kansas  fairly  votes  herself  a  slave  State,  she  must 
be  admitted,  or  the  Union  must  be  dissolved. 
But  how  if  she  votes  herself  a  slave  State  unfairly? 
.  .  .  Must  she  still  be  admitted,  or  the  Union  be 
dissolved?  That  will  be  the  phase  of  the  question 
when  it  first  becomes  a  practical  one." 

The  struggle  was  now  transferred  to  Washing 
ton.     President  Buchanan  had    solemnly  pledged 
himself  to  accept  the  result  of  the  popular  vote. 
Now  he  was  confronted  by  two  popular  votes,  of 
1  Aug.  24,  1855;  Holland,  145. 


106  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

which  the  one  made  somewhat  the  better  technical 
and  formal  showing,  and  the  other  undeniably  ex 
pressed  the  true  will  of  a  large  majority  of  lawful 
voters.  He  selected  the  former,  and  advised  Con 
gress  to  admit  Kansas  under  the  Lecompton  Con 
stitution  with  slavery.  But  Douglas  took  the 
other  side.  The  position  of  Douglas  in  the  nation 
and  in  the  Democratic  party  deserves  brief  consid 
eration,  for  in  a  way  it  was  the  cause  of  Lincoln's 
nomination  as  the  Republican  candidate  for  the 
presidency  in  1860.  From  1852  to  1860  Douglas 
was  the  most  noteworthy  man  in  public  life  in  the 
country.  Webster,  Clay,  and  Calhoun  had  passed 
away.  Seward,  Chase,  and  Simmer,  still  in  the 
earlier  stages  of  their  brilliant  careers,  were  or 
ganizing  the  great  party  of  the  future.  This  in 
terval  of  eight  years  belonged  to  Douglas  more 
than  to  any  other  one  man.  He  had  been  a  candi 
date  for  the  Democratic  nomination  for  the  presi 
dency  in  1852  and  again  in  1856 ;  and  had  failed 
to  secure  it  in  part  by  reason  of  that  unwritten 
rule  whereby  the  leading  statesmen  are  so  often 
passed  over,  in  order  to  confer  the  great  prize  upon 
insignificant  and  therefore  presumably  submissive 
men.  Douglas  was  not  of  this  type ;  he  had  high 
spirit,  was  ambitious,  masterful  and  self-confident ; 
he  was  also  an  aggressive,  brilliant,  and  tireless 
fighter  in  a  political  campaign,  an  orator  combin 
ing  something  of  the  impressiveness  of  Webster 
with  the  readiness  and  roughness  of  the  stump 
speaker.  He  had  a  thorough  familiarity  with  all 


NORTH  AND   SOUTH.  107 

the  politics,  both  the  greater  and  the  smaller,  of 
the  time ;  he  was  shrewd  and  adroit  as  a  politician, 
and  he  had  as  good  a  right  as  any  man  then  prom 
inent  in  public  life  to  the  more  dignified  title  of 
statesman.  He  had  the  art  of  popularity,  and 
upon  sufficient  occasion  could  be  supple  and  accom 
modating  even  in  the  gravest  matters  of  principle. 
He  had  always  been  a  Democrat.  He  now  re 
garded  himself  as  properly  the  leader  of  the  Demo 
cratic  party;  and  of  course  he  still  aimed  at  the 
high  office  which  he  had  twice  missed.1  With 
this  object  in  view,  he  had  gone  very  far  to  retain 
his  hold  upon  the  South.  He  told  Southerners 
that  by  his  happy  theory  of  "popular  sovereignty  " 
he  had  educated  the  public  mind,  and  accomplished 
the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise.  When 
the  Dred  Scott  decision  took  the  life  out  of  his 
"popular  sovereignty ,"  he  showed  his  wonted  read 
iness  in  adapting  himself  to  the  situation.  To  the 
triumphant  South  he  graciously  admitted  the  final 
ity  of  a  decision  which  sustained  the  most  extreme 
Southern  doctrine.  To  the  perturbed  and  indig 
nant  North  he  said  cheeringly  that  the  decision 
was  of  no  practical  consequence  whatsoever!  For 
every  one  knew  that  slavery  could  not  exist  in 
any  community  without  the  aid  of  friendly  legisla 
tion  ;  and  if  any  anti -slavery  community  should  by 
its  anti-slavery  legislature  withhold  this  essential 
friendly  legislation,  then  slavery  in  that  State 

1  For  a  good  sketch  of  Douglas,  see  Blaine,  Twenty  Years  of 
Congress,  i.  144. 


108  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

might  be  lawful  but  would  be  impossible.  So,  he 
said,  there  is  still  in  fact  "popular  sovereignty."1 
When  the  pro-slavery  Lecompton  Constitution 
came  up  for  consideration  Douglas  decided  not 
to  rest  content  with  the  form  of  popular  approval, 
but  to  stand  out  for  the  substance.  He  quarreled 
with  Buchanan,  and  in  an  angry  interview  they 
exchanged  threats  and  defiance.  Douglas  felt 
himself  the  greater  man  of  the  two  in  the  party, 
and  audaciously  indicated  something  like  contempt 
for  the  rival  who  was  not  leader  but  only  President. 
Conscience,  if  one  may  be  allowed  gravely  to  speak 
of  the  conscience  of  a  professional  politician,  and 
policy,  were  in  comfortable  unison  in  commending 
this  choice  to  Douglas.  For  his  term  as  senator 
was  to  expire  in  1858,  and  reelection  was  not  only 
in  itself  desirable,  but  seemed  essential  to  securing 
the  presidency  in  1860.  Heretofore  Illinois  had 
been  a  Democratic  State;  the  southern  part,  peo 
pled  by  immigrants  from  neighboring  slave  States, 
was  largely  pro-slavery;  but  the  northern  part, 
containing  the  rapidly  growing  city  of  Chicago, 
had  been  filled  from  the  East,  and  was  inclined  to 
sympathize  with  the  rest  of  the  North.  Such  be 
ing  the  situation,  an  avowal  of  Democratic  princi 
ples,  coupled  with  the  repudiation  of  the  Lecomp 
ton  fraud,  seemed  the  shrewd  and  safe  course  in 
view  of  Douglas's  political  surroundings,  also  the 

1  This  doctrine  was  set  forth  by  Doug-las  in  a  speech  at  Spring 
field,  111.,  June  12,  1857.  A  fortnight  later,  June  26,  at  the  same 
place,  Lincoln  answered  this  speech.  N.  and  H.,  ii.  85-89. 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH.  109 

consistent,  or  may  we  say  honest,  course  in  view 
of  his  antecedent  position.  If,  in  thus  retaining 
his  hold  on  Illinois,  he  gave  to  the  Southern  Demo 
cracy  an  offense  which  could  never  be  forgotten  or 
forgiven,  this  misfortune  was  due  to  the  impracti 
cable  situation  and  not  to  any  lack  of  skilful  strat 
egy  on  his  part.  In  spite  of  him  the  bill  passed 
the  Senate,  but  in  the  House  twenty-two  Northern 
Democrats  went  over  to  the  opposition,  and  car 
ried  a  substitute  measure,  which  established  that 
the  Lecompton  Constitution  must  again  be  sub 
mitted  to  popular  vote.  Though  this  was  done  by 
the  body  of  which  Douglas  was  not  a  member,  yet 
every  one  felt  that  it  was  in  fact  his  triumph  over 
the  administration.  A  Committee  of  Conference 
then  brought  in  the  "English  bill."  Under  this 
the  Kansans  were  to  vote,  August  3,  1858,  either 
to  accept  the  pro-slavery  Lecompton  Constitution, 
with  the  douceur  of  a  land  grant,  or  to  reject  it. 
If  they  accepted  it,  the  State  was  to  be  admitted 
at  once;  if  they  rejected  it,  they  were  not  to  be 
admitted  until  the  population  should  reach  the 
number  which  was  required  for  electing  a  member 
to  the  House  of  Representatives.  At  present  the 
population  was  far  short  of  this  number,  and 
therefore  rejection  involved  a  long  delay  in  acquir 
ing  statehood.  Douglas  very  justly  assailed  the 
unfairness  of  a  proposal  by  which  an  anti-slavery 
vote  was  thus  doubly  and  very  severely  handi 
capped;  but  the  bill  was  passed  by  both  Houses 
of  Congress  and  was  signed  by  the  president.  The 


110  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Kansans,  however,  by  an  enormous  majority,1  re 
jected  the  bribes  of  land  and  statehood  in  connec 
tion  with  slavery.  For  his  action  concerning  the 
Lecompton  Constitution  and  the  "English  bill" 
Douglas  afterward  took  much  credit  to  himself. 

Such  was  the  stage  of  advancement  of  the  slav 
ery  conflict  in  the  country,  and  such  the  position 
of  Douglas  in  national  and  in  state  politics,  when 
there  took  place  that  great  campaign  in  Illinois 
which  made  him  again  senator  in  1858,  and  made 
Lincoln  president  in  1860. 

1  By  11,300  against  1,788,  Aug.  2,  1858.  Kansas  was  admitted 
as  a  State  at  the  close  of  January,  1861,  after  many  of  the  Southern 
States  had  already  seceded. 


CHAPTER   V. 

THE   LINCOLN-DOUGLAS    JOINT   DEBATE. 

ABOUT  this  time  Lincoln  again  became  active 
in  the  politics  of  his  State,  aiding  in  the  formation 
of  the  Republican  party  there.     On  May  29,  1856, 
a  state  convention  of  "all  opponents  of  anti-Ne 
braska    legislation "    was    held   at    Bloomington. 
After  "a  platform  ringing  with  strong  anti-Ne 
braska  sentiments"  had  been   adopted,   Lincoln, 
"in  response  to  repeated  calls,  came  forward  and 
delivered  a  speech  of  such  earnestness  and  power 
that  no  one  who  heard  it  will  ever  forget  the  effect 
it   produced."     It    was    "never    written    out    or 
printed,"  which  is  to  be  regretted;  but  it  lives  in 
one  of  those  vivid  descriptions  by  Herndon  which 
leave  nothing  to  the  imagination.     For  the  moment 
this  triumph  was  gratifying;  but  when   Lincoln, 
leaving  the  hot  enthusiasts  of  Bloomington,  came 
home   to  his   fellow-townsmen  at    Springfield,  he 
passed  into  a  chill  atmosphere  of  indifference  and 
disapproval.     An  effort  was  made  to  gather  a  mass 
meeting  in  order  to  ratify  the  action  of  the  State 
convention.     But  the   "mass"   consisted  of  three 
persons,   viz.,   Abraham   Lincoln,    Herndon,   and 
one  John  Pain.     It  was  trying,  but  Lincoln  was 


112  ABU  AH  AM  LINCOLN. 

finely  equal  to  the  occasion ;  in  a  few  words,  pass 
ing  from  jest  to  earnest,  he  said  that  the  meeting 
was  larger  than  he  knew  it  would  be;  for  while 
he  knew  that  he  and  his  partner  would  attend, 
he  was  not  sure  of  any  one  else;  and  yet  another 
man  had  been  found  brave  enough  to  come  out. 
But,  "while  all  seems  dead,  the  age  itself  is  not. 
It  liveth  as  sure  as  our  Maker  liveth.  Under  all 
this  seeming  want  of  life  and  motion  the  world 
does  move,  nevertheless.  Be  hopeful,  and  now 
let  us  adjourn  and  appeal  to  the  people! " 

In  the  presidential  campaign  of  1856  the  Repub 
licans  of  Illinois  put  Lincoln  on  their  electoral 
ticket,  and  he  entered  into  the  campaign  promptly 
and  very  zealously.  Traveling  untiringly  to  and 
fro,  he  made  about  fifty  speeches.  By  the  quality 
of  these,  even  more  than  by  their  number,  he  be 
came  the  champion  of  the  party,  so  that  pressing 
demands  for  him  came  from  the  neighboring 
States.  He  was  even  heard  of  in  the  East.  But 
there  he  encountered  a  lack  of  appreciation  and 
in  some  quarters  an  hostility  which  he  felt  to  be 
hurtful  to  his  prospects  as  well  as  unjust  towards 
a  leading  Republican  of  the  Northwest.  Horace 
Greeley,  enthusiastic,  well  meaning,  ever  blunder 
ing,  the  editor  of  the  New  York  "Tribune,"  cast 
the  powerful  influence  of  that  sheet  against  him; 
and  as  the  senatorial  contest  of  1858  was  approach 
ing,  in  which  Lincoln  hoped  to  be  a  principal,  this 
ill  feeling  was  very  unfortunate.1  "I  fear,"  he 

1  As  an  example  of  Greeley' s  position,  see  letter  quoted  by 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     113 

said,  "that  Greeley's  attitude  will  damage  me 
with  Sumner,  Seward,  Wilson,  Phillips,  and  other 
friends  in  the  East,"  —  and  by  the  way,  it  is  in 
teresting  to  note  this  significant  list  of  political 
"friends."  Thereupon  Herndon,  as  guardian  of 
Lincoln's  political  prospects,  went  to  pass  the  open 
ing  months  of  the  important  year  upon  a  crusade 
among  the  great  men  of  the  East,  designing  to  ex 
tinguish  the  false  lights  erroneously  hung  out  by 
persons  ignorant  of  the  truth.  Erelong  he  cheered 
Lincoln  by  encouraging  accounts  of  success  and  of 
kind  words  spoken  by  many  Eastern  magnates. 

In  1858,  ability,  courage,  activity,  ambition, 
the  prestige  of  success,  and  a  plausible  moderation 
in  party  politics  combined  to  make  Douglas  the 
most  conspicuous  individual  in  the  public  view. 
There  was  no  other  way  whereby  any  other  man 
could  so  surely  attract  the  close  and  interested  at 
tention  of  the  whole  people  as  by  meeting  Douglas 
in  direct  personal  competition.  If  Douglas  had 
not  held  the  position  which  he  did,  or  if,  holding 
it,  he  had  lived  in  another  State  than  Illinois,  Lin 
coln  might  never  have  been  president  of  the  United 
States.  But  the  essential  facts  lay  favorably  for 
effecting  that  presentation  before  the  people  which 
was  indispensable  for  his  fortunes.  In  April, 
1858,  the  Democratic  State  Convention  of  Illinois 

N.  and  H.,  ii.  140,  note.  The  fact  that  he  was  strenuously  pro- 
Douglas  and  anti-Lincoln  is  well  known.  Yet  afterward  he  said 
that  it  "  was  hardly  in  human  nature  "  for  Republicans  to  treat 
Douglas  as  a  friend.  Greeley's  American  Conflict,  i.  301. 


114  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

indorsed  the  position  which  Douglas  had  taken  in 
the  Kansas  business.  This  involved  that  the  party 
should  present  him  as  its  candidate  for  reelection 
to  the  national  Senate  by  the  legislature  whose 
members  were  to  be  chosen  in  the  following  autumn. 
"In  the  very  nature  of  things,"  says  the  enthu 
siastic  Herndon,  Lincoln  was  at  once  selected  by 
the  Republicans,  and  on  June  16  their  Convention 
resolved  that  "Hon.  Abraham  Lincoln  is  our  first 
and  only  choice  for  United  States  senator  to  fill 
the  vacancy  about  to  be  created  by  the  expiration 
of  Mr.  Douglas's  term  of  office."  Immediately 
the  popular  excitement  gave  measure  of  the  esti 
mate  placed  upon  the  two  men  by  those  who  most 
accurately  knew  their  qualities.  All  Illinoisians 
looked  forward  eagerly  to  the  fine  spectacle  of  a 
battle  royal  between  real  leaders. 

The  general  political  condition  was  extremely 
confused.  The  great  number  of  worthy  citizens, 
who  had  been  wont  to  save  themselves  from  the 
worry  of  critical  thought  in  political  matters  by 
the  simple  process  of  uniform  allegiance  to  a  party, 
now  found  the  old  familiar  organizations  rapidly 
disintegrating.  They  were  dismayed  and  bewil 
dered  at  the  scene;  everywhere  there  were  new 
cries,  new  standards,  new  leaders,  while  small 
bodies  of  recruits,  displaying  in  strange  union  old 
comrades  beside  old  foes,  were  crossing  to  and  fro 
and  changing  relationships,  to  the  inextricable  con 
fusion  of  the  situation.  In  such  a  chaos  each  man 
was  driven  to  do  his  own  thinking,  to  discover  his 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     115 

genuine  beliefs,  and  to  determine  in  what  company 
he  could  stand  enduringly  in  the  troublous  times 
ahead.  It  was  one  of  those  periods  in  which  small 
men  are  laid  aside  and  great  leaders  are  recognized 
by  popular  instinct ;  when  the  little  band  that  is  in 
deepest  earnest  becomes  endowed  with  a  force 
which  compels  the  mass  of  careless,  temporizing 
human-kind  to  gravitate  towards  it.  Such  bands 
were  now  the  Abolitionists  at  the  North  and  the 
Secessionists  at  the  South.  Between  them  lay  the 
nation,  disquieted,  contentious,  and  more  than  a 
little  angry  at  the  prevalent  discomfort  and  alarm. 
At  the  North  nine  men  out  of  ten  cared  far  less 
for  any  principle,  moral  or  political,  than  they  did 
for  the  discovery  of  some  course  whereby  this  un 
welcome  conflict  between  slavery  and  freedom 
could  be  prevented  from  disorganizing  the  course 
of  daily  life  and  business ;  and  since  the  Abolition 
ists  were  generally  charged  with  being  in  great 
measure  responsible  for  the  present  menacing  con 
dition,  they  were  regarded  with  bitter  animosity 
by  a  large  number  of  their  fellow-citizens.  The 
Secessionists  were  not  in  equal  disfavor  at  the 
South,  yet  they  were  still  very  much  in  the  minor 
ity,  even  in  the  Gulf  States. 

Illinois  had  been  pretty  stanchly  Democratic  in 
times  past,  but  no  one  could  forecast  the  complex 
ion  which  she  would  put  on  in  the  coming  cam 
paign.  The  Whigs  were  gone.  The  Republican 
party,  though  so  lately  born,  yet  had  already  trav 
ersed  the  period  of  infancy  and  perhaps  also  that 


116  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

of  youth;  men  guessed  wildly  how  many  voters 
would  now  cast  its  ballot.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Democrats  were  suffering  from  internal  quarrels. 
The  friends  of  Douglas,  and  all  moderate  Demo 
crats,  declared  him  to  be  the  leader  of  the  Demo 
cracy;  but  Southern  conventions  and  newspapers 
were  angrily  " reading  him  out"  of  the  party,  and 
the  singular  spectacle  was  witnessed  of  the  Demo 
cratic  administration  sending  out  its  orders  to  all 
Federal  office  -  holders  in  Illinois  to  oppose  the 
Democratic  nominee,  even  to  the  point  of  giving 
the  election  to  the  Republicans;  for  if  discipline 
was  to  exist,  a  defection  like  that  of  which  Douglas 
had  been  guilty  must  be  punished  with  utter  and 
everlasting  destruction  at  any  cost.  This  schism 
of  course  made  the  numerical  uncertainties  even 
more  uncertain  than  they  rightfully  should  have 
been.  Yet,  in  an  odd  way,  the  same  fact  worked 
also  against  Lincoln;  for  Douglas's  recent  votes 
against  the  pro- slavery  measures  of  the  administra 
tion  for  the  admission  of  Kansas,  together  with  his 
own  direct  statements  on  recent  occasions,  had  put 
him  in  a  light  which  misled  many  Northern  anti- 
slavery  men,  whose  perception  did  not  penetrate  to 
the  core-truth.  For  example,  not  only  Greeley, 
but  Henry  Wilson,  Burlingame,  Washburne,  Col- 
fax,  and  more,  really  believed  that  Douglas  was 
turning  his  back  upon  his  whole  past  career,  and 
that  this  brilliant  political  strategist  was  actually 
bringing  into  the  anti-slavery  camp  1  all  his  accu- 
i  Wilson,  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Slave  Power,  ii.  567  ;  for  sketches 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     117 

initiations  of  prestige,  popularity,  and  experience, 
all  his  seductive  eloquence,  his  skill,  and  his  grand 
mastery  over  men.  Blinded  by  the  dazzling  pros 
pect,  they  gave  all  their  influence  in  favor  of  this 
priceless  recruit,  forgetting  that,  if  he  were  in  fact 
such  an  apostate  as  they  believed  him  to  be,  he 
would  come  to  them  terribly  shrunken  in  value  and 
trustworthiness.  Some  even  were  so  infatuated  as 
to  insist  that  the  Republicans  of  Illinois  ought  to 
present  no  candidate  against  him.  Fortunately 
the  Illinoisians  knew  their  fellow-citizen  better; 
yet  in  so  strange  a  jumble,  no  one  could  deny  that 
it  was  a  doubtful  conflict  in  which  these  two  rivals 
were  joining. 

Lincoln  had  expected  to  be  nominated,  and  dur 
ing  several  weeks  he  had  been  thinking  over  his 
speech  of  acceptance.  However  otherwise  he  might 
seem  at  any  time  to  be  engaged,  he  was  ceaselessly 
turning  over  this  matter  in  his  mind;  and  fre 
quently  he  stopped  short  to  jot  down  an  idea  or 
expression  upon  some  scrap  of  paper,  which  then 
he  thrust  into  his  hat.  Thus,  piece  by  piece,  the 
accumulation  grew  alike  inside  and  outside  of  his 
head,  and  at  last  he  took  all  his  fragments  and 
with  infinite  consideration  moulded  them  into 
unity.  So  studiously  had  he  wrought  that  by  the 
time  of  delivery  he  had  unconsciously  committed 

of  Douglas's  position,  see  Blaine,  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  i.  141- 
144  ;  von  Hoist,  Const.  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  vi.  280-286  ;  Herndon,  391- 
305;  N.  and  H.,  ii.  138-14:5;  Lamon,  390-395;  Holland,  158. 
Crittenden  was  one  of  the  old  Whigs,  who  now  sorely  disappointed 
Lincoln  by  preferring  Douglas.  N.  and  II.,  ii.  142. 


118  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

the  whole  speech  accurately  to  memory.  If  so 
much  painstaking  seemed  to  indicate  an  exagger 
ated  notion  of  the  importance  of  his  words,  he  was 
soon  vindicated  by  events;  for  what  he  said  was 
subjected  to  a  dissection  and  a  criticism  such  as 
have  not  often  pursued  the  winged  words  of  the 
orator.  When  at  last  the  composition  was  com 
pleted,  he  gathered  a  small  coterie  of  his  friends 
and  admirers,  and  read  it  to  them.  The  opening 
paragraph  was  as  follows :  — 

"If  we  could  first  know  where  we  are,  and 
whither  we  are  tending,  we  could  better  judge 
what  to  do  and  how  to  do  it.  We  are  now  far 
into  the  fifth  year  since  a  policy  was  initiated  witli 
the  avowed  object  and  confident  promise  of  putting 
an  end  to  slavery  agitation.  Under  the  operation 
of  that  policy,  that  agitation  has  not  only  not 
ceased,  but  has  constantly  augmented.  In  my 
opinion,  it  will  not  cease  until  a  crisis  shall  have 
been  reached  and  jpassed.  'A  house  divided 
against  itself  cannot  stand.'  I  believe  this  gov 
ernment  cannot  endure  permanently  half  slave  and 
half  free.  I  do  not  expect  the  Union  to  be  dis 
solved,  —  I  do  not  expect  the  house  to  fall,  —  but 
I  do  expect  it  will  cease  to  be  divided.  It  will 
become  all  one  thing  or  all  the  other.  Either 
the  opponents  of  slavery  will  arrest  the  further 
spread  of  it,  and  place  it  where  the  public  mind 
shall  rest  in  the  belief  that  it  is  in  the  course 
of  ultimate  extinction ;  or  its  advocates  will  push 
it  forward,  till  it  shall  become  alike  lawful  in  all 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     119 

the  States,  old  as  well  as  new,  —  North  as  we.ll 
as  South." 

As  the  reader  watched  for  the  effect  of  this  ex 
ordium  he  saw  only  disapproval  and  consternation. 
His  assembled  advisers  and  critics,  each  and  all 
save  only  the  fiery  Herndon,  protested  that  lan 
guage  so  daring  and  advanced  would  work  a  ruin 
that  might  not  be  mended  in  years.  Lincoln  heard 
their  condemnation  with  gravity  rather  than  sur 
prise.  But  he  had  worked  his  way  to  a  conviction, 
and  he  was  immovable;  all  he  said  was,  that  the 
statement  was  true,  right,  and  just,  that  it  was 
time  it  should  be  made,  and  that  he  would  make 
it,  even  though  he  might  have  "to  go  down  with 
it;"  that  he  would  "rather  be  defeated  with  this 
expression  in  the  speech  .  .  .  than  to  be  victo 
rious  without  it."  Accordingly,  on  the  next  day 
he  spoke  the  paragraph  without  the  change  of  a 
word. 

It  is  not  without  effort  that  we  can  now  appre 
ciate  fully  why  this  utterance  was  so  momentous 
in  the  spring  of  1858. 1  By  it  Lincoln  came  before 

1  Several  months  afterward,  Oct.  25,  1858,  Mr.  Seward  made 
the  speech  at  Rochester  which  contained  the  famous  sentence : 
"It  is  an  irrepressible  conflict  between  opposing-  and  enduring- 
forces,  and  it  means  that  the  United  States  must  and  will,  sooner 
or  later,  become  either  entirely  a  slave-holding  nation,  or  entirely 
a  free-labor  nation."  Seward's  Works,  new  edition,  1884,  iv.  292. 
But  Seward  ranked  among-  the  extremists  and  the  agitators.  See 
Lincoln  and  Douglas  Deb.  244.  After  all,  the  idea  had  already 
found  expression  in  the  Richmond  Enquirer,  May  6,  1856,  quoted 
by  von  Hoist,  vi.  299,  also  referred  to  by  Lincoln;  see  Lincoln 
and  Douglas  Deb.  262. 


120  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

the  people  with  a  plain  statement  of  precisely  that 
which  more  than  nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine 
persons  in  every  thousand,  especially  at  the  North, 
were  striving  with  all  their  might  to  stamp  down 
as  an  untruth;  he  said  to  them  what  they  all  were 
denying  with  desperation,  and  with  rage  against 
the  assertors.  Their  bitterness  was  the  greater 

O 

because  very  many,  in  the  bottom  of  their  hearts, 
distrusted  their  own  painful  and  strenuous  denial. 
No  words  could  be  more  unpopular  than  that  the 
divided  house  could  not  permanently  stand,  when 
the  whole  nation  was  insisting,  with  the  intensity 
of  despair,  that  it  could  stand,  would  stand,  must 
stand.  Consequently  occurrences  soon  showed  his 
friends  to  be  right  so  far  as  concerned  the  near, 
practical  point:  that  the  paragraph  would  cost 
more^  voters  in  Illinois  than  Lincoln  could  lose 
without  losing  his  election.  But  beyond  that 
point,  a  little  farther  away  in  time,  much  deeper 
down  amid  enduring  results,  Lincoln's  judgment 
was  ultimately  seen  to  rest  upon  fundamental 
wisdom,  politically  as  well  as  morally.  For  Lin 
coln  was  no  idealist,  sacrificing  realities  to  abstrac 
tions;  on  the  contrary,  the  right  which  he  saw 
was  always  a  practical  right,  a  right  which  could 
be  compassed.  In  this  instance,  the  story  goes 
that  he  retorted  upon  some  of  those  who  grumbled 
about  his  "mistake,"  that  in  time  they  "would 
consider  it  the  wisest  thing  he  ever  said."  In  this 
he  foretold  truly ;  that  daring  and  strong  utterance 
was  the  first  link  in  the  chain  of  which  a  more  dis- 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     121 

tant  link  lay  across  the  threshold  of  the  White 
House. 

A  battle  opened  by  so  resounding  a  shot  was 
sure  to  be  furious.  Writers  and  speakers  fell 
upon  the  fateful  paragraph  and  tore  it  savagely. 
They  found  in  it  a  stimulus  which,  in  fact,  was  not 
needed;  for  already  were  present  all  the  elements 
of  the  fiercest  struggle,  —  the  best  man  and  the 
best  fighter  in  each  party  at  the  front,  and  not  un 
evenly  matched ;  a  canvass  most  close  and  doubt 
ful  ;  and  a  question  which  stirred  the  souls  of  men 
with  the  passions  of  crusading  days.  Douglas 
added  experience  and  distinction  to  gallantry  in 
attack,  adroitness  in  defense,  readiness  in  person 
alities,  and  natural  aptitude  for  popular  oratory. 
Lincoln  frankly  admitted  his  formidable  qualifica 
tions.  But  the  Kepublican  managers  had  a  shrewd 
appreciation  of  both  opponents;  they  saw  that  Lin 
coln's  forte  lay  in  hitting  out  straight,  direct,  and 
hard ;  and  they  felt  that  blows  of  the  kind  he  de 
livered  should  not  go  out  into  the  air,  but  should 
alight  upon  a  concrete  object,  —  upon  Douglas. 
They  conceived  a  wise  plan.  On  July  24,  1858, 
Lincoln  challenged  Douglas  to  a  series  of  joint 
debates.  Douglas  accepted,  and  named  seven 
meetings,  which  he  so  arranged  that  he  opened  and 
closed  four  times  and  Lincoln  opened  and  closed 
three  times;  but  Lincoln  made  no  point  of  the 
inequality;  the  arrangement  was  completed,  and 
this  famous  duel  constituted  another  link  in  that 
White  House  chain. 


122  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

The  setting  of  the  spectacle  had  the  picturesque- 
ness  of  the  times  and  the  region.  The  people 
gathered  in  vast  multitudes,  to  the  number  of  ten 
thousand,  even  of  twenty  thousand,  at  the  places 
named  for  the  speech-making;  they  came  in  their 
wagons  from  all  the  country  round,  bringing  pro 
visions,  and  making  camps  in  the  groves  and  fields. 
There  were  bonfires  and  music,  parading  and 
drinking.  He  was  a  singular  man  in  Illinois  who 
was  not  present  at  some  one  of  these  encounters. 

Into  a  competition  so  momentous  Lincoln  en 
tered  with  a  full  appreciation  of  the  burden  and 
responsibility  which  it  put  upon  him.  He  had  at 
once  to  meet  a  false  gloss  of  his  famous  sentence; 
and  though  he  had  been  very  precise  and  accurate 
in  his  phraseology  for  the  express  purpose  of  es 
caping  misinterpretation,  yet  it  would  have  been 
a  marvel  in  applied  political  morals  if  the  para 
phrases  devised  by  Douglas  had  been  strictly  in 
genuous.  The  favorite  distortion  was  to  alter 
what  was  strictly  a  forecast  into  a  declaration  of  a 
policy,  to  make  a  prediction  pass  for  an  avowal  of 
a  purpose  to  wage  war  against  slavery  until  either 
the  "institution"  or  "Abolitionism"  should  be 
utterly  defeated  and  forever  exterminated.  It  was 
said  to  be  a  "doctrine"  which  was  "revolutionary 
and  destructive  of  this  government,"  and  which 
"invited  a  warfare  between  the  North  and  the 
South,  to  be  carried  on  with  ruthless  vengeance, 
until  the  one  section  or  the  other  shall  be  driven  to 
the  wall  and  become  the  victim  of  the  rapacity  of 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     123 

the  other."  Such  misrepresentation  annoyed  Lin 
coln  all  the  more  because  it  was  undeserved.  The 
history  of  the  utterance  thus  maltreated  illustrates 
the  deliberate,  cautious,  thorough  way  in  which  his 
mind  worked.  So  long  ago  as  August  15,  1855, 
he  had  closed  a  letter  with  the  paragraph :  "  Our 
political  problem  now  is:  Can  we,  as  a  nation, 
continue  together  permanently  — forever,  half  slave 
and  half  free?  The  problem  is  too  mighty  for  me. 
May  God  in  his  mercy  superintend  the  solution."  l 
This  is  one  among  many  instances  which  show  how 
studiously  Lincoln  pondered  until  he  had  got  his 
conclusion  into  that  simple  shape  in  which  it  was 
immutable.  When  he  had  found  a  form  which 
satisfied  him  for  the  expression  of  a  conviction,  he 
was  apt  to  use  it  repeatedly  rather  than  to  seek 
new  and  varied  shapes,  so  that  substantially  iden 
tical  sentences  often  recur  at  distant  intervals  of 
time  and  place. 

When  one  has  been  long  studying  with  much 
earnest  intensity  of  thought  a  perplexing  and  mov 
ing  question,  and  at  last  frames  a  conclusion  with 
painstaking  precision  in  perfectly  clear  language, 
it  is  not  pleasant  to  have  that  accurate  utterance 
mis-stated  with  tireless  reiteration,  and  with  infi 
nite  art  and  plausibility.  But  for  this  vexation 
Lincoln  could  find  no  remedy,  and  it  was  in  vain 
that  he  again  and  again  called  attention  to  the  fact 
that  he  had  expressed  neither  a  "doctrine,"  nor  an 

1  Letter  to  Hon.  Geo.  Robertson,  N.  and  H.,  i.  392;  and  see 
Lamon,  398 ;  also  see  remarks  of  von  Hoist,  vi.  277. 


124  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

"invitation,"  nor  any  "purpose"  or  policy  whatso 
ever.  But  as  it  seemed  not  altogether  courageous 
to  leave  his  position  in  doubt,  he  said:  "Now, 
it  is  singular  enough,  if  you  will  carefully  read 
that  passage  over,  that  I  did  not  say  in  it  that  I 
was  in  favor  of  anything.  I  only  said  what  I  ex 
pected  would  take  place.  ...  I  did  not  even  say 
that  I  desired  that  slavery  should  be  put  in  course 
of  ultimate  extinction.  I  do  say  so  now,  however, 
so  there  need  be  no  longer  any  difficulty  about 
that."  He  felt  that  nothing  short  of  such  extinc 
tion  would  surely  prevent  the  revival  of  a  dispute 
which  had  so  often  been  settled  "forever."  "We 
can  no  more  foretell,"  he  said,  "where  the  end  of 
this  slavery  agitation  will  be  than  we  can  see  the 
end  of  the  world  itself.  .  .  .  There  is  no  way  of 
putting  an  end  to  the  slavery  agitation  amongst  us 
but  to  put  it  back  upon  the  basis  where  our  fathers 
placed  it.  ...  Then  the  public  mind  will  rest  in 
the  belief  that  it  is  in  the  course  of  ultimate  ex 
tinction." 

There  was  much  of  this  eloquence  about  "the 
fathers,"  much  evocation  of  the  shades  of  the 
great  departed,  who,  having  reached  the  eternal 
silence,  could  be  claimed  by  both  sides.  The  con 
tention  was  none  the  less  strenuous  because  it  was 
entirely  irrelevant;  since  the  opinion  of  "the  fa 
thers"  could  not  make  slavery  right  or  wrong. 
Many  times  therefore  did  Douglas  charge  Lincoln 
with  having  said  "that  the  Union  could  not  en 
dure  divided  as  our  fathers  made  it,  with  free  and 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     125 

slave  States; "  as  though  this  were  a  sort  of  blas 
phemy  against  the  national  demigods.  Lincoln 
aptly  retorted  that,  as  matter  of  fact,  these  same 
distinguished  "fathers"  -"Washington,  Jeffer 
son,  Franklin,  Madison,  Hamilton,  Jay,  and  the 
great  men  of  that  day  "  —  did  not  make,  \mtfound, 
the  nation  half  slave  and  half  free;  that  they  set 
"many  clear  marks  of  disapprobation"  upon  slav 
ery,  and  left  it  so  situated  that  the  popular  mind 
rested  in  the  belief  that  it  was  in  the  course  of  ul 
timate  extinction.  Unfortunately  it  had  not  been 
allowed  to  remain  as  they  had  left  it;  but  on  the 
contrary,  "all  the  trouble  and  convulsion  has  pro 
ceeded  from  the  efforts  to  spread  it  over  more 
territory." 

Pursuing  this  line,  Lincoln  alleged  the  purpose 
of  the  pro-slavery  men  to  make  slavery  "perpetual 
and  universal"  and  "national."  In  his  great 
speech  of  acceptance  at  Springfield  he  put  this 
point  so  well  that  he  never  improved  upon  this 
first  presentation  of  it.  The  repeal  of  the  Mis 
souri  Compromise  in  1854  "opened  all  the  na 
tional  territory  to  slavery,  and  was  the  first  point 
gained.  But  so  far  Congress  only  had  acted,  and 
an  indorsement  by  the  people,  real  or  imaginary," 
was  obtained  by  "the  notable  argument  of  'squat 
ter  sovereignty,'  otherwise  called  'sacred  right  of 
self-government,'  which  latter  phrase,  though  ex 
pressive  of  the  only  rightful  basis  of  any  govern 
ment,  was  so  perverted  in  this  attempted  use  of  it 
as  to  amount  to  just  this:  that  if  any  one  man 


126  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

choose  to  enslave  another,  no  third  man  shall  be 
permitted  to  object.  That  argument  was  incorpo 
rated  into  the  Nebraska  bill."  In  May,  1854, 
this  bill  was  passed.  Then  the  presidential  elec 
tion  came.  "Mr.  Buchanan  was  elected,  and  the 
indorsement  was  secured.  That  was  the  second 
point  gained."  Meantime  the  celebrated  case  of 
the  negro,  Dred  Scott,  was  pending  in  the  Su 
preme  Court,  and  the  "President  in  his  inaugural 
address  fervently  exhorted  the  people  to  abide  by 
the  forthcoming  decision,  whatever  it  might  be. 
Then  in  a  few  days  came  the  decision,"  which  was 
at  once  emphatically  indorsed  by  Douglas,  "the 
reputed  author  of  the  Nebraska  bill,"  and  by  the 
new  President. 

"At  length  a  squabble  springs  up  between  the 
President  and  the  author  of  the  Nebraska  bill  on 
the  mere  question  of  fact,  whether  the  Lecompton 
Constitution  was  or  was  not,  in  any  just  sense, 
made  by  the  people  of  Kansas;  and  in  that  quarrel 
the  latter  declares  that  all  he  wants  is  a  fair  vote 
for  the  people,  and  that  he  cares  not  whether  slav 
ery  be  voted  down  or  voted  up. 

"The  several  points  of  the  Dred  Scott  decision 
in  connection  with  Senator  Douglas's  'care  not ' 
policy  constitute  the  piece  of  machinery  in  its 
present  state  of  advancement.  This  was  the  third 
point  gained. 

"We  cannot  absolutely  know  that  all  these  ex- 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     127 

act  adaptations  are  the  result  of  preconcert.  But 
when  we  see  a  lot  of  framed  timbers,  different  por 
tions  of  which  we  know  have  been  gotten  out  at 
different  times  and  places  and  by  different  work 
men,  —  Stephen,  Franklin,  Roger,  and  James,  for 
instance, — and  when  we  see  these  timbers  joined 
together,  and  see  they  exactly  make  the  frame  of 
a  house  or  a  mill,  all  the  tenons  and  mortices  ex 
actly  fitting,  and  all  the  lengths  and  proportions 
of  the  different  pieces  exactly  adapted  to  their  re 
spective  places,  and  not  a  piece  too  many  or  too 
few,  —  not  omitting  even  scaffolding ;  or,  if  a  sin 
gle  piece  be  lacking,  we  see  the  place  in  the  frame 
exactly  fitted  and  prepared  yet  to  bring  such  piece 
in,  —  in  such  a  case,  we  find  it  impossible  not  to 
believe  that  Stephen  and  Franklin  and  Roger  and 
James  all  understood  one  another  from  the  begin 
ning,  and  all  worked  upon  a  common  plan  or  draft 
drawn  up  before  the  first  blow  was  struck. 

"It  should  not  be  overlooked  that  by  the  Ne 
braska  bill  the  people  of  a  State  as  well  as  a  Terri 
tory  were  to  be  left  'perfectly  free,'  'subject  only 
to  the  Constitution.'  Why  mention  a  State? 
.  .  .  Why  is  mention  of  this  lugged  into  this 
merely  territorial  law? 

.  .  .  "Put  this  and  that  together,  and  we  have 
another  nice  little  niche,  which  we  may  erelong  see 
filled  with  another  Supreme  Court  decision,  declar 
ing  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  does 
not  permit  a  /State  to  exclude  slavery  from  its 


128  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

limits.  And  this  may  especially  be  expected  if 
the  doctrine  of  'care  not  whether  slavery  be  voted 
down  or  voted  uj) '  shall  gain  upon  the  public  mind 
sufficiently  to  give  promise  that  such  a  decision  can 
be  maintained  when  made.  Such  a  decision  is  all 
that  slavery  now  lacks  of  being  alike  lawful  in  all 
the  States."  Following  out  this  idea  Lincoln  re 
peatedly  put  to  Douglas  a  question  to  which  he 
could  never  get  a  direct  answer  from  his  nimble 
antagonist:  "If  a  decision  is  made,  holding  that 
the  people  of  the  States  cannot  exclude  slavery, 
will  he  support  it,  or  not?  " 

Even  so  skilful  a  dialectician  as  Douglas  found 
this  compact  structure  of  history  and  argument  a 
serious  matter.  Its  simple  solidity  was  not  so  sus 
ceptible  to  treatment  by  the  perverting  process  as 
had  been  the  figurative  and  prophetic  utterance 
about  the  "house  divided  against  itself."  Neither 
could  he  find  a  chink  between  the  facts  and  the 
inferences.  One  aspect  of  the  speech,  however, 
could  not  be  passed  over.  Lincoln  said  that  he 
had  not  charged  "Stephen  and  Franklin  and 
Roger  and  James"  with  collusion  and  conspiracy; 
but  he  admitted  that  he  had  "arrayed  the  evidence 
tending  to  prove,"  and  which  he  "thought  did 
prove,"  these  things.1  It  was  impossible  for  the 

1  Lincoln  and  Douglas  Deb.,  93.  W.  P.  Fessenden,  "who," 
says  Mr.  Blaine,  "  always  spoke  with  precision  and  never  with 
passion,"  expressed  his  opinion  that  if  Fremont  had  been  elected 
instead  of  Buchanan,  that  decision  would  never  have  been  given, 
Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  i.  133. 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     129 

four  distinguished  gentlemen  1  who  owned  the  rest 
of  these  names  to  refuse  to  plead.  Accordingly 
Douglas  sneered  vehemently  at  the  idea  that  two 
presidents,  the  chief  justice,  and  he  himself  had 
been  concerned  in  that  grave  crime  against  the 
State  which  was  imputed  to  them;  and  when,  by 
his  lofty  indignation,  he  had  brought  his  auditors 
into  sympathy,  he  made  the  only  possible  reply: 
that  the  real  meaning,  the  ultimate  logical  out 
come,  of  what  Lincoln  had  said  was,  that  a  deci 
sion  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  to  be  set  aside  by 
the  political  action  of  the  people  at  the  polls. 
The  Supreme  Court  had  interpreted  the  Constitu 
tion,  and  Lincoln  was  inciting  the  people  to  annul 
that  interpretation  by  some  political  process  not 
known  to  the  law.  For  himself,  he  proclaimed 
with  effective  emphasis  his  allegiance  to  that 
great  tribunal  in  the  performance  of  its  constitu 
tional  duties.  Lincoln  replied  that  he  also  bowed 
to  the  Dred  Scott  decision  in  the  specific  case; 
but  he  repudiated  it  as  a  binding  rule  in  political 
action.2  His  point  seemed  more  obscure  than  was 

1  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  Franklin  Pierce,  Roger  B.  Taney,  James 
Buchanan. 

2  Lincoln  and  Douglas  Deb.,  198.      At  Chicago  he  said  that  he 
would  vote  for  the  prohibition  of  slavery  in  a  new  Territory  "  in 
spite  of  the  Dred  Scott  decision."     Lincoln  and  Douglas   Deb., 
20 ;  and  see  the  rest  of  his  speech  on  the  same  page.    The  Illinois 
Republican  Convention,  June  16,  1858,  expressed  "condemnation 
of  the  principles  and  tendencies  of  the  extra-judicial  opinions  of 
a  majority  of  the  judges,  "  as  putting  forth  a  "political  heresy." 
Holland,  159. 

Years  ago  Salmon  P.  Chase  had  dared  to  say  that,  if  the  courts 


130  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

usual  with  him,  and  not  satisfactory  as  an  answer 
to  Douglas.  But  as  matter  of  fact  no  one  was 

O 

deceived  by  the  amusing  adage  of  the  profession : 
that  the  Courts  do  not  make  the  law,  but  only 
declare  ^ohat  it  is.  Every  one  knew  that  the  law 
was  just  what  the  judges  chose  from  time  to  time 
to  say  that  it  was,  and  that  if  judicial  declarations 
of  the  law  were  not  reversed  quite  so  often  as  le 
gislative  makings  of  the  law  were  repealed,  it  was 
only  because  the  identity  of  a  bench  is  usually  of 
longer  duration  than  the  identity  of  a  legislative 
body.  If  the  people,  politically,  willed  the  rever 
sal  of  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  it  was  sure  in  time 
to  be  judicially  reversed.1 

Douglas  boasted  that  the  Democrats  were  a  na 
tional  party,  whereas  the  "Black  Republicans" 
were  a  sectional  body  whose  creed  could  not  be 
uttered  south  of  Mason  and  Dixon's  line.  He  was 
assiduous  in  fastening  upon  Lincoln  the  name  of 
"Abolitionist,"  and  "Black  Republican,"  epithets 
so  unpopular  that  those  who  held  the  faith  often 
denied  the  title,  and  he  only  modified  them  by  the 
offensive  admission  that  Lincoln's  doctrines  were 
sometimes  disingenuously  weakened  to  suit  certain 
audiences:  "His  principles  in  the  north  [of  Illi 
nois]  are  jet  black;  in  the  centre  they  are  in  color 

would  not  overthrow  the  pro-slavery  construction  of  the  Consti 
tution,  the  people  would  do  so,  even  if  it  should  be  "  necessary  to 
overthrow  the  courts  also."  Warden's  Life  of  Chase,  313. 

1  For  Lincoln's  explanation  of  his  position  concerning  the  Dred 
Scott  decision,  see  Lincoln  and  Douglas  Deb.,  20. 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     131 

a  decent  mulatto ;  and  in  lower  Egypt l  they  are 
almost  white." 

Concerning     sectionalism,     Lincoln     countered 
fairly  enough  on  his  opponent  by  asking :  Was  it, 
then,  the  case  that  it  was  slavery  which  was  na 
tional,  and  freedom  which  was  sectional  ?    Or,  "  Is 
it  the  true  test  of  the  soundness  of  a  doctrine  that 
in  some  places  people  won't  let  you  proclaim  it?" 
But  the  remainder  of  Douglas's  assault  was  by  no 
means  to  be  disposed  of  by  quick  retort.     When 
Lincoln  was  pushed  to   formulate   accurately  his 
views  concerning  the  proper  status  of  the  negro  in 
the  community,  he  had  need  of  all  his  extraordi 
nary  care  in  statement.      Herein  lay  problems  that 
were  vexing  many  honest  citizens  and  clever  men 
besides  himself,  and  were  breeding  much  disagree 
ment  among  persons  who  all  were  anti -slavery  in 
a  general  way,  but  could  by  no  means  reach  a  com 
fortable    unison  concerning    troublesome    particu 
lars.     The  "all  men  free  and  equal"  of  the  Con 
stitution,  and  the  talk  about  human  brotherhood 
gave  the  Democrats  wide  scope  for  harassing  anti- 
slavery  men  with  vexatious  taunts  and  embarrass 
ing  cross-interrogatories  on  practical  points.      "I 
do  not  question,"  said  Douglas,  "Mr.   Lincoln's 
conscientious  belief  that  the  negro  was  made  his 
equal,  and  hence  is  his  brother.     But  for  my  own 
part,  I  do  not  regard  the  negro  as  my  equal,  and 
positively  deny  that  he  is  my  brother,  or  any  krqj^^l 
to  me  whatever."     He  said  that  "the  signers  of 

1  A  nickname  for  the  southern  part  of  Illinois.  '    <ATi 


av^v 


132  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

the  Declaration  had  no  reference  to  the  negro  .  .  . 
or  any  other  inferior  and  degraded  race,  when  they 
spoke  of  the  equality  of  men,"  but  meant  only 
"white  men,  of  European  birth  and  descent." 
This  topic  opens  the  whole  subject  of  Lincoln's 
political  affiliations  and  of  his  opinions  concerning 
slavery  and  the  negro,  opinions  which  seem  to 
have  undergone  no  substantial  change  during  the 
interval  betwixt  this  campaign  and  his  election  to 
the  presidency.  Some  selections  from  what  he 
said  may  sufficiently  explain  his  position. 

At  Freeport,  August  27,  replying  to  a  series  of 
questions  from  Douglas,  he  declared  that  he  had 
supposed  himself,  "since  the  organization  of  the 
Republican  party  at  Bloomiiigton,  in  May,  1856, 
bound  as  a  party  man  by  the  platforms  of  the 
party,  then  and  since."  He  said:  "I  do  not  now, 
nor  ever  did,  stand  in  favor  of  the  unconditional 
repeal  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law."  He  believed 
that  under  the  Constitution  the  Southerners  were 
entitled  to  such  a  law ;  but  thought  that  the  exist 
ing  law  "  should  have  been  framed  so  as  to  be  free 
from  some  of  the  objections  that  pertain  to  it,  with 
out  lessening  its  efficiency."  He  would  not  "in 
troduce  it  as  a  new  subject  of  agitation  upon  the 
general  question  of  slavery." 

He  should  be  "exceedingly  sorry"  ever  to  have 
to  pass  upon  the  question  of  admitting  more  slave 
States  into  the  Union,  and  exceedingly  glad  to 
know  that  another  never  would  be  admitted.  But 
"  if  slavery  shall  be  kept  out  of  the  Territories  dur- 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.    133 

ing  the  territorial  existence  of  any  one  given  Ter 
ritory,  and  then  the  people  shall,  having  a  fair 
chance  and  a  clear  field,  when  they  come  to  adopt 
their  constitution,  do  such  an  extraordinary  thing 
as  to  adopt  a  slave  constitution,  uninfluenced  by 
the  actual  presence  of  the  institution  among  them, 
I  see  no  alternative,  if  we  own  the  country,  but 
to  admit  them  into  the  Union."  He  should  also, 
he  said,  be  "exceedingly  glad  to  see  slavery  abol 
ished  in  the  District  of  Columbia,"  and  he  believed 
that  Congress  had  "constitutional  power  to  abolish 
it"  there;  but  he  would  favor  the  measure  only 
upon  condition:  "First,  that  the  abolition  should 
be  gradual;  second,  that  it  should  be  on  a  vote 
of  the  majority  of  qualified  voters  in  the  District; 
and,  third,  that  compensation  should  be  made  to 
unwilling  owners."  As  to  the  abolition  of  the 
slave  trade  between  the  different  States,  he  ac 
knowledged  that  he  had  not  considered  the  matter 
sufficiently  to  have  reached  a  conclusion  concern 
ing  it.  But  if  he  should  think  that  Congress  had 
power  to  effect  such  abolition,  he  should  "not  be 
in  favor  of  the  exercise  of  that  power  unless  upon 
some  conservative  principle,  akin  to  what  I  have 
said  in  relation  to  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the 
District  of  Columbia."  As  to  the  territorial  con 
troversy,  he  said:  "I  am  impliedly,  if  not  ex 
pressly,  pledged  to  a  belief  in  the  right  and  duty 
of  Congress  to  prohibit  slavery  in  all  the  United 
States  Territories."  Concerning  the  acquisition 
of  new  territory  he  said:  "I  am  not  generally  op- 


134  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

posed  to  honest  acquisition  of  territory;  and  in 
any  given  case  I  would  or  would  not  oppose  such 
acquisition,  according  as  I  might  think  such  acqui 
sition  would  or  would  not  aggravate  the  slavery 
question  among  ourselves."  The  statement  de 
rived  its  immediate  importance  from  the  well- 
known  purpose  of  the  administration  and  a  con 
siderable  party  in  the  South  very  soon  to  acquire 
Cuba.  All  these  utterances  were  certainly  clear 
enough,  and  were  far  from  constituting  Abolition 
ist  doctrine,  though  they  were  addressed  to  an 
audience  "as  strongly  tending  to  Abolitionism  as 
any  audience  in  the  State  of  Illinois,"  and  Mr. 
Lincoln  believed  that  he  was  saying  "that  which, 
if  it  would  be  offensive  to  any  persons  and  render 
them  enemies  to  himself,  would  be  offensive  to 
persons  in  this  audience." 

At  Quincy  Lincoln  gave  his  views  concerning 
Republicanism  with  his  usual  unmistakable  accu 
racy,  and  certainly  he  again  differentiated  it  widely 
from  Abolitionism.  The  Republican  party,  he 
said,  think  slavery  "a  moral,  a  social,  and  a  polit 
ical  wrong."  Any  man  who  does  not  hold  this 
opinion  "is  misplaced  and  ought  to  leave  us. 
While,  on  the  other  hand,  if  there  be  any  man  in 
the  Republican  party  who  is  impatient  over  the 
necessity  springing  from  its  actual  presence,  and 
is  impatient  of  the  Constitutional  guaranties 
thrown  around  it,  and  would  act  in  disregard  of 
these,  he,  too,  is  misplaced,  standing  with  us. 
He  will  find  his  place  somewhere  else ;  for  we  have 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     135 

a  due  regard  .  .  .  for  all  these  things."  "I  have 
always  hated  slavery  as  much  as  any  Abolitionist, 
.  .  .  but  I  have  always  been  quiet  about  it  until 
this  new  era  of  the  introduction  of  the  Nebraska 
bill  again."  He  repeated  often  that  he  had  "no 
purpose,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  interfere  with 
the  institution  of  slavery  in  the  States  where  it 
exists;"  that  he  had  "no  lawful  right  to  do  so," 
and  "no  inclination  to  do  so."  He  said  that  his 
declarations  as  to  the  right  of  the  negro  to  "life, 
liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness,"  were  de 
signed  only  to  refer  to  legislation  "about  any  new 
country  which  is  not  already  cursed  with  the  ac 
tual  presence  of  the  evil,  — slavery."  He  denied 
having  ever  "manifested  any  impatience  with  the 
necessities  that  spring  from  the  .  .  .  actual  exist 
ence  of  slavery  among  us,  where  it  does  already 
exist." 

He  dwelt  much  upon  the  equality  clause  of  the 
Declaration.  If  we  begin  "making  exceptions  to 
it,  where  will  it  stop  ?  If  one  man  says  it  does  not 
mean  a  negro,  why  not  another  say  it  does  not 
mean  some  other  man? "  Only  within  three  years 
past  had  any  one  deubted  that  negroes  were  in 
cluded  by  this  language.  But  he  said  that,  while 
the  authors  "intended  to  include  all  men,  they  did 
not  mean  to  declare  all  men  equal  in  all  respects, 
...  in  color,  size,  intellect,  moral  development, 
or  social  capacity,"  but  only  "equal  in  certain  in 
alienable  rights."  "Anything  that  argues  me  into 
his  [Douglas's]  idea  of  perfect  social  and  political 


136  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

equality  with  the  negro  is  but  a  specious  and  fan 
tastic  arrangement  of  words,  by  which  a  man  can 
prove  a  horse-chestnut  to  be  a  chestnut  horse. 
...  I  have  no  purpose  to  produce  political  and 
social  equality  between  the  white  and  the  black 
races.  There  is  a  physical  difference  between  the 
two,  which,  in  my  judgment,  will  probably  forever 
forbid  their  living  together  upon  the  footing  of 
perfect  equality;  and  inasmuch  as  it  becomes  a 
necessity  that  there  must  be  a  difference,  I,  as  well 
as  Judge  Douglas,  am  in  favor  of  the  race  to 
which  I  belong  having  the  superior  position.  .  .  . 
But  I  hold  that  .  .  .  there  is  no  reason  in  the 
world  why  the  negro  is  not  entitled  to  all  the 
natural  rights  enumerated  in  the  Declaration  of 
Independence,  the  right  to  life,  liberty,  and  the 
pursuit  of  happiness.  I  hold  that  he  is  as  much 
entitled  to  these  as  the  white  man.  I  agree  with 
Judge  Douglas  that  he  is  not  my  equal  in  many 
respects,  —  certainly  not  in  color,  perhaps  not  in 
moral  or  intellectual  endowment.  But  in  the  right 
to  eat  the  bread,  without  the  leave  of  anybody  else, 
which  his  own  hand  earns,  Tie  is  my  equal,  and  the 
equal  of  Judye  Douglas,  and  the  equal  of  every 
living  man."  Later  at  Charleston  he  reiterated 
much  of  this  in  almost  identical  language,  and 
then  in  his  turn  took  his  fling  at  Douglas:  "I 
am  not  in  favor  of  making  voters  or  jurors  of  ne 
groes,  nor  of  qualifying  them  to  hold  office,  nor 
to  intermarry  with  white  people.  ...  I  do  not 
understand  that  because  I  do  not  want  a  negro  wo- 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     137 

man  for  a  slave  I  must  necessarily  want  her  for  a 
wife.  My  understanding  is  that  I  can  just  let  her 
alone.  ...  I  have  never  had  the  least  apprehen 
sion  that  I  or  my  friends  would  marry  negroes,  if 
there  was  no  law  to  keep  them  from  it;  but  as 
Judge  Douglas  and  his  friends  seem  to  be  in  great 
apprehension  that  they  might,  if  there  were  no  law 
to  keep  them  from  it,  I  give  him  the  most  solemn 
pledge  that  I  will  to  the  very  last  stand  by  the  law 
of  this  State,  which  forbids  the  marrying  of  white 
people  with  negroes." 

By  all  this  it  is  made  entirely  evident  that  Lin 
coln  held  a  faith  widely  different  from  that  of  the 
great  crusading  leaders  of  Abolitionism  at  the 
East.1  Equally  marked  was  the  difference  between 
him  and  them  in  the  matters  of  temper  and  of  the 
attitude  taken  towards  opponents.  The  absence  of 
any  sense  of  personal  hostility  towards  those  who 
assailed  him  with  unsparing  vindictiveness  was  a 
trait  often  illustrated  in  his  after  life,  and  which 
was  now  noted  with  surprise,  for  it  was  rare  in  the 
excited  politics  of  those  days.  In  this  especial 
campaign  both  contestants  honestly  intended  to 
refrain  from  personalities,  but  the  difference  be 
tween  their  ways  of  doing  so  was  marked.  Doug- 

1  Henry  Wilson  has  made  his  criticism  in  the  words  that  "  some 
of  his  [Lincoln's]  assertions  and  admissions  were  both  unsatisfac 
tory  and  offensive  to  anti-slavery  men  ;  betrayed  too  much  of  the 
spirit  of  caste  and  prejudice  against  color,  and  sound  harshly  dis 
sonant  by  the  side  of  the  Proclamation  of  Emancipation  and  the 
grand  utterances  of  his  later  state  papers."  Rise  and  Fall  of  the 
Slave  Power,  ii.  576, 


138  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

las,  under  the  temptation  of  high  ability  in  that 
line,  held  himself  in  check  by  an  effort  which  was 
often  obvious  and  not  always  entirely  successful. 
But  Lincoln  never  seemed  moved  by  the  desire. 
"All  I  have  to  ask,"  he  said,  "is  that  we  talk 
reasonably  and  rationally;"  and  again:  "I  hope 
to  deal  in  all  things  fairly  with  Judge  Douglas." 
No  innuendo,  no  artifice,  in  any  speech,  gave  the 
lie  to  these  protestations.  Besides  this,  his  denun 
ciations  were  always  against  slavery,  and  never 
against  slave-holders*  The  emphasis  of  condem 
nation,  the  intensity  of  feeling,  were  never  ex 
pended  against  persons.  By  this  course,  unusual 
among  the  Abolitionists,  he  not  only  lost  nothing 
in  force  and  impressiveness,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
his  attack  seemed  to  gain  in  effectiveness  by  being 
directed  against  no  personal  object,  but  exclusively 
against  a  practice.  His  war  was  against  slavery, 
not  against  the  men  and  women  of  the  South  who 
owned  slaves.  At  Ottawa  he  read  from  the  Peoria 
speech  of  1854:  "I  have  no*  prejudice  against  the 
Southern  people.  They  are  just  what  we  would 
[should]  be  in  their  situation.  If  slavery  did  not 
now  exist  among  them,  they  would  not  introduce 
it.  If  it  did  now  exist  among  us,  we  should  not 
instantly  give  it  up.  ...  It  does  seem  to  me  that 
systems  of  gradual  emancipation  might  be  adopted ; 
but  for  their  tardiness  in  this,  I  will  not  undertake 
to  judge  our  brethren  of  the  South."  Kepeatedly 
he  admitted  the  difficulty  of  the  problem,  and  fas 
tened  no  blame  upon  those  Southerners  who  ex- 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     139 

cused  themselves  for  not  expelling  the  evil  on  the 
ground  that  they  did  not  know  how  to  do  so.  At 
Peoria  he  said:  "If  all  earthly  power  were  given 
me,  I  should  not  know  what  to  do  as  to  the  exist 
ing  institution."  He  contributed  some  sugges 
tions  which  certainly  were  nothing  better  than 
chimerical.  Deportation  to  Africa  was  his  favor 
ite  scheme;  he  also  proposed  that  it  would  be 
"best  for  all  concerned  to  have  the  colored  popu 
lation  in  a  State  by  themselves."  But  he  did  not 
abuse  men  who  declined  to  adopt  his  methods. 
Though  he  was  dealing  with  a  question  which  was 
arousing  personal  antagonisms  as  bitter  as  any 
that  history  records,  yet  he  never  condemned  any 
one,  nor  ever  passed  judgment  against  his  fellow- 
men. 

Diagnosis  would  perhaps  show  that  the  trait 
thus  illustrated  was  rather  mental  than  moral. 
This  absence  of  animosity  and  reproach  as  towards 
individuals  found  its  root  not  so  much  in  human 
charity  as  in  fairness  of  thinking.  Lincoln's 
ways  of  mental  working  are  not  difficult  to  dis 
cover.  He  thought  slowly,  cautiously,  profoundly, 
and  with  a  most  close  accuracy ;  but  above  all  else 
he  thought  fairly .  This  capacity  far  transcended, 
or,  more  correctly,  differed  from,  what  is  ordinar 
ily  called  the  judicial  habit  of  mind.  Many  men 
can  weigh  arguments  without  letting  prejudice 
get  into  either  scale ;  but  Lincoln  carried  on  the 
whole  process  of  thinking  not  only  with  an  equal 
clearness  of  perception,  but  also  with  an  entire 


140  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

impartiality  of  liking  or  disliking  for  both  sides. 
His  aim,  while  he  was  engaged  in  thinking,  was 
to  discover  what  was  really  true ;  and  later  when 
he  spoke  to  others  his  purpose  was  to  show  them 
the  truth  which  he  had  discovered  and  to  state  to 
them  on  what  grounds  he  believed  it  to  be  the 
truth;  it  did  not  involve  a  judgment  against  the 
individuals  who  failed  to  recognize  that  truth. 
His  singular  trait  of  impersonality  was  not  made 
more  apparent  in  any  other  way.  His  effort  never 
was  to  defeat  the  person  who  happened  to  be  his 
adversary,  but  always  was  to  overcome  the  argu 
ments  of  that  adversary.  Primarily  he  was  dis 
cussing  a  topic  and  establishing  a  truth;  it  was 
only  incidental  that  in  doing  these  things  he  had 
to  oppose  a  man.  It  is  noteworthy  that  his  oppo 
nents  never  charged  hiui  with  mis-stating  their  case 
in  order  to  make  an  apparently  effective  answer  to 
it.  On  the  contrary,  his  hope  of  success  seemed 
always  to  lie  in  having  both  sides  presented  with 
the  highest  degree  of  clearness  and  honesty.  He 
had  perfect  confidence  in  the  ultimate  triumph  of 
the  truth ;  he  was  always  willing  to  tie  fast  to  it, 
according  as  he  could  see  it,  and  then  to  bide  time 
with  it.  This  being  a  genuine  faith  and  not  mere 
lip-service,  he  used  the  same  arguments  to  others 
which  he  used  to  himself,  and  staked  his  final  sue-. 
cess  upon  the  probability  that  what  had  persuaded 
his  mind  would  in  time  persuade  also  the  minds  of 
other  intelligent  men.  It  has  been  well  said  of 
him  by  an  excellent  judge :  "  He  loved  the  truth, 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     141 

for  the  truth's  sake.  He  would  not  argue  from 
a  false  premise,  or  be  deceived  himself,  or  deceive 
others,  by  a  false  conclusion.  .  .  .  He  did  not 
seek  to  say  merely  the  thing  which  was  best  for 
that  day's  debate,  but  the  thing  which  would  stand 
the  test  of  time,  and  square  itself  with  eternal  jus 
tice.  .  .  .  His  logic  was  severe  and  faultless.  He 
did  not  resort  to  fallacy."  1 

To  return  to  the  points  made  in  the  debate: 
Douglas  laid  down  the  "great  principle  of  non 
interference  and  non-intervention  by  Congress 
with  slavery  in  the  States  and  Territories  alike;" 
which  he  assured  his  audience  would  enable  us  to 
"continue  at  peace  with  one  another."  In  the 
same  connection  he  endeavored  to  silver-coat  for 
Northern  palates  the  bitter  pill  of  the  Dred  Scott 
decision,  by  declaring  that  the  people  of  any  State 
or  Territory  might  withhold  that  protecting  legis 
lation,  those  " friendly  police  regulations,"  without 
which  slavery  could  not  exist.  But  this  was,  in 
deed,  a  "lame,  illogical,  evasive  answer,"  which 
enabled  Lincoln  to  "secure  an  advantage  in  the 
national  relations  of  the  contest  which  he  held  to 
the  end." 

Lincoln,  in  replying,  agreed  that  "all  the  States 
have  the  right  to  do  exactly  as  they  please  about 
"all  their  domestic  relations,  including  that  of  slav 
ery."  But  he  said  that  the  proposition  that  slav 
ery  could  not  enter  a  new  country  without  police 
regulations  was  historically  false;  and  that  the 

1  Elaine,  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  i.  145. 


142  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

facts  of  the  Dred  Scott  case  itself  showed  that 
there  was  "vigor  enough  in  slavery  to  plant  itself 
in  a  new  country  even  against  unfriendly  legisla 
tion."  Beyond  this  issue  of  historical  fact,  Doug 
las  had  already  taken  and  still  dared  to  maintain 
a  position  which  proved  to  be  singularly  ill  chosen. 
The  right  to  hold  slaves  as  property  in  the  Terri 
tories  had  lately,  to  the  infinite  joy  of  the  South, 
been  declared  by  the  Supreme  Court  to  be  guaran 
teed  by  the  Constitution;  and  now  Douglas  had 
the  audacity  to  repeat  that  notion  of  his,  so  ab 
horrent  to  all  friends  of  slavery,  —  that  this  inval 
uable  right  could  be  made  practically  worthless 
by  unfriendly  local  legislation,  or  even  by  the 
negative  hostility  of  withholding  friendly  legisla 
tion!  From  the  moment  when  this  deadly  sug 
gestion  fell  from  his  ingenious  lips,  the  Southern 
Democracy  turned  upon  him  with  vindictive  hate 
and  marked  him  for  destruction.  He  had  also 
given  himself  into  the  hands  of  his  avowed  and 
natural  enemies.  The  doctrine,  said  Mr.  Lin 
coln,  is  "no  less  than  that  a  thing  may  lawfully 
be  driven  away  from  a  place  where  it  has  a  lawful 
right  to  be."  "If  you  were  elected  members  of 
the  Legislature,  what  would  be  the  first  thing 
you  would  have  to  do,  before  entering  upon  your 
duties?  Swear  to  support  the  Constitution  of  the' 
United  States.  Suppose  you  believe,  as  Judge 
Douglas  does,  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  guarantees  to  your  neighbor  the  right  to 
hold  slaves  in  that  Territory,  —  that  they  are  his 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     143 

property,  —  how  can  you  clear  your  oaths,  unless 
you  give  him  such  legislation  as  is  necessary  to 
enable  him  to  enjoy  that  property?  What  do  you 
understand  by  supporting  the  Constitution  of  a 
State,  or  of  the  United  States  ?  Is  it  not  to  give 
such  constitutional  helps  to  the  rights  established 
by  that  Constitution  as  may  be  practically  needed  ? 
.  .  .  And  what  I  say  here  will  hold  with  still 
more  force  against  the  Judge's  doctrine  of  'un 
friendly  legislation.'  How  could  you,  having 
sworn  to  support  the  Constitution,  and  believing 
it  guaranteed  the  right  to  hold  slaves  in  the  Terri 
tories,  assist  in  legislation  intended  to  defeat  that 
right?"  "Is  not  Congress  itself  under  obligation 
to  give  legislative  support  to  any  right  that  is  es 
tablished  under  the  United  States  Constitution  ?  " 
Upon  what  other  principle  do  "many  of  us,  who 
are  opposed  to  slavery  upon  principle,  give  our 
acquiescence  to  a  Fugitive  Slave  Law?"  Does 
Douglas  mean  to  say  that  a  territorial  legislature, 
"by  passing  unfriendly  laws,"  can  "nullify  a 
Constitutional  right  ?  "  He  put  to  Douglas  the 
direct  and  embarrassing  query:  "If  the  slave- 
holding  citizens  of  a  United  -States  Territory 
should  need  and  demand  Congressional  legislation 
for  the  protection  of  their  slave  property  in  such 
Territory,  would  you,  as  a  member  of  Congress, 
vote  for  or  against  such  legislation?"  "Repeat 
that,"  cried  Douglas,  ostentatiously;  "I  want  to 
answer  that  question."  But  he  never  composed 
his  reply. 


144  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Another  kindred  question  had  already  been  put 
by  Lincoln:  "Can  the  people  of  a  United  States 
Territory,  in  any  lawful  way,  against  the  wish  of 
any  citizen  of  the  United  States,  exclude  slavery 
from  its  limits,  prior  to  the  formation  of  a  State 
Constitution?  "  Friends  advised  him  not  to  force 
this,  as  it  seemed  against  the  immediate  policy  of 
the  present  campaign.  But  it  was  never  his  way 
to  subordinate  his  own  deliberate  opinion  to  the 
opinions  of  advisers;  and  on  this  occasion  he  was 
merciless  in  pressing  this  question.  A  story  has 
been  very  generally  repeated  that  he  told  the  pro 
testers  that,  whatever  might  be  the  bearing  on  the 
senatorship,  Douglas  could  not  answer  that  ques 
tion  and  be  elected  president  of  the  United  States 
in  1860.  "I  am  killing  larger  game,"  he  said; 
"the  battle  of  1860  is  worth  a  hundred  of  this."1 
A  few  legends  of  this  kind  are  extant,  which  tend 
to  indicate  that  Lincoln  already  had  in  mind  the 
presidential  nomination,  and  was  fighting  the 
present  fight  with  an  eye  to  that  greater  one  in 
the  near  future.  It  is  not  easy  to  say  how  much 
credit  should  be  given  to  such  tales;  they  may 
not  be  wholly  inventions,  but  a  remark  which  is 
uttered  with  little  thought  may  later  easily  take  on 
a  strong  color  in  the  light  of  subsequent  develop 
ments. 

In  presenting  the  Republican  side  of  the  ques- 

1  N.  and  H.,  ii.  159,  160,  163;  Arnold,  151;  Lamon,  415,  416. 
and  see  406 ;  Holland,  189 ;  Wilson,  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Slave 
Power,  ii.  576 ;  Elaine,  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  i.  148. 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     145 

tion  Lincoln  seemed  to  feel  a  duty  beyond  that  of 
merely  out-arguing  his   opponent.     He   bore  the 
weighty  burden   of   a   responsibility  graver   than 
personal  success.     He  might  prevail  in  the  opin 
ions  of   his    fellow-citizens;   without   this    instant 
triumph  he  might  so  present  his    cause  that  the 
jury  of    posterity  would    declare   that   the    truth 
lay  with  him;    he  might  even  convince  both  the 
present  and  the  coming  generations;  and  though 
achieving  all  these  triumphs,   he  might  still  fall 
far  short  of   the   peculiar  and   exacting   require 
ment  of   the  occasion.     For  the  winning   of   the 
senatorship  was  the  insignificant  part  of  what  he 
had   undertaken;    his   momentous    charge  was   to 
maintain  a  grand  moral  crusade,  to  stimulate  and 
to  vindicate  a  great  uprising  in  the  cause  of  hu 
manity  and  of  justice.     His  full  appreciation  of 
this  is  entirely  manifest  in  the  tone  of  his  speeches. 
They  have  an  earnestness,  a  gravity,  at  times  even 
a  solemnity,  unusual  in  such  encounters  in  any  era 
or  before  any  audiences,  but  unprecedented   "on 
the  stump "   before  the  uproarious  gatherings  of 
the  West  at  that  day.     Repeatedly  he  stigmatized 
slavery  as   "a  moral,   a  social,   a  political  evil." 
Very  impressively  he  denounced  the  positions  of 
an  opponent  who  "cared  not  whether  slavery  was 
voted  down  or  voted  up,"  who  said  that  slavery 
was  not  to  be  differentiated  from  the  many  domes 
tic  institutions   and    daily  affairs  which    civilized 
societies  control  by  police  regulations.     He   said 
that  slavery  could  not  be  treated  as  "only  equal 


146  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

to  the  cranberry  laws  of  Indiana;"  that  slaves 
could  not  be  put  "upon  a  par  with  onions  and  po 
tatoes;"  that  to  Douglas  he  supposed  that  the  in 
stitution  really  "looked  small,"  but  that  a  great 
proportion  of  the  American  people  regarded  slav 
ery  as  "a  vast  moral  evil."  "The  real  issue  in 
this  controversy  —  the  one  pressing  upon  every 
mind  —  is  the  sentiment  on  the  part  of  one  class 
that  looks  upon  the  institution  of  slavery  as  a 
wrong,  and  of  another  class  that  does  not  look 
upon  it  as  a  wrong.  .  .  .  No  man  can  logically 
say  he  does  not  care  whether  a  wrong  is  voted  up 
or  voted  down.  He  [Douglas]  contends  that  what 
ever  community  wants  slaves  has  a  right  to  have 
them.  So  they  have,  if  it  is  not  a  wrong.  But 
if  it  is  a  wrong,  he  cannot  say  people  have  a  right 
to  do  wrong.  He  says  that,  upon  the  score  of 
equality,  slaves  should  be  allowed  to  go  into  a  new 
Territory,  like  other  property.  This  is  strictly 
logical  if  there  is  no  difference  between  it  and 
other  property.  .  .  .  But  if  you  insist  that  one  is 
wrong  and  the  other  right,  there  is  no  use  to  insti 
tute  a  comparison  between  right  and  wrong.  .  .  . 
That  is  the  real  issue.  That  is  the  issue  that  will 
continue  in  this  country  when  these  poor  tongues 
of  Judge  Douglas  and  myself  shall  be  silent.  It 
is  the  eternal  struggle  between  these  two  principles, 
right  and  wrong,  throughout  the  world.  They 
are  the  two  principles  that  have  stood  face  to  face 
from  the  beginning  of  time,  and  will  ever  continue 
to  struggle.  The  one  is  the  common  right  of  hu- 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     147 

inanity,  and  the  other  the  divine  right  of  kings. 
It  is  the  same  principle  in  whatever  shape  it  devel 
ops  itself.  It  is  the  same  spirit  that  says:  'You 
work  and  toil  and  earn  bread,  and  I  '11  eat  it. ' ' 
"I  ask  you  if  it  is  not  a  false  philosophy?  Is  it 
not  a  false  statesmanship  that  undertakes  to  build 
up  a  system  of  policy  upon  the  basis  of  caring  no 
thing  about  the  very  thing  that  everybody  does  care 
the  most  about  ?  " 

We  cannot  leave  these  speeches  without  a  word 
concerning  their  literary  quality.  In  them  we 
might  have  looked  for  vigor  that  would  be  a  little 
uncouth,  wit  that  would  be  often  coarse,  a  logic 
generally  sound  but  always  clumsy,  —  in  a  word, 
tolerably  good  substance  and  very  poor  form.  We 
are  surprised,  then,  to  find  many  and  high  excel 
lences  in  art.  As  it  is  with  Bacon's  essays,  so  it 
is  with  these  speeches :  the  more  attentively  they 
are  read  the  more  striking  appears  the  closeness 
of  their  texture  both  in  logic  and  in  language. 
Clear  thought  is  accurately  expressed.  Each  sen 
tence  has  its  special  errand,  and  each  word  its 
individual  importance.  There  is  never  either  too 
much  or  too  little.  The  work  is  done  with  clean 
precision  and  no  waste.  Nowhere  does  one  pause 
to  seek  a  meaning  or  to  recover  a  connection ;  and 
an  effort  to  make  out  a  syllabus  shows  that  the 
most  condensed  statement  has  already  been  used. 
There  are  scintillations  of  wit  and  humor,  but  they 
are  not  very  numerous.  When  Lincoln  was  urged 
to  adopt  a  more  popular  style,  he  replied:  "The 


148  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

occasion  is  too  serious;  the  issues  are  too  grave. 
I  do  not  seek  applause,  or  to  amuse  the  people,  but 
to  convince  them."  This  spirit  was  upon  him 
from  the  beginning  to  the  end.  Had  he  been  ad 
dressing  a  bench  of  judges,  subject  to  a  close  limi 
tation  of  minutes,  he  would  have  won  credit  by  the 
combined  economy  and  force  which  were  displayed 
in  these  harangues  to  general  assemblages.  To 
speak  of  the  lofty  tone  of  these  speeches  comes 
dangerously  near  to  the  distasteful  phraseology 
of  extravagant  laudation,  than  which  nothing  else 
can  produce  upon  honest  men  a  worse  impression. 
Yet  it  is  a  truth  visible  to  every  reader  that  at  the 
outset  Lincoln  raised  the  discussion  to  a  very 
high  plane,  and  held  it  there  throughout.  The 
truth  which  he  had  to  sustain  was  so  great  that  it 
was  perfectly  simple,  and  he  had  the  good  sense  to 
utter  it  with  appropriate  simplicity.  In  no  speech 
was  there  fervor  or  enthusiasm  or  rhetoric;  he 
talked  to  the  reason  and  the  conscience  of  his  au 
ditors,  not  to  their  passions.  Yet  the  depth  of  his 
feeling  may  be  measured  by  the  story  that  once  in 
the  canvass  he  said  to  a  friend :  "  Sometimes,  in 
the  excitement  of  speaking,  I  seem  to  see  the  end 
of  slavery.  I  feel  that  the  time  is  soon  coming 
when  the  sun  shall  shine,  the  rain  fall,  on  no  man 
who  shall  go  forth  to  unrequited  toil.  How  this 
will  come,  when  it  will  come,  by  whom  it  will 
come,  I  cannot  tell,  —  but  that  time  will  surely 
come."  It  is  just  appreciation,  and  not  extrava- 

1  Arnold,  144.     This  writer  speaks  with  discriminating  praise 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     149 

gance,  to  say  that  the  cheap  and  miserable  little 
volume,  now  out  of  print,  containing  in  bad  news 
paper  type,  "The  Lincoln  and  Douglas  Debates," l 
holds  some  of  the  masterpieces  of  oratory  of  all 
ages  and  nations. 

The  immediate  result  of  the  campaign  was  the 
triumph  of  Douglas,  who  had  certainly  made  not 
only  a  very  able  and  brilliant  but  a  splendidly  gal 
lant  fight,  with  Republicans  assailing  him  in  front 
and  Administrationists  in  rear.2  Lincoln  was 
disappointed.  His  feelings  had  been  so  deeply 
engaged,  he  had  worked  so  strenuously,  and  the 
result  had  been  so  much  in  doubt,  that  defeat 
was  trying.  But  he  bore  it  with  his  wonted  reso 
lute  equanimity.  He  said  that  he  felt  "like  the 
boy  that  stumped  his  toe, — 'it  hurt  too  bad  to 
laugh,  and  he  was  too  big  to  cry.' '  In  fact,  there 
were  encouraging  elements.3  The  popular  vote 
stood,4  Republicans,  126,084;  Douglas  Democrats, 

concerning  Lincoln's  oratory,  p.  139.  It  is  an  illustration  of  Lin 
coln's  habit  of  adopting  for  permanent  use  any  expression  that 
pleased  him,  that  this  same  phrase  had  been  used  by  him  in  a 
speech  made  two  years  before  this  time.  Holland,  151. 

1  Published  in  Columbus,  in  1860,  for  campaign  purposes,  from 
copies  furnished   by  Lincoln ;    see   his   letter   to   Central   Exec. 
Comni.,  Dec.  19,  1859,  on  fly-leaf. 

2  Many  tributes  have  been  paid  to  Douglas  by  writers  who  op 
pose  his  opinions;  e.  <?.,  Arnold  says:   "There  is,  on  the  whole, 
hardly  any  greater  personal  triumph  in  the  history  of  American 
politics  than  his  reelection,' '  pp.  149,  150 ;  Elaine,  Twenty  Years 
of  Congress,  i.  149. 

3  See  Lincoln's  letter  to  Judd,  quoted  N.  and  H.,  ii.  167 ;  als'< 
Rid.  169. 

4  Raymond,  76. 


150  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

121,940;  Lecompton  Democrats,  5,091.  But  the 
apportionment  of  districts  was  such  that  the  legis 
lature  contained  a  majority  for  Douglas.1  So  the 
prestige  of  victory  seemed  separated  from  its 
fruits;  for  the  nation,  attentively  watching  this 
duel,  saw  that  the  new  man  had  convinced  upwards 
of  four  thousand  voters  more  than  had  the  great 
leader  of  the  Democracy.  Douglas  is  reported  to 
have  said  that,  during  his  sixteen  years  in  Con 
gress,  he  had  found  no  man  in  the  Senate  whom 
he  would  not  rather  encounter  in  debate  than  Lin 
coln.  If  it  was  true  that  Lincoln  was  already 
dreaming  of  the  presidency,  he  was  a  sufficiently 
shrewd  politician  to  see  that  his  prospects  were 
greatly  improved  by  this  campaign.  He  had 
worked  hard  for  what  he  had  gained ;  he  had  been 
travelling  incessantly  to  and  fro  and  delivering 
speeches  in  unbroken  succession  during  about  one 
hundred  of  the  hot  days  of  the  Western  summer, 
and  speeches  not  of  a  commonplace  kind,  but 
which  severely  taxed  the  speaker.  After  all  was 
over,  he  was  asked  by  the  State  Committee  to  con 
tribute  to  the  campaign  purse!  He  replied:  "I 
am  willing  to  pay  according  to  my  ability,  but  I 
am  the  poorest  hand  living  to  get  others  to  pay. 
/  have  been  on  expense  so  long,  without  earning 
anything,  that  I  am  absolutely  without  money  now 
for  even  household  expenses.  Still,  if  you  can  put 
in  $250  for  me,  ...  I  will  allow  it  when  you  and 

1  The   Senate   showed    14    Democrats,    11   Republicans;    the 
House,  40  Democrats,  35  Republicans. 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     151 

I  settle  the  private  matter  between  us.  This, 
with  what  I  have  already  paid,  .  .  .  will  exceed 
my  subscription  of  $500.  This,  too,  is  exclusive 
of  my  ordinary  expenses  during  the  campaign,  all 
of  which  being  added  to  my  loss  of  time  and  busi 
ness  bears  pretty  heavily  upon  one  no  better  off 
than  I  am.  .  .  .  You  are  feeling  badly;  'and  this, 
too,  shall  pass  away;  '  never  fear." 

The  platform  which,  with  such  precision  and 
painstaking,  Lincoln  had  constructed  for  himself 
was  made  by  him  even  more  ample  and  more  strong 
by  a  few  speeches  delivered  in  the  interval  between 
the  close  of  this  great  campaign  and  his  nomina 
tion  by  the  Republicans  for  the  presidency.  In 
Ohio  an  important  canvass  for  the  governorship 
took  place,  and  Douglas  went  there,  and  made 
speeches  filled  with  allusions  to  Lincoln  and  the 
recent  Illinois  campaign.  Even  without  this  pro 
vocation  Lincoln  knew,  by  keen  instinct,  that 
where  Douglas  was  there  he  should  be  also.  In 
no  other  way  had  he  yet  appeared  to  such  advan 
tage  as  in  encountering  "the  Little  Giant."  To 
Ohio,  accordingly,  he  hastened,  and  spoke  at 
Columbus  and  at  Cincinnati.1  To  the  citizens  of 
the  latter  place  he  said :  "  This  is  the  first  time  in 
my  life  that  I  have  appeared  before  an  audience 
in  so  great  a  city  as  this.  I  therefore  make  this 
appearance  under  some  degree  of  embarrassment." 
There  was  little  novelty  in  substance,  but  much 

1  In  September,  1859.  These  are  included  in  the  volume  of 
The  Lincoln  and  Douglas  Debates,  printed  at  Columbus,  1860. 


152  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

in  treatment.  Thus,  at  Cincinnati,  he  imagined 
himself  addressing  Kentuckians,  and  showed  them 
that  their  next  nominee  for  the  presidency  ought 
to  be  his  "distinguished  friend,  Judge  Douglas;" 
for  "in  all  that  there  is  a  difference  between  you 
and  him,  I  understand  he  is  sincerely  for  you,  and 
more  wisely  for  you  than  you  are  for  yourselves." 
Through  him  alone  pro -slavery  men  retained  any 
hold  upon  the  free  States  of  the  North;  and  in 
those  States  "in  every  possible  way  he  can,  he 
constantly  moulds  the  public  opinion  to  your  ends." 
Ingeniously  but  fairly  he  sketched  Douglas  as  the 
most  efficient  among  the  pro-slavery  leaders.  Per 
haps  the  clever  and  truthful  picture  may  have  led 
Mr.  Greeley  and  some  other  gentlemen  at  the  East 
to  suspect  that  they  had  been  inconsiderate  in  their 
choice  between  the  Western  rivals;  and  perhaps, 
also,  Lincoln,  while  addressing  imaginary  Ken 
tuckians,  had  before  his  inner  eye  some  Eastern 
auditors.  For  at  the  time  he  did  not  know  that 
his  voice  would  ever  be  heard  at  any  point  nearer 
to  their  ears  than  the  hall  in  which  he  then  stood. 
Within  a  few  weeks,  however,  this  unlooked-for 
good  fortune  befell.  In  October,  1859,  he  was 
invited  to  speak  in  the  following  winter  in  New 
York.  That  the  anti-slavery  men  of  that  city 
wished  to  test  him  by  personal  observation  signified 
that  his  reputation  was  national,  and  that  the  high 
est  aspirations  were,  therefore,  not  altogether  pre 
sumptuous.  He  accepted  gladly,  and  immediately 
began  to  prepare  an  address  which  probably  cost 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS    JOINT  DEBATE.    153 

him  more  labor  than  any  other  speech  which  he 
ever  made.  He  found  time,  however,  in  December 
to  make  a  journey  through  Kansas,  where  he  de 
livered  several  speeches,  which  have  not  been  pre 
served  but  are  described  as  "repetitions  of  those 
previously  made  in  Illinois."  Lamon  tells  us  that 
the  journey  was  an  "ovation,"  and  that  "wherever 
Lincoln  went,  he  was  met  by  vast  assemblages  ox 
people."  The  population  of  this  agricultural  State 
was  hardly  in  a  condition  to  furnish  "vast  assem 
blages  "  at  numerous  points,  but  doubtless  the  vis 
itor  received  gratifying  assurance  that  upon  this 
battle-ground  of  slavery  and  anti-slavery  the  win 
ning  party  warmly  appreciated  his  advocacy  of 
their  cause. 

On  Saturday,  February  25,  1860,  Lincoln  ar 
rived  in  New  York.  On  Monday  his  hosts  "found 
him  dressed  in  a  sleek  and  shining  suit  of  new 
black,  covered  with  very  apparent  creases  and 
wrinkles,  acquired  by  being  packed  too  closely  and 
too  long  in  his  little  valise.  He  felt  uneasy  in  his 
new  clothes  and  a  strange  place."  Certainly  no 
thing  in  his  previous  experience  had  prepared  him 
to  meet  with  entire  indifference  an  audience  of 
metropolitan  critics;  indeed,  had  the  surroundings 
been  more  familiar,  he  had  enough  at  stake  to  tax 
his  equanimity  when  William  Cullen  Bryant  intro 
duced  him  simply  as  "an  eminent  citizen  of  the 
West,  hitherto  known  to  you  only  by  reputation." 
Probably  the  first  impression  made  upon  those 
auditors  by  the  ungainly  Westerner  in  his  outland- 


154  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

ish  garb  were  not  the  same  which  they  carried 
home  with  them  a  little  later.  The  speech  was  so 
condensed  that  a  sketch  of  it  is  not  possible.  For 
tunately  it  had  the  excellent  quality  of  steadily 
expanding  in  interest  and  improving  to  the  end. 

Of  the  Dred  Scott  case  he  cleverly  said  that  the 
Courts  had  decided  it  "in  a  sort  of  way  /"  but, 
after  all,  the  decision  was  "mainly  based  upon  a 
mistaken  statement  of  fact,  —  the  statement  in  the 
opinion  that  'the  right  of  property  in  a  slave  is 
distinctly  and  expressly  affirmed  in  the  Constitu 
tion.'" 

In  closing,  he  begged  the  Republicans,  in  behalf 
of  peace  and  harmony,  to  "do  nothing  through 
passion  and  ill-temper; "  but  he  immediately  went 
on  to  show  the  antagonism  between  Republican 
opinion  and  Democratic  opinion  with  a  distinct 
ness  which  left  110  hope  of  harmony,  and  very  lit 
tle  hope  of  peace.  To  satisfy  the  Southerners,  he 
said,  we  must  "cease  to  call  slavery  wrong ^  and 
join  them  in  calling  it  right.  And  this  must  be 
done  thoroughly,  —  done  in  acts  as  well  as  in 
words.  .  .  .  We  must  arrest  and  return  their 
fugitive  slaves  with  greedy  pleasure.  We  must 
pull  down  our  free-state  Constitutions.  ...  If 
slavery  is  right,  all  words,  acts,  laws,  and  consti 
tutions  against  it  are  themselves  wrong,  and  should 
be  silenced  and  swept  away.  If  it  is  right,  we 
cannot  object  to  its  nationality,  its  universality; 
if  it  is  wrong,  they  cannot  justly  insist  upon  its 
extension,  its  enlargement.  All  they  ask  we  could 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     155 

readily  grant,  if  we  thought  slavery  right;  all  we 
ask  they  could  as  readily  grant,  if  they  thought  it 
wrong.  Their  thinking  it  right  and  our  thinking 
it  wrong  is  the  precise  fact  upon  which  depends 
the  whole  controversy.  Thinking  it  right,  as  they 
do,  they  are  not  to  blame  for  desiring  its  full  recog 
nition,  as  being  right;  but  thinking  it  wrong,  as 
we  do,  can  we  yield  to  them  ?  .  .  .  Wrong  as  we 
think  slavery  is,  we  can  yet  afford  to  let  it  alone 
where  it  is,  because  that  much  is  due  to  the  neces 
sity  arising  from  its  actual  presence  in  the  nation ; 
but  can  we,  while  our  votes  will  prevent  it,  allow 
it  to  spread  into  the  national  Territories,  and  to 
overrun  us  here  in  these  free  States?  If  our  sense 
of  duty  forbids  this  ...  let  us  be  diverted  by  no 
sophistical  contrivances,  such  as  groping  for  some 
middle  ground  between  the  right  and  the  wrong, 
vain  as  the  search  for  a  man  who  should  be  neither 
a  living  man  nor  a  dead  man ;  such  as  a  policy  of 
'don't  care  '  on  a  question  about  which  all  true 
men  do  care;  such  as  Union  appeals  beseeching 
true  Union  men  to  yield  to  Disunionists,  reversing 
the  divine  rule  and  calling  not  the  sinners  but  the 
righteous  to  repentance." 

The  next  morning  the  best  newspapers  gave  full 
reports  of  the  speech,  with  compliments.  The 
columns  of  the  "Evening  Post"  were  generously 
declared  to  be  "indefinitely  elastic"  for  such  utter 
ances;  and  the  "Tribune"  expressed  commenda 
tion  wholly  out  of  accord  with  the  recent  notions 
of  its  editor.  The  rough  fellow  from  the  crude 


156  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

West  had  made  a  powerful  impression  upon  the 
cultivated  gentlemen  of  the  East. 

From  New  York  Lincoln  went  to  Massachusetts, 
Khode  Island,  New  Hampshire  and  Connecticut. 
In  this  last  -  named  State  he  delivered  speeches 
which  are  said  to  have  contributed  largely  to  the 
Republican  success  in  the  closely  contested  election 
then  at  hand.  In  Manchester  it  was  noticed  that 
"He  did  not  abuse  the  South,  the  administration, 
or  the  Democrats,  or  indulge  in  any  personalities, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  hits  at  Douglas's  no 
tions."1 

These  speeches  of  1858,  1859,  and  1860,  have  a 
very  great  value  as  contributions  to  history.  Dur 
ing  that  period  every  dweller  in  the  United  States 
was  hotly  concerned  about  this  absorbing  question 
of  slavery,  advancing  his  own  views,  weighing  or 
encountering  the  arguments  of  others,  quarrelling, 
perhaps,  with  his  oldest  friends  and  his  nearest 
kindred,  —  for  about  this  matter  men  easily  quar 
relled  and  rarely  compromised.  Every  man  who 
fancied  that  he  could  speak  in  public  got  upon 
some  platform  in  city,  town,  or  village,  and  secured 
an  audience  by  his  topic  if  not  by  his  ability ;  every 
one  who  thought  that  he  could  write  found  some 
way  to  print  what  he  had  to  say  upon  a  subject  of 
which  readers  never  tired ;  and  for  whatever  pur 
pose  two  or  three  men  were  gathered  together,  they 
were  not  likely  to  separate  without  a  few  words 
about  North  and  South,  pro-slavery  and  anti-slav- 

1  The  Mirror,  quoted  by  Lamon,  442. 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     157 

ery.  Never  was  any  matter  more  harried  and  ran 
sacked  by  disputation.  Now  to  all  the  speaking 
and  writing  of  the  Republicans  Lincoln's  condensed 
speeches  were  what  a  syllabus  is  to  an  elaborate 
discourse,  what  a  lawyer's  brief  is  to  his  verbal 
argument.  Perhaps  they  may  better  be  likened  to 
an  anti- slavery  gospel ;  as  the  New  Testament  is 
supposed  to  cover  the  whole  ground  of  Christian 
doctrines  and  Christian  ethics,  so  that  theologians 
and  preachers  innumerable  have  only  been  able  to 
make  elaborations  or  glosses  upon  the  original  text, 
so  Lincoln's  speeches  contain  the  whole  basis  of 
the  anti-slavery  cause  as  maintained  by  the  Repub 
lican  party.  They  also  set  forth  a  considerable 
part  of  the  Southern  position,  doubtless  as  fairly 
as  the  machinations  of  the  Devil  are  set  forth  in 
Holy  Writ.  They  only  rather  gingerly  refrain 
from  speaking  of  the  small  body  of  ultra-Aboli 
tionists,  —  for  while  Lincoln  was  far  from  agreeing 
with  these  zealots,  he  felt  that  it  was  undesirable 
to  widen  by  any  excavation  upon  his  side  the  chasm 
between  them  and  the  Republicans.  So  the  fact 
is  that  the  whole  doctrine  of  Republicanism,  as 
it  existed  during  the  political  campaign  which  re 
sulted  in  the  election  of  Lincoln,  also  all  the  his 
torical  facts  supporting  that  doctrine,  were  clearly 
and  accurately  stated  in  these  speeches.  Specific 
points  were  more  elaborated  by  other  persons ;  but 
every  seed  was  to  be  found  in  this  granary. 

This  being  the  case,  it  is  worth  noticing  that 
both  Lincoln  and  Douglas  confined  their  dispu- 


158  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

tation  closely  to  the  slavery  question.  Disunion 
and  secession  were  words  familiar  in  every  ear, 
yet  Lincoln  referred  to  these  things  only  twice 
or  thrice,  and  incidentally,  while  Douglas  ignored 
them.  This  fact  is  fraught  with  meaning.  Amer 
ican  writers  and  American  readers  have  always 
met  upon  the  tacit  understanding  that  the  Union 
was  the  chief  cause  of,  and  the  best  justification 
for,  the  war.  An  age  may  come  when  historians, 
treating  our  history  as  we  treat  that  of  Greece, 
stirred  by  no  emotion  at  the  sight  of  the  "Stars 
and  Stripes,"  moved  by  no  patriotism  at  the  name 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  will  seek  a  deeper 
philosophy  to  explain  this  obstinate,  bloody,  costly 
struggle.  Such  writers  may  say,  that  a  rich,  civil 
ized  multitude  of  human  beings,  possessors  of  the 
quarter  of  a  continent,  believing  it  best  for  their 
interests  to  set  up  an  independent  government  for 
themselves,  fell  back  upon  the  right  of  revolution, 
though  they  chose  not  to  call  it  by  that  name. 
Now  even  if  it  be  possible  to  go  so  far  as  to  say 
that  every  nation  has  always  a  right  to  preserve  by 
force,  if  it  can,  its  own  integrity,  certainly  it  can 
not  be  stated  as  a  further  truth  that  no  portion 
of  a  nation  can  ever  be  justified  in  endeavoring 
to  obtain  an  independent  national  existence;  no 
citizen  of  this  country  can  admit  this,  but  must 
say  that  such  an  endeavor  is  justifiable  or  not  jus 
tifiable  according  as  its  cause  and  basis  are  right 
or  wrong.  Far  down,  then,  at  the  very  bottom 
lay  the  question  whether  the  Southerners  had  a 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  JOINT  DEBATE.     159 

sufficient  cause  upon  which  to  base  a  revolution. 
Now  this  question  was  hardly  conclusively  an 
swered  by  the  perfectly  true  statement  that  the 
North  had  not  interfered  with  Southern  rights. 
Southerners  might  admit  this,  and  still  believe 
that  their  welfare  could  be  best  subserved  by  a 
government  wholly  their  own.  So  the  very  bot 
tom  question  of  all  still  remained :  Was  the  South 
endeavoring  to  establish  a  government  of  its  own 
for  a  justifiable  reason  and  a  right  purpose  ?  Now 
the  avowed  purpose  was  to  establish  on  an  endur 
ing  foundation  a  permanent  slave  empire ;  and  the 
declared  reason  was,  that  slavery  was  not  safe 
within  the  Union.  Underneath  the  question  of 
the  Union  therefore  lay,  logically,  the  question  of 
slavery. 

Lincoln  and  the  other  Republican  leaders  said 
that,  if  slavery  extension  was  prevented,  then 
slavery  was  in  the  way  of  extinction.  If  the 
assertion  was  true,  it  pretty  clearly  followed  that 
the  South  could  retain  slavery  only  by  indepen 
dence  and  a  complete  imperial  control  within  the 
limits  of  its  own  homogeneous  nationality;  for 
undeniably  the  preponderant  northern  mass  was 
becoming  firmly  resolved  that  slavery  should  not 
be  extended,  however  it  might  be  tolerated  within 
its  present  limits.  So  still,  by  anti-slavery  state 
ment  itself,  the  ultimate  question  was:  whether 
or  not  the  preservation  of  slavery  was  a  right  and 
sufficient  cause  or  purpose  for  establishing  an 
independent  nationality.  Lincoln,  therefore,  went 
direct  to  the  logical  heart  of  the  contention,  when 


160  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

he  said  that  the  real  dispute  was  whether  slavery 
was  a  right  thing  or  a  wrong  thing.  If  slavery 
was  a  right  thing,  a  Union,  conducted  upon  a  policy 
which  was  believed  to  doom  it  to  "ultimate  ex- 
tinctifcn  "  was  not  a  right  thing.  But  if  slavery 
was  a  wrong  thing,  a  revolution  undertaken  with 
the  purpose  of  making  it  perpetual  was  also  a 
wrong  thing.  Therefore,  from  beginning  to  end 
Lincoln  talked  about  slavery.  By  so  doing  he  did 
what  he  could  to  give  to  the  war  a  character  far 
higher  even  than  a  war  of  patriotism,  for  he  ex 
tended  its  meaning  far  beyond  the  age  and  the 
country  of  its  occurrence,  and  made  of  it  not  a  war 
for  the  United  States  alone,  but  a  war  for  hu 
manity,  a  war  for  ages  and  peoples  yet  to  come. 
In  like  manner,  he  himself  also  gained  the  right  to 
be  regarded  as  much  more  than  a  great  party 
leader,  even  more  than  a  great  patriot ;  for  he  be 
came  a  champion  of  mankind  and  the  defender  of 
the  chief  right  of  man.  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that 
he  saw  these  things  in  this  light  at  the  moment,  or 
that  he  accurately  formulated  the  precise  relation 
ship  and  fundamental  significance  of  all  that  was 
then  in  process  of  saying  and  doing.  Time  must 
elapse,  and  distance  must  enable  one  to  get  a  com 
prehensive  view,  before  the  philosophy  of  an  era 
like  that  of  the  civil  war  becomes  intelligible. 
But  the  philosophy  is  not  the  less  correct  because 
those  who  were  framing  it  piece  by  piece  did  not 
at  any  one  moment  project  before  their  mental 
vision  the  whole  in  its  finished  proportions  and  re 
lationship. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

ELECTION. 

MR.  J.  W.  FELL,  a  leading  citizen  of  Illinois, 
says  that  after  the  debates  of  1858  he  urged  Lin 
coln  to  seek  the  Republican  nomination  for  the 
presidency  in  1860.  Lincoln,  however,  replied 
curtly  that  men  like  Seward  and  Chase  were  enti 
tled  to  take  precedence,  and  that  no  such  "good 
luck"  was  in  store  for  him.  In  March,  1859,  he 
wrote  to  another  person :  "In  regard  to  the  other 
matter  that  you  speak  of,  I  beg  that  you  will  not 
give  it  further  mention.  I  do  not  think  I  am 
fit  for  the  presidency."  He  said  the  same  to  the 
editor  of  the  "Central  Illinois  Gazette;  "  but  this 
gentleman  "brought  him  out  in  the  issue  of  May 
4,"  and  "thence  the  movement  spread  rapidly  and 
strongly."1  In  the  winter  of  1859-60  sundry 
"intimate  friends,"  active  politicians  of  Illinois, 
pressed  him  to  consent  to  be  mentioned  as  a  can 
didate.  He  considered  the  matter  over  night  and 
then  gave  them  the  desired  permission,  at  the  same 
time  saying  that  he  would  not  accept  the  vice- 
presidency. 

Being  now  fairly  started  in  the  race,   he  used 

1  Lamon,  422. 


162  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

all  his  well-known  skill  as  a  politician  to  forward 
his  campaign,  though  nothing  derogatory  is  to 
be  inferred  from  these  words  as  to  his  conduct 
or  methods.  February  9,  1860,  he  wrote  to  Mr. 
Judd:  "I  am  not  in  a  position  where  it  would 
hurt  much  for  me  not  to  be  nominated  on  the  na 
tional  ticket;  but  I  am  where  it  would  hurt  some 
for  me  not  to  get  the  Illinois  delegates.  .  .  .  Can 
you  help  me  a  little  in  this  matter  at  your  end  of 
the  vineyard?"  This  point  of  the  allegiance  of 
his  own  State  was  soon  made  right.  The  Repub 
lican  State  Convention  met  in  the  "Wigwam"  at 
Decatur,  May  9  and  10,  1860.  Governor  Oglesby, 
who  presided,  suggested  that  a  distinguished  citi 
zen,  whom  Illinois  delighted  to  honor,  was  pres 
ent,  and  that  he  should  be  invited  to  a  place  on 
the  stand ;  and  at  once,  amid  a  tumult  of  applause, 
Lincoln  was  lifted  over  the  heads  of  the  crowd  to 
the  platform.  John  Hanks  then  theatrically  en 
tered,  bearing  a  couple  of  fence  rails,  and  a  flag 
with  the  legend  that  they  were  from  a  "lot  made 
by  Abraham  Lincoln  and  John  Hanks  in  the 
Sangamon  Bottom,  in  the  year  1880."  The  sym 
pathetic  roar  rose  again.  Then  Lincoln  made  a 
"speech,"  appropriate  to  the  occasion.  At  last, 
attention  was  given  to  business,  and  the  Convention 
resolved  that  Abraham  Lincoln  was  the  first  choice 
of  the  Republican  party  of  Illinois  for  the  presi 
dency,  and  instructed  their  delegates  to  the  nomi 
nating  convention  "to  use  all  honorable  means  to 

O 

secure  his  nomination,  and  to  cast  the  vote  of  the 
State  as  a  unit  for  him." 


ELECTION.  163 

With  the  opening  of  the  spring  of  1860  the  sev 
eral  parties  began  the  campaign  in  earnest.  The 
Democratic  Convention  met  first,  at  Charleston, 
April  23 ;  and  immediately  the  line  of  disruption 
opened.  Upon  the  one  side  stood  Douglas,  with 
the  moderate  men  and  nearly  all  the  Northern 
delegates,  while  against  him  were  the  advocates 
of  extreme  Southern  doctrines,  supported  by  the 
administration  and  by  most  of  the  delegates  from 
the  "Cotton  States."  The  majority  of  the  com 
mittee  appointed  to  draft  the  platform  were  anti- 
Douglas  men ;  but  their  report  was  rejected,  and 
that  offered  by  the  pro-Douglas  minority  was  sub 
stituted,  165  yeas  to  138  nays.1  Thereupon  the 
delegations  of  Alabama,  Mississippi,  Florida,  and 
Texas,  and  sundry  delegates  from  other  States, 
withdrew  from  the  Convention,2  taking  away  45 
votes  out  of  a  total  of  303.  Those  who  remained 
declared  the  vote  of  two  thirds  of  a  full  Conven 
tion,  i.  e.,  202  votes,  to  be  necessary  for  a  choice. 
Then  during  three  days  fifty-seven  ballots  were 
cast,  Douglas  being  always  far  in  the  lead,  but 
never  polling  more  than  152J  votes.  At  last,  on 
May  3,  an  adjournment  was  had  until  June  18, 
at  Baltimore.  At  this  second  meeting  contesting 

1  The  majority  report  was  supported  by  15  slave  States  and  2 
free  States,  casting1  127  electoral  votes ;  the   minority  report  was 
siipported  by  15  free  States,  casting1 176  electoral  votes.    N.  and  H., 
ii.  234. 

2  This  action  was  soon  afterward  approved  in  a  manifesto  signed 
by  Jefferson  Davis,  Toombs,  Iverson,   Slidell,  Benjamin,  Mason 
and  others.     Ibid.  245. 


164  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

delegations  appeared,  and  the  decisions  were  uni 
formly  in  favor  of  the  Douglas  men,  which  pro 
voked  another  secession  of  the  extremist  Southern 
men.  A  ballot  showed  173J  votes  for  Douglas 
out  of  a  total  of  191^;  the  total  was  less  than  two 
thirds  of  the  full  number  of  the  original  Conven 
tion,  and  therefore  it  was  decided  that  any  person 
receiving  two  thirds  of  the  votes  cast  by  the  dele 
gates  present  should  be  deemed  the  nominee.  The 
next  ballot  gave  Douglas  181J.  Herschel  V. 
Johnson  of  Georgia  was  nominated  for  vice-presi 
dent. 

On  June  28,  also  at  Baltimore,  there  came  to 
gether  a  collection  composed  of  original  seceders 
at  Charleston,  and  of  some  who  had  been  rejected 
and  others  who  had  seceded  at  Baltimore.  Very 
few  Northern  men  were  present,  and  the  body  in 
fact  represented  the  Southern  wing  of  the  Demo 
cracy.  Having,  like  its  competitor,  the  merit  of 
knowing  its  own  mind,  it  promptly  nominated 
John  C.  Breckenridge  of  Kentucky  and  Joseph 
Lane  of  Oregon,  and  adopted  the  radical  platform 
which  had  been  reported  at  Charleston. 

These  doings  opened,  so  that  it  could  never  be 
closed,  that  seam  of  which  the  thread  had  long 
been  visible  athwart  the  surface  of  the  old  Demo 
cratic  party.  The  great  record  of  discipline  and 
of  triumph,  which  the  party  had  made  when  united 
beneath  the  dominion  of  imperious  leaders,  was 
over,  and  forever.  Those  questions  which  Lin 
coln  obstinately  and  against  advice  had  insisted 


ELECTION.  165 

upon  pushing  in  1858  had  forced  this  disastrous 
development  of  irreconcilable  differences.  The 
answers,  which  Douglas  could  not  shirk,  had  alien 
ated  the  most  implacable  of  men,  the  dictators 
of  the  Southern  Democracy.  His  "  looking-both- 
ways  "  theory  would  not  fit  with  their  policy,  and 
their  policy  was  and  must  be  immutable ;  modifi 
cation  was  in  itself  defeat.  On  the  other  hand, 
what  he  said  constituted  the  doctrine  to  which  the 
mass  of  the  Northern  Democracy  firmly  held.  So 
now,  although  Eepublicans  admitted  that  it  was 
"morally  certain"  that  the  Democratic  party, 
holding  together,  could  carry  the  election,1  yet 
these  men  from  the  Cotton  States  could  not  take 
victory  and  Douglas  together.2  It  had  actually 
come  to  this,  that  in  spite  of  all  that  Douglas  had 
done  for  the  slave-holders,  they  now  marked  him 
for  destruction  at  any  cost.  Many  also  believe 
that  they  had  another  motive ;  that  they  had  ma 
tured  their  plans  for  secession ;  and  that  they  did 
not  mean  to  have  the  scheme  disturbed  or  post 
poned  by  an  ostensibly  Democratic  triumph  in  the 
shape  of  the  election  of  Douglas. 

In  May  the  convention  of  the  Constitutional 
Union  party  met,  also  at  Baltimore.  This  organ 
ization  was  a  sudden  outgrowth  designed  only  to 
meet  the  present  emergency.  Its  whole  political 
doctrine  lay  in  the  opening  words  of  the  one  reso 
lution  which  constituted  its  platform:  "That  it  is 
both  the  part  of  patriotism  and  of  duty  to  recog- 

1  Greeley's  Amer.  Conflict,  i.  326.  >2  Ibid.  i.  306,  307. 


166  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

nize  no  political  principle  other  than  the  Constitu 
tion  of  the  country,  the  union  of  the  States,  and 
the  enforcement  of  the  laws."  This  party  gath 
ered  nearly  all  the  peaceable  elements  of  the  com 
munity;  it  assumed  a  deprecatory  attitude  between 
angry  contestants,  and  of  course  received  the  abuse 
and  contempt  of  both;  it  was  devoid  of  combative 
force,  yet  had  some  numerical  strength.  The  Re 
publicans  especially  mocked  at  these  "trimmers," 
as  if  their  only  platform  was  moral  cowardice, 
which,  however,  was  an  unfair  statement  of  their 
position.  The  party  died,  of  necessity,  upon  the 
day  when  Lincoln  was  elected,  and  its  members 
were  then  distributed  between  the  Republicans, 
the  Secessionists,  and  the  Copperheads.  John 
Bell,  of  Tennessee,  the  candidate  for  the  presi 
dency,  joined  the  Confederacy;  Edward  Everett, 
of  Massachusetts,  the  candidate  for  the  vice-presi 
dency,  became  a  Republican.  The  party  never 
had  a  hope  of  electing  its  men;  but  its  existence 
increased  the  chance  of  throwing  the  election  into 
Congress;  and  this  hope  inspired  exertions  far 
beyond  what  its  own  prospects  warranted. 

On  May  16  the  Republican  Convention  came 
together  at  Chicago,  where  the  great  "Wigwam" 
had  been  built  to  hold  10,000  persons.  The  in 
tense  interest  with  which  its  action  was  watched 
indicated  the  popular  belief  that  probably  it  would 
name  the  next  president  of  the  United  States. 
Many  candidates  were  named,  chiefly  Seward,  Lin 
coln,  Chase,  Cameron,  Edward  Bates  of  Missouri, 


ELECTION.  167 

and  William  L.  Dayton  of  New  Jersey.  Thurlow 
Weed  was  Seward's  lieutenant.  Horace  Greeley, 
chiefly  bent  upon  the  defeat  of  Seward,  would 
have  liked  to  achieve  it  by  the  success  of  Bates. 
David  Davis,  aided  by  Judge  Logan  and  a  band 
of  personal  friends  from  Illinois,  was  manager  for 
Lincoln.  Primarily  the  contest  lay  between  Sew 
ard  and  Lincoln,  and  only  a  dead -lock  between 
these  two  could  give  a  chance  to  some  one  of  the 
others.  But  Seward's  friends  hoped,  and  Lin 
coln's  friends  dreaded,  that  the  New  Yorker  might 
win  by  a  rush  011  the  first  ballot.  George  Ash- 
mun  of  Massachusetts  presided.  With  little 
discussion  a  platform  was  adopted,  long  and  ill- 
written,  overloaded  with  adjectives  and  rhetoric, 
sacrificing  dignity  to  the  supreme  pleasure  of 
abusing  the  Democracy,  but  honest  in  stating 
Republican  doctrines,  and  clearly  displaying  the 
temper  of  an  earnest,  aggressive  party,  hot  for  the 
fight  and  confident  of  victory.  The  vote  of  accept 
ance  was  greeted  with  such  a  cheering  that  "a 
herd  of  buffaloes  or  lions  could  not  have  made  a 
more  tremendous  roaring." 

The  details  of  the  brief  but  sharp  contest  for 
the  nomination  are  not  altogether  gratifying.  The 
partisans  of  Seward  set  about  winning  votes  by 
much  parading  in  the  streets  with  banners  and 
music,  and  by  out-yelling  all  competitors  within 
the  walls  of  the  convention.  For  this  intelligent 
purpose  they  had  engaged  Tom  Hyer,  the  prize 
fighter,  with  a  gang  of  roughs,  to  hold  possession 


168  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

of  the  Wigwam,  and  to  howl  inimitably  at  appro 
priate  moments.  But  they  had  undertaken  a  diffi 
cult  task  in  trying  to  outdo  the  great  West,  in  one 
of  its  own  cities,  at  a  game  of  this  kind.  The 
"Lincoln  leaders  in  their  turn  secured  a  couple  of 
stentorian  yellers  (one  of  them  a  Democrat),  in 
structed  them  carefully,  and  then  filled  the  Wig 
wam  full  actually  at  daybreak,  while  the  Seward 
men  were  marching ;  so  in  the  next  yelling  match 
the  West  won  magnificently.  How  great  was  the 
real  efficiency  of  these  tactics  in  affecting  the 
choice  of  the  ruler  of  a  great  nation  commonly 
accounted  intelligent,  it  is  difficult  to  say  with 
accuracy;  but  it  is  certain  that  the  expert  mana 
gers  spared  no  pains  about  this  scenic  business  of 
"enthusiasm." 

Meanwhile  other  work,  entirely  quiet,  was  be 
ing  done  elsewhere.  The  objection  to  Seward  was 
that  he  was  too  radical,  too  far  in  advance  of  the 
party.  The  Bates  following  were  pushing  their 
candidate  as  a  moderate  man,  who  would  be  ac 
ceptable  to  "Union  men."  But  Bates's  chance 
was  small,  and  any  tendency  towards  a  moderate 
candidate  was  likely  to  carry  his  friends  to  Lin 
coln  rather  than  to  Seward;  for  Lincoln  was  gen 
erally  supposed,  however  erroneously,1  to  be  more 
remote  from  Abolitionism  than  Seward  was.  To 
counteract  this,  a  Seward  delegate  telegraphed  to 

1  Mr.  Blaine  says  that  Lincoln  "  was  chosen  in  spite  of  expres 
sions  far  more  radical  than  those  of  Mr.  Seward."  Twenty  Years 
of  Congress,  i.  169. 


ELECTION.  169 

the  Bates  men  at  St.  Louis  that  Lincoln  was  as 
radical  as  Seward.  Lincoln,  at  Springfield,  saw 
this  dispatch,  and  at  once  wrote  a  message  to  David 
Davis :  "  Lincoln  agrees  with  Seward  in  his  irre 
pressible-conflict  idea,  and  in  Negro  Equality;  but 
he  is  opposed  to  Seward 's  Higher  Law.  Make  no 
contracts  that  will  bind  me."  He  underscored  the 
last  sentence ;  but  when  his  managers  saw  it,  they 
recognized  that  such  independence  did  not  accord 
with  the  situation,  and  so  they  set  it  aside. 
The  first  vote  was :  — 

Whole  number       .....  465 

Necessary  for  choice            .         .         .  233 

William  H.  Seward,  of  New  York          .  173| 

Abraham' Lincoln,  of  Illinois      .          .  102 

Simon  Cameron,  of  Pennsylvania  .          .  50J 

Salmon  P.  Chase,  of  Ohio .         .  49 

Edward  Bates,  of  Missouri    ...  48 

William  L.  Dayton,  of  New  Jersey    .  14 

John  McLean,  of  Ohio            ...  12 

Jacob  Collamer,  of  Vermont       .         .  10 

Scattering     ...  6 

The  fact  was,  and  Lincoln's  friends  perfectly 
understood  it,  that  Cameron  held  that  peculiar 
kind  of  power  which  gave  him  no  real  prospect  of 
success,  yet  had  a  considerable  saleable  value. 
Could  they  refrain  from  trying  the  market?  They 
asked  the  owners  of  the  50J  Cameron  votes  what 
was  their  price.  The  owners  said :  The  Treasury 
Department.  Lincoln's  friends  declared 
extravagant.  Then  they  all  chaffered. 


170  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Cameron's  men  took  a  place  in  the  Cabinet,  with 
out  further  specification.  Lamon  says  that  an 
other  smaller  contract  was  made  with  the  friends 
of  Caleb  B.  Smith.  Then  the  Lincoln  managers 
rested  in  a  pleasing  sense  of  security. 

The  second  ballot  showed  slight  changes :  — 

Seward            .         .     184$  Bates          ...  35 

Lincoln  .          .          181  Dayton            .          .  10 

Cameron         .         .         2  McLean     ...  8 

Chase  .         .           42  £  Scattering       .         .  2 

Upon  the  third  ballot  delivery  was  made  of 
what  Mr.  Davis  had  bought.  That  epidemic  fore 
knowledge,  which  sometimes  so  unaccountably  fore 
runs  an  event,  told  the  convention  that  the  decision 
was  at  hand.  A  dead  silence  reigned  save  for  the 
click  of  the  telegraphic  instruments  and  the  low 
scratching  of  hundreds  of  pencils  checking  off  the 
votes  as  the  roll  was  called.  Those  who  were 
keeping  the  tally  saw  that  it  stood :  — 

Seward  .          .     180  Dayton       ...  1 

Lincoln  .         .         23 1|  McLean          .         .  5 

Chase    .  .          .       24|  Scattering           .         .  1 

Bates  .         .           22 

Cameron  was  out  of  the  race;  Lincoln  was 
within  1^  votes  of  the  goal.  Before  the  count 
could  be  announced,  a  delegate  from  Ohio  trans 
ferred  four  votes  to  Lincoln.  This  settled  the 
matter;  and  then  other  delegations  followed,  till 
Lincoln's  score  rose  to  354.  At  once  the  "enthu 
siasm  "  of  10,000  men  again  reduced  to  insignin- 


ELECTION.  171 

cance  a  "herd  of  buffaloes  or  lions."  When  at 
last  quiet  was  restored,  William  M.  Evarts,  who 
had  led  for  Seward,  offered  the  usual  motion  to 
make  the  nomination  of  Abraham  Lincoln  unani 
mous.  It  was  done.  Again  the  "tremendous 
roaring  "  arose.  Later  in  the  day  the  convention 
nominated  Hannibal  Hamlin1  of  Maine,  on  the 
second  ballot,  by  367  votes,  for  the  vice-presi 
dency.  Then  for  many  hours,  till  exhaustion 
brought  rest,  Chicago  was  given  over  to  the  wonted 
follies;  cannon  boomed,  music  resounded,  and 
streets  and  bar-rooms  were  filled  with  the  howling 
and  drinking  crowds  of  the  intelligent  promoters 
of  one  of  the  great  moral  crusades  of  the  human 
race. 

Lamon  says  that  the  committee  deputed  to  wait 
upon  Lincoln  at  Springfield  found  him  "sad  and 
dejected.  The  reaction  from  excessive  joy  to  deep 
despondency  —  a  process  peculiar  to  his  constitu 
tion —  had  already  set  in."2  His  remarks  to 
these  gentlemen  were  brief  and  colorless.  His 
letter  afterward  was  little  more  than  a  simple  ac 
ceptance  of  the  platform. 

Since  white  men  first  landed  on  this  continent, 
the  selection  of  Washington  to  lead  the  army  of 
the  Revolution  is  the  only  event  to  be  compared  in 

1  "  In  strong1  common-sense,  in  sagacity  and  sound  judgment, 
iu  rugged  integrity  of  character,  Mr.  Hamlin  has  had  no  superior 
among  public  men."  Blaine,  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  i.  170. 

-  Lamon,  453. 


172  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

good  fortune  with  this  nomination  of  Abraham 
Lincoln.  Yet  the  convention  deserved  no  credit 
for  its  action.  It  did  not  know  the  true  ratio  be 
tween  Seward  and  Lincoln,  which  only  the  future 
was  to  make  plain.  By  all  that  it  did  know,  it 
ought  to  have  given  the  honor  to  Seward,  who 
merited  it  by  the  high  offices  which  he  had  held 
with  distinction  and  without  blemish,  by  the  lead 
ership  which  he  had  acquired  in  the  party  through 
long-continued  constancy  and  courage,  by  the  force 
and  clearness  with  which  he  had  maintained  its 
principles,  by  his  experience  and  supposed  natural 
aptitude  in  the  higher  walks  of  statesmanship. 
Yet  actually  by  reason  of  these  very  qualifica 
tions  a  it  was  now  admitted  that  the  all-important 
"October  States"  of  Indiana  and  Pennsylvania 
could  not  be  carried  by  the  Eepublicans,  if  Seward 
were  nominated;  while  Greeley,  sitting  in  the  con 
vention  as  a  substitute  for  a  delegate  from  Oregon, 
cast  as  much  of  the  weight  of  New  York  as  he 
could  lift  into  the  anti-Seward  scale.  In  plain 
fact,  the  convention,  by  its  choice,  paid  no  com 
pliment  either  to  Lincoln  or  to  the  voters  of  the 
party.  They  took  him  because  he  was  "availa 
ble,"  and  the  reason  that  he  was  "available"  lay 
not  in  any  popular  appreciation  of  his  merits,  but 
in  the  contrary  truth :  —  that  the  mass  of  people 
could  place  no  intelligent  estimate  upon  him  at  all, 

1  McClure  adds,  or  rather  mentions  as  the  chief  cause,  Seward's 
position  on  the  public-school  question  in  New  York.  Lincoln  and 
Men  of  War-Times,  28,  29. 


ELECTION.  173 

either  for  good  or  for  ill.  Outside  of  Illinois  a  few 
men,  who  had  studied  his  speeches,  esteemed  him 
an  able  man  in  debate ;  more  had  a  vague  notion 
of  him  as  an  effective  stump  speaker  of  the  West; 
far  the  greatest  number  had  to  find  out  about 
him.1  In  a  word,  Mr.  Lincoln  gained  the  nom 
ination  because  Mr.  Seward  had  been  "too  con 
spicuous,"  whereas  he  himself  was  so  little  known 
that  it  was  possible  for  Wendell  Phillips  to  in 
quire  indignantly:  "Who  is  this  huckster  in  poli 
tics?  Who  is  this  county  court  advocate?"  2  For 
these  singular  reasons  he  was  the  most  "available  " 
candidate  who  could  be  offered  before  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States ! 

It  cannot  be  said  that  the  nomination  was  re 
ceived  with  much  satisfaction.  "Honest  old  Abe, 
the  rail-splitter !  "  might  sound  well  in  the  ear  of 
the  masses;  but  the  Republican  party  was  laden 
with  the  burden  of  an  immense  responsibility,  and 
the  men  who  did  its  thinking  could  not  reasonably 
feel  certain  that  rail-splitting  was  an  altogether 
satisfactory  training  for  the  leader  in  such  an  era 
as  was  now  at  hand.  Nevertheless,  nearly  3  all  came 
to  the  work  of  the  campaign  with  as  much  zeal  as  if 
they  had  surely  known  the  full  value  of  their  candi 
date.  Shutting  their  minds  against  doubts,  they 
made  the  most  spirited  and  energetic  canvass  which  . 

"  To  the  country  at  large  he  was  an  obscure,  not  to  say  an  un 
known  man."  Life  of  W.  L.  Garrison,  by  his  children,  iii.  503. 

2  Life  of  W.  L.  Garrison,  by  his  children,  iii.  503. 

3  See  remarks  of  McClure,  Lincoln  and  Men  of  War-Times, 

28,  29. 


174  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

has  ever  taken  place  in  the  country.  The  organi 
zation  of  the  "  Wide- Awake  "  clubs  was  an  effec 
tive  success.1  None  who  saw  will  ever  forget  the 
spectacle  presented  by  these  processions  wherein 
many  thousands  of  men,  singing  the  campaign 
songs,  clad  in  uniform  capes  of  red  or  white  oil 
cloth,  each  with  a  flaming  torch  or  a  colored  lan 
tern,  marched  nightly  in  every  city  and  town  of 
the  North,  in  apparently  endless  numbers  and  with 
military  precision,  making  the  streets  a  brilliant 
river  of  variously  tinted  flame.  Torchlight  pa 
rades  have  become  mere  conventional  affairs  since 
those  days,  when  there  was  a  spirit  in  them  which 
nothing  has  ever  stirred  more  lately.  They  were 
a  good  preparation  for  the  more  serious  marching 
and  severer  drill  which  were  soon  to  come,  though 
the  Republicans  scoffed  at  all  anticipations  of  such 
a  future,  and  sneered  at  the  timid  ones  who 
croaked  of  war  and  bloodshed. 

Almost  from  the  beginning  it  was  highly  prob 
able  that  the  Republicans  would  win,  and  it  was 
substantially  certain  that  none  of  their  competitors 
could  do  so.  The  only  contrary  chance  was  that 
no  election  might  be  made  by  the  people,  and  that 
it  might  be  thrown  into  Congress.  Douglas  with 
his  wonted  spirit  made  a  vigorous  fight,  travelling 
to  and  fro,  speaking  constantly  in  the  North  and 
a  few  times  in  the  South,  but  defiant  rather  than 
conciliatory  in  tone.  He  did  not  show  one  whit 
the  less  energy  because  it  was  obvious  that  he 
1  See  N.  and  H.,  ii.  284  n. 


ELECTION.  175 

waged  a  contest  without  hope.  If  there  were  any 
road  to  Democratic  success,  which  it  now  seems 
that  there  was  not,  it  lay  in  uniting  the  sundered 
party.  An  attempt  was  made  to  arrange  that 
whichever  Democratic  candidate  should  ultimately 
display  the  greater  strength  should  receive  the  full 
support  of  the  party.  Projects  for  a  fusion  ticket 
met  with  some  success  in  New  York.  In  Pennsyl 
vania  like  schemes  were  imperfectly  successful. 
In  other  Northern  States  they  were  received  with 
scant  favor.  Except  some  followers  of  Bell  and 
Everett,  men  were  in  no  temper  for  compromise. 
At  the  South  fusion  was  not  even  attempted;  the 
Breckenridge  men  would  not  hear  of  it ;  the  voters 
in  that  section  were  controlled  by  leaders,  and 
these  leaders  probably  had  a  very  distinct  policy, 
which  would  be  seriously  interfered  with  by  the 
triumph  of  the  Douglas  ticket. 

The  chief  anxiety  of  Lincoln  and  the  Eepubli- 
can  leaders  was  lest  some  voters,  who  disagreed 
with  them  only  on  less  important  issues,  might  stay 
away  from  the  polls.  All  the  platforms,  except 
that  of  the  Constitutional  Union  party,  touched 
upon  other  topics  besides  the  question  of  slavery 
in  the  Territories;  the  tariff,  native  Americanism, 
acquisition  of  Cuba,  a  transcontinental  railway, 
public  lands,  internal  improvements,  all  found 
mention.  The  Know-Nothing  party  still  by  occa 
sional  twitchings  showed  that  life  had  not  quite 
taken  flight,  and  endeavors  were  made  to  induce 


176  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Lincoln  to  express  his  views.  But  he  evaded  it.1 
For  above  all  else  he  wished  to  avoid  the  stirring 
of  any  dissension  upon  side  issues  or  minor  points ; 
his  hope  was  to  see  all  opponents  of  the  extension 
of  slavery  put  aside  for  a  while  all  other  matters, 
refrain  from  discussing  troublesome  details,  and 
unite  for  the  one  broad  end  of  putting  slavery 
where  "the  fathers"  had  left  it,  so  that  the  "pub 
lic  mind  should  rest  in  the  belief  that  it  was  in 
the  way  of  ultimate  extinction."  He  felt  it  to  be 
fair  and  right  that  he  should  receive  the  votes  of 
all  anti-slavery  men ;  and  ultimately  he  did,  with 
the  exception  only  of  the  thorough -going  Aboli 
tionists. 

It  was  not  so  very  long  since  he  had  spoken  of 
the  Abolitionist  leaders  as  "friends;  "  but  they  did 
not  reciprocate  the  feeling,  nor  indeed  could  rea 
sonably  be  expected  to  do  so,  or  to  vote  the  Re 
publican  ticket.  They  were  even  less  willing  to 
vote  it  with  Lincoln  at  the  head  of  it  than  if  Sew- 
ard  had  been  there.2  But  Republicanism  itself 
under  any  leader  was  distinctly  at  odds  with  their 
views;  for  when  they  said  "abolition  "  they  meant 
accurately  what  they  said,  and  abolition  certainly 
was  impossible  under  the  Constitution.  The  Re 
publicans,  and  Lincoln  personally,  with  equal  di 
rectness  acknowledged  the  supremacy  of  the  Con- 

1  See  letter  of  May  17,  1859,  to  Dr.  Canisius,  Holland,  196 ;  N. 
and  H.,  ii.  181. 

2  Life  of  W.  L.  Garrison,  by  his  children,  iii.  502. 


ELECTION.  177 

stitution.  Lincoln,  therefore,  plainly  asserted  a 
policy  which  the  Abolitionists  equally  plainly  con 
demned.  In  their  eyes  to  be  a  party  to  a  contract 
maintaining  slavery  throughout  a  third  of  a  conti 
nent  was  only  a  trifle  less  criminal  than  aiding  to 
extend  it  over  another  third.  Yet  it  should  be 
said  that  the  Abolitionists  were  not  all  of  one 
mind,  and  some  voted  the  Republican  ticket  as 
being  at  least  a  step  in  the  right  direction.  Joshua 
R.  Giddings  was  a  member  of  the  Republican  Con 
vention  which  nominated  Lincoln.  But  Wendell 
Phillips,  always  an  extremist  among  extremists, 
published  an  article  entitled  "Abraham  Lincoln, 
the  Slave-hound  of  Illinois,"  whereof  the  key 
note  was  struck  in  this  introductory  sentence: 
"We  gibbet  a  Northern  hound  to-day,  side  by 
side  with  the  infamous  Mason  of  Virginia."  Mr. 
Garrison,  a  man  of  far  larger  and  sounder  intel 
lectual  powers  than  belonged  to  Phillips,  did  not 
fancy  this  sort  of  diatribe,  though  five  months 
earlier  he  had  accused  the  Republican  party  of 
"slavish  subserviency  to  the  Union,"  and  declared 
it  to  be  "still  insanely  engaged  in  glorifying  the 
Union,  and  pledging  itself  to  frown  upon  all  at 
tempts  to  dissolve  it."  Undeniably  men  who  held 
these  views  could  not  honestly  vote  for  Mr.  Lin 
coln. 

The  popular  vote  and  the  electoral  vote  were  as 
follows : l  - 

1  This  table  is  taken  from  Stanwood's  History  of  Presidential 
Elections. 


178 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 


STATES. 

POPULAK  VOTE. 

ELECTOBA 
VOTE. 

Abraham  Lin 
coln,  Illinois. 

<Z 

gjT 

If! 

lp~ 

ij 

?** 

in 

John  Bell,  Ten 
nessee. 

ri 
£J 

1 

1  '  '  >  '  '  '  '  '  «  '  '  *.».o-i<0c0oaoo  '  ooos'  i  '  '  1  Breckenridge. 

Maine 

62,811 
37,519 
33,808 
106,533 
12,244 
43,792 
3G2,G46 
58,324 
2G8,030 
3,815 
2,294 
1,929 

17,028 

1,364 
231,610 
88,480 
139,033 
172,161 
86,110 
22,069 
70,409 
39,173 
5,270 

26,693 
25,831 
6,849 
34,372 
7,707f 
15,522 
312,510f 
62,801  1 
16,765 
1,023 
5,966 
16,290 
2,701 

11,590 
367 
13,651 
3,283 
7,625 

5,227 
58,801 
11,350 
25,651 
187,232 
65,057 
115,509 
160,215 
65,021 
11,920 
55,111 
38,516 
3,951 

6,368 
2,112 
218 
5,939 

14,641 

178,871t 
7,337 
42,482 
74.323 
48',539 

51,889 
8,543 
48,831 
40,797 
22,861 
47,548 
28,732 
31,317 
64,709 
53,143 
11.405 
805 
12,295 
2,404 
888 
748 
1,048 
34,334 
5,006 

2,046 
441 
1,969 
22,231 

3,291 

12,776 
3.864 
41,7GO 
74,681 
44,990 

42,886 
5,437 
27,875 
25,040 
20,204 
15,438) 
20,094 
58,372 
69,274 
66,058 
12,194 
405 
5,306 
4,913 
161 
62 
1,703 
6,817 
183 

8 
5 
6 
13 

4 
6 

:;:, 
4 
27 

23 
6 
13 

11 

j 

3 

;; 
9 

New  Hampshire  .  .  . 
Vermont  

Massachusetts 
Rhode  Island  .... 
Connecticut     .... 
New  York 

New  Jersey  .... 
Pennsylvania  .... 
Delaware  
Maryland  
Virginia  

North  Carolina  .  .  . 
South  Carolina*  .  .  . 
Georgia  
Florida  

Mississippi  
Louisiana  
Texas  
Arkansas  
Missouri  

Kentucky  

Ohio  .  

Michigan 

Indiana  

Illinois  
Wisconsin  

Iowa  

Oregon  

Totals 

1,866,452 

1,375,157 

847,953 

590,631 

180 

12  72. 

i      i 

By  Legislature. 


t  Fusion  electoral  tickets. 


Messrs.  Nicolay  and  Hay  say  that  Lincoln  was 
the  "indisputable  choice  of  the  American  people," 
and  by  way  of  sustaining  the  statement  say  that, 
if  the  "whole  voting  strength  of  the  three  oppos- 


ELECTION.  179 

ing  parties  had  been  united  upon  a  single  candi 
date,  Lincoln  would  nevertheless  have  been  chosen 
with  only  a  trifling  diminution  of  his  electoral 
majority."1  It  might  be  better  to  say  that  Lin 
coln  was  the  "indisputable  choice  "  of  the  electoral 
college.  The  "American  people  "  fell  enormously 
short  of  showing  a  majority  in  his  favor.  His 
career  as  President  was  made  infinitely  more  diffi 
cult  as  well  as  greatly  more  creditable  to  him  by 
reason  of  the  very  fact  that  he  was  not  the  choice 
of  the  American  people,  but  of  less  than  half  of 
them,  —  and  this,  too,  even  if  the  Confederate 
States  be  excluded  from  the  computation.2 

The  election  of  Lincoln  was  "hailed  with  de 
light"  by  the  extremists  in  South  Carolina;  for  it 
signified  secession,  and  the  underlying  and  real 
desire  of  these  people  was  secession,  and  not  either 
compromise  or  postponement.3 

1  N.  and  H.,  iii.  146. 

2  The  total  popular  vote  was  4,680,193.     Lincoln  had  1,866,452. 
In  North  Carolina,  Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  Lou 
isiana,  Texas,  Arkansas  and  Tennessee,  no  vote  was  cast  for  the 
Lincoln  ticket ;  in  Virginia  only  1929  voted  it.     Adding  the  total 
popular  vote  of  all  these  States  (except  the  1929),  we  get  854,775  ; 
deducting  this  from  the  total  popular  vote  leaves  a  balance  of 
3,825,418;  of  which  one  half  is  1,912,709;  so  that  even  outside  of 
the  States  of  the  Confederacy  Lincoln  did  not  get  one  half  of  the 
popular  vote.     South  Carolina  is  not  included  in  any  calculation 
concerning  the  popular  vote,  because  she  chose  electors  by  her 
legislature. 

3  Letter  of  Henry  A.  Wise,  of  Virginia,  May  28,  1858,  quoted 
N.  and  H.,  ii.  302  n. 


CHAPTER   VII. 

INTERREGNUM. 

FOR  a  while  now  the  people  of  the  Northern 
States  were  compelled  passively  to  behold  a  spec 
tacle  which  they  could  not  easily  reconcile  with 
the  theory  of  the  supreme  excellence  and  wisdom 
of  their  system  of  government.  Abraham  Lincoln 
was  chosen  President  of  the  United  States  No 
vember  6,  1860 ;  he  was  to  be  inaugurated  March 
4,  1861.  During  the  intervening  four  months  the 
government  must  be  conducted  by  a  chief  whose 
political  creed  was  condemned  by  an  overwhelming 
majority  of  the  nation.1  The  situation  was  as  un 
fair  for  Mr.  Buchanan  as  it  was  hurtful  for  the 
people.  As  head  of  a  republic,  or,  in  the  more 
popular  phrase,  as  the  chief  "servant  of  the  peo 
ple,"  he  must  respect  the  popular  will,  yet  he 
could  not  now  administer  the  public  business  ac 
cording  to  that  will  without  being  untrue  to  all  his 
own  convictions,  and  repudiating  all  his  trusted 
counsellors.  In  a  situation  so  intrinsically  false 
efficient  government  was  impossible,  no  matter 

1  Breckenridge  was  the  legitimate  representative  of  the  admin- 
istrationists,  and  his  ticket  received  only  847,953  votes  out  of 
4,680,193.  Douglas  and  Buchanan  were  at  open  war. 


INTERREGNUM.  181 

what  was  the  strength  or  weakness  of  the  hand  at 
the  helm.  Therefore  there  was  every  reason  for 
displacing-  Buchanan  from  control  of  the  national 
affairs  in  the  autumn,  and  every  reason  against 
continuing  him  in  that  control  through  the  winter ; 
yet  the  law  of  the  land  ordained  the  latter  course. 
It  seemed  neither  sensible  nor  even  safe.  During 
this  doleful  period  all  descriptions  of  him  agree : 
he  seemed,  says  Chittenden,  "shaken  in  body  and 
uncertain  in  mind,  ...  an  old  man  worn  out  by 
worry;  "while  the  Southerners  also  declared  him 
as  "incapable  of  purpose  as  a  child."  To  the  like 
purport  spoke  nearly  all  who  saw  him. 

During  the  same  time  Lincoln's  position  was 
equally  absurd  and  more  trying.  After  the  lapse 
of  four  months  he  was,  by  the  brief  ceremony  of 
an  hour,  to  become  the  leader  of  a  great  nation 
under  an  exceptionally  awful  responsibility;  but 
during  those  four  months  he  could  play  no  other 
part  than  simply  to  watch,  in  utter  powerlessness, 
the  swift  succession  of  crowding  events,  which  all 
were  tending  to  make  his  administration  of  the 
government  difficult,  or  even  impossible.  Through 
out  all  this  long  time,  the  third  part  of  a  year, 
which  statutes  scarcely  less  venerable  than  the 
Constitution  itself  freely  presented  to  the  disunion 
leaders,  they  safely  completed  their  civil  and  mili 
tary  organization,  while  the  Northerners,  under  a 
ruler  whom  they  had  discredited  but  of  whom  they 
could  not  get  rid,  were  paralyzed  for  all  purposes 
of  counter  preparation. 


182  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

As  a  trifling  compensation  for  its  existence  this 
costly  interregnum  presents  to  later  generations  a 
curious  spectacle.  A  volume  might  be  made  of 
the  public  utterances  put  forth  in  that  time  by  men 
of  familiar  names  and  more  or  less  high  repute, 
and  it  would  show  many  of  them  in  most  strange 
and  unexpected  characters,  so  entirely  out  of  keep 
ing  with  the  years  which  they  had  lived  before  and 
the  years  which  they  were  to  live  afterward,  that 
the  reader  would  gaze  in  hopeless  bewilderment. 
In  the  "solid  "  South,  so  soon  to  be  a  great  rebel 
ling  unit,  he  would  find  perhaps  half  of  the  people 
opposed  to  disunion;  in  the  North  he  would  hear 
everywhere  words  of  compromise  and  concession, 
while  coercion  would  be  mentioned  only  to  be  de 
nounced.  If  these  four  months  were  useful  in 
bringing  the  men  of  the  North  to  the  fighting 
point,  on  the  other  hand  they  gave  an  indispensa 
ble  opportunity  for  proselyting,  by  whirl  and  ex 
citement,  great  numbers  at  the  South.  Even  in 
the  autumn  of  1860  and  in  the  Gulf  States  seces 
sion  was  still  so  much  the  scheme  of  leaders  that 
there  was  no  popular  preponderance  in  favor  of 
disunion  doctrines.  In  evidence  of  this  are  the 
responses  of  governors  to  a  circular  letter  of  Gov 
ernor  Gist,  of  South  Carolina,  addressed  to  them 
October  5,  1860,  and  seeking  information  as  to  the 
feeling  among  the  people.  From  North  Carolina, 
Louisiana,  Georgia  and  Alabama  came  replies  that 
secession  was  not  likely  to  be  favorably  received. 
Mississippi  was  non-committal.  Louisiana,  Geor- 


INTERRE  GN  UM.  183 

gia  and  Alabama  desired  a  convention  of  the  dis 
contented  States,  and  might  be  influenced  by  its 
action.  North  Carolina,  Louisiana,  and  Alabama 
would  oppose  forcible  coercion  of  a  seceding  State. 
Florida  alone  was  rhetorically  belligerent.  These 
reports  were  discouraging  in  the  ears  of  the  ex 
tremist  governor;  but  against  them  he  could  set 
the  fact  that  the  disunionists  had  the  advantage 
of  being  the  aggressive,  propagandist  body,  homo 
geneous,  and  pursuing  an  accurate  policy  in  entire 
concert.  They  were  willing  to  take  any  amount 
of  pains  to  manipulate  and  control  the  election 
of  delegates  and  the  formal  action  of  conven 
tions,  and  in  all  cases  except  that  of  Texas  the 
question  was  conclusively  passed  upon  by  conven 
tions.  By  every  means  they  "fired  the  Southern 
heart,"  which  was  notoriously  combustible;  they 
stirred  up  a  great  tumult  of  sentiment ;  they  made 
thunderous  speeches ;  they  kept  distinguished  emis 
saries  moving  to  and  fro;  they  celebrated  each 
success  with  an  uproar  of  cannonading,  with  bon 
fires,  illuminations  and  processions;  they  appealed 
to  those  chivalrous  virtues  supposed  to  be  pecu 
liar  to  Southerners;  they  preached  devotion  to 
the  State,  love  of  the  state  flag,  generous  loyalty 
to  sister  slave -communities ;  sometimes  they  used 
insult,  abuse  and .  intimidation ;  occasionally  they 
argued  seductively.  Thus  Mr.  Cobb's  assertion, 
that  "we  can  make  better  terms  out  of  the  Union 
than  in  it,"  was,  in  the  opinion  of  Alexander  H. 
Stephens,  the  chief  influence  which  carried  Geor- 


184  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

gia  out  of  the  Union.  In  the  main,  however,  it 
was  the  principle  of  state  sovereignty  and  state 
patriotism  which  proved  the  one  entirely  trust 
worthy  influence  to  bring  over  the  reluctant.  "I 
abhor  disunion,  but  I  go  with  my  State  "  was  the 
common  saying ;  and  the  States  were  under  skilful 
and  resolute  leadership.  So  though  the  popular 
discontent  was  far  short  of  the  revolutionary  point, 
yet  individuals,  one  after  another,  yielded  to  that 
sympathetic,  emotional  instinct  which  tempts  each 
man  to  fall  in  with  the  big  procession.  In  this 
way  it  was  that  during  the  Buchanan  interregnum 
the  people  of  the  Gulf  States  became  genuinely 
fused  in  rebellion. 

It  is  not  correct  to  say  that  the  election  of  Lin 
coln  was  the  cause  of  the  Rebellion ;  it  was  rather 
the  signal.  To  the  Southern  leaders,  it  was  the 
striking  of  the  appointed  hour.  His  defeat  would 
have  meant  only  postponement.  South  Carolina 
led  the  way.  On  December  17,  1860,  her  conven 
tion  came  together,  the  Palmetto  flag  waving  over 
its  chamber  of  conference,  and  on  December  20  it 
issued  its  "Ordinance."1  This  declared  that  the 
Ordinance  of  May  23,  1788,  ratifying  the  Consti 
tution,  is  "hereby  repealed,"  and  the  "Union  now 
subsisting  between  South  Carolina  and  other 
States,  under  the  name  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  is  hereby  dissolved."  A  Declaration  of 
Causes  said  that  South  Carolina  had  "resumed 

1  See  remarks  of  Mr.  Blaine  upon  use  of  this  word.     Twenty 
Years  of  Congress,  i.  219. 


INTERREGNUM.  185 

her  position  among  the  nations  of  the  world  as  a 
separate  and  independent  State."  The  language 
used  was  appropriate  for  the  revocation  of  a  power 
of  attorney.  The  people  hailed  this  action  with 
noisy  joy,  unaccompanied  by  any  regret  or  solem 
nity  at  the  severance  of  the  old  relationship.  The 
newspapers  at  once  began  to  publish  "Foreign 
News  "  from  the  other  States.  The  new  governor, 
Pickens,  a  fiery  Secessionist,  and  described  as  one 
"born  insensible  to  fear,"  -presumably  the  con 
dition  of  most  persons  at  that  early  period  of  ex 
istence,  —  had  already  suggested  to  Mr.  Buchanan 
the  impropriety  of  reinforcing  the  national  gar 
risons  in  the  forts  in  Charleston  harbor.  He  now 
accredited  to  the  President  three  commissioners  to 
treat  with  him  for  the  delivery  of  the  "forts,  maga 
zines,  light-houses,  and  other  real  estate,  with  their 
appurtenances,  in  the  limits  of  South  Carolina; 
and  also  for  an  apportionment  of  the  public  debt, 
and  for  a  division  of  all  other  property  held  by  the 
government  of  the  United  States  as  agent  of  the 
Confederate  States  of  which  South  Carolina  was 
recently  a  member."  This  position,  as  of  the  dis 
solution  of  a  copartnership,  or  the  revocation  of  an 
agency,  and  an  accounting  of  debts  and  assets,  was 
at  least  simple ;  and  by  way  of  expediting  it  an  ap 
praisal  of  the  "real  estate"  and  "appurtenances" 
within  the  state  limits  had  been  made  by  the  state 
government.  Meanwhile  there  was  in  the  harbor 
of  Charleston  a  sort  of  armed  truce,  which  mig 
at  any  moment  break  into  war.  Major  Anderson, 


186  ABU  AH  AM  LINCOLN. 

in  Fort  Moultrie,  and  the  state  commander  in  the 
city  watched  each  other  like  two  suspicious  ani 
mals,  neither  sure  when  the  other  will  spring.  In 
short,  in  all  the  overt  acts,  the  demeanor  and  the 
language  of  this  excitable  State,  there  was  such 
insolence,  besides  hostility,  that  her  emissaries 
must  have  been  surprised  at  the  urbane  courtesy 
with  which  they  were  received,  even  by  a  presi 
dent  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  views. 

After  the  secession  of  South  Carolina  the  other 
Gulf  States  hesitated  briefly.  Mississippi  fol 
lowed  first;  her  convention  assembled  January  7, 
1861,  and  on  January  9  passed  the  Ordinance,  84 
yeas  to  15  nays,  subsequently  making  the  vote 
unanimous.  The  Florida  convention  met  January 
3,  and  on  January  10  decreed  the  State  to  be  "a 
sovereign  and  independent  nation,"  62  yeas  to  7 
nays.  The  Alabama  convention  passed  its  Ordi 
nance  on  January  11  by  61  yeas  to  39  nays;  the 
president  announced  that  the  idea  of  reconstruc 
tion  must  be  forever  "dismissed."  Yet  the  north 
ern  part  of  the  State  appeared  to  be  substantially 
anti-secession.  In  Georgia  the  secessionists 
doubted  whether  they  could  control  a  convention, 
yet  felt  obliged  to  call  one.  Toombs,  Cobb,  and 
Iverson  labored  with  tireless  zeal  throughout  the 
State ;  but  in  spite  of  all  their  proselyting,  Union 
ist  feeling  ran  high  and  debate  was  hot.  The 
members  from  the  southern  part  of  the  State  ven 
tured  to  menace  and  dragoon  those  from  the  north 
ern  part,  who  were  largely  Unionists.  The  latter 


INTERREGNUM.  187 

retorted  angrily;  a  schism  and  personal  collisions 
were  narrowly  avoided.  Alexander  H.  Stephens 
spoke  for  the  Union  with  a  warmth  and  logic  not 
surpassed  by  anything  that  was  said  at  the  North. 
He  and  Herschel  V.  Johnson  both  voted  against 
secession ;  yet,  on  January  18,  when  the  vote  was 
taken,  it  showed  208  yeas  against  89  nays.  On 
January  26  Louisiana  followed,  the  vote  of  the 
convention  being  113  yeas  to  17  nays;  but  it  re 
fused  to  submit  the  ordinance  to  the  people  for 
ratification.  The  action  of  Texas,  the  only  other 
State  which  seceded  prior  to  the  inauguration  of 
Lincoln,  was  delayed  until  February  1.  There 
Governor  Houston  was  opposing  secession  with 
such  vigor  as  remained  to  a  broken  old  man, 
whereby  he  provoked  Senator  Iverson  to  utter  the 
threat  of  assassination :  "  Some  Texan  Brutus  may 
arise  to  rid  his  country  of  this  old  hoary-headed 
traitor."  But  in  the  convention,  when  it  came  to 
voting,  the  yeas  were  166,  the  nays  only  7. 

By  the  light  that  was  in  him  Mr.  Buchanan  was 
a  Unionist,  but  it  was  a  sadly  false  and  flickering- 
light,  and  beneath  its  feeble  illumination  his  steps 
staggered  wofully.  For  two  months  he  diverged 
little  from  the  path  which  the  secessionist  leaders 
would  have  marked  out  for  him,  had  they  controlled 
his  movements.  At  the  time  of  the  election  his 
cabinet  was :  — 

Lewis  Cass,  of  Michigan,  Secretary  of  State. 
Howell  Cobb,  of  Georgia,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 
John  B.  Floyd,  of  Virginia,  Secretary  of  War. 


188  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Isaac  Toucey,  of  Connecticut,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
Jacob  Thompson,  of  Mississippi,  Secretary  of  the  Interior. 
Aaron  V.  Brown,  of  Tennessee,  Postmaster-General. 
Jeremiah  S.  Black,  of  Pennsylvania,  Attorney-General. 

Of  these  men  Cobb,  Floyd,  and  Thompson  were 
extreme  Secessionists.  Many  felt  that  Cobb  should 
have  been  made  President  of  the  Southern  Confed 
eracy  instead  of  Davis.  In  December  Thompson 
went  as  commissioner  from  Mississippi  to  North 
Carolina  to  persuade  that  State  to  secede,  and  did 
not  resign  his  place  in  the  Cabinet  because,  as  he 
said,  Mr.  Buchanan  approved  his  mission. 

Betwixt  his  own  predilections  and  the  influence 
of  these  advisers  Mr.  Buchanan  composed  for  the 
Thirty-sixth  Congress  a  Message  which  carried 
consternation  among  all  Unionists.  It  was  of  little 
consequence  that  he  declared  the  present  situation 
to  be  the  "natural  effect"  of  the  "long-continued 
and  intemperate  interference "  of  the  Northern 
people  with  slavery.  But  it  was  of  the  most  seri 
ous  consequence  that  while  he  condemned  secession 
as  unconstitutional,  he  also  declared  himself  power 
less  to  prevent  it.  His  duty  "to  take  care  that 
the  laws  be  faithfully  executed  "  he  knew  no  other 
way  to  perform  except  by  aiding  Federal  officers 
in  the  performance  of  their  duties.  But  where,  as 
Jin  South  Carolina,  the  Federal  officers  had  all  re 
signed,  so  that  none  remained  to  be  aided,  what 
was  he  to  do?  This  was  practically  to  take  the 
position  that  half  a  dozen  men,  by  resigning  their 
offices,  could  make  the  preservation  of  the  Union 


1NTERRE  GN  UM.  189 

by  its  chief  executive  impossible !  \  Besides  this, 
Mr.  Buchanan  said  that  he  had  "no  authority  to 
decide  what  should  be  the  relations  between  the 
Federal  government  and  South  Carolina."  He 
afterward  said  that  he  desired  to  avoid  a  collision 
of  arms  "between  this  and  any  other  government." 
He  did  not  seem  to  reflect  that  he  had  no  right  to 
recognize  a  State  of  the  Union  as  being  an  "other 
government,"  in  the  sense  in  which  he  used  the 
phrase,  and  that,  by  his  very  abstention  from  the 
measures  necessary  for  maintaining  unchanged  that 
relationship  which  had  hitherto  existed,  he  became 
a  party  to  the  establishment  of  a  new  relation 
ship,  and  that,  too,  of  a  character  which  he  himself 
alleged  to  be  unconstitutional.  In  truth,  his  chief 
purpose  was  to  rid  himself  of  any  responsibility 
and  to  lay  it  all  upon  Congress.  Yet  he  was  will 
ing  to  advise  Congress  as  to  its  powers  and  duties 
in  the  business  which  he  shirked  in  favor  of  that 
body,  saying  that  the  power  to  coerce  a  seceding 
State  had  not  been  delegated  to  it,  and  adding  the 
warning  that  "the  Union  can  never  be  cemented 
by  the  blood  of  its  citizens  shed  in  civil  war."  So 
the  nation  learned  that  its  ruler  was  of  opinion  that 
to  resist  the  destruction  of  its  nationality  was  both 
unlawful  and  inexpedient. 

If  the  conclusions  of  the  Message  aroused  alarm 

1  But  it  should  be  said  that  Attorney-General  Black  supported 
these  views  in  a  very  elaborate  opinion,  which  he  had  furnished  to 
the  President,  and  which  was  transmitted  to  Congress  at  the  same 
time  with  the  Message. 


190  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

and  indignation,  its  logic  excited  ridicule.  Sen 
ator  Hale  gave  a  not  unfair  synopsis :  The  Presi 
dent,  he  said,  declares:  1.  That  South  Carolina 
has  just  cause  for  seceding.  2.  That  she  has  no 
right  to  secede.  3.  That  we  have  no  right  to 
prevent  her  from  seceding;  and  that  the  power  of 
the  government  is  "a  power  to  do  nothing  at  all." 
Another  wit  said  that  Buchanan  was  willing  to 
give  up  a  part  of  the  Constitution,  and,  if  neces 
sary,  the  whole,  in  order  to  preserve  the  remainder! 
But  while  this  message  of  Mr.  Buchanan  has 
been  bitterly  denounced,  and  with  entire  justice, 
from  the  hour  of  its  transmission  to  the  present 
day,  yet  a  palliating  consideration  ought  to  be 
noted:  he  had  little  reason  to  believe  that,  if  he 
asserted  the  right  and  duty  of  forcible  coercion,  he 
would  find  at  his  back  the  indispensable  force, 
moral  and  physical,  of  the  people.  Demoraliza 
tion  at  the  North  was  widespread.  After  the  lapse 
of  a  few  months  this  condition  passed,  and  then 
those  who  had  been  beneath  its  influence  desired 
to  forget  the  humiliating  fact,  and  hoped  that 
others  might  either  forget  or  never  know  the 
measure  of  their  weakness.  In  order  that  they 
might  save  their  good  names,  it  was  natural  that 
they  should  seek  to  suppress  all  evidence  which  had 
not  already  found  its  way  upon  the  public  record; 
but  enough  remains  to  show  how  grievously  for  a 
while  the  knees  were  weakened  under  many  who  en 
joy  —  and  rightfully,  by  reason  of  the  rest  of  their 
lives  —  the  reputation  of  stalwart  patriots.  For 


INTERREGNUM.  191 

example,  late  in  October,  General  Scott  suggested 
to  the  President  a  division  of  the  country  into  four 
separate  confederacies,  roughly  outlining  their 
boundaries.  Scott  was  a  dull  man,  but  he  was  the 
head  of  the  army  and  enjoyed  a  certain  prestige,  so 
that  it  was  impossible  to  say  that  his  notions,  how 
ever  foolish  in  themselves,  were  of  no  consequence. 
But  if  the  blunders  of  General  Scott  could  not 
fatally  wound  the  Union  cause,  the  blunders  of 
Horace  Greeley  might  conceivably  do  so.  If  there 
had  been  in  the  Northern  States  any  newspaper  — 
apart  from  Mr.  Garrison's  "Liberator"  —which 
was  thoroughly  committed  to  the  anti  -  slavery 
cause,  it  was  the  New  York  "Tribune,"  under 
the  guidance  of  that  distinguished  editor.  Repub 
licans  everywhere  throughout  the  land  had  been 
educated  by  his  teachings  and  had  become  accus 
tomed  to  take  a  large  part  of  their  knowledge  and 
their  opinions  in  matters  political  from  his  writ 
ings.  It  was  a  misfortune  for  Abraham  Lincoln, 
which  cannot  be  over  -  rated,  that  from  the  mo 
ment  of  his  nomination  to  the  day  of  his  death 
the  "Tribune"  was  largely  engaged  in  criticising 
his  measures  and  in  condemning  his  policy. 

No  sooner  did  all  that,  which  Mr.  Greeley  had 
been  striving  during  many  years  to  bring  about, 
seem  to  be  on  the  point  of  consummation,  than 
the  demoralized  and  panic-stricken  reformer  be 
came  desirous  to  undo  his  own  achievements,  and 
to  use  for  the  purpose  of  effecting  a  sudden  retro 
gression  all  the  influence  which  he  had  gained 


192  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

by  bold  leadership.  November  9,  1860,  it  was 
appalling  to  read  in  the  editorial  columns  of  his 
sheet,  that  "if  the  Cotton  States  shall  decide  that 
they  can  do  better  out  of  the  Union  than  in  it,  we 
insist  on  letting  them  go  in  peace;"  that,  while 
the  "Tribune"  denied  the  right  of  nullification, 
yet  it  would  admit  that  "to  withdraw  from  the 
Union  is  quite  another  matter;  "  that  "whenever  a 
considerable  section  of  our  Union  shall  deliber 
ately  resolve  to  go  out,  we  shall  resist  all  coercive 
measures  designed  to  keep  it  in."1  At  the  end 
of  another  month  the  "Tribune's  "  famous  editor 
was  still  in  the  same  frame  of  mind,  declaring 
himself  "averse  to  the  employment  of  military 
force  to  fasten  one  section  of  our  Confederacy  to 
the  other,"  and  saying  that,  "if  eight  States, 
having  five  millions  of  people,  choose  to  separate 
from  us,  they  cannot  be  permanently  withheld 
from  so  doing  by  Federal  cannon."  On  Decem 
ber  17  he  even  said  that  the  South  had  as  good 
a  right  to  secede  from  the  Union  as  the  colonies 
had  to  secede  from  Great  Britain,  and  that  he 
"would  not  stand  up  for  coercion,  for  subjuga 
tion,"  because  he  did  "not  think  it  would  be 
just."  On  February  23,  1861,  he  said  that  if 
the  Cotton  States,  or  the  Gulf  States,  "choose 
to  form  an  independent  nation,  they  have  a  clear 

1  Greeley  afterwards  truly  said  that  his  journal  had  plenty  of 
company  in  these  sentiments,  even  among1  the  Republican  sheets. 
Amer.  Conflict,  i.  359.  Reference  is  made  in  the  text  to  the  utter 
ances  of  the  Tribune  more  because  it  was  so  prominent  and  influ 
ential  than  because  it  was  very  peculiar  in  its  position. 


INTERREGNUM.  193 

moral  right  to  do  so,"  and  if  the  "great  body  of 
the  Southern  people  "  become  alienated  from  the 
Union  and  wish  to  "escape  from  it,  we  will  do  our 
best  to  forward  their  views."  A  volume  could 
be  filled  with  the  like  writing  of  his  prolific  pen 
at  this  time,  and  every  sentence  of  such  purport 
was  the  casting  of  a  new  stone  to  create  an  almost 
impassable  obstruction  in  the  path  along  which 
the  new  President  must  soon  endeavor  to  move. 
Thurlow  Weed,  editor  of  the  Albany  "Evening 
Journal,"  and  the  confidential  adviser  of  Seward, 
wrote  in  favor  of  concessions;  he  declared  that 
"a  victorious  party  can  afford  to  be  tolerant;" 
and  he  advocated  a  convention  to  revise  the  Con 
stitution,  on  the  ground  that,  "after  more  than 
seventy  years  of  wear  and  tear,  of  collision  and 
abrasion,  it  should  be  no  cause  of  wonder  that 
the  machinery  of  government  is  found  weakened, 
or  out  of  repair,  or  even  defective."  Frequently 
he  uttered  the  wish,  vague  and  of  fine  sound, 
but  enervating,  that  the  Republicans  might  "meet 
secession  as  patriots  and  not  as  partisans."  On 
November  9  the  Democratic  New  York  "Herald," 
discussing  the  election  of  Lincoln,  said:  "For  far 
less  than  this  our  fathers  seceded  from  Great 
Britain;"  it  also  declared  coercion  to  be  "out  of 
the  question,"  and  laid  down  the  principle  that 
each  State  possesses  "the  right  to  break  the  tie  of 
the  Confederacy,  as  a  nation  might  break  a  treaty, 
and  to  repel  coercion  as  a  nation  might  repel  inva- 


194  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Local  elections  in  New  York  and  Massachusetts 
"showed  a  striking  and  general  reduction  of  Re 
publican  strength."  In  December  the  mayor  of 
Philadelphia,  though  that  city  had  polled  a  heavy 
Republican  majority,  told  a  mass  meeting  in  In 
dependence  Square  that  denunciations  of  slavery 
were  inconsistent  with  national  brotherhood  and 
"must  be  frowned  down  by  a  just  and  law-abid 
ing  people."  The  Bell  and  Everett  men,  gene 
rally,  desired  peace  at  any  price.  The  business 
men  of  the  North,  alarmed  at  the  prospect  of 
disorder,  became  loudly  solicitous  for  concession, 
compromise,  even  surrender.1  In  Democratic 
meetings  a  threatening  tone  was  adopted.  One 
proposal  was  to  reconstruct  the  Union,  leaving 
out  the  New  England  States.  So  late  even  as 
January  21,  1861,  before  an  immense  and  note 
worthy  gathering  in  New  York,  an  orator  ventured 
to  say:  "If  a  revolution  of  force  is  to  begin,  it 
shall  be  inaugurated  at  home;"  and  the  words 
were  cheered.  The  distinguished  Chancellor 
Walworth  said  that  it  would  be  "as  brutal  to  send 
men  to  butcher  our  own  brothers  of  the  Southern 
States  as  it  would  be  to  massacre  them  in  the 
Northern  States."  When  DeWitt  Clinton's  son, 
George,  spoke  of  secession  as  "rebellion,"  the 
multitude  hailed  the  word  with  cries  of  dissent. 
Even  at  Faneuil  Hall,  in  Boston,  "a  very  large 

1  Wilson,  Rise  and  Fall  of  Slave  Power,  iii.  03-09;  N.  and  H., 
iii.  255.  See  account  of  "  the  Pine  Street  meeting."  New  York,  in 
Dix's  Memoirs  of  Dix,  i.  347. 


INTERREGNUM.  195 

and  respectable  meeting"  was  emphatically  in 
favor  of  compromise.  It  was  impossible  to  mea 
sure  accurately  the  extent  and  force  of  all  this 
demoralization ;  but  the  symptoms  were  that  vast 
numbers  were  infected  with  such  sentiments,  and 
that  they  would  have  been  worse  than  useless  as 
backers  of  a  vigorous  policy  on  the  part  of  the 
government. 

With  the  North  wavering  and  ready  to  retreat, 
and  the  South  aggressive  and  confident,  it  was 
exacting  to  expect  Mr.  Buchanan  to  stand  up  for 
a  fight.  Why  should  he,  with  his  old-time  Demo 
cratic  principles,  now  by  a  firm,  defiant  attitude 
precipitate  a  crisis,  possibly  a  civil  war,  when 
Horace  Greeley  and  Wendell  Phillips  were  con 
spicuously  running  away  from  the  consequences 
of  their  own  teachings,  and  were  loudly  crying 
"peace!  peace!"  after  they  themselves  had  long- 
been  doing  all  in  their  power  to  bring  the  North 
up  to  the  fighting  point?  When  these  leaders 
faced  to  the  rear,  it  was  hard  to  say  who  could  be 
counted  upon  to  fill  the  front  rank.  In  truth,  it 
was  a  situation  which  might  have  discouraged  a 
more  combative  patriot  than  Buchanan.  Mean 
while,  while  the  Northerners  talked  chiefly  of 
yielding,  the  hot  and  florid  rhetoric  of  the  South 
ern  orators,  often  laden  with  contemptuous  insult, 
smote  with  disturbing  menace  upon  the  ears  even 
of  the  most  courageous  Unionists.  It  was  said  at 
the  South  and  feared  at  the  North  that  secession 
had  a  "Spartan  band  in  every  Northern  State," 


196  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

and  that  blood  would  flow  in  Northern  cities  at 
least  as  soon  and  as  freely  as  on  the  Southern 
plantations,  if  forcible  coercion  should  be  at 
tempted.  Was  it  possible  to  be  sure  that  this  was 
all  rodomontade?  To  many  good  citizens  there 
seemed  some  reason  to  think  that  the  best  hope  for 
avoiding  the  fulfilment  at  the  North  of  these  san 
guinary  threats  might  lie  in  the  probability  that 
the  ant i- slavery  agitators  would  not  stand  up  to 
encounter  a  genuinely  mortal  peril. 

When  the  Star  of  the  West  retired,  a  little 
ignominiously,  from  her  task  of  reinforcing  Fort 
Sumter,  Senator  Wigf all  jeered  insolently:  "Your 
flag  has  been  insulted,"  he  said;  "redress  it  if  you 
dare !  You  have  submitted  to  it  for  two  months, 
and  you  will  submit  forever.  .  .  .  We  have  dis 
solved  the  Union ;  mend  it  if  you  can ;  cement  it 
with  blood;  try  the  experiment !"  Mr.  Chestnut 
of  South  Carolina  wished  to  "unfurl  the  Palmetto 
flag,  fling  it  to  the  breeze  .  .  .  and  ring  the  clarion 
notes  of  defiance  in  the  ears  of  an  insolent  foe." 
Such  bombastic  but  confident  language,  of  which  a 
great  quantity  was  uttered  in  this  winter  of  1860- 
61,  may  exasperate  or  intimidate  according  to  the 
present  temper  of  the  opponent  whose  ear  it  as 
saults  ;  for  a  while  the  North  was  more  in  condi 
tion  to  be  awestruck  than  to  be  angered.  Her 
spokesmen  failed  to  answer  back,  and  left  her  to 
listen  not  without  anxiety  to  fierce  predictions  that 
Southern  flags  would  soon  be  floating  over  the 
dome  of  the  Capitol  and  even  over  Faneuil  Hall, 


INTERREGNUM.  197 

if  she  should  be  so  imprudent  as  to  test  Southern 
valor  and  Southern  resources. 

Matters  looked  even  worse  for  the  Union  cause 
in  Congress  than  in  the  country.  Occasionally 
some  irritated  Northern  Republican  shot  out  words 
of  spirit;  but  the  prevalent  desire  was  for  concilia 
tion,  compromise,  and  concession,  while  some  actu 
ally  adopted  secession  doctrines.  For  example, 
Daniel  E.  Sickles,  in  the  House,  threatened  that 
the  secession  of  the  Southern  States  should  be  fol 
lowed  by  that  of  New  York  city;  and  in  fact  the 
scheme  had  been  recommended  by  the  Democratic 
mayor,  Fernando  Wood,  in  a  message  to  the  Com 
mon  Council  of  the  city  on  January  6 ;  and  Gen 
eral  Dix  conceived  it  to  be  a  possibility.  In  the 
Senate  Simon  Cameron  declared  himself  desirous 
to  preserve  the  Union  "by  any  sacrifice  of  feeling, 
and  I  may  say  of  principle."  A  sacrifice  of  politi 
cal  principle  by  Cameron  was  not,  perhaps,  a  seri 
ous  matter;  but  he  intended  the  phrase  to  be 
emphatic,  and  he  was  a  leading  Republican  poli 
tician,  had  been  a  candidate  for  the  presidential 
nomination,  and  was  dictator  in  Pennsylvania. 
Even  Seward,  in  the  better  days  of  the  middle  of 
January,  felt  that  he  could  "afford  to  meet  preju 
dice  with  conciliation,  exaction  with  concession 
which  surrenders  no  principle,  and  violence  with 
the  right  hand  of  peace;"  and  he  was  "willing, 
after  the  excitement  of  rebellion  and  secession 
should  have  passed  away,  to  call  a  convention  for 
amending  the  Constitution." 


198  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

This  Message-  of  Buchanan  marked  the  lowest 
point  to  which  the  temperature  of  his  patriotism 
fell.  Soon  afterward,  stimulated  by  heat  applied 
from  outside,  it  began  to  rise.  The  first  intima 
tion  which  impressed  upon  his  anxious  mind  that 
he  was  being  too  acquiescent  towards  the  South 
came  from  General  Cass.  That  steadfast  Demo 
crat,  of  the  old  Jacksonian  school,  like  many  of 
his  party  at  the  North,  was  fully  as  good  a  patriot 
and  Union  man  as  most  of  the  Republicans  were 
approving  themselves  to  be  during  these  winter 
months  of  vacillation,  alarm  and  compromise.  In 
November  he  was  strenuously  in  favor  of  forcibly 
coercing  a  seceding  State,  but  later  assented  to  the 
tenor  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  Message.  The  frame  of 
mind  which  induced  this  assent,  however,  was  tran 
sitory;  for  immediately  he  began  to  insist  upon 
the  reinforcement  of  the  garrisons  of  the  Southern 
forts,  and  on  December  13  he  resigned,  because 
the  President  refused  to  accede  to  his  views.  A 
few  days  earlier  Howell  Cobb  had  had  the  grace  to 
resign  from  the  Treasury,  which  he  left  entirely 
empty.  In  the  reorganization  Philip  F.  Thomas 
of  Maryland,  a  Secessionist  also,  succeeded  Cobb ; 
Judge  Black  was  moved  into  the  State  Depart 
ment,  and  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  of  Pennsylvania, 
followed  Black  as  Attorney -General.  Mr.  Floyd, 
than  whom  no  Secessionist  has  left  a  name  in  worse 
odor  at  the  North,  had  at  first  advised  against  any 
"rash  movement"  in  the  way  of  secession,  on  the 
ground  that  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration  would 


INTERREGNUM.  199 

"fail,  and  be  regarded  as  impotent  for  good  or 
evil,  within  four  months  after  his  inauguration." 
None  the  less  he  had  long  been  using  his  official 
position  in  the  War  Department  to  send  arms  into 
the  Southern  States  and  to  make  all  possible  ar 
rangements  for  putting  them  in  an  advantageous 
position  for  hostilities.  Fortunately  about  this 
time  the  famous  defalcation  in  the  Indian  Depart 
ment,  in  which  he  was  guiltily  involved,  destroyed 
his  credit  with  the  President,  and  at  the  same 
time  he  quarrelled  with  his  associates  concerning 
Anderson's  removal  to  Fort  Sumter.  On  Decem 
ber  29  he  resigned,  and  the  duties  of  his  place 
were  laid  for  a  while  upon  Judge  Holt,  the  Post 
master-General. 

On  Sunday  morning,  December  30,  there  was 
what  has  been  properly  called  a  Cabinet  crisis. 
The  South  Carolina  commissioners,  just  arrived 
in  Washington,  were  demanding  recognition,  and 
to  treat  with  the  government  as  if  they  were  re 
presentatives  of  a  foreign  power.  The  President 
declined  to  receive  them  in  a  diplomatic  character, 
but  offered  to  act  as  go-between  betwixt  them  and 
Congress.  The  President's  advisers,  however, 
were  in  a  far  less  amiable  frame  of  mind,  for  their 
blood  had  been  stirred  wholesomely  by  the  seces 
sion  of  South  Carolina  and  the  presence  of  these 
emissaries  with  their  insolent  demands.  Mr. 
Black,  now  at  the  head  of  the  State  Department, 
had  gone  through  much  the  same  phases  of  feeling 
as  General  Cass.  In  November  he  had  been  "em- 


200  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

phatic  in  his  advocacy  of  coercion,"  but  afterward 
had  approved  the  President's  message  and  even 
declared  forcible  coercion  to  be  "ipso  facto  an  ex 
pulsion  "  of  the  State  from  the  Union;  since  then 
he  had  drifted  back  and  made  fast  at  his  earlier 
moorings.  On  this  important  Sunday  morning 
Mr.  Buchanan  learned  with  dismay  that  either  his 
reply  to  the  South  Carolinians  must  be  substan 
tially  modified,  or  Mr.  Black  and  Mr.  Stanton 
would  retire  from  the  Cabinet.  Under  this  pres 
sure  he  yielded.  Mr.  Black  drafted  a  new  reply  to 
the  commissioners,  Mr.  Stanton  copied  it,  Holt 
concurred  in  it,  and,  in  substance,  Mr.  Buchanan 
accepted  it.  This  affair  constituted,  as  Messrs. 
Nicolay  and  Hay  well  say,  "the  President's  virtual 
abdication,"  and  thereafterward  began  the  "Cab 
inet  regime."  Upon  the  commissioners  this  chill 
gust  from  the  North  struck  so  disagreeably  that,  on 
January  2,  they  hastened  home  to  their  "indepen 
dent  nation."  From  this  time  forth  the  South 
covered  Mr.  Buchanan  with  contumely  and  abuse; 
Mr.  Benjamin  called  him  "a  senile  executive,  un 
der  the  sinister  influence  of  insane  counsels; "  and 
the  poor  old  man,  really  wishing  to  do  right,  but 
stripped  of  friends  and  of  his  familiar  advisers, 
and  confounded  by  the  views  of  new  counsellors, 
presented  a  spectacle  for  pity. 

On  January  8  Mr.  Thompson,  Secretary  of  the 
Interior,  resigned,  and  the  vacancy  was  left  un 
filled.  A  more  important  change  took  place  on 
the  following  day,  when  Mr.  Thomas  left  the 


INTERREGNUM.  201 

Treasury  Department,  and  the  New  York  bankers, 
whose  aid  was  essential,  forced  the  President, 
sorely  against  his  will,  to  give  the  place  to  General 
John  A.  Dix.  This  proved  an  excellent  appoint 
ment.  General  Dix  was  an  old  Democrat,  but  of 
the  high-spirited  type ;  he  could  have  tolerated  se 
cession  by  peaceable  agreement,  but  rose  in  anger 
at  menaces  against  the  flag  and  the  Union.  He 
conducted  his  department  with  entire  success,  and 
also  rendered  to  the  country  perhaps  the  greatest 
service  that  was  done  by  any  man  during  that  win 
ter.  On  January  29  he  sent  the  telegram  which 
closed  with  the  famous  words:  "If  any  one  at 
tempts  to  haul  down  the  American  flag,  shoot  him 
on  the  spot."  :  This  rung  out  as  the  first  cheer 
ing,  stimulating  indication  of  a  fighting  temper  at 
the  North.  It  was  a  tonic  which  came  at  a  time 
of  sore  need,  and  for  too  long  a  while  it  remained 
the  solitary  dose ! 

So  much  of  the  President's  Message  as  con 
cerned  the  condition  of  the  country  was  referred 
in  the  House  to  a  Committee  of  Thirty -three, 
composed  by  appointing  one  member  from  each 
State.  Other  resolutions  and  motions  upon  the 
same  subject,  to  the  number  of  twenty -five,  were 
also  sent  to  this  Committee.  It  had  many  sessions 
from  December  11  to  January  14,  but  never  made 
an  approach  to  evolving  anything  distantly  ap 
proaching  agreement.  When,  on  January  14,  the 

1  For  an  account  of  this  by  General  Dix  himself,  see  Memoirs  of 
John  A.  Dix,  by  Morgan  Dix,  i.  870-373. 


202  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Report  came,  it  was  an  absurd  fiasco ;  it  contained 
six  propositions,  of  which  each  had  the  assent  of  a 
majority  of  a  quorum ;  but  seven  minority  reports, 
bearing  together  the  signatures  of  fourteen  mem 
bers,  were  also  submitted ;  and  the  members  of  the 
seceding  States  refused  to  act.  The  only  actual 
fruit  was  a  proposed  amendment  to  the  Constitu 
tion  :  "  That  no  amendment  shall  be  made  to  the 
Constitution  which  will  authorize  or  give  to  Con 
gress  the  power  to  abolish  or  interfere,  within  any 
State,  with  the  domestic  institutions  thereof,  in 
cluding  that  of  persons  held  to  labor  or  service  by 
the  laws  of  said  State."  In  the  expiring  hours  of 
the  Thirty-sixth  Congress  this  was  passed  by  the 
House,  and  then  by  the  Senate,  and  was  signed  by 
the  President.  Lincoln,  in  his  inaugural  address, 
said  of  it :  "  Holding  such  a  provision  to  be  now 
constitutional  law,  I  have  no  objection  to  its  being 
made  express  and  irrevocable."  This  view  of  it 
was  correct;  it  had  no  real  significance,  and  the 
ill-written  sentence  never  disfigured  the  Constitu 
tion;  it  simply  sank  out  of  sight,  forgotten  by 
every  one. 

Collaterally  with  the  sitting  of  this  House  Com 
mittee,  a  Committee  of  Thirteen  was  appointed  in 
the  Senate.  To  these  gentlemen  also  "a  string  of 
Union-saving  devices  "  was  presented,  but  on  the 
last  day  of  the  year  they  reported  that  they  had 
"not  been  able  to  agree  upon  any  general  plan  of 
adjustment." 

The'  earnest  effort  of  the  venerable  Crittenden 


INTERREGNUM.  203 

to  effect  a  compromise  aroused  a  faint  hope.  But 
he  offered  little  else  than  an  extension  westward 
of  the  Missouri  Compromise  line;  and  he  never 
really  had  the  slightest  chance  of  effecting  that 
consummation,  which  in  fact  could  not  be  effected. 
His  plan  was  finally  defeated  on  the  last  evening 
of  the  session. 

Collaterally  with  these  congressional  debates 
there  were  also  proceeding  in  Washington  the  ses 
sions  of  the  Peace  Congress,  another  futile  effort 
to  concoct  a  cure  for  an  incurable  condition.  It 
met  on  February  4,  1861,  but  only  twenty-one 
States  out  of  thirty -four  were  represented.  The 
seven  States  which  had  seceded  said  that  they 
could  not  come,  being  "Foreign  Nations."  Six 
other  States l  held  aloof.  Those  Northern  States 
which  sent  delegates  selected  "their  most  conserv 
ative  and  compromising  men,"  and  so  great  a 
tendency  towards  concession  was  shown  that 
Unionists  soon  condemned  the  scheme  as  merely  a 
deceitful  cover  devised  by  the  Southerners  behind 
which  they  could  the  more  securely  carry  on  their 
processes  of  secession.  These  gentlemen  talked  a 
great  deal  and  finally  presented  a  report  or  plan 
to  Congress  five  days  before  the  end  of  the  session ; 
the  House  refused  to  receive  it,  the  Senate  re 
jected  it  by  7  ayes  to  28  nays.  The  only  useful 
ness  of  the  gathering  was  as  evidence  of  the  unwill-  ^ 
ingness  of  the  South  to  compromise.  In  fact  the 

1  Arkansas,  California,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Oregon,  a 


204  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Southern  leaders  were  entirely  frank  and  outspoken 
in  acknowledging  their  position;  they  had  said, 
from  the  beginning,  that  they  did  not  wish  the 
Committee  of  Thirty-three  to  accomplish  anything ; 
and  they  had  endeavored  to  dissuade  Southerners 
from  accepting  positions  upon  it.  Hawkins  of 
Florida  said  that  "the  time  of  compromise  had 
passed  forever."  South  Carolina  refused  to  share 
in  the  Peace  Congress,  because  she  did  "not  deem 
it  advisable  to  initiate  negotiations  when  she  had 
no  desire  or  intention  to  promote  the  object  in 
view."  Governor  Peters,  of  Mississippi,  in  poetic 
language,  suggested  another  difficulty:  "When 
sparks  cease  to  fly  upwards,"  he  said,  "Comanches 
respect  treaties,  and  wolves  kill  sheep  no  more, 
the  oath  of  a  Black  Kepublican  might  be  of  some 
value  as  a  protection  to  slave  property."  Jeffer 
son  Davis  contemptuously  stigmatized  all  the 
schemes  of  compromise  as  "quack  nostrums,"  and 
he  sneered  justly  enough  at  those  who  spun  fine 
arguments  of  legal  texture,  and  consumed  time 
"discussing  abstract  questions,  reading  patchwork 
from  the  opinions  of  men  now  mingled  with  the 
dust." 

It  is  not  known  by  what  logic  gentlemen  who 
held  these  views  defended  their  conduct  in  re 
taining  their  positions  in  the  government  of  the 
nation  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  it.  Senator 
Yulee,  of  Florida,  shamelessly  gave  his  motive  foi 
staying  in  the  Senate:  "It  is  thought  we  can  keep 
the  hands  of  Mr.  Buchanan  tied  and  disable  the 


INTERREGNUM.  205 

Republicans  from  effecting  any  legislation  which 
will  strengthen  the  hands  of  the  incoming  admin 
istration."  Mr.  Toombs,  of  Georgia,  speaking 
and  voting  at  his  desk  in  the  Senate,  declared  him 
self  "as  good  a  rebel  and  as  good  a  traitor  as  ever 
descended  from  Revolutionary  loins,"  and  said 
that  the  Union  was  already  dissolved,  —  by  which 
assertion  he  made  his  position  in  the  Senate  abso 
lutely  indefensible.  The  South  Carolina  senators 
resigned  before  their  State  ordained  itself  a  "for 
eign  nation,"  and  incurred  censure  for  being  so 
"precipitate."  In  a  word,  the  general  desire  was 
to  remain  in  office,  hampering  and  obstructing  the 
government,  until  March  4,  1861,  and  at  a  caucus 
of  Disunionists  it  was  agreed  to  do  so.  But  the 
pace  became  too  rapid,  and  resignations  followed 
pretty  close  upon  the  formal  acts  of  secession. 

On  the  same  day  on  which  the  Peace  Congress 
opened  its  sessions  in  Washington,  there  came 
together  at  Montgomery,  in  Alabama,  delegates 
from  six  States  for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  South 
ern  Confederacy.  On  the  third  day  thereafter  a 
plan  for  a  provisional  government,  substantially 
identical  with  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  was  adopted.  On  February  9  the  oath  of 
allegiance  was  taken,  and  Jefferson  Davis  and 
Alexander  H.  Stephens  were  elected  respectively 
President  and  Yice-President.  On  February  13 
the  military  and  naval  committees  were  directed 
to  report  plans  for  organizing  an  army  and  navy. 
Mr.  Davis  promptly  journeyed  to  Montgomery, 


206  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

making  on  the  way  many  speeches,  in  which  he 
told  his  hearers  that  no  plan  for  a  reconstruction 
of  the  old  Union  would  be  entertained;  and  prom 
ised  that  those  who  should  interfere  with  the  new 
nation  would  have  to  "smell  Southern  powder  and 
to  feel  Southern  steel."  On  February  18  he  was 
inaugurated,  and  in  his  address  again  referred  to 
the  "arbitrament  of  the  sword."  Immediately 
afterward  he  announced  his  Cabinet  as  follows :  — 
Robert  Toombs,  of  Georgia,  Secretary  of  State. 
C.  G.  Memminger,  of  South  Carolina,  Secretary  of  the 

Treasury. 

L.  P.  Walker,  of  Alabama,  Secretary  of  War. 
S.  R.  Mallory,  of  Florida,  Secretary  of  tbe  Navy. 
J.  H.  Reagan,  of  Texas,  Postmaster-General. 
Judah  P.  Benjamin,  of  Louisiana,  Attorney-General. 

On  March  11  the  permanent  Constitution  was 
adopted.1  Thus  the  machine  of  the  new  govern 
ment  was  set  in  working  order.  Mr.  Greeley  gives 
some  interesting  figures  showing  the  comparative 
.numerical  strength  of  the  sections  of  the  country 
at  this  time :  2  — 

The  free  population  of  the  seven  States  which 

had  seceded,  was 2,656,948 

The  free  population  of  the  eight  slave  States  3 

which  had  not  seceded,  was  .  .  .  5,633,005 

Total 8,289,953 

1  It  differed  from  that  of  the  United  States  very  little,  save  in 
containing  a  distinct  recognition  of  slavery ;  and  in  being  made  by 
the  States  instead  of  by  the  people. 

2  American  Conflict,  i.  351. 

3  This  includes  Delaware,  110,420,  and  Maryland,  599,846. 


INTERREGNUM.  207 

The  slaves  in  the  States  of  the  first  list  were,  2,312,046 

The  slaves  in  the  States  of  the  second  list  were  1,638,297 

Total  of  slaves 3,950,343 

The  population  of  the  whole  Union  by  the 

census  of  1860,  was         ....  31,443,321 

The  disproportion  would  have  discouraged  the 
fathers  of  the  new  nation,  if  they  had  anticipated 
that  the  North  would  be  resolute  in  using  its  over 
whelming  resources.  But  how  could  they  believe 
that  this  would  be  the  case  when  they  read  the 
New  York  "Tribune"  and  the  reports  of  Mr. 
Phillips 's  harangues? 

On  February  13  the  electoral  vote  was  to  be 
counted  in  Congress.  Kumors  were  abroad  that 
the  Secessionists  intended  to  interfere  with  this  by 
tumults  and  violence;  but  the  evidence  is  insuffi 
cient  to  prove  that  any  such,  scheme  was  definitely 
matured ;  it  was  talked  of,  but  ultimately  it  seems 
to  have  been  laid  aside  with  a  view  to  action  at  a 
later  date.  Naturally  enough,  however,  the  coun 
try  was  disquieted.  In  the  emergency  the  action 
of  General  Scott  was  watched  with  deep  anxiety. 
A  Southerner  by  birth  and  by  social  sympathies, 
he  had  been  expected  by  the  Secessionists  to  join 
their  movement.  But  the  old  soldier  —  though 
broken  by  age  and  infirmities,  and  though  he  had 
proposed  the  folly  of  voluntarily  quartering  the 
country,  like  the  corpse  of  a  traitor  —  had  his  pa 
triotism  and  his  temper  at  once  aroused  when  vio 
lence  was  threatened.  On  and  after  October  29 


208  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

he  had  repeatedly  advised  reinforcement  of  the 
Southern  garrisons;  though  it  must  be  admitted, 
in  Buchanan's  behalf,  that  the  General  made  no 
suggestion  as  to  how  or  where  the  troops  could  be 
obtained  for  this  purpose.  In  the  same  spirit  he 
now  said,  with  stern  resolution,  that  there  should 
be  ample  military  preparations  to  ensure  both  the 
count  and  the  inauguration;  and  he  told  some  of 
the  Southerners  that  he  would  blow  traitors  to 
pieces  at  the  cannon's  mouth  without  hesitation. 
Disturbed  at  his  vehemence,  they  denounced  him 
bitterly,  and  sent  him  frequent  notices  of  assas 
sination.  Floyd  distributed  orders  concerning 
troops  and  munitions  directly  from  the  War  De 
partment,  and  carefully  concealed  them  from  the 
General  who  was  the  head  of  the  army.  But 
secrecy  and  intimidation  were  in  vain.  The  aged 
warrior  was  fiercely  in  earnest;  if  there  was  go 
ing  to  be  any  outbreak  in  Washington  he  was 
going  to  put  it  down  with  bullets  and  bayonets, 
and  he  gathered  his  soldiers  and  instructed  his 
officers  accordingly.  But  happily  the  preparation 
of  these  things  was  sufficient  to  render  the  use  of 
them  unnecessary.  When  the  day  came  Vice- 
President  Breckenridge  performed  his  duty,  how 
ever  unwelcome,  without  flinching.  He  presided 
over  the  joint  session  and  conducted  the  count 
with  the  air  of  a  man  determined  to  enforce  law 
and  order,  and  at  the  close  declared  the  election 
of  Abraham  Lincoln  and  Hannibal  Hamlin. 

Still  only  the  smaller  crisis  had  been  passed. 


INTERREGNUM.  209 

Much  more  alarming  stories  now  flew  from  mouth 
to  mouth,  —  of  plots  to  seize  the  capital  and  to 
prevent  the  inauguration,  even  to  assassinate  Lin 
coln  on  his  journey  to  Washington.  How  much 
foundation  there  was  for  these  is  not  accurately 
known.  That  the  idea  of  capturing  Washing 
ton  had  fascinated  the  Southern  fancy  is  certain. 
"I  see  no  reason,"  said  Senator  Iverson,  "why 
Washington  City  should  not  be  continued  the 
capital  of  the  Southern  Confederacy."  The  Rich 
mond  "Examiner"  railed  grossly:  "That  filthy 
cage  of  unclean  birds  must  and  will  assuredly 
be  purified  by  fire.  .  .  .  Our  people  can  take  it, 
—  they  will  take  it.  ...  Scott,  the  arch-traitor, 
and  Lincoln,  the  beast,  combined,  cannot  prevent 
it.  The  'Illinois  Ape  '  must  retrace  his  journey 
more  rapidly  than  he  came."  The  abundant  talk 
of  this  sort  created  uneasiness;  and  Judge  Holt 
said  that  there  was  cause  for  alarm.  But  a  com 
mittee  of  Congress  reported  that,  though  it  was 
difficult  to  speak  positively,  yet  they  found  no 
evidence  sufficient  to  prove  "the  existence  of  a 
secret  organization."  Alexander  H.  Stephens  has 
denied  that  there  was  any  intention  to  attack  the 
city,  and  probably  the  notion  of  seizure  did  not 
pass  beyond  the  stage  of  talk. 

But  the  alleged  plot  to  assassinate  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  more  definite.  He  had  been  spending  the 
winter  quietly  in  Springfield,  where  he  had  been 
overrun  by  visitors,  who  wished  to  look  at  him, 
to  advise  him,  and  to  secure  promises  of  office; 


210  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

fortunately  the  tedious  procession  had  lost  part  of 
its  offensiveness  by  touching  his  sense  of  humor. 
Anxious  people  made  well-meaning  but  useless 
efforts  to  induce  him  to  say  something  for  effect 
upon  the  popular  mind;  but  he  resolutely  and 
wisely  maintained  silence.  His  position  and  opin 
ions,  he  said,  had  already  been  declared  in  his 
speeches  with  all  the  clearness  he  could  give  to 
them,  and  the  people  had  appeared  to  understand 
and  approve  them.  He  could  not  improve  and  did 
not  desire  to  change  these  utterances.  Occasion 
ally  he  privately  expressed  his  dislike  to  the  con 
ceding  and  compromising  temper  which  threatened 
to  undo,  for  an  indefinite  future,  all  which  the 
long  and  weary  struggle  of  an ti- slavery  men  had 
accomplished.  In  this  line  he  wrote  a  letter  of 
protest  to  Greeley,  which  inspired  that  gentleman 
to  a  singular  expression  of  sympathy;  let  the 
Union  go  to  pieces,  exclaimed  the  emotional  editor, 
let  presidents  be  assassinated,  let  the  Republican 
party  suffer  crushing  defeat,  but  let  there  not  be 
"another  nasty  compromise."  To  Mr.  Kellogg,  the 
Illinoisian  on  the  House  Committee  of  Thirty-three, 
Lincoln  wrote:  "Entertain  no  proposition  for  a 
compromise  in  regard  to  the  extension  of  slavery. 
The  instant  you  do,  they  have  us  under  again ;  all 
our  labor  is  lost,  and  sooner  or  later  must  be  done 
over  again."  He  repeated  almost  the  same  words 
to  E.  B.  Washburne,  a  member  of  the  House. 
Duff  Green  tried  hard  to  get  something  out  of 
him  for  the  comfort  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  but  failed 


INTERREGNUM.  211 

to  extort  more  than  commonplace  generalities. 
To  Seward  he  wrote  that  he  did  not  wish  to  inter 
fere  with  the  present  status,  or  to  meddle  with 
slavery  as  it  now  lawfully  existed.  To  like  pur 
port  he  wrote  to  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  induced 
thereto  by  the  famous  Union  speech  of  that  gen 
tleman.  He  eschewed  hostile  feeling,  saying:  "I 
never  have  been,  am  not  now,  and  probably  never 
shall  be,  in  a  mood  of  harassing  the  people,  either 
North  or  South."  Nevertheless  while  he  said  that 
all  were  "brothers  of  a  common  country,"  he  was 
perfectly  resolved  that  the  country  should  remain 
"common,"  even  if  the  bond  of  brotherhood  had 
to  be  riveted  by  force.  He  admitted  that  this 
necessity  would  be  "an  ugly  point;"  but  he  was 
perfectly  clear  that  "the  right  of  a  State  to  secede 
is  not  an  open  or  debatable  question."  He  de 
sired  that  General  Scott  should  be  prepared  either 
to  "hold  or  retake"  the  Southern  forts,  if  need 
should  be,  at  or  after  the  inauguration;  but  on 
his  journey  to  Washington  he  said  to  many  audi 
ences  that  he  wished  no  war  and  no  bloodshed, 
and  that  these  evils  could  be  avoided  if  people 
would  only  "keep  cool"  and  "keep  their  temper, 
on  both  sides  of  the  line." 

On  Monday,  February  11,  1861,  Mr.  Lincoln 
spoke  to  his  fellow-citizens  of  Springfield  a  very 
brief  farewell,  so  solemn  as  to  sound  ominous  in 
the  ears  of  those  who  know  what  afterward  oc 
curred.  It  was  arranged  that  he  should  stop  at 
various  points  upon  the  somewhat  circuitous  route 


212  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

which  had  been  laid  out,  and  that  he  should  arrive 
in  Washington  on  Saturday,  February  23.  The 
programme  was  pursued  accurately  till  near  the 
close ;  he  made,  of  course,  many  speeches,  but  none 
added  anything  to  what  was  already  known  as  to 
his  views. 

Meantime  the  thick  rumors  of  violence  were 
bringing  much  uneasiness  to  persons  who  were 
under  responsibilities.  Baltimore  was  the  place 
where,  and  its  villainous  "Plug  Uglies  "  were  the 
persons  by  whom,  the  plot,  if  there  was  one,  was 
to  be  executed.  Mr.  Felton,  President  of  the 
Philadelphia,  Wilmington  and  Baltimore  Railroad 
Company,  engaged  Allan  Pinkerton  to  explore  the 
matter,  and  the  report  of  this  skilful  detective  in 
dicated  a  probability  of  an  attack  with  the  pur 
pose  of  assassination.  At  that  time  the  cars  were 
drawn  by  horses  across  town  from  the  northern  to 
the  southern  station,  and  during  the  passage  an 
assault  could  be  made  with  ease  and  with  great 
chance  of  success.  As  yet  there  was  no  indication 
that  the  authorities  intended  to  make,  even  if  they 
could  make,1  any  adequate  arrangements  for  the 
protection  of  the  traveller.  At  Philadelphia  Mr. 
Lincoln  was  told  of  the  fears  of  his  friends,  and 
talked  with  Mr.  Pinkerton,  but  he  refused  to 
change  his  plan.  On  February  22  he  was  to 
assist  at  a  flag-raising  in  Philadelphia,  and  was 
then  to  go  on  to  Harrisburg,  and  on  the  following 

1  Marshal  Kane  and  most  of  the  police  were  reported  to  be 
Secessionists.  Pinkerton,  Spy  of  the  Rebellion,  50,  61. 


INTERREGNUM.  213 

day  he  was  to  go  from  there  to  Baltimore.  He 
declined  to  alter  either  route  or  hours. 

But  other  persons  besides  Mr.  Felton  had  been 
busy  with  independent  detective  investigations, 
the  result  of  which  was  in  full  accord  with  the 
report  of  Mr.  Pinkerton.  On  February  22  Mr. 
Frederick  W.  Seward,  sent  by  his  father  and 
General  Scott,  both  then  at  Washington,  delivered 
to  Mr.  Lincoln,  at  Philadelphia,  the  message  that 
there  was  "serious  danger"  to  his  life  if  the  time 
of  his  passage  through  Baltimore  should  be  known. 
Yet  Lincoln  still  remained  obdurate.  He  declared 
that  if  an  escorting  delegation  from  Baltimore 
should  meet  him  at  Harrisburg,  he  would  go  on 
with  it.  But  at  Harrisburg  no  such  escort  pre 
sented  itself.  Then  the  few  who  knew  the  situa 
tion  discussed  furtjier  as  to  what  should  be  done, 
Norman  B.  Judd  being  chief  spokesman  for  evad 
ing  the  danger  by  a  change  of  programme.  Natur 
ally  the  objection  of  seeming  timid  and  of  exciting 
ridicule  was  present  in  the  minds  of  all,  and  it 
was  put  somewhat  emphatically  by  Colonel  Stun 
ner.  Mr.  Lincoln  at  last  settled  the  dispute;  he 
said:  "I  have  thought  over  this  matter  consider 
ably  since  I  went  over  the  ground  with  Pinkerton 
last  night.  The  appearance  of  Mr.  Frederick 
Seward,  with  warning  from  another  source,  con 
firms  Mr.  Pinkerton' s  belief.  Unless  there  are 
some  other  reasons  besides  fear  of  ridicule,  I  am 
disposed  to  carry  out  Judd's  plan." 

This  plan  was  accordingly  carried  out  with  the 


214  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

success  which  its  simplicity  insured.  Mr.  Lin 
coln  and  his  stalwart  friend,  Colonel  Lamon, 
slipped  out  of  a  side  door  to  a  hackney  carriage, 
were  driven  to  the  railway  station,  and  returned 
by  the  train  to  Philadelphia.  Their  departure  was 
not  noticed,  but  had  it  been,  news  of  it  could  not 
have  been  sent  awaj7,  for  Mr.  Felton  had  had  the 
telegraph  wires  secretly  cut  outside  the  town.  He 
also  ordered,  upon  a  plausible  pretext,  that  the 
southward-bound  night  train  on  his  road  should 
be  held  back  until  the  arrival  of  this  train  from 
Harrisburg.  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Colonel  Lamon 
passed  from  the  one  train  to  the  other  without 
recognition,  and  rolled  into  Washington  early  on 
the  following  morning.  Mr.  Seward  and  Mr. 
Washburne  met  Lincoln  at  the  station  and  went 
with  him  to  Willard's  Hotel.  Soon  afterward 
the  country  was  astonished,  and  perhaps  some  per 
sons  were  discomfited,  as  the  telegraph  carried 
abroad  the  news  of  his  arrival. 

Those  who  were  disappointed  at  this  safe  con 
clusion  of  his  journey,  if  in  fact  there  were  any 
such,  together  with  many  who  would  have  con 
temned  assassination,  at  once  showered  upon  him 
sneers  and  ridicule.  They  said  that  Lincoln  had 
put  on  a  disguise  and  had  shown  the  white  feather, 
when  there  had  been  no  real  danger.  But  this 
was  not  just.  Whether  or  not  there  was  the  com 
pleted  machinery  of  a  definite,  organized  plot  for 
assault  and  assassination  is  uncertain;  that  is  to 
say,  this  is  not  proved;  yet  the  evidence  is  so 


INTERREGNUM.  215 

strong  that  the  majority  of  investigators  seem  to 
agree  in  the  opinion  that  probably  there  was  a 
plan  thoroughly  concerted  and  ready  for  execu 
tion.  Even  if  there  was  not,  it  was  very  likely 
that  a  riot  might  be  suddenly  started,  which 
would  be  as  fatal  in  its  consequences  as  a  premed 
itated  scheme.  But,  after  all,  the  question  of  the 
plot  is  one  of  mere  curiosity  and  quite  aside  from 
the  true  issue.  That  issue,  so  far  as  it  presented 
itself  for  determination  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  was  sim 
ply  whether  a  case  of  such  probability  of  danger 
was  made  out  that  as  a  prudent  man  he  should 
over-rule  the  only  real  objection,  —  that  of  exciting- 
ridicule,  —  and  avoid  a  peril  which  the  best  judges 
believed  to  exist,  and  which,  if  it  did  exist,  in 
volved  consequences  of  immeasurable  seriousness 
not  only  to  himself  but  to  the  nation.  For  a  wise 
man  only  one  conclusion  was  possible.  The  story 
of  the  disguise  was  a  silly  slander,  based  upon 
the  trifling  fact  that  for  this  night  journey  Lincoln 
wore  a  travelling  cap  instead  of  his  hat. 

Lincoln's  own  opinion  as  to  the  danger  is  not 
quite  clear.1  He  said  to  Mr.  Lossing  that,  after 
hearing  Mr.  Seward,  he  believed  "such  a  plot  to 
be  in  existence."  But  he  also  said:  "I  did  not 
then,  nor  do  I  now,  believe  I  should  have  been 
assassinated,  had  I  gone  through  Baltimore  as  first 
contemplated;  but  I  thought  it  wise  to  run  no 
risk,  where  no  risk  was  necessary." 

1  Lamon  says  that  Mr.  Lincoln  afterwards  regretted  this  jour 
ney,  and  became  convinced  "  that  he  had  committed  a  grave  mis- 
.  take."  Lamon,  527.  So  also  McClure,  45,  48. 


216  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

The  reflection  can  hardly  fail  to  occur,  how 
grossly  unfair  it  was  that  Mr.  Lincoln  should  be 
put  into  the  position  in  which  he  was  put  at  this 
time,  and  then  that  fault  should  be  found  with 
him  even  if  his  prudence  was  overstrained.  Many 
millions  of  people  in  the  country  hated  him  with 
a  hatred  unutterable ;  among  them  might  well  be 
many  fanatics,  to  whom  assassination  would  seem 
a  noble  act,  many  desperadoes  who  would  regard  it 
as  a  pleasing  excitement ;  and  he  was  to  go  through 
a  city  which  men  of  this  stamp  could  at  any  time 
dominate.  The  custom  of  the  country  compelled 
this  man,  whom  it  had  long  since  selected  as  its 
ruler,  to  make  a  journey  of  extreme  danger  with 
out  any  species  of  protection  whatsoever.  So  far 
as  peril  went  no  other  individual  in  the  United 
States  had  ever,  presumably,  been  in  a  peril  like 
that  which  beset  him;  so  far  as  safeguards  went, 
he  had  no  more  than  any  other  traveller.  A  few 
friends  volunteered  to  make  the  journey  with  him, 
but  they  were  useless  as  guardians;  and  he  and 
they  were  so  hustled  and  jammed  in  the  railway 
stations  that  one  of  them  actually  had  his  arm 
broken.  This  extraordinary  spectacle  may  have 
indicated  folly  on  the  part  of  the  nation  which 
permitted  it,  but  certainly  it  did  not  involve  the 
disgrace  of  the  individual  who  had  no  choice  about 
it.  The  people  put  Mr.  Lincoln  in  a  position  in 
which  he  was  subjected  to  the  most  appalling,  as  it 
is  the  most  vague,  of  all  dangers,  and  then  left  him 
to  take  care  of  himself  as  best  he  could.  It  was 


INTEHRE  GN  UM.  217 

ungenerous  afterward  to  criticise  him  for  exercis 
ing  prudence  in  the  performance  of  that  duty 
which  he  ought  never  to  have  been  called  upon  to 
perform  at  all.1 

1  For  accounts  of  this  journey  and  statements  of  the  evidence 
of  a  plot,  see  Schouler,  Hist,  of  Mass,  in  Civil  War,  i.  59-65 
(account  by  Samuel  M.  Felton,  Prest.  P.  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.) ; 
N.  and  H.,  iii.  ch.  19  and  20  ;  Chittenden,  Recoil,  of  Lincoln,  x.  ; 
Holland,  275 ;  Arnold,  183-187 ;  Lamon,  ch.  xx. ;  (this  account 
ought  to  be,  and  doubtless  is,  the  most  trustworthy) ;  Herndon, 
492  (a  bit  of  gossip  which  sounds  improbable) ;  Pinkerton,  Spy 
of  the  Rebellion,  45-103.  On  the  anti-plot  side  of  the  question 
the  most  important  evidence  is  the  little  volume  Baltimore  and 
the  Nineteenth  of  April,  1861,  by  George  William  Brown.  This 
witness,  whose  strict  veracity  is  beyond  question,  was  mayor  of 
the  city.  One  of  his  statements,  especially,  is  of  the  greatest 
importance.  It  is  obvious  that,  if  the  plot  existed,  one  of  two 
things  ought  to  occur  on  the  morning  of  February  23,  viz. :  either 
the  plotters  and  the  mobsmen  should  know  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had 
escaped  them,  or  else  they  should  be  at  the  station  at  the  hour 
set  for  his  arrival.  In  fact  they  were  not  at  the  station;  there 
was  no  sudden  assault  on  the  cars,  nor  other  indication  of  assassins 
and  a  mob.  Had  they,  then,  received  knowledge  of  what  had  oc 
curred  ?  Those  who  sustain  the  plot-theory  say  that  the  news  had 
spread  through  the  city,  so  that  all  the  assassins  and  the  gangs  of 
the  "  Plug  Uglies  "  knew  that  their  game  was  up.  This  was  pos 
sible,  for  Mr.  Lincoln  had  arrived  in  the  Washington  station  a  few 
minutes  after  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  the  train  which  was 
expected  to  bring  him  to  Baltimore  did  not  arrive  in  Baltimore 
until  half  after  eleven  o'clock.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  news 
was  not  dispatched  from  Washington  immediately  upon  his  arrival ; 
somewhat  later,  though  still  early  in  the  morning,  the  detectives 
telegraphed  to  the  friends  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  but  in  cipher.  Just  at 
what  time  intelligible  telegrams,  which  would  inform  the  public, 
were  sent  out  cannot  be  learned ;  but  upon  any  arrangement  of 
hours  it  is  obvious  that  the  time  was  exceedingly  short  for  distrib 
uting  the  news  throughout  the  lower  quarters  of  Baltimore  by  word 
of  mouth,  and  there  is  no  pretense  of  any  publication.  But  while 


218  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Immediately  after  his  arrival  in  Washington 
Mr.  Lincoln  received  a  visit  from  the  members  of 
the  Peace  Congress.  Grotesque  and  ridiculous 
descriptions  of  him,  as  if  he  had  been  a  Caliban 
in  education,  manners,  and  aspect,  had  been  rife 
among  Southerners,  and  the  story  goes  that  the 
Southern  delegates  expected  to  be  at  once  amused 
and  shocked  by  the  sight  of  a  clodhopper  whose 
conversation  would  be  redolent  of  the  barnyard, 
not  to  say  of  the  pigsty.  Those  of  them  who  had 
any  skill  in  reading  character  were  surprised,  — 
as  the  tradition  is,  —  discomfited,  even  a  little 

the  believers  in  the  plot  say,  nevertheless,  that  this  had  been  done 
and  that  the  story  of  the  journey  had  spread  through  the  city  so 
that  all  the  assassins  and  "  Plug1  Uglies  "  knew  it  in  time  to  avoid 
assembling-  at  the  railway  station  about  eleven  o'clock,  yet  it  ap 
pears  that  Mr.  Brown,  the  mayor,  knew  nothing  about  it.  On  the 
contrary,  he  tells  us  that  in  anticipation  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  arrival 
he,  "as  mayor  of  the  city,  accompanied  by  the  police  commis 
sioners  and  supported  by  a  strong  force  of  police,  was  at  the  Cal- 
vert  Street  station  on  Saturday  morning,  February  2:5d,  at  11.30 
o'clock  .  .  .  ready  to  receive  with  due  respect  the  incoming  Presi 
dent.  An  open  carriage  was  in  waiting,  in  which  I  was  to  have  the 
honor  of  escorting  Mr.  Lincoln  through  the  city  to  the  Washington 
station,  and  of  sharing  in  any  danger  which  he  might  encounter. 
It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  I  apprehended  none."  To  the 
"great  astonishment"  of  Mr.  Brown,  however,  the  train  brought 
only  "Mrs.  Lincoln  and  her  three  sons,"  and  "it  was  then  an 
nounced  that  he  had  passed  through  the  city  incognito  in  the  night 
train."  This  is  a  small  bit  of  evidence  to  set  against  the  elaborate 
stories  of  the  believers  in  the  plot,  yet  to  some  it  will  seem  like 
the  little  obstruction  which  suffices  to  throw  a  whole  railway  train 
from  the  track.  I  would  rather  let  any  reader,  who  is  sufficiently 
interested  to  examine  the  matter,  reach  his  own  conclusion,  than 
endeavor  to  furnish  one  for  him  ;  for  I  think  that  a  dispute  more 
difficult  of  really  conclusive  settlement  will  not  easily  be  found. 


INTERREGNUM.  219 

alarmed,  at  what  in  fact  they  beheld;  for  Mr.  Lin 
coln  appeared  before  them  a  self-possessed  man, 
expressing  to  them  such  clear  convictions  and  such 
a  distinct  and  firm  purpose  as  compelled  them  into 
new  notions  of  his  capacity  and  told  them  of  much 
trouble  ahead.  His  remark  to  Mr.  Bives,  coming 
from  one  who  spoke  accurately,  had  an  ominous 
sound  in  rebellious  ears:  "My  course  is  as  plain 
as  a  turnpike  road.  It  is  marked  out  by  the  Con 
stitution.  I  am  in  no  doubt  which  way  to  go." 
The  wiser  Southerners  withdrew  from  this  recep 
tion  quite  sober  and  thoughtful,  with  some  new 
ideas  about  the  man  with  whom  their  relationship 
seemed  on  the  verge  of  becoming  hostile.  After 
abundant  allowance  is  made  for  the  enthusiasm  of 
Northern  admirers,  it  remains  certain  that  Lincoln 
bore  well  this  severe  ordeal  of  criticism  on  the  part 
of  those  who  would  have  been  glad  to  despise  him. 
Ungainly  they  saw  him,  but  not  undignified,  and 
the  strange  impressive  sadness  seldom  dwelt  so 
strikingly  upon  his  face  as  at  this  time,  as  though 
all  the  weight  of  misery,  which  the  millions  of  his 
fellow-citizens  were  to  endure  throughout  the  com 
ing  years,  already  burdened  the  soul  of  the  ruler 
who  had  been  chosen  to  play  the  most  responsible 
part  in  the  crisis  and  the  anguish. 

March  4,  1861,  inauguration  day,  was  fine  and 
sunny.  If  there  had  ever  been  any  real  danger 
of  trouble,  the  fear  of  it  had  almost  entirely  sub 
sided.  Northerners  and  Southerners  had  found 
out  in  good  season  that  General  Scott  was  not  in 


220  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

a  temporizing  mood ;  he  had  in  the  city  two  bat 
teries,  a  few  companies  of  regulars,  —  653  men, 
exclusive  of  some  marines,  —  and  the  corps  of 
picked  Washington  Volunteers.  He  said  that  this 
force  was  all  he  wanted.  President  Buchanan  left 
the  White  House  in  an  open  carriage,  escorted  by 
a  company  of  sappers  and  miners  under  Captain 
Duane.  At  Willard's  Hotel  Mr.  Lincoln  entered 
the  carriage,  and  the  two  gentlemen  passed  along 
the  avenue,  through  crowds  which  cheered  but 
made  no  disturbance,  to  the  Capitol.  General 
Scott  with  his  regulars  marched,  "flanking  the 
movement,  in  parallel  streets."  His  two  batteries, 
while  not  made  unpleasantly  conspicuous,  yet  con 
trolled  the  plateau  which  extends  before  the  east 
front  of  the  Capitol.  Mr.  Lincoln  was  simply 
introduced  by  Senator  Baker  of  Oregon,  and  de 
livered  his  inaugural  address.  His  voice  had  great 
carrying  capacity,  and  the  vast  crowd  heard  with 
ease  a  speech  of  which  every  sentence  was  fraught 
with  an  importance  and  scrutinized  with  an  anxiety 
far  beyond  that  of  any  other  speech  ever  delivered 
in  the  United  States.  At  its  close  the  venerable 
Chief  Justice  Taney  administered  the  oath  of 
office,  thereby  informally  but  effectually  reversing 
the  most  famous  opinion  delivered  by  him  during 
his  long  incumbency  in  his  high  office. 

The  inaugural  address  was  simple,  earnest  and 
direct,  unencumbered  by  that  rhetorical  ornament 
ation  which  the  American  people  have  always 
admired  as  the  highest  form  of  eloquence.  Those 


INTERREGNUM.  221 

Northerners  who  had  expected  magniloquent  pe 
riods  and  exaggerated  outbursts  of  patriotism  were 
disappointed ;  and  as  they  listened  in  vain  for  the 
scream  of  the  eagle,  many  grumbled  at  the  absence 
of  what  they  conceived  to  be  force.  Yet  the  gen 
eral  feeling  was  of  satisfaction,  which  grew  as  the 
address  was  more  thoroughly  studied.  The  South 
erners,  upon  their  part,  looking  anxiously  to  see 
whether  or  not  they  must  fight  for  their  purpose, 
construed  the  words  of  the  new  President  cor 
rectly.  They  heard  him  say :  "  The  union  of  these 
States  is  perpetual."  "No  State  upon  its  own 
mere  motion  can  lawfully  get  out  of  the  Union." 
"I  shall  take  care,  as  the  Constitution  itself  ex 
pressly  enjoins  upon  me,  that  the  laws  of  the 
Union  be  faithfully  executed  in  all  the  States." 
lie  also  declared  his  purpose  "to  hold,  occupy  and 
possess  the  property  and  places  belonging  to  the 
Government,  and  to  collect  the  duties  and  im 
posts."  These  sentences  made  up  the  issue  di 
rectly  with  secession,  and  the  South,  reading 
them,  knew  that,  if  the  North  was  ready  to  back 
the  President,  war  was  inevitable;  none  the  less 
so  because  Mr.  Lincoln  closed  with  patriotic  and 
generous  words:  "We  are  not  enemies,  but 
friends.  We  must  not  be  enemies.  Though  pas 
sion  may  have  strained,  it  must  not  break  our 
bonds  of  affection." 

Until  after  the  election  of  Mr.  Lincoln  in  No 
vember,  1860,  the  sole  issue  between  the  North  and 
the  South,  between  Republicans  on  the  one  hand 


222  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

and  Democrats  and  Compromisers  on  the  other, 
had  related  to  slavery.  Logically  the  position  of 
the  Republicans  was  impregnable.  Their  plat 
forms  and  their  leaders  agreed  that  the  party 
intended  strictly  to  respect  the  Constitution,  and 
not  to  interfere  at  all  with  slavery  in  the  States 
within  which  it  now  lawfully  existed.  They  said 
with  truth  that  they  had  in  no  case  deprived  the 
slave-holding  communities  of  their  rights,  and  they 
denied  the  truth  of  the  charge  that  they  cherished 
an  inchoate  design  to  interfere  with  those  rights; 
adding  very  truly  that,  at  worst,  a  mere  design, 
which  did  not  find  expression  in  an  overt  act,  could 
give  no  right  of  action  to  the  South.  fMr.  Lincoln 
had  been  most  explicit  in  declaring  that  the  op 
position  to  slavery  was  not  to  go  beyond  efforts  to 
prevent  its  extension,  which  efforts  would  be  wholly 
within  the  Constitution  and  the  law.  He  repeated 
these  things  in  his  inaugural. 

But  while  these  incontrovertible  allegations  gave 
the  Republicans  a  logical  advantage  of  which  they 
properly  made  the  most,  the  South  claimed  a  right 
to  make  other  collateral  and  equally  undeniable 
facts  the  ground  of  action.  \The  only  public  mat 
ter  in  connection  with  which  Mr.  Lincoln  had  won 
any  reputation  was  that  of  slavery.  No  one  could 
deny  that  he  had  been  elected  because  the  Repub 
lican  party  had  been  pleased  with  his  expression  of 
opinion  on  this  subject.  Now  his  most  pointed 
and  frequently  reiterated  expression  of  that  opin 
ion  was,  that  slavery  was  a  7  moral,  social,  and 


INTERREGNUM.  223 

political  evil;*'  and  this  language  was  a  fair 
equivalent  of  the  statement  of  the  Republican 
platform  of  1856,  classing  Slavery  and  Mormonism 
together,  as  "twin  relics  of  barbarism."  That  the 
North  was  willing,  or  would  long  be  willing,  to  re 
main  in  amicable  social  and  political  bonds  with  a 
moral,  social,  and  political  evil,  and  a  relic  of  bar 
barism,  was  intrinsically  improbable,  and  was  made 
more  improbable  by  the  symptoms  of  the  times.1 
Indeed,  Mr.  Seward  had  said,  in  famous  words, 
that  his  section  would  not  play  this  unworthy  part ; 
he  had  proclaimed  already  the  existence  of  an  "ir 
repressible  conflict;  "  and  therefore  the  South  had 
the  word  of  the  Republican  leader  that,  in  spite  of 
the  Republican  respect  for  the  law,  an  anti-slavery 
crusade  was  already  in  existence.  The  Southern 
chiefs  distinctly  recognized  and  accepted  this  situ 
ation.2  There  was  an  avowed  Northern  condem- 

1  Some  of  the  Southern  members  of  Congress  collected  and 
recited  sundry  noteworthy  utterances  of  Republicans  concerning 
slavery,  and  certainly  there  was  little  in  them  to  induce  a  sense  of 
security  on  the  part  of  slave-holders.     Wilson,  Rise  and  Fall  of 
Slave  Power,  iii.  97,  154. 

2  Toombs  declared,  as  Lincoln  had  said,  that  what  was  wanted 
was  that  the  North  should  call  slavery  right.     Wilson,  Rise  and 
Fall  of  Slave  Power,  iii.  76.    Stephens  declared  the  "  corner  stone  " 
of  the  new  government  to  be  "  the  great  truth  that  the  negro  is 
not  equal  to  the  white  man ;  that  slavery  ...  is  his  natural  and 
normal  condition  ;  v  and  said  that  it  was  the  first  government  "  in 
the  history  of  the  world,  based  upon  this  great  physical,  philo 
sophical  and  moral  truth."    N.  and  H.,  iii.  203  ;  and  see  his  letter 
to  Lincoln,  ibid.  272,  273.     Mississippi,  in  declaring  the  causes  of 
her  secession,  said  :  "  Our  position  is  thoroughly  identical  with  the 
institution  of  slavery,  —  the  greatest  material  interest  in  the  world." 


224  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

nation  of  their  institution;  there  was  an  acknow 
ledged  "conflict."  Such  being  the  case  it  was  the 
opinion  of  the  chief  men  at  the  South  that  the 
position  taken  by  the  North,  of  strict  performance 
of  clear  constitutional  duties  concerning  an  odious 
institution,  would  not  suffice  for  the  safe  perpetu 
ation  of  that  institution.1  This,  their  judgment, 
appeared  to  be  in  a  certain  way  also  the  judgment 
of  Mr.  Lincoln;  for  he  also  conceived  that  to 
put  slavery  where  the  "fathers"  had  left  it  was  to 
put  it  "in  the  way  of  ultimate  extinction;"  and 
he  had,  in  the  most  famous  utterance  of  his  life, 
given  his  forecast  of  the  future  to  the  effect  that 
the  country  would  in  time  be  "all  free."  The 
only  logical  deduction  was  that  he,  and  the  Repub 
lican  party  which  had  agreed  with  him  sufficiently 
to  make  him  President,  believed  that  the  South 
had  no  lawful  recourse  by  which  this  result,  how 
ever  unwelcome  or  ruinous,  could  in  the  long  run 
and  the  fulness  of  time  be  escaped.  Under  such 

N.  and  H.,  iii.  201.  Senator  Mason,  of  Virginia,  said  :  It  is  "  a  war 
of  sentiment,  of  opinion ;  a  war  of  one  form  of  society  against  an 
other  form  of  society."  Wilson,  Eise  and  Fall  of  Slave  Power, 
iii.  26.  Green,  of  Missouri,  ascribed  the  trouble  to  the  "  vitiated 
and  corrupted  state  of  public  sentiment.'1  Ibid.  23.  Iverson,  of 
Georgia,  said  it  was  the  "  public  sentiment "  at  the  North,  not  the 
"  overt  acts  "  of  the  Republican  administration,  that  was  feared  ; 
and  said  that  there  was  ineradicable  enmity  between  the  two  sec 
tions,  which  had  not  lived  together  in  peace,  were  not  so  living 
now,  and  could  not  be  expected  to  do  so  in  the  future.  Ibid.  17. 

1  Historians  generally  seem  to  admit  that  the  South  had  to 
choose  between  making  the  fight  now,  and  seeing  its  favorite 
institution  gradually  become  extinct. 


INTERREGNUM.  225 

circumstances  Southern  political  leaders  now  de 
cided  that  the  time  for  separation  had  come.  In 
speaking  of  their  scheme  they  called  it  "secession," 
and  said  that  secession  was  a  lawful  act  because 
the  Constitution  was  a  compact  revocable  by  any 
of  the  parties.  They  might  have  called  it  "revo 
lution,"1  and  have  defended  it  upon  the  general 
right  of  any  large  body  of  people,  dissatisfied  with 
the  government  under  which  they  find  themselves, 
to  cast  it  off.  But,  if  the  step  was  revolution^ 
then  the  burden  of  proof  was  upon  them ;  whereas 
they  said  that  secession  was  their  lawful  right, 
without  any  regard  whatsoever  to  the  motive  which 
induced  them  to  exercise  it.2  Such  was  the  char 
acter  of  the  issue  between  the  North  and  the  South 
prior  to  the  first  ordinance  of  secession.  The 
action  of  South  Carolina,  followed  by  the  other 
Gulf  States,  at  once  changed  that  issue,  shifting 
it  from  pro-slavery  versus  anti-slavery,  to  union 
versus  disunion.  This  alteration  quickly  compelled 
great  numbers  of  men  both  at  the  North  and  at 
the  South,  to  reconsider  and,  upon  a  new  issue, 
to  place  themselves  also  anew. 

It  has  been  said  by  all  writers  that  in  the  seven 
seceding  States  there  was,  in  the  four  months  fol 
lowing  the  election,  a  very  large  proportion  of 
"Union  men."  The  name  only  signified  that 
these  men  did  not  think  that  the  present  induce 
ments  to  disunion  were  sufficient  to  render  it  a 

1  Sometimes,  though  very  rarely,  the  word  was  used. 

2  See  Lincoln's  Message  to  Congress,  July  4,  1861. 


226  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

wise  measure.  It  did  not  signify  that  they 
thought  disunion  unlawful,  unconstitutional,  and 
treasonable.  When,  however,  state  conventions 
decided  the  question  of  advisability  against  their 
opinions,  and  they  had  to  choose  between  alle 
giance  to  the  State  and  allegiance  to  the  Union, 
they  immediately  adhered  to  the  State,  and  this 
none  the  less  because  they  feared  that  she  had 
taken  an  ill-advised  step.  That  is  to  say,  at  the 
South  a  "Union  man"  wished  to  preserve  the 
Union,  whereas  at  the  North  a  "Union  man" 
recognized  a  supreme  obligation  to  do  so. 

While  the  South,  by  political  alchemy,  was 
becoming  solidified  and  homogeneous,  a  corre 
sponding  change  was  going  on  at  the  North.  In 
that  section  the  great  numbers  —  of  whom  some 
would  have  re -made  the  Constitution,  others  would 
have  agreed  to  peaceable  separation,  and  still 
others  would  have  made  any  concession  to  retain 
the  integrity  of  the  Union  —  now  saw  that  these 
were  indeed,  as  Jefferson  Davis  had  said,  "quack 
nostrums,"  and  that  the  choice  lay  between  per 
mitting  a  secession  accompanied  with  insulting 
menaces  and  some  degree  of  actual  violence,  and 
maintaining  the  Union  by  coercion.  In  this  di 
lemma  great  multitudes  of  Northern  Democrats, 
whose  consciences  had  never  been  in  the  least  dis 
turbed  by  the  existence  of  slavery  in  the  country 
or  even  by  efforts  to  extend  it,  became  "Union 
men "  in  the  Northern  sense  of  the  word,  which 
made  it  about  equivalent  to  coercionists.  Their 


INTERREGNUM.  227 

simple  creed  was  the  integrity  and  perpetuity  of 
the  nation. 

Mr.  Lincoln  showed  in  his  inaugural  his  accu 
rate  appreciation  of  the  new  situation.  Owing  all 
that  he  had  become  in  the  world  to  a  few  anti- 
slavery  speeches,  elevated  to  the  presidency  by 
votes  which  really  meant  little  else  than  hostility 
to  slavery,  what  was  more  natural  than  that  he 
should  at  this  moment  revert  to  this  great  topic 
and  make  the  old  dispute  the  main  part  and  real 
substance  of  his  address?  But  this  fatal  error  he 
avoided.  With  unerring  judgment  he  dwelt  little 
on  that  momentous  issue  which  had  only  just  been 
displaced,  and  took  his  stand  fairly  upon  that  still 
more  momentous  one  which  had  so  newly  come  up. 
He  spoke  for  the  Union;  upon  that  basis  a  united 
North  ought  to  support  him ;  upon  that  basis  the 
more  northern  of  the  slave  States  might  remain 
loyal.  As  matter  of  fact  Union  had  suddenly 
become  the  real  issue,  but  it  needed  at  the  hands 
of  the  President  to  be  publicly  and  explicitly  an 
nounced  as  such;  his  recognition  was  essential; 
he  gave  it  on  this  earliest  opportunity,  and  the 
announcement  was  the  first  great  service  of  the 
new  Republican  ruler.  It  seems  now  as  though 
he  could  hardly  have  done  otherwise  or  have  fallen 
into  the  error  of  allying  himself  with  bygone  or 
false  issues.  It  may  be  admitted  that  he  could 
not  have  passed  this  new  one  by ;  but  the  impor 
tant  matter  was  that  of  proportion  and  relat: 
and  in  this  it  was  easy  to  blunder.  In  trutb^itj> 

"51^ 

'•'V    JLT>  * 


228  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

was  a  crisis  when  blundering  was  so  easy  that 
nearly  all  the  really  able  men  of  the  North  had 
been  doing  it  badly  for  three  or  four  months  past, 
and  not  a  few  of  them  were  going  to  continue  it 
for  two  or  three  months  to  come.  Therefore,  the 
sound  conception  of  the  inaugural  deserves  to  be 
considered  as  an  indication,  one  among  many,  of 
Lincoln's  capacity  for  seeing  with  entire  distinct 
ness  the  great  main  fact,  and  for  recognizing  it  as 
such.  Other  matters,  which  lay  over  and  around 
such  a  fact,  side  issues,  questions  of  detail,  affairs 
of  disguise  or  deception,  never  confused  or  misled 
him.  He  knew  with  unerring  accuracy  where  the 
biggest  fact  lay,  and  he  always  anchored  fast  to  it, 
and  stayed  with  it.  For  many  years  he  had  been 
anchored  to  anti -slavery ;  now,  in  the  face  of  the 
nation,  he  shifted  his  anchorage  to  the  Union; 
and  each  time  he  held  securely. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

THE   BEGINNING   OF   WAR. 

FROM  the  inaugural  ceremonies  Lincoln  drove 
quietly  back  through  Pennsylvania  Avenue  and 
entered  the  White  House,  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  —  alas,  united  no  longer.  Many  an 
anxious  citizen  breathed  more  freely  when  the 
dreaded  hours  had  passed  without  disturbance. 
But  burdens  a  thousand-fold  heavier  than  any 
which  were  lifted  from  others  descended  upon  the 
new  ruler.  Save,  however,  that  the  thoughtful, 
far-away  expression  of  sadness  had  of  late  seemed 
deeper  and  more  impressive  than  ever  before,  Lin 
coln  gave  no  sign  of  inward  trouble.  His  singular 
temperament  armed  him  with  a  rare  and  peculiar 
strength  beneath  responsibility  and  in  the  face  of 
duty.  He  has  been  seen,  with  entire  tranquillity, 
not  only  seeking,  but  seeming  to  assume  as  his 
natural  due  or  destiny,  positions  which  appeared 
preposterously  out  of  accord  alike  with  his  early 
career  and  with  his  later  opportunities  for  develop 
ment.  In  trying  to  explain  this,  it  is  easier  to 
say  what  was  not  the  underlying  quality  than  what 
it  was.  Certainly  there  was  no  taint  whatsoever 
of  that  vulgar  self  -  confidence,  which  is  so  apt 


230  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

to  lead  the  "free  and  equal"  citizens  of  the  great 
Republic  into  grotesque  positions.  Perhaps  it  was 
a  grand  simplicity  of  faith ;  a  profound  instinctive 
confidence  that  by  patient,  honest  thinking  it  would 
be  possible  to  know  the  right  road,  and  by  earnest 
enduring  courage  to  follow  it.  Perhaps  it  was 
that  so-called  divine  inspiration  which  seems  always 
a  part  of  the  highest  human  fitness.  The  fact 
which  is  distinctly  visible  is,  that  a  fair,  plain  and 
honest  method  of  thinking  saved  him  from  the 
perplexities  which  beset  subtle  dialecticians  in  pol 
itics  and  in  constitutional  law.  He  had  lately  said 
that  his  course  was  "as  plain  as  a  turnpike  road; " 
it  was,  to  execute  the  public  laws. 

His  duty  was  simple;  his  understanding  of  it 
was  unclouded  by  doubt  or  sophistry ;  his  resolu 
tion  to  do  it  was  firm ;  but  whether  his  hands  would 
be  strengthened  sufficiently  to  enable  him  to  do  it 
was  a  question  of  grave  anxiety.  The  President 
of  a  Republic  can  do  everything  if  the  people  are 
at  his  back,  and  almost  nothing  if  the  people  are 
not  at  his  back.  Where,  then,  were  now  the  peo 
ple  of  the  United  States  ?  In  seven  States  they 
were  openly  and  unitedly  against  him ;  in  at  least 
seven  more  they  were  under  a  very  strong  tempta 
tion  to  range  themselves  against  him  in  case  of  a 
conflict;  and  as  for  the  Republican  States  of  the 
North,  on  that  fourth  day  of  March,  1861,  110  man 
could  say  to  what  point  they  would  sustain  the 
administration.  There  had  as  yet  come  slight 
indications  of  any  change  in  the  conceding,  com- 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR,  231 

promising  temper  of  that  section.  Greeley  and 
Seward  and  Wendell  Phillips,  representative  men, 
were  little  better  than  Secessionists.  The  state 
ment  sounds  ridiculous,  yet  the  proof  against  each 
comes  from  his  own  mouth.  The  "  Tribune  "  had 
retracted  none  of  those  disunion  sentiments,  of 
which  examples  have  been  given.  Even  so  late  as 
April  10,  1861,  Mr.  Seward  wrote  officially  to  Mr. 
C.  F.  Adams,  Minister  to  England,  "Only  an  im 
perial  and  despotic  government  could  subjugate 
thoroughly  disaffected  and  insurrectionary  members 
of  the  State.  This  federal,  republican  country  of 
ours  is,  of  all  forms  of  government,  the  very  one 
which  is  the  most  unfitted  for  such  a  labor."  He 
had  been  and  still  was  favoring  delay  and  concilia 
tion,  in  the  visionary  hope  that  the  seceders  would 
follow  the  scriptural  precedent  of  the  prodigal  son. 
On  April  9,  the  rumor  of  a  fight  at  Sumter  being 
spread  abroad,  Mr.  Phillips  said : l  "  Here  are  a 
series  of  States,  girding  the  Gulf,  who  think  that 
their  peculiar  institutions  require  that  they  should 
have  a  separate  government.  They  have  a  right 
to  decide  that  question  without  appealing  to  you 
or  me.  .  .  .  Standing  with  the  principles  of  '76 
behind  us,  who  can  deny  them  the  right?  .  .  . 
Abraham  Lincoln  has  no  right  to  a  soldier  in  Fort 
Sumter.  .  .  .  There  is  no  longer  a  Union.  .  .  . 
Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  is  angry,  and  Mr.  Abraham 
Lincoln  is  mad,  and  they  agree  to  fight.  .  .  .  You 

1  At  New  Bedford,  in  a  lecture  "  which  was  interrupted  by  fre 
quent  hisses."     Schouler,  Hist,  of  Mass,  in  the  Civil  War,  i.  44-47. 


232  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

cannot  go  through  Massachusetts  and  recruit  men 
to  bombard  Charleston  or  New  Orleans.  .  .  .  We 
are  in  no  condition  to  fight.  .  .  .  Nothing  but 
madness  can  provoke  war  with  the  Gulf  States;" 
—  with  much  more  to  the  same  effect. 

If  the  veterans  of  the  old  anti-slavery  contest 
were  in  this  frame  of  mind  in  April,  Lincoln  could 
hardly  place  much  dependence  upon  the  people  at 
large  in  March.  If  he  could  not  "recruit  men'* 
in  Massachusetts,  in  what  State  could  he  reasona 
bly  expect  to  do  so?  Against  such  discourage 
ment  it  can  only  be  said  that  he  had  a  singular 
instinct  for  the  underlying  popular  feeling,  that  he 
could  scent  it  in  the  distance  and  in  hiding;  more 
over,  that  he  was  always  willing  to  run  the  chance 
of  any  consequences  which  might  follow  the  per 
formance  of  a  clear  duty.  Still,  as  he  looked  over 
the  dreary  Northern  field  in  those  chill  days  of 
early  March,  he  must  have  had  a  marvellous  sensi 
tiveness  in  order  to  perceive  the  generative  heat 
and  force  in  the  depths  beneath  the  cheerless  sur 
face  and  awaiting  only  the  fulness  of  the  near 
spring  season  to  burst  forth  in  sudden  universal 
vigor.  Yet  such  was  his  knowledge  and  such  his 
faith  concerning  the  people  that  we  may  fancy,  if 
we  will,  that  he  foresaw  the  great  transformation. 
But  there  were  still  other  matters  which  disturbed 
him.  Before  his  inauguration,  he  had  heard  much 
of  his  coming  official  isolation.  One  of  the  argu 
ments  reiterated  alike  by  Southern  Unionists  and 
by  Northerners  had  been  that  the  Republican 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  233 

President  would  be  powerless,  because  the  Senate, 
the  House,  and  the  Supreme  Court  were  all  op 
posed  to  him.  But  the  supposed  lack  of  political 
sympathy  on  the  part  of  these  bodies,  however  it 
might  beget  anxiety  for  the  future,  was  for  the 
present  of  much  less  moment  than  another  fact, 
viz.,  that  none  of  the  distinguished  men,  leaders 
in  his  own  party,  whom  Lincoln  found  about  him 
at  Washington,  were  in  a  frame  of  mind  to  assist 
him  efficiently.  If  all  did  not  actually  distrust  his 
capacity  and  character,  —  which,  doubtless,  many 
honestly  did,  —  at  least  they  were  profoundly  ig 
norant  concerning  both.  Therefore  they  could  not 
yet,  and  did  not,  place  genuine,  implicit  confidence 
in  him ;  they  could  not  yet,  and  did  not,  advise  and 
aid  him  at  all  in  the  same  spirit  and  with  the  same 
usefulness  as  later  they  were  able  to  do.  They 
were  not  to  blame  for  this;  on  the  contrary,  the 
condition  had  been  brought  about  distinctly  against 
their  will,  since  certainly  few  of  them  had  looked 
with  favor  upon  the  selection  of  an  unknown,  in 
experienced,  ill-educated  man  as  the  Republican 
candidate  for  the  presidency.  How  much  Lincoln 
felt  his  loneliness  will  never  be  known ;  for,  reti 
cent  and  self-contained  at  all  times,  he  gave  no 
outward  sign.  That  he  felt  it  less  than  other  men 
would  have  done  may  be  regarded  as  certain;  for, 
as  has  already  appeared  to  some  extent,  and  as 
will  appear  much  more  in  this  narrative,  he  was 
singularly  self-reliant,  and,  at  least  in  appearance, 
was  strangely  indifferent  to  any  counsel  or  support 


234  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

which  could  be  brought  to  him  by  others.  Yet, 
marked  as  was  this  trait  in  him,  he  could  hardly 
have  been  human  had  he  not  felt  oppressed  by  the 
personal  solitude  and  political  isolation  of  his  posi 
tion  when  the  responsibility  of  his  great  office 
rested  newly  upon  him.  Under  all  these  circum 
stances,  if  this  lonely  man  moved  slowly  and  cau 
tiously  during  the  early  weeks  of  his  administra 
tion,  it  was  not  at  his  door  that  the  people  had  the 
right  to  lay  the  reproach  of  weakness  or  hesitation. 
Mr.  Buchanan,  for  the  convenience  of  his  suc 
cessor,  had  called  an  extra  session  of  the  Senate, 
and  on  March  5  President  Lincoln  sent  in  the 
nominations  for  his  Cabinet.  All  were  immedi 
ately  confirmed,  as  follows :  — 

William  H.  Seward,  New  York,  Secretary  of  State. 
Salmon  P.  Chase,  Ohio,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 
Simon  Cameron,  Pennsylvania,  Secretary  of  War. 
Gideon  Welles,  Connecticut,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
Caleb  B.  Smith,  Indiana,  Secretary  of  the  Interior. 
Edward  Bates,  Missouri,  Attorney-General. 
Montgomery  Blair,  Maryland,  Postmaster-General. 

It  is  matter  of  course  that  a  Cabinet  slate  should 
fail  to  give  general  satisfaction ;  and  this  one  en 
countered  fully  the  average  measure  of  criticism. 
The  body  certainly  was  somewhat  heterogeneous 
in  its  composition,  yet  the  same  was  true  of  the 
Republican  party  which  it  represented.  Nor  was 
it  by  any  means  so  heterogeneous  as  Mr.  Lincoln 
had  designed  to  have  it,  for  he  had  made  efforts 
to  place  in  it  a  Southern  spokesman  for  Southern 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  235 

views;  and  he  had  not  desisted  from  the  purpose 
until  its  futility  was  made  apparent  by  the  direct 
refusal  of  Mr.  Gilmer  of  North  Carolina,  and  by 
indications  of  a  like  unwillingness  on  the  part  of 
one  or  two  other  Southerners  who  were  distantly 
sounded  on  the  subject.  Seward,  Chase,  Bates 
and  Cameron  were  the  four  men  who  had  mani 
fested  the  greatest  popularity,  after  Lincoln,  in 
the  national  convention,  and  the  selection  of  them, 
therefore,  showed  that  Mr.  Lincoln  was  seeking 
strength  rather  than  amity  in  his  Cabinet;  for  it 
was  certainly  true  that  each  one  of  them  had  a  fol 
lowing  which  was  far  from  being  wholly  in  sym 
pathy  with  the  following  of  any  one  of  the  others. 
The  President  evidently  believed  that  it  was  of 
more  importance  that  each  great  body  of  Northern 
men  should  feel  that  its  opinions  were  fairly  pre 
sented,  than  that  his  Cabinet  officers  should  always 
comfortably  unite  in  looking  at  questions  from  one 
and  the  same  point  of  view.  Judge  Davis  says 
that  Lincoln's  original  design  was  to  appoint 
Democrats  and  Kepublicans  alike  to  office.  He 
carried  this  theory  so  far  that  the  radical  Kepubli 
cans  regarded  the  make-up  of  the  Cabinet  as  a 
"disgraceful  surrender  to  the  South;"  while  men 
of  less  extreme  views  saw  with  some  alarm  that  he 
had  called  to  his  advisory  council  four  ex-Demo 
crats  and  only  three  ex-Whigs,  a  criticism  which 
he  met  by  saying  that  he  himself  was  an  "old-line 
Whig "  and  should  be  there  to  make  the  parties 
even.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Republicans  of  the 


236  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

middle  line  of  States  grumbled  much  at  the  selec 
tion  of  Bates  and  Blair  as  representatives  of  their 
section. 

The  Cabinet  had  not  been  brought  together 
without  some  jarring  and  friction,  especially  in  the 
case  of  Cameron.  On  December  31  Mr.  Lincoln 
intimated  to  him  that  he  should  have  either  the 
Treasury  or  the  War  Department,  but  on  January 
3  requested  him  to  "decline  the  appointment." 
Cameron,  however,  had  already  mentioned  the 
matter  to  many  friends,  without  any  suggestion 
that  he  should  not  be  glad  to  accept  either  position, 
and  therefore,  even  if  he  were  willing  to  accede  to 
the  sudden,  strange,  and  unexplained  request  of 
Mr.  Lincoln,  he  would  have  found  it  difficult  to 
do  so  without  giving  rise  to  much  embarrassing 
gossip.  Accordingly  he  did  not  decline,  and  there 
upon  ensued  much  wire-pulling.  Pennsylvania 
protectionists  wanted  Cameron  in  the  Treasury, 
and  strenuously  objected  to  Chase  as  an  ex-Demo 
crat  of  free-trade  proclivities.  On  the  other  hand, 
Lincoln  gradually  hardened  into  the  resolution  that 
Chase  should  have  the  Treasury.  He  made  the 
tender,  and  it  was  accepted.  He  then  offered 
consolation  to  Pennsylvania  by  giving  the  War 
portfolio  to  Cameron,  which  was  accepted  with 
something  of  chagrin.  How  far  this  Cameron 
episode  was  affected  by  the  bargain  declared  by 
Lamon  to  have  been  made  at  Chicago  cannot  be 
told.  Other  biographers  ignore  this  story,  but  I 
do  not  see  how  the  direct  testimony  furnished  by 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  237 

Lamon  and  corroborated  by  Colonel  McClure  can 
justly  be  treated  in  this  way ;  neither  is  the  temp 
tation  so  to  treat  it  apparent,  since  the  evidence 
entirely  absolves  Lincoln  from  any  complicity  at 
the  time  of  making  the  alleged  "trade,"  while 
he  could  hardly  be  blamed  if  he  felt  somewhat 
hampered  by  it  afterward. 

Seward  also  gave  trouble  which  he  ought  not 
to  have  given.  On  December  8  Lincoln  wrote  to 
him  that  he  would  nominate  him  as  Secretary  of 
State.  Mr.  Seward  assented  and  the  matter  re 
mained  thus  comfortably  settled  until  so  late  as 
March  2,  1861,  when  Seward  wrote  a  brief  note 
asking  "leave  to  withdraw  his  consent."  Appar 
ently  the  Democratic  complexion  of  the  Cabinet, 
and  the  suggestions  of  suspicious  friends  made 
him  fear  that  his  influence  in  the  ministry  would 
be  inferior  to  that  of  Chase.  Coming  at  this 
eleventh  hour,  which  already  had  its  weighty 
burden  of  many  anxieties,  this  brief  destructive 
note  was  both  embarrassing  and  exasperating. 
It  meant  the  entire  reconstruction  of  the  cabinet. 
Never  did  Lincoln's  tranquil  indifference  to  per 
sonal  provocation  stand  him  in  better  stead  than 
in  this  crisis,  —  for  a  crisis  it  was  when  Seward, 
in  discontent  and  distrust,  desired  to  draw  aloof 
from  the  administration.  He  held  the  note  of  the 
recalcitrant  politician  for  two  days  unanswered, 
then  he  wrote  a  few  lines:  "Your  note,"  he  said, 
"is  the  subject  of  the  most  painful  solicitude  with 
me;  and  I  feel  constrained  to  beg  that  you  will 


238  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

countermand  the  withdrawal.  The  public  interest, 
I  think,  demands  that  you  should ;  and  my  personal 
feelings  are  deeply  enlisted  in  the  same  direction." 
These  words  set  Mr.  Seward  right  again:  on 
March  5  he  withdrew  his  letter  of  March  2,  and 
in  a  few  hours  was  appointed. 

Immediately  after  the  installation  of  the  new 
government  three  commissioners  from  the  Confed 
eracy  came  to  Washington,  and  requested  an  offi 
cial  audience.  They  said  that  seven  States  of  the 
American  Union  had  withdrawn  therefrom,  had 
reassumed  sovereign  power,  and  were  now  an  in 
dependent  nation  in  fact  and  in  right;  that,  in 
order  to  adjust  upon  terms  of  amity  and  good-will 
all  questions  growing  out  of  this  political  separa 
tion,  they  were  instructed  to  make  overtures  for 
opening  negotiations,  with  the  assurance  that  the 
Confederate  Government  earnestly  desired  a  peace 
ful  solution  and  would  make  no  demand  not 
founded  in  strictest  justice,  neither  do  any  act  to 
injure  their  late  confederates.  From  the  Confed 
erate  point  of  view  these  approaches  were  dignified 
and  conciliatory ;  from  the  Northern  point  of  view 
they  were  treasonable  and  insolent.  Probably  the 
best  fruit  which  Mr.  Davis  hoped  from  them  was 
that  Mr.  Seward,  who  was  well  known  to  be  desir 
ous  of  finding  some  peace-assuring  middle  course, 
might  be  led  into  a  discussion  of  the  situation, 
inevitably  provoking  divisions  in  the  Cabinet,  in 
the  Republican  party,  and  in  the  country.  But 
though  Seward 's  frame  of  mind  about  this  time 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  239 

was  such  as  to  put  him  in  great  jeopardy  of  com 
mitting  hurtful  blunders,  he  was  fortunate  enough 
to  escape  quite  doing  so.  To  the  agent  of  the  com 
missioners  he  replied  that  he  must  "consult  the 
President,"  and  the  next  day  he  wrote,  in  terms  of 
personal  civility,  that  he  could  not  receive  them. 
Nevertheless  they  remained  in  Washington  a  few 
weeks  longer,  gathering  and  forwarding  to  the 
Confederate  government  such  information  as  they 
could.  In  this  they  were  aided  by  Judge  Camp 
bell,  of  Alabama,  a  Secessionist,  who  still  retained 
his  seat  upon  the  bench  of  the  Supreme  Court. 
This  gentleman  now  became  a  messenger  between 
the  commissioners  and  Mr.  Seward,  with  the  pur 
pose  of  eliciting  news  and  even  pledges  from  the 
latter  for  the  use  of  the  former.  His  errands  es 
pecially  related  to  Fort  Sumter,  and  he  gradually 
drew  from  Mr.  Seward  strong  expressions  of  opin 
ion  that  Sumter  would  in  time  be  evacuated,  even 
declarations  substantially  to  the  effect  that  this 
was  the  arranged  policy  of  the  government. 
Words  which  fell  in  so  agreeably  with  the  wishes 
of  the  Judge  and  the  commissioners  were  received 
with  that  warm  welcome  which  often  outruns  cor 
rect  construction,  and  later  were  construed  by  them 
as  actual  assurances,  at  least  in  substance,  whereby 
they  conceived  themselves  to  have  been  "abused 
and  over-reached,"  and  they  charged  the  govern 
ment  with  "equivocating  conduct."  In  the  second 
week  in  April,  contemporaneously  with  the  Sum 
ter  crisis,  they  addressed  to  Mr.  Seward  a  high- 


240  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

flown  missive  of  reproach,  in  which  they  ostenta 
tiously  washed  the  hands  of  the  South,  as  it  were, 
and  shook  from  their  own  departing  feet  the  dust 
of  the  obdurate  North,  where  they  had  not  been 
met  "in  the  conciliatory  and  peaceful  spirit"  in 
which  they  had  come.  They  invoked  "impartial 
history  "  to  place  the  responsibility  of  blood  and 
mourning  upon  those  who  had  denied  the  great 
fundamental  doctrine  of  American  liberty;  and 
they  declared  it  "clear  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had  de 
termined  to  appeal  to  the  sword  to  reduce  the  peo 
ple  of  the  Confederate  States  to  the  will  of  the 
section  or  party  whose  President  he  is."  In  this 
dust-cloud  of  glowing  rhetoric  vanished  the  last 
deceit  of  peaceful  settlement. 

About  the  same  time,  April  13,  sundry  commis 
sioners  from  the  Virginia  convention  waited  upon 
Lincoln  with  the  request  that  he  would  communi 
cate  the  policy  which  he  intended  to  pursue  to 
wards  the  Confederate  States.  Lincoln  replied 
with  a  patient  civility  that  cloaked  satire :  "  Hav 
ing  at  the  beginning  of  my  official  term  expressed 
my  intended  policy  as  plainly  as  I  was  able,  it  is 
with  deep  regret  and  some  mortification  I  now 
learn  that  there  is  great  and  injurious  uncertainty 
in  the  public  mind  as  to  what  that  policy  is,  and 
what  course  I  intend  to  pursue."  To  this  ratifica 
tion  of  the  plain  position  taken  in  his  inaugural,  he 
added  that  he  might  see  fit  to  repossess  himself  of 
the  public  property,  and  that  possibly  he  might 
withdraw  the  mail  service  from  the  seceding  States. 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  241 

The  inauguration  of  Mr.  Lincoln  was  followed 
by  a  lull  which  endured  for  several  weeks.  A  like 
repose  reigned  contemporaneously  in  the  Confed 
erate  States.  For  a  while  the  people  in  both  sec 
tions  received  with  content  this  reaction  of  quies 
cence.  But  as  the  same  laws  of  human  nature 
were  operative  equally  at  the  North  and  at  the 
South,  it  soon  came  about  that  both  at  the  North 
and  at  the  South  there  broke  forth  almost  simul 
taneously  strong  manifestations  of  impatience. 
The  genuine  President  at  Washington  and  the 
sham  President  at  Montgomery  were  assailed  by 
the  like  pressing  demand:  Why  did  they  not  do 
something  to  settle  this  matter?  Southern  irasci 
bility  found  the  situation  exceedingly  trying.  The 
imposing  and  dramatic  attitude  of  the  Confederate 
States  had  not  achieved  an  appropriate  result. 
They  had  organized  a  government  and  posed  as  an 
independent  nation,  but  no  power  in  the  civilized 
world  had  yet  recognized  them  in  this  character; 
on  the  contrary,  Abraham  Lincoln,  living  hard  by 
in  the  White  House,  was  explicitly  denying  it, 
contumaciously  alleging  himself  to  be  their  lawful 
ruler,  and  waiting  with  an  exasperating  patience 
to  see  what  they  really  were  going  to  do  in  the 
business  which  they  had  undertaken.  They  must 
make  some  move  or  they  would  become  ridiculous, 
and  their  revolution  would  die  and  their  confed 
eracy  would  dissolve  from  sheer  inanition.  The 
newspapers  told  their  leaders  this  plainly ;  and  a 
prominent  gentleman  of  Alabama  said  to  Mr. 


242  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Davis:  "Sir,  unless  you  sprinkle  blood  in  the  face 
of  the  people  of  Alabama,  they  will  be  back  in 
the  Union  in  ten  days."  On  the  other  hand,  the 
people  of  the  North  were  as  energetic  as  the  sons 
of  the  South  were  excitable,  and  with  equal  ur 
gency  they  also  demanded  a  conclusion.  If  the 
Union  was  to  be  enforced  why  did  not  Mr.  Lin 
coln  enforce  it?  How  long  did  he  mean  placidly 
to  suffer  treason  and  a  rival  government  to  rest 
undisturbed  within  the  country? 

With  this  state  of  feeling  growing  rapidly  more 
intense  in  both  sections,  action  was  inevitable. 
Yet  neither  leader  wished  to  act  first,  even  for  the 
important  purpose  of  gratifying  the  popular  will. 
As  where  two  men  are  resolved  to  fight,  yet  have 
an  uneasy  vision  of  a  judge  and  jury  in  waiting 
for  them,  each  seeks  to  make  the  other  the  assail 
ant  and  himself  to  be  upon  his  defense,  so  these 
two  rulers  took  prudent  thought  of  the  tribunal 
of  public  sentiment  not  in  America  alone  but  in 
Europe  also,  with  perhaps  a  slight  forward  glance 
towards  posterity.  If  Mr.  Lincoln  did  not  like 
to  "invade"  the  Southern  territory,  Mr.  Davis 
was  equally  reluctant  to  make  the  Southern  "with 
drawal  "  actively  belligerent  through  operations  of 
military  offense.  Both  men  were  capable  of 
statesmanlike  waiting  to  score  a  point  that  was 
worth  waiting  for;  Davis  had  been  for  years  bid 
ing  the  ripeness  of  time,  but  Lincoln  had  the  ca 
pacity  of  patience  beyond  any  precedent  on  record. 

The  spot  where  the  strain  came,  where  this  ques- 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  243 

tion  of  the  first  blow  must  be  settled,  was  at  Fort 
Sumter,  in  the  mid-throat  of  Charleston  harbor. 
On  December  27,  1860,  by  a  skilful  movement  at 
night,  Major  Anderson,  the  commander  at  Fort 
Moultrie,  had  transferred  his  scanty  force  from 
that  dilapidated  and  untenable  post  on  the  shore 
to  the  more  defensible  and  more  important  posi 
tion  of  Fort  Smnter.  Thereafter  a  precarious 
relationship  betwixt  peace  and  war  had  subsisted 
between  him  and  the  South  Carolinians.  It  was 
distinctly  understood  that,  sooner  or  later,  by  ne 
gotiation  or  by  force,  South  Carolina  intended  to 
possess  herself  of  this  fortress.  From  her  point 
of  view  it  certainly  was  preposterous  and  unendur 
able  that  the  key  to  her  chief  harbor  and  city 
should  be  permanently  held  by  a  "foreign  "  power. 
Gradually  she  erected  batteries  on  the  neighboring 
mainland  and  kept  a  close  surveillance  upon  the 
troops  now  more  than  half  besieged  in  the  fort. 

Under  the  Buchanan  regime  the  purpose  of  the 
United  States  government  had  been  less  plain  than 
it  became  after  Mr.  Lincoln's  accession;  for  Bu 
chanan  had  not  the  courage  either  to  order  a  sur 
render,  or  to  provoke  real  warfare  by  reinforcing 
the  place.  In  vain  did  the  unfortunate  Major 
Anderson  seek  distinct  instructions;  the  replies 
which  he  received  were  contradictory  and  more 
obscure  than  Delphic  oracles.  This  unfair,  vacil 
lating  and  contemptible  conduct  indicated  the  de 
sire  to  lay  upon  him  alone  the  whole  responsibility 
of  the  situation,  with  a  politic  and  selfish  reserva- 


244  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

tion  to  the  government  of  the  advantage  of  disa 
vowing  and  discrediting  him,  whatever  he  might 
do.  On  January  9  a  futile  effort  at  communica 
tion  was  made  by  the  steamer  Star  of  the  West; 
it  failed,  and  left  matters  worse  rather  than  better. 
On  March  3,  1861,  the  Confederate  government 
put  General  Beauregard  in  command  at  Charleston, 
thereby  emphasizing  the  resolution  to  have  Sumter 
ere  long.  Such  was  the  situation  on  March  4, 
when  Mr.  Lincoln  came  into  control  and  declared 
a  policy  which  bound  him  to  "hold,  occupy,  and 
possess  "  Sumter.  On  the  same  day  there  came  a 
letter  from  Major  Anderson,  describing  his  posi 
tion.  There  were  shut  up  in  the  fort  together  a 
certain  number  of  men  and  a  certain  quantity  of 
biscuit  and  of  pork;  when  the  men  should  have 
eaten  the  biscuit  and  the  pork,  which  they  would 
probably  do  in  about  four  weeks,  they  would  have 
to  go  away.  The  problem  thus  became  direct, 
simple,  and  urgent. 

Lincoln  sought  an  opinion  from  Scott,  and  was 
told  that  "evacuation  seems  almost  inevitable." 
He  requested  a  more  thorough  investigation,  and 
a  reply  to  specific  questions:  "To  what  point  of 
time  can  Anderson  maintain  his  position  in  Sum 
ter?  Can  you,  with  present  means,  relieve  him 
in  that  time?  What  additional  means  would 
enable  you  to  do  so?"  The  General  answered 
that  four  months  would  be  necessary  to  prepare 
the  naval  force,  and  an  even  longer  time  to  get 
together  the  5000  regular  troops  and  20,000  vol- 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  245 

unteers  that  would  be  needed,  to  say  nothing  of 
obtaining  proper  legislation  from  Congress. 
Equally  discouraging  were  the  opinions  of  the 
Cabinet  officers.  On  March  15  Lincoln  put  to 
them  the  question:  "Assuming  it  to  be  possible 
to  now  provision  Fort  Sumter,  under  all  the  cir 
cumstances  is  it  wise  to  attempt  it?"  Only  Chase 
and  Blair  replied  that  it  would  be  wise ;  Seward, 
Cameron,  Welles,  Smith  and  Bates  were  against  it. 
The  form  of  this  question  indicated  that  Lincoln 
contemplated  a  possibility  of  being  compelled  to 
recede  from  the  policy  expressed  in  his  inaugural. 
Yet  it  was  not  his  temperament  to  abandon  a 
purpose  deliberately  matured  and  definitely  an 
nounced,  except  under  absolute  necessity.  To  de 
termine  now  this  question  of  necessity  he  sent  an 
emissary  to  Sumter  and  another  to  Charleston, 
and  meantime  stayed  offensive  action  on  the  part 
of  the  Confederates  by  authorizing  Seward  to  give 
assurance  through  Judge  Campbell  that  no  provi 
sioning  or  reinforcement  should  be  attempted  with 
out  warning.  Thus  he  secured,  or  continued,  a' 
sort  of  truce,  irregular  and  informal,  but  practical. 
Meantime  he  was  encouraged  by  the  earnest  pro 
positions  of  Mr.  G.  V.  Fox,  until  lately  an  officer 
of  the  navy,  who  was  ready  to  undertake  the  relief 
of  the  fort.  Eager  discussions  ensued,  wherein 
naval  men  backed  the  project  of  Mr.  Fox,  and 
army  men  condemned  it.  Such  difference  of  ex 
pert  opinion  was  trying,  for  the  problem  was  of  a 
kind  which  Mr.  Lincoln's  previous  experience  in 


246  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

life  did  not  make  it  easy  for  him  to  solve  with  any 
confidence  in  the  correctness  of  his  own  judgment. 

Amid  this  puzzlement  day  after  day  glided  by, 
and  the  question  remained  unsettled.  Yet  during 
this  lapse  of  time  sentiment  was  ripening,  and  per 
haps  this  was  the  real  purpose  of  Lincoln's  patient 
waiting.  On  March  29  his  ministers  again  put 
their  opinions  in  writing,  and  now  Chase,  Welles 
and  Blair  favored  an  effort  at  reinforcement ;  Bates 
modified  his  previous  opposition  so  far  as  to  say 
that  the  time  had  come  either  to  evacuate  or  relieve 
the  fort;  Smith  favored  evacuation,  but  only  on 
the  ground  of  military  necessity ;  and  Seward  alone 
advocated  evacuation  in  part  on  the  ground  of  pol 
icy;  he  deemed  it  unwise  to  "provoke  a  civil  war," 
especially  "in  rescue  of  an  untenable  position." 

Was  it  courtesy  or  curiosity  that  induced  the 
President  to  sit  and  listen  to  this  warm  debate 
between  his  chosen  advisers?  They  would  have 
been  angry  had  they  known  that  they  were  bring 
ing  their  counsel  to  a  chief  who  had  already  made 
his  decision.  They  did  not  yet  know  that  upon 
every  occasion  of  great  importance  Lincoln  would 
make  up  his  mind  for  and  by  himself,  yet  would 
not  announce  his  decision,  or  save  his  counsellors 
the  trouble  of  counselling,  until  such  time  as  he 
should  see  fit  to  act.  So  in  this  instance  he  had 
already,  the  day  before  the  meeting  of  the  Cabinet, 
directed  Fox  to  draw  up  an  order  for  such  ships, 
men,  and  supplies  as  he  would  require,  and  when 
the  meeting  broke  up  he  at  once  issued  formal 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  247 

orders  to  the  Secretaries  of  the  Navy  and  of  War 
to  enter  upon  the  necessary  preparation. 

Contemporaneously  with  this  there  was  also  un 
dertaken  another  enterprise  for  the  relief  of  Fort 
Pickens  at  Pensacola.  It  was,  however,  kept  so 
strictly  secret  that  the  President  did  not  even 
communicate  it  to  Mr.  Welles.  Apparently  his 
only  reason  for  such  extreme  reticence  lay  in  the 
proverb:  "If  you  wish  your  secret  kept,  keep  it." 
But  proverbial  wisdom  had  an  unfortunate  result 
upon  this  occasion.  Both  the  President  and 
Mr.  Welles  set  the  eye  of  desire  upon  the  warship 
Powhatan,  lying1  in  New  York  harbor.  The  Sec 
retary  designed  her  for  the  Sumter  fleet ;  the  Pres 
ident  meant  to  send  her  to  Pensacola.  Of  the 
Sumter  expedition  she  was  an  absolutely  essential 
part ;  for  the  Pensacola  plan  she  was  not  altogether 
indispensable. 

On  April  6  Captain  Mercer,  on  board  the  Pow 
hatan  as  his  flagship,  and  on  the  very  point  of 
weighing  anchor  to  sail  in  command  of  the  Sum 
ter  reinforcement,  under  orders  from  Secretary 
Welles,  was  astounded  to  find  himself  dispossessed 
and  superseded  by  Lieutenant  Porter,  who  sud 
denly  came  upon  the  deck  bringing  an  order  signed 
by  the  President  himself.  A  few  hours  later,  at 
Washington,  a  telegram  startled  Mr.  Welles  with 
the  news.  Utterly  confounded,  he  hastened,  in 
the  early  night  time,  to  the  White  House,  and 
obtained  an  audience  of  the  President.  Then 
Mr.  Lincoln  learned  what  a  disastrous  blunder  he 


248  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

had  made;  greatly  mortified,  he  requested  Mr. 
Seward  to  telegraph  with  all  haste  to  New  York 
that  the  Powhatan  must  be  immediately  restored 
to  Mercer  for  Sumter.  Lieutenant  Porter  was 
already  far  down  the  bay,  when  he  was  overtaken 
by  a  swift  tug  bringing  this  message.  But  unfor 
tunately  Mr.  Seward  had  so  phrased  the  dispatch 
that  it  did  not  purport  to  convey  an  order  either 
from  the  President  or  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
and  he  had  signed  his  own  name :  "  Give  up  the 
Powhatan  to  Mercer.  SEWARD."  To  Porter, 
hurriedly  considering  this  unintelligible  occurrence, 
it  seemed  better  to  go  forward  under  the  Presi 
dent's  order  than  to  obey  the  order  of  an  official 
who  had  no  apparent  authority  to  command  him. 
So  he  steamed  on  for  Pensacola. 

On  April  8,  discharging  the  obligation  of  warn 
ing,  Mr.  Lincoln  notified  General  Beauregard  that 
an  attempt  would  be  made  to  put  provisions  into 
Sumter,  but  not  at  present  to  put  in  men,  arms, 
or  ammunition,  unless  the  fort  should  be  attacked. 
Thereupon  Beauregard, ,  at  two  o'clock  p.  M.  on 
April  11,  sent  to  Anderson  a  request  for  a  sur 
render.  Anderson  refused,  remarking  incidentally 
that  he  should  be  starved  out  in  a  few  days.  At 
3.20  A.  M.,  on  April  12,  Beauregard  notified  An 
derson  that  he  should  open  fire  in  one  hour.  That 
morning  the  occupants  of  Sumter,  9  commissioned 
officers,  68  non-commissioned  officers  and  privates, 
8  musicians,  and  43  laborers,  breakfasted  on  pork 
and  water,  the  last  rations  in  the  fort.  Before 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  249 

daybreak  the  Confederate  batteries  were  pouring 
shot  and  shell  against  the  walls.  Kesponse  was 
made  from  as  many  guns  as  the  small  body  of 
defenders  could  handle.  But  the  fort  was  more 
easily  damaged  than  were  the  works  on  the  main 
land,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  the  officers' 
quarters  having  caught  fire,  and  the  magazine  be 
ing  so  imperilled  that  it  had  to  be  closed  and  cov 
ered  with  earth,  the  fort  became  untenable.  Early 
in  the  evening  terms  of  capitulation  were  agreed 
upon. 

Meantime  three  transports  of  the  relief  expedi 
tion  were  lying  outside  the  bar.  The  first  arrived 
shortly  before  the  bombardment  began,  the  other 
two  came  only  a  trifle  later.  All  day  long  these 
vessels  lay  to,  wondering  why  the  Powhatan  did 
not  appear.  Had  she  been  there  upon  the  critical 
night  of  the  12th,  the  needed  supplies  could  have 
been  thrown  into  the  fort,  for  the  weather  was  so 
dark  that  the  rebel  patrol  was  useless,  and  it  was 
actually  believed  in  Charleston  that  the  relief  had 
been  accomplished.  But  the  Powhatan  was  far 
away  steaming  at  full  speed  for  Pensacola.  For 
this  sad  blunder  Lincoln  generously,  but  fairly 
enough,  took  the  blame  to  himself.  The  only  ex 
cuse  which  has  ever  been  advanced  in  behalf  of 
Mr.  Lincoln  is  that  he  allowed  himself  to  be  led 
blindfold  through  this  important  business  by  Mr. 
Seward,  and  that  he  signed  "such  papers  as  the 
Secretary  of  State  presented  to  him  without  learn 
ing  their  purport  and  bearing.  But  such  an  ex- 


250  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

cuse,  even  if  it  can  be  believed,  seems  fully  as  bad 
as  the  blunder  which  it  is  designed  to  palliate. 

Other  blame  also  has  been  laid  upon  Lincoln  on 
the  ground  that  he  was  dilatory  in  reaching  the 
determination  to  relieve  the  fort.  That  the  deci 
sion  should  have  been  reached  and  the  expedition 
dispatched  more  promptly  is  entirely  evident;  but 
whether  or  not  Lincoln  was  in  fault  is  quite  an 
other  question.  Three  facts  are  to  be  considered : 
1.  The  highest  military  authority  in  the  country 
advised  him,  a  civilian,  that  evacuation  was  a 
necessity.  2.  Most  of  his  ministers  were  at  first 
against  reinforcement,  and  they  never  unanimously 
recommended  it ;  especially  his  Secretary  of  State 
condemned  it  as  bad  policy.  3.  The  almost  uni 
versal  feeling  of  the  people  at  the  North,  so  far  as 
it  could  then  be  divined,  was  compromising,  con 
ciliatory,  and  thoroughly  opposed  to  any  act  of 
war.  Under  such  circumstances  it  was  rather  an 
exhibition  of  independence  and  courage  that  Lin 
coln  reached  the  conclusion  of  relieving  the  fort  at 
all,  than  it  was  a  cause  of  fault-finding  that  he  did 
not  come  to  the  conclusion  sooner.  He  could  not 
know  in  March  how  the  people  were  going  to  feel 
after  the  13th  of  April;  in  fact,  if  they  had  fan 
cied  that  he  was  provoking  hostilities,  their  feeling 
might  not  even  then  have  developed  as  it  did. 
Finally,  he  gained  his  point  in  forcing  the  Confed 
eracy  into  the  position  of  assailant,  and  there  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  he  bought  that  point 
cheaply  at  the  price  of  the  fortress. 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  251 

The  news  of  the  capture  of  Sumter  had  an  in 
stant  and  tremendous  effect.  The  States  which 
had  seceded  were  thrown  into  a  pleasurable  fer 
ment  of  triumph;  the  Northern  States  arose  in 
fierce  wrath;  the  Middle  States,  still  balancing 
dubiously  between  the  two  parties,  were  rent  with 
passionate  discussion.  For  the  moment  the  North 
seemed  a  unit;  there  had  been  Southern  sympa 
thizers  before,  and  Southern  sympathizers  appeared 
in  considerable  numbers  later,  but  for  a  little 
while  just  now  they  were  very  scarce.  Douglas  at 
once  called  upon  the  President,  and  the  telegraph 
carried  to  his  numerous  followers  throughout  the 
land  the  news  that  he  had  pledged  himself  "to  sus 
tain  the  President  in  the  exercise  of  all  his  con 
stitutional  functions  to  preserve  the  Union,  and 
maintain  the  government,  and  defend  the  Federal 
capital."  By  this  prompt  and  generous  action  he 
warded  off  the  peril  of  a  divided  North.  Douglas 
is  not  in  quite  such  good  repute  with  posterity  as 
he  deserves  to  be;  his  attitude  towards  slavery 
was  bad,  but  his  attitude  towards  the  country  was 
that  of  a  zealous  patriot.  His  veins  were  full  of 
fighting  blood,  and  he  was  really  much  more  ready 
to  go  to  war  for  the  Union  than  were  great  num 
bers  of  Republicans  whose  names  survive  in  the 
strong  odor  of  patriotism.  During  the  presiden 
tial  campaign  he  had  been  speaking  out  with  de 
fiant  courage  regardless  of  personal  considerations, 
and  in  this  present  juncture  he  did  not  hesitate  an 
instant  to  bring  to  his  successful  rival  an  aid  which 


252  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

at  the  time  and  under  the  circumstances  was  inval 
uable. 

In  every  town  and  village  there  were  now  mass- 
meetings,  ardent  speeches,  patriotic  resolutions,  a 
confusing  stir  and  tumult  of  words  that  would  be 
come  deeds  as  fast  as  definite  plans  could  furnish 
opportunity.  The  difficulty  lay  in  utilizing  this 
abundant,  this  exuberant  zeal.  Historians  say 
rhetorically  that  the  North  sprang  to  arms ;  and  it 
really  would  have  done  so  if  there  had  been  any 
arms  to  spring  to;  but  muskets  were  scarce,  and 
that  there  were  any  at  all  was  chiefly  due  to  the 
fact  that  antiquated  and  unserviceable  weapons 
had  been  allowed  to  accumulate  undestroyed. 
Moreover,  no  one  knew  even  the  manual  of  arms ; 
and  there  were  no  uniforms,  or  accoutrements,  or 
camp  equipment  of  any  sort.  There  was,  how 
ever,  the  will  which  makes  the  way.  Simultane 
ously  with  the  story  of  Sumter  came  also  the  Pres 
ident's  Proclamation  of  April  15.  He  called  for 
seventy-five  thousand  volunteers  to  serve  for  three 
months,  —  an  insignificant  body  of  men,  as  it  now 
seems,  and  a  period  of  time  not  sufficient  to 
change  them  from  civilians  into  soldiers.  Yet  for 
the  work  immediately  visible  the  demand  seemed 
adequate.  Moreover,  as  the  law  stood,  a  much 
longer  term  could  not  have  been  named,1  and  an 

1  The  Act  of  1795  only  permitted  the  use  of  the  militia  until 
thirty  days  after  the  next  session  of  Congress ;  this  session  being 
now  summoned  for  July  4,  the  period  of  service  extended  only 
until  August  3. 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  253 

apparently  disproportionate  requisition  in  point  of 
numbers  might  have  been  of  injurious  effect ;  for 
nearly  every  one  was  cheerfully  saying  that  the 
war  would  be  no  such  very  great  affair  after  all. 
In  his  own  mind  the  President  may  or  may  not 
have  forecast  the  future  more  accurately  than  most 
others  were  doing ;  but  his  idea  plainly  was  to  ask 
no  more  than  was  necessary  for  the  visible  occa 
sion.  He  stated  that  the  troops  would  be  used  to 
"repossess  the  forts,  places,  and  property  which 
had  been  seized  from  the  Union,"  and  that  great 
care  would  be  taken  not  to  disturb  peaceful  citi 
zens.  Amid  all  the  prophesying  and  theorizing, 
and  the  fanciful  comparisons  of  the  respective 
fighting  qualities  of  the  Northern  and  Southern 
populations,  a  sensible  remark  is  attributed  to 
Lincoln :  "  We  must  not  forget  that  the  people  of 
the  seceded  States,  like  those  of  the  loyal  States, 
are  American  citizens  with  essentially  the  same 
characteristics  and  powers.  Exceptional  advan 
tages  on  one  side  are  counterbalanced  by  excep 
tional  advantages  on  the  other.  We  must  make 
up  our  minds  that  man  for  man  the  soldier  from 
the  South  will  be  a  match  for  the  soldier  from  the 
North,  and  vice  versa.'1''  This  was  good  common 
sense,  seasonably  offsetting  the  prevalent  but  fool 
ish  notion  that  the  Southerners  were  naturally  a 
better  fighting  race  than  the  Northerners.  Facts 
ultimately  sustained  Lincoln's  just  estimate  of 
equality;  for  though  the  North  employed 
greater  numbers  than  did  the  South,  it  wa^be- 


• 


254  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

cause  the  North  had  the  burdens  of  attack  and 
conquest  upon  exterior  lines  of  great  extent,  be 
cause  it  had  to  detail  large  bodies  of  troops  for 
mere  garrison  and  quasi-police  duty,  and  because 
during  the  latter  part  of  the  war  it  took  miser 
able  throngs  of  bounty-bought  foreigners  into  its 
ranks.  Man  for  man,  as  Lincoln  said  at  the  out 
set,  the  war  proved  that  northern  Americans  and 
southern  Americans  were  closely  matched.1 

By  the  same  instrument  the  President  summoned 
Congress  to  assemble  in  extra  session  on  July  4. 
It  seemed  a  distant  date ;  and  many  thought  that 
the  Executive  Department  ought  not  to  endeavor 
to  handle  alone  all  the  possible  novel  developments 
of  so  long  a  period.  But  Mr.  Lincoln  had  his 
purposes.  By  July -4  he  and  circumstances,  to 
gether,  would  have  wrought  out  definite  conditions, 
which  certainly  did  not  exist  at  present ;  perhaps 
also,  like  most  men  who  find  themselves  face  to 
face  with  difficult  practical  affairs,  he  dreaded  the 
conclaves  of  the  law-makers;  but  especially  he 
wished  to  give  Kentucky  a  chance  to  hold  a  spe 
cial  election  for  choosing  members  of  this  Congress, 
because  the  moral  and  political  value  of  Kentucky 
could  hardly  be  overestimated,  and  the  most  tact 
ful  manoeuvring  was  necessary  to  control  her. 

1  When  General  Grant  took  command  of  the  Eastern  armies  he 
said  that  the  country  should  be  cautioned  against  expecting  too 
great  success,  because  the  loyal  and  rebel  armies  were  made  up 
of  men  of  the  same  race,  having  about  the  same  experience  in 
war,  and  neither  able  justly  to  claim  any  great  superiority  over 
the  other  in  endurance,  courage  or  discipline.  Chittenden,  Re- 
coll,  320. 


THE  BEGINNING   OF   WAR.  255 

The    Confederate    Cabinet   was    said   to    have 
greeted  Mr.  Lincoln's  Proclamation  with  "bursts 
of  laughter."     The  governors  of  Kentucky,  North 
Carolina,  Arkansas,  Tennessee,  and  Missouri  tele 
graphed   that    no  troops    would   be  furnished    by 
their   respective    States,    using    language    clearly 
designed    to    be    offensive    and    menacing.     The 
Northern  States,  however,  responded  promptly  and 
enthusiastically.     Men  thronged  to  enlist.     Hun 
dreds  of  thousands  offered  themselves  where  only 
75,000    could   be  accepted.     Of   the  human   raw 
material   there   was    excess;    but    discipline   and 
equipment  could  not  be  created  by  any  measure 
of   mere  willingness.     Yet  there  was  great  need 
of  dispatch.     Both  geographically  and  politically 
Washington  lay  as  an  advanced  outpost  in  imme 
diate  peril.     General  Scott  had  been  collecting  the 
few  companies  within  reach;  but  all,  he  said  on 
April   8,   "may  be  too  late  for  this  place."     By 
April   15,   however,   he  believed   himself   able  to 
hold   the   city  till   reinforcements    should   arrive. 
The  total  nominal  strength  of  the  United  States 
army,  officers  and  men,  was  only  17,113,  of  whom 
not  two  thirds  could  be  counted  upon  the  Union 
side,   and  even  these  were   scattered  over  a  vast 
expanse  of    country,   playing   police  for  Indians, 
and  garrisoning  distant  posts.     Rumors  of  South 
ern  schemes  to  attack  Washington  caused  wide 
spread  alarm;  the  government  had  no  more  defi 
nite    information  than    the  people,   and    all   alike 
feared  that  there  was  to  be  a  race  for  the  capital, 


256  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

and  that  the  South,  being  near  and  prepared, 
would  get  there  first.  As  matter  of  fact  the  South 
ern  leaders  had  laid  no  military  plan  for  this  en 
terprise,  and  the  danger  was  exaggerated.  The 
Northerners,  however,  did  not  know  this,  and 
made  desperate  haste. 

The  first  men  to  arrive  came  from  Philadelphia, 
460  troops,  as  they  were  called,  though  they  came 
"almost  entirely  without  arms."  In  Massachu 
setts,  Governor  Andrew,  an  anti-slavery  leader, 
enthusiastic,  energetic,  and  of  great  executive 
ability,  had  been  for  many  months  preparing  the 
militia  for  precisely  this  crisis,  weeding  out  the 
holiday  soldiers  and  thoroughly  equipping  his  regi 
ments  for  service  in  the  field.  For  this  he  had 
been  merrily  ridiculed  by  the  aristocracy  of  Bos 
ton  during  the  winter;  but  inexorable  facts  now 
declared  for  him  and  against  the  local  aristocrats. 
On  April  15  he  received  the  call  from  Washing 
ton,  and  immediately  sent  forth  his  own  summons 
through  the  State.  All  day  on  the  16th,  amid  a 
fierce  northeasterly  storm,  the  troops  poured  into 
Boston,  and  by  six  o'clock  on  that  day  three  full 
regiments  were  ready  to  start.1  Three  days  be 
fore  this  the  governor  had  asked  Secretary  Cam 
eron  for  2000  rifled  muskets  from  the  national 
armory  at  Springfield,  in  the  State.  The  Secre 
tary  refused,  and  the  governor  managed  to  supply 
his  regiment  with  the  most  improved  arms  2  with- 

1  The  third,  fourth  and  sixth.     Schouler,   Mass,   in  the  Civil 
War,  i.  52. 

2  Ibid.,  i.  72. 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  257 

out  aid  from  the  national  government.  On  the 
forenoon  of  the  17th,  the  Sixth  Regiment  started 
for  Washington.  Steamers  were  ready  to  take  it 
to  Annapolis;  but  the  Secretary  of  War,  with 
astonishing  ignorance  of  facts  easily  to  be  known, 
ordered  it  to  come  through  Baltimore.  Accord 
ingly  the  regiment  reached  Baltimore  on  the  19th, 
the  anniversary  of  the  battle  of  Lexington.  Seven 
companies  were  transported  in  horse-cars  from  the 
northern  to  the  southern  station  without  serious 
hindrance ;  but  then  the  tracks  of  the  street  rail 
way  were  torn  up,  and  the  remaining  four  com 
panies  had  to  leave  the  cars  and  march.  A  furi 
ous  mob  of  "Plug  Uglies"  and  Secessionists 
assailed  them  with  paving-stones,  brickbats,  and 
pistol  shots.  The  mayor  and  the  marshal  of  the 
police  force  performed  fairly  their  official  duty, 
but  were  far  from  quelling  the  riot.  The  troops, 
therefore,  thrown  on  their  own  resources,  justi 
fiably  fired  upon  their  assailants.  The  result  of 
the  conflict  was  that  4  soldiers  were  killed,  and  36 
were  wounded,  and  of  the  rioters,  12  were  killed, 
and  the  number  of  wounded  could  not  be  ascer 
tained.  The  troops  reached  Washington  at  five 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  first  armed  rescuers 
of  the  capital ;  their  presence  brought  a  comforting 
sense  of  relief,  and  they  were  quartered  in  the 
Senate  chamber  itself. 

What  would  be  the  effect  of  the  Proclamation, 
of  the  mustering  of   troops  in  the   capital,   and 


258  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

of  the  bloodshed  at  Baltimore  upon  the  slave 
States  which  still  remained  in  the  Union  was  a 
problem  of  immeasurable  importance.  The  Presi 
dent,  who  had  been  obliged  to  take  the  responsi 
bility  of  precipitating  the  crisis  in  these  States, 
appreciated  more  accurately  than  any  one  else  the 
magnitude  of  the  stake  involved  in  their  alle 
giance.  He  watched  them  with  the  deepest  anxi 
ety,  and  brought  the  utmost  care  and  tact  of  his 
nature  to  the  task  of  influencing  them.  The  geo 
graphical  position  of  Maryland,  separating  the 
District  of  Columbia  from  the  loyal  North,  made 
it  of  the  first  consequence.  The  situation  there, 
precarious  at  best,  seemed  to  be  rendered  actually 
hopeless  by  what  had  occurred.  A  tempest  of  un 
controllable  rage  whirled  away  the  people  and 
prostrated  all  Union  feeling.  Mayor  Brown  ad 
mits  that  "for  some  days  it  looked  very  much  as 
if  Baltimore  had  taken  her  stand  decisively  with 
the  South;"  and  this  was  putting  it  mildly,  when 
the  secessionist  Marshal  Kane  was  telegraphing: 
"Streets  red  with  Maryland  blood.  Send  express 
over  the  mountains  of  Maryland  and  Virginia  for 
the  riflemen  to  come  without  delay."  Governor 
Hicks  was  opposed  to  secession,  but  he  was  shaken 
like  a  reed  by  this  violent  blast.  Later  on  this 
same  April  19,  Mayor  Brown  sent  three  gentlemen 
to  President  Lincoln,  bearing  a  letter  from  him 
self,  in  which  he  said  that  it  was  "not  possible  for 
more  soldiers  to  pass  through  Baltimore  unless 
they  fight  their  way  at  every  step."  That  night 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  259 

he  caused  the  northward  railroad  bridges  to  be 
burned  and  disabled;  and  soon  afterward  the  tele 
graph  wires  were  cut. 

The  President  met  the  emergency  with  coolness 
and  straightforward  simplicity,  abiding  firmly  by 
his  main  purpose,  but  conciliatory  as  to  means. 
He  wrote  to  the  governor  and  the  mayor:  "For 
the  future  troops  must  be  brought  here,  but  I 
make  no  point  of  bringing  them  through  Balti 
more;"  he  would  "march  them  around  Balti 
more,"  if,  as  he  hoped,  General  Scott  should  find 
it  feasible  to  do  so.  In  fulfilment  of  this  promise 
he  ordered  a  detachment,  which  had  arrived  at  a 
station  near  Baltimore,  to  go  all  the  way  back  to 
Philadelphia  and  come  around  by  water.  He  only 
demurred  when  the  protests  were  extended  to  in 
clude  the  whole  "sacred"  soil  of  Maryland,  — for 
it  appeared  that  the  presence  of  slavery  accom 
plished  the  consecration  of  soil!  His  troops,  he 
said,  could  neither  fly  over  the  State,  nor  burrow 
under  it;  therefore  they  must  cross  it,  and  the 
Mary  landers  must  learn  that  "there  was  no  piece 
of  American  soil  too  good  to  be  pressed  by  the 
foot  of  a  loyal  soldier  on  his  march  to  the  defense 
of  the  capital  of  his  country."  For  a  while,  how 
ever,  until  conditions  in  Baltimore  changed,  East 
ern  regiments  came  by  way  of  Annapolis,  though 
with  difficulty  and  delay.  Yet  even  upon  this 
route,  conflict  was  narrowly  avoided. 

Soon,  however,  these  embarrassments  came  to 
an  end,  and  the  President's  policy  was  vindicated 


260  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

by  its  fruits.     It  had  been  strictly  his  own ;  he  alone 
ruled  the  occasion,  and  he  did  so  in  the  face  of  severe 
pressure  to  do  otherwise,  some  of  which  came  even 
from  members  of  his  Cabinet.     Firmness,  reasona 
bleness  and  patience  brought  things  right ;  Lincoln 
spoke  sensibly  to  the  Marylanders,  and  gave  them 
time  to   consider  the  situation.      Such   treatment 
started  a  reaction;  Unionism  revived  and  Union 
ists  regained  courage.     Moreover  the  sure  pres 
sure  of  material  considerations  was  doing  its  work. 
Baltimore,  as  an  isolated  secession  outpost,  found, 
even  in  the  short  space  of  a  week,  that  business 
was  destroyed  and  that  she  was  suffering  every 
day  financial  loss.     In  a  word,  by  the  end  of  the 
month,  "the  tide  had  turned."     Baltimore,  if  not 
quite  a  Union  city,  at  least  ceased  to  be  secession 
ist.      On  May  9   Northern   troops    passed    unmo 
lested  through  it.     On  May  13    General    Butler 
with  a  body  of  troops  took  possession  of  Federal 
Hill,   which  commands  the  harbor  and  city,  and 
fortified  it.      If  the  Baltimore  question  was  still 
open  at  that  time,  this  settled  it.     Early  in  the 
same  month  the   state  legislature  came  together, 
Mr.   Lincoln  refusing  to  accept  the  suggestion  of 
interfering  with  it.      This  body  was  by  no  means 
Unionist,  for  it  "protested  against  the  war  as  un 
just  and   unconstitutional,   announced  a  determi 
nation    to    ta,ke    no   part  in    its  prosecution,   and 
expressed  a  desire  for  the  immediate  recognition  of 
the  Confederate  States."     Yet  practically  it  put 
a  veto  on  secession  by  voting  that  it  was  inexpedi- 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR. 

ent  to  summon  a  convention;  it  called  on  all  good 
citizens  "  to  abstain  from  violent  and  unlawful  inter 
ference  with  the  troops."  Thus  early  in  May  this 
brand,  though  badly  scorched,  was  saved  from  the 
conflagration ;  and  its  saving  was  a  piece  of  good 
fortune  of  which  the  importance  cannot  be  exag 
gerated  ;  for  without  Maryland  Washington  could 
hardly  have  been  held,  and  with  the  national  capi 
tal  in  the  hands  of  the  rebels  European  recog 
nition  probably  could  not  have  been  prevented. 
These  momentous  perils  were  in  the  mind  of  the 
administration  during  those  anxious  days,  and 
great  indeed  was  the  relief  when  the  ultimate 
turn  of  affairs  became  assured.  For  a  week  offi 
cials  in  Washington  were  painfully  taught  what 
it  would  mean  to  have  Baltimore  a  rebel  city 
and  Maryland  a  debatable  territory  and  battle 
ground.  For  a  week  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  advis 
ers  lived  almost  in  a  state  of  siege;  they  were 
utterly  cut  off  from  communication  with  the 
North;  they  could  get  no  news;  they  could  not 
learn  what  was  doing  for  their  rescue,  nor  how 
serious  were  the  obstructions  in  the  way  of  such 
efforts ;  in  place  of  correct  information  they  heard 
only  the  most  alarming  rumors.  In  a  word,  they 
were  governing  a  country  to  which  they  really  had 
no  access.  The  tension  of  those  days  was  awful; 
and  it  was  with  infinite  comfort  that  they  became 
certain  that  whatever  other  strain  might  come, 
this  one  at  least  could  not  be  repeated.  Hence 
forth  the  loyalty  of  Maryland,  so  carefully  nur- 


262  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

tured,  gradually  grew  in  strength  to  the  end. 
Many  individuals  long  remained  in  their  hearts 
disloyal,  and  thousands l  joined  the  Confederate 
ranks ;  but  they  had  to  leave  their  State  in  order 
to  get  beneath  a  secessionist  standard,  for  Mary 
land  was  distinctly  and  conclusively  in  the  Union. 
The  situation,  resources  and  prestige  of  Vir 
ginia  made  her  next  to  Maryland  in  importance 
among  the  doubtful  States.  Her  Unionists  were 
numerically  preponderant;  and  accordingly  the 
Convention,  which  assembled  early  in  January, 
was  opposed  to  secession  by  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  89  to  45.  But  the  Secessionists  here 
as  elsewhere  in  the  South  were  propagandists,  fiery 
with  enthusiasm  and  energy,  and  they  controlled 
the  community  although  they  were  outnumbered 
by  those  who  held,  in  a  more  quiet  way,  contrary 
opinions.  When  the  decisive  conflict  came  it  was 
short  and  sharp  and  carried  with  a  rush.  By  in 
trigue,  by  menace,  by  passionate  appeals  season 
ably  applied  with  sudden  intensity  of  effort  at  the 
time  of  the  assault  upon  Sumter,  the  convention 
was  induced  to  pass  an  ordinance  of  secession. 
Those  who  could  not  bring  themselves  to  vote  in 
the  affirmative  were  told  that  they  might  "absent 
themselves  or  be  hanged."  On  the  other  hand, 
there  were  almost  no  lines  along  which  the  Presi 
dent  could  project  any  influence  into  the  State  to 
encourage  the  Union  sentiment.  He  sought  an 

1  Mayor  Brown  thinks  that  the  estimate  of  these  at  20,000 as 
too  great.     Brown,  Baltimore  and  Nineteenth  April,  1861,  p.  85. 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  263 

interview  with  a  political  leader,  but  the  gentleman 
only  sent  a  substitute,  and  the  colloquy  amounted 
to  nothing.  He  fell  in  with  the  scheme  of  Gen 
eral  Scott  concerning  Robert  E.  Lee,  which  might 
have  saved  Virginia;  but  this  also  miscarried. 
General  Lee  has  always  been  kindly  spoken  of  at 
the  North,  whether  deservedly  or  not  is  a  matter  not 
to  be  discussed  here.  Only  a  few  bare  facts  and 
dates  can  be  given :  —  April  17,  by  a  vote  of  88  to 
55,  the  dragooned  Convention  passed  an  "ordinance 
to  repeal  the  ratification  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,"  but  provided  that  this  action 
should  for  the  present  be  kept  secret,  and  that  it 
might  be  annulled  by  the  people  at  a  popular  vot 
ing,  which  should  be  had  upon  it  on  the  fourth 
Thursday  in  May.  The  injunction  of  secrecy  was 
immediately  broken,  and  before  the  polls  were  to 
be  opened  for  the  balloting  Virginia  was  held  by 
the  military  forces  of  the  Confederacy,  so  that  the 
vote  was  a  farce.  April  18  Mr.  F.  P.  Blair, 
Jr.,  had  an  interview  in  Washington  with  Lee, 
in  which  he  intimated  to  Lee  that  the  President 
and  General  Scott  designed  to  place  him  in  com 
mand  of  the  army  which  had  just  been  summoned.1 
Accounts  of  this  conversation,  otherwise  inconsist 
ent,  all  agree  that  Lee  expressed  himself  as  op 
posed  to  secession,2  but  as  unwilling  to  occupy  the 

1  N.  and  EL,  iv.  98  ;  Chittenden,  102  ;  Lee's  biographer,  Childe, 
says  that  "  President  Lincoln  offered  him  the  effective  command 
of  the  Union  Army,"  and  that  Scott  "  conjured  him  .  .  .  not  to 
quit  the  army."     Childe,  Lee,  30. 

2  Shortly  before  this  time  he  had  written  to  his  son  that  it  was 


264  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

position  designed  for  him,  because  he  "could  take 
no  part  in  an  invasion  of  the  Southern  States." 
April  20  he  tendered  his  resignation  of  his  com 
mission  in  the  army,  closing  with  the  words, 
"  Save  in  defense  of  my  native  State,  I  never  de 
sire  again  to  draw  my  sword."1  On  April  22-23 
he  was  appointed  to,  and  accepted,  the  command 
of  the  state  forces.  In  so  accepting  he  said:  "I 
devote  myself  to  the  service  of  my  native  State,  in 
whose  behalf  alone  will  I  ever  again  draw  my 
sword."2  April  24  a  military  league  was  formed 
between  Virginia  and  the  Confederate  States,  and 
her  forces  were  placed  under  the  command  of 
Jefferson  Davis;  also  an  invitation  was  given, 
and  promptly  accepted,  to  make  Kichmond  the 
Confederate  capital.  May  16  Virginia  formally 
entered  the  Confederacy,  and  Lee  became  a  general 
—  the  third  in  rank  —  in  the  service  of  the  Con 
federate  States,  though  the  secession  of  his  State 
was  still  only  inchoate  and  might  never  become 
complete,  since  the  day  set  for  the  popular  vote  had 
not  arrived,  and  it  was  still  a  possibility  that  the 
Unionists  might  find  courage  to  go  to  the  polls. 
Thus  a  rapid  succession  of  events  settled  it  that 

"idle  to  talk  of  secession,"  that  it  was  "nothing  but  revolution" 
and  "anarchy."  N.  and  H.,  iv.  99. 

1  Childe,  Lee,  32 ;  Mr.  Childe,  p.  33,  says  that  Lee's  resigna 
tion  was  accepted  on  the  20th  (the  very  day  on  which  his  letter 
was  dated!),  so  that  he  "ceased  to  be  a  member  of  the  United 
States  Army  "  before  he  took  command  of  the  state  forces.  Per 
contra,  N.  and  H.,  iv.  101. 

'2  Childe,  Lee,  34. 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  265 

the  President  could  save  neither  Virginia  nor 
Robert  E.  Lee  for  the  Union.  Yet  the  failure 
was  not  entire.  The  northwestern  counties  were 
strongly  Union  in  their  proclivities,  and  soon  fol 
lowed  to  a  good  end  an  evil  example ;  for  they  in 
turn  seceded  from  Virginia,  established  a  state 
government,  sought  admission  into  the  Union, 
and  became  the  State  of  West  Virginia. 

Next  in  order  of  importance  came  Kentucky. 
The  Secessionists,  using  here  the  tactics  so  success 
ful  in  other  States,  endeavored  to  drive  through 
by  rush  and  whirl  a  formal  act  of  secession.  But 
the  Unionists  of  Kentucky  were  of  more  resolute 
and  belligerent  temper  than  those  of  Georgia  and 
Virginia,  and  would  not  submit  to  be  swept  away 
by  a  torrent  really  of  less  volume  than  their  own.1 
Yet  in  spite  of  the  spirited  head  thus  made  by  the 
loyalists  the  condition  in  the  State  long  remained 
such  as  to  require  the  most  skilful  treatment  by 
the  President;  during  several  critical  weeks  one 
error  of  judgment,  a  single  imprudence,  upon  his 
part  might  have  proved  fatal.  For  the  condition 
was  anomalous  and  perplexing,  and  the  conflict  of 
opinion  in  the  State  had  finally  led  to  the  evolu 
tion  of  a  theory  or  scheme  of  so-called  "neutral 
ity."  A  similar  notion  had  been  imperfectly  de 
veloped  in  Maryland,  when  her  legislature  declared 
that  she  would  take  no  part  in  a  war.  The  idea 

1  Greeley  in  his  Amer.  Conflict,  i.  349,  says  that  the  "  open  Seces 
sionists  were  but  a  handful."  This,  however,  is  clearly  an  exag 
gerated  statement. 


266  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

was  illogical  to  the  point  of  absurdity,  for  by  it 
the  "neutral"  State  would  at  once  stay  in  the 
Union  and  stand  aloof  from  it.  Neutrality  really 
signified  a  refusal  to  perform  those  obligations 
which  nevertheless  were  admitted  to  be  binding, 
and  it  made  of  the  State  a  defensive  barrier  for 
the  South,  not  to  be  traversed  by  Northern  troops 
on  an  errand  of  hostility  against  Confederate 
Secessionists.  It  was  practical  "non  -coercion" 
under  a  name  of  fairer  sound,  and  it  involved  the 
inconsequence  of  declaring  that  the  dissolution  of 
an  indissoluble  Union  should  not  be  prevented; 
it  was  the  proverbial  folly  of  being  "for  the  law 
but  ag'in  the  enforcement  of  it."  In  the  words  of 
a  resolution  passed  by  a  public  meeting  in  Louis 
ville:  it  was  the  "duty"  of  Kentucky  to  maintain 
her  "independent  position,"  taking  sides  neither 
with  the  administration  nor  with  the  seceding 
States,  "but  irith  the  Union  against  them  both." 
Nevertheless,  though  both  logic  and  geography 
made  neutrality  impracticable,  yet  at  least  the  de 
sire  to  be  neutral  indicated  a  wavering  condition, 
and  therefore  it  was  Mr.  Lincoln's  task  so  to 
arrange  matters  that,  when  the  State  should  at  last 
see  that  it  could  by  no  possibility  avoid  casting  its 
lot  with  one  side  or  the  other,  it  should  cast  it  with 
the  North.  For  many  weeks  the  two  Presidents 
played  the  game  for  this  invaluable  stake  with  all 
the  tact  and  skill  of  which  each  was  master.  It 
proved  to  be  a  repetition  of  the  fable  of  the  sun 
and  the  wind  striving  to  see  which  could  the  bet- 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  267 

ter  make  the  traveller  take  off  his  cloak,  and  for 
tunately  the  patience  of  Mr.  Lincoln  represented 
the  warmth  of  the  sun.  He  gave  the  Kentuckians 
time  to  learn  by  observation  and  the  inarch  of 
events  that  neutrality  was  an  impossibility,  also  to 
determine  with  which  side  lay  the  probable  ad 
vantages  for  themselves;  also  he  respected  the 
borders  of  the  State  during  its  sensitive  days, 
though  in  doing  so  he  had  to  forego  some  military 
advantages  of  time  and  position.  Deliberation 
brought  a  sound  conclusion.  Kentucky  never 
passed  an  ordinance  of  secession,  but  maintained 
her  representation  in  Congress  and  contributed  her 
quota  to  the  armies;  and  these  invaluable  results 
were  largely  due  to  this  wise  policy  of  the  Presi 
dent.  Many  of  her  citizens,  of  course,  fought 
upon  the  Southern  side,  as  was  the  case  in  all 
these  debatable  Border  States  where  friends  and 
even  families  divided  against  each  other,  and  each 
man  placed  himself  according  to  his  own  convic 
tions.  It  may  seem,  therefore,  in  view  of  this 
individual  independence  of  action,  that  the  ordi 
nance  of  secession  was  a  formality  which  would 
not  have  greatly  affected  practical  conditions;  and 
many  critics  of  Mr.  Lincoln  at  the  time  could  not 
appreciate  the  value  of  his  "border-state  policy," 
and  thought  that  he  was  making  sacrifices  and 
paying  prices  wholly  against  wisdom,  and  out  of 
proportion  to  anything  that  could  be  gained 
thereby.  But  he  understood  the  situation  and 
comparative  values  correctly.  Loyalty  to  the 


268  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

State  governed  multitudes ;  preference  of  the  State 
over  the  United  States  cost  the  nation  vast  num 
bers  of  would-be  Unionists  in  the  seceding  States, 
and  in  fact  made  secession  possible ;  and  the  same 
feeling,  erroneous  though  it  was  from  the  Unionist 
point  of  view,  yet  saved  for  the  Unionist  party 
very  great  numbers  in  these  doubtful  States  which 
never  in  fact  seceded.  Mr.  Davis  appreciated 
this  just  as  Mr.  Lincoln  did;  both  were  shrewd 
men  and  were  wasting  no  foolish  efforts  when  they 
strove  so  hard  to  carry  or  to  prevent  formal  state 
action.  They  appreciated  very  well  that  success 
in  passing  an  ordinance  would  gain  for  the  South 
throngs  of  adherents  whose  allegiance  was,  by  their 
peculiar  political  creed,  due  to  the  winner  in  this 
local  contest. 

In  Tennessee  the  Unionist  majority,  as  indi 
cated  early  in  February,  was  overwhelming.  Out 
of  a  total  vote  of  less  than  92,000,  more  than 
67,000  opposed  a  State  Convention.  The  moun 
taineers  of  the  eastern  region  especially  were  stal 
wart  loyalists  and  later  held  to  their  faith  through 
the  severe  ordeal  of  a  peculiarly  cruel  invasion. 
But  the  political  value  of  these  scattered  settle 
ments  was  small ;  and  in  the  more  populous  parts 
the  Secessionists  pursued  their  usual  aggressive 
and  enterprising  tactics  with  success.  Ultimately 
the  governor  and  the  legislature  despotically  com 
pelled  secession.  It  was  not  decreed  by  a  popular 
vote,  not  even  by  a  convention,  but  by  votes  of 
the  legislature  cast  in  secret  session,  a  proceeding 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  269 

clearly  ultra  vires  of  that  body.  Finally,  on  June 
8,  when  a  popular  vote  was  taken,  the  State  was 
in  the  military  control  of  the  Confederacy. 

Very  similar  was  the  case  of  North  Carolina. 
The  people  of  the  uplands,  like  their  neighbors  of 
Tennessee,  were  Unionists,  and  in  the  rest  of  the 
State  there  was  a  prevalent  Union  sentiment ;  but 
the  influence  of  the  political  leaders,  their  direct 
usurpations  of  power,  and  the  customary  energetic 
propagandism,  ultimately  won.  After  a  conven 
tion  had  been  once  voted  down  by  popular  vote,  a 
second  effort  to  bring  one  together  was  successfully 
made,  and  an  ordinance  of  secession  was  passed 
on  May  20.  Arkansas  was  swept  along  with  the 
stream,  seceding  on  May  6,  although  prior  to  that 
time  the  votes  both  for  holding  a  state  convention 
and  afterward  in  the  convention  itself  had  shown 
a  decided  Unionist  preponderance.  These  three 
States,  Tennessee,  North  Carolina,  and  Arkansas, 
were  entirely  beyond  the  reach  of  the  President. 
He  had  absolutely  no  lines  of  influence  along 
which  he  could  work  to  restrain  or  to  guide  them. 

Missouri  had  a  career  peculiar  to  herself.  In 
St.  Louis  there  was  a  strong  Unionist  majority, 
and  especially  the  numerous  German  population 
was  thoroughly  anti-slavery  and  was  vigorously 
led  by  F.  P.  Blair,  Jr.  But  away  from  her  river 
front  the  State  had  a  sparse  population  preserving 
the  rough  propensities  of  frontiersmen ;  these  men 
were  not  unevenly  divided  between  loyalty  and 
secession  and  they  were  an  independent,  fighting 


270  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

set  of  fellows,  each  one  of  whom  intended  to  fol 
low  his  own  fancy.  The  result  was  that  Missouri 
for  a  long  while  carried  on  a  little  war  of  her  own 
within  her  own  borders,  on  too  large  a  scale  to  be 
called  "bushwhacking,"  and  yet  with  a  strong 
flavor  of  that  irregular  style  of  conflict.  The 
President  interested  himself  a  good  deal  in  the 
early  efforts  of  the  loyalists,  and  amid  a  puzzling 
snarl  of  angry  "personal  politics"  he  tried  to  ex 
tend  to  them  aid  and  countenance,  though  with 
imperfect  success.  It  was  fortunate  that  Missouri 
was  away  on  the  outskirts,  for  she  was  the  most 
vexatious  and  perplexing  part  of  the  country. 
Her  population  had  little  feeling  of  state  allegiance 
or,  indeed,  of  any  allegiance  at  all,  but  what  small 
amount  there  was  fell  upon  the  side  of  the  Union; 
for  though  the  governor  and  a  majority  of  the 
legislature  declared  for  secession,  yet  the  State 
Convention  voted  for  the  Union  by  a  large  major 
ity.  It  is  true  that  a  sham  convention  passed  a 
sham  ordinance,  but  this  had  no  weight  with  any 
except  those  who  were  already  Secessionists. 

Thus  by  the  close  of  May,  1861,  President 
Lincoln  looked  forth  upon  a  spectacle  tolerably 
definite  at  last,  and  certainly  as  depressing  as 
ever  met  the  eyes  of  a  great  ruler.  Eleven  States, 
with  area,  population  and  resources  abundant  for 
constituting  a  powerful  nation  and  sustaining  an 
awful  war,  were  organized  in  rebellion ;  their  people 
were  welded  into  entire  unity  of  feeling,  were  en 
thusiastically  resolute,  and  were  believed  to  be 


THE  BEGINNING   OF  WAR.  271 

exceptionally  good  fighters.  The  population  of 
three  Border  States  was  divided  between  loyalty 
and  disloyalty.  The  Northern  States,  teeming 
with  men  and  money,  had  absolutely  no  expe 
rience  whatsoever  to  enable  them  to  utilize  their 
vast  resources  with  the  promptitude  needful  in 
the  instant  emergency.  There  was  a  notion,  pre 
valent  even  among  themselves,  that  they  were  by 
temperament  not  very  well  fitted  for  war ;  but  this 
fancy  Mr.  Lincoln  quietly  set  aside,  knowing  bet 
ter.  He  also  had  confidence  in  the  efficiency  of 
Northern  men  in  practical  affairs  of  any  kind  what 
soever,  and  he  had  not  to  tax  his  patience  to  see 
this  confidence  vindicated.  His  appeal  for  mili 
tary  support  seemed  the  marvellous  word  of  a  ma 
gician  and  wrought  instant  transformation  through 
out  the  vast  loyal  territory.  One  half  of  the  male 
population  began  to  practice  the  manual,  to  drill, 
and  to  study  the  text-books  of  military  science ;  the 
remainder  put  at  least  equal  energy  into  the  pre 
parations  for  equipment ;  every  manufacturer  in  the 
land  set  the  proverbial  Yankee  enterprise  and  in 
genuity  at  work  in  the  adaptation  of  his  machinery 
to  the  production  of  munitions  of  war  and  all  the 
various  outfit  for  troops.  Every  foundry,  every 
mill  and  every  shipyard  was  at  once  diverted  from 
its  accustomed  industries  in  order  to  supply  mili 
tary  demands ;  patriotism  and  profit  combined  to 
stimulate  sleepless  toil  and  invention.  In  a  hard 
working  community  no  one  had  ever  before  worked 
nearly  so  hard  as  now.  The  whole  North  was  in 


272  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

a  ferment,  and  every  human  being  strained  his 
abilities  of  mind  and  of  body  to  the  utmost  in  one 
serviceable  direction  or  another ;  the  wise  and  the 
foolish,  the  men  of  words  and  the  men  of  deeds, 
the  projectors  of  valuable  schemes,  and  the  ven 
ders  of  ridiculous  inventions,  the  applicants  for 
military  commissions  and  the  seekers  after  the 
government's  contracts,  all  hustled  and  crowded 
each  other  in  feverish  eagerness  to  get  at  work 
in  the  new  condition  of  things.  It  was  going  to 
take  time  for  all  this  energy  to  produce  results 
—  yet  not  a  very  long  time;  the  President  had 
more  patience  than  would  be  needed,  and  the 
spirit  of  his  people  reassured  him.  If  the  luke 
warm,  compromising  temper  of  the  past  winter 
had  caused  him  to  feel  any  lurking  anxious  doubts 
as  to  how  the  crisis  would  be  met,  such  illusive 
mists  were  now  cleared  away  in  a  moment  before 
the  sweeping  gale  of  patriotism. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

A  REAL  PRESIDENT,  AND  NOT  A  REAL  BATTLE. 

THE  capture  of  Fort  Sumter  and  the  call  for 
troops  established  one  fact.  There  was  to  be  a 
war.  The  period  of  speculation  was  over  and  the 
period  of  action  had  begun.  The  transition  meant 
much.  The  talking  men  of  the  country  had  not 
appeared  to  advantage  during  the  few  months  in 
which  they  had  been  busy  chiefly  in  giving  weak 
advice  and  in  concocting  prophecies.  They  now 
retired  before  the  men  of  affairs,  who  were  to  do 
better.  To  the  Anglo-Saxon  temperament  it  was 
a  relief  to  have  done  with  waiting  and  to  begin  to 
do  something.  Activity  cleared  the  minds  of  men, 
and  gave  to  each  his  appropriate  duty. 

The  gravity  of  the  crisis  being  undeniable,  the 
people  of  the  North  queried,  with  more  anxiety  than 
ever  before,  as  to  what  kind  of  a  chief  they  had 
taken  to  carry  them  through  it.  But  the  question 
which  all  asked  none  could  answer.  Mr.  Lincoln 
had  achieved  a  good  reputation  as  a  politician  and 
a  stump  speaker.  Whatever  a  few  might  think, 
this  was  all  that  any  one  knew.  The  narrow  lim 
itations  of  his  actual  experience  certainly  did  not 
encourage  a  belief  in  his  probable  fitness  to  en- 


274  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

counter  duties  more  varied,  pressing,  numerous, 
novel  and  difficult  than  had  ever  come  so  suddenly 
to  confound  any  ruler  within  recorded  time.  Later 
on,  when  it  was  seen  with  what  rare  capacity  he 
met  demands  so  exacting,  many  astonished  and  ex 
citable  observers  began  to  cry  out  that  he  was  in 
spired.  This,  however,  was  sheer  nonsense.  That 
the  very  peculiar  requirements  of  these  four  years 
found  a  president  so  well  responding  to  them  may 
fairly  be  regarded,  by  those  who  so  please,  as  a 
specific  Providential  interference,  —  a  striking  one 
among  many  less  striking.  But,  in  fact,  nothing 
in  Mr.  Lincoln's  life  requires,  for  its  explanation, 
the  notion  of  divine  inspiration.  His  doings,  one 
and  all,  were  perfectly  intelligible  as  the  outcome 
of  honesty  of  purpose,  strong  common  sense,  clear 
reasoning  powers,  and  a  singular  sagacity  in  read 
ing  the  popular  mind.  Intellectually  speaking,  a 
clear  and  vigorous  thinking  capacity  was  his  chief 
trait.  This  sounds  commonplace  and  uninterest 
ing;  but  a  more  serviceable  qualification  could  not 
have  been  given  him.  The  truth  is  that  it  was 
part  of  the  good  fortune  of  the  country  that  the 
President  was  not  a  brilliant  man.  Moreover,  he 
was  cool,  shrewd,  dispassionate,  and  self-possessed, 
and  was  endowed  really  in  an  extraordinary  degree 
with  an  intermingling  of  patience  and  courage, 
whereby  he  was  enabled  both  to  await  and  to  en 
dure  results.  Above  all  he  was  a  masterful  man ; 
not  all  the  time  and  in  small  matters,  and  not 
often  in  an  opinionated  way;  but,  from  beginning 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  275 

to  end,  whenever  he  saw  fit  to  be  master,  master 
he  was.1 

This  last  fact,  when  it  became  known,  answered 
another  question  which  people  were  asking:  In 
whose  hands  were  the  destinies  of  the  North  to  be  ? 
In  those  of  Mr.  Lincoln?  or  in  those  of  the  Cabi 
net?  or  in  those  of  influential  advisers,  something 
like  what  have  been  called  "favorites"  in  Europe, 
and  "kitchen  cabinet"  in  the  more  homely  phrase 
of  the  United  States?  The  early  impression  was 
that  Mr,  Lincoln  did  not  know  a  great  deal.  How 
could  he?  Where  and  how  could  he  have  learned 
much?  It  must  be  admitted  that  it  was  entirely 
natural  that  his  advisers,  and  other  influential  men 
concerned  in  public  affairs  should  adopt  and  act 
upon  the  theory  that  Mr.  Lincoln,  emerging  so 
sharply  from  such  a  past  as  his  had  been,  into 
such  a  crisis  as  was  now  present,  must  need  a 
vast  amount  of  instruction,  guidance,  suggestion. 
Accordingly  there  were  many  gentlemen  who  stood 
ready,  not  to  say  eager,  to  supply  these  fancied 
wants;  and  who  could  have  supplied  them  very 
well,  had  they  existed.  Therefore  one  of  the  first 
things  which  Mr.  Lincoln  had  to  do  was,  without 
antagonizing  Mr.  Seward  and  Mr.  Chase,  to  indi 
cate  to  them  that  they  were  to  be  not  only  in  name 
but  also  in  rigid  fact  his  Secretaries,  and  that  he 
was  in  fact  as  well  as  by  title  President.  This 

1  So  said  Hon.  Geo.  W.  Julian,  somewhat  ruefully  acknowledg 
ing  that  Lincoln  "was  always  himself  the  President."  Polit. 
Recoil.,  190. 


276  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

delicate  business  was  done  so  soon  as  opportunity 
offered,  not  in  any  disguised  way  but  witli  plain 
simplicity.  Mr.  Chase  never  took  the  disposition 
quite  pleasantly.  He  managed  his  department 
with  splendid  ability,  but  in  the  personal  relation 
of  a  Cabinet  adviser  upon  the  various  matters  of 
governmental  policy  he  was  always  somewhat  un 
comfortable  to  get  along  with,  inclined  to  fault 
finding,  ever  ready  with  discordant  suggestions, 
and  in  time  also  disturbed  by  ambition. 

Mr.  Seward  behaved  far  better.  After  the 
question  of  supremacy  had  been  settled,  though  in 
a  way  quite  contrary  to  his  anticipation,  he  franldy 
accepted  the  subordinate  position,  and  discharged 
his  duties  with  hearty  good-will.  Indeed  this  set 
tlement  had  already  come,  before  the  time  which 
this  narrative  has  reached;  but  the  people  did 
not  know  it;  it  was  a  private  matter  betwixt  the 
two  men  who  had  been  parties  to  it.  Only  Mr. 
Lincoln  and  Mr.  Seward  knew  that  the  Secretary 
had  suggested  his  willingness  to  run  the  govern 
ment  for  the  President,  and  that  the  President 
had  replied  that  he  intended  to  run  it  himself. 
It  came  about  in  this  way:  on  April  1  Mr. 
Seward  presented,  in  writing,  "Some  thoughts 
for  the  President's  consideration."  He  opened 
with  the  statement,  not  conciliatory,  that  "We 
are  at  the  end  of  a  month's  administration,  and 
yet  without  a  policy,  either  domestic  or  foreign." 
He  then  proceeded  to  offer  suggestions  for  each. 
For  the  "policy  at  home"  he  proposed,  as  the 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  277 

" ruling  idea :"  "Change  the  question  before  the 
public  from  one  upon  slavery,  or  about  slavery, 
for  a  question  upon  Union  or  Disunion."  It  was 
odd  and  not  complimentary  that  he  should  seem 
to  forget  or  ignore  that  precisely  this  thing  had 
already  been  attempted  by  Mr.  Lincoln  in  his 
inaugural  address.  Also  within  a  few  days,  as 
we  all  know  now,  events  were  to  show  that  the 
attempt  had  been  successful.  Further  comment 
upon  the  domestic  policy  of  Mr.  Seward  is,  there 
fore,  needless.  But  his  scheme  "For  Foreign 
Nations  "  is  more  startling:  — 

"I  would  demand  explanations  from  Spain  and 
France  categorically  at  once. 

"I  would  seek  explanations  from  Great  Britain 
and  Russia,  and  send  agents  into  Canada,  Mexico, 
and  Central  America,  to  rouse  '  a  vigorous  spirit 
of  independence  on  this  continent  against  Euro 
pean  intervention. 

"And,  if  satisfactory  explanations  are  not  re 
ceived  from  Spain  and  France, 

"Would  convene  Congress  and  declare  war 
against  them. 

"But  whatever  policy  we  adopt  there  must  be 
an  energetic  prosecution  of  it. 

"For  this  purpose  it  must  be  somebody's  busi 
ness  to  pursue  and  direct  it  incessantly. 

"Either  the  President  must  do  it  himself,  and 
be  all  the  while  active  in  it,  or 

"Devolve  it  on  some  member  of  his  Cabinet. 

"Once  adopted,  debates  on  it  must  end,  and  all 
agree  and  abide. 


278  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

"It  is  not  in  my  especial  province. 

"  But  I  neither  seek  to  evade  nor  assume  respon 
sibility." 

Suggestions  so  wild  could  not  properly  consti 
tute  material  for  "consideration"  by  the  Presi 
dent;  but  much  consideration  on  the  part  of  stu 
dents  of  those  times  and  men  is  provoked  by  the 
fact  that  such  counsel  emanated  from  such  a  source. 
The  Secretary  of  State,  heretofore  the  most  dis 
tinguished  leader  in  the  great  Republican  move 
ment,  who  should  by  merit  of  actual  achievement 
have  been  the  Republican  candidate  for  the  presi 
dency,  and  who  was  expected  by  a  large  part  of 
the  country  to  save  an  ignorant  president  from 
bad  blunders,  was  advancing  a  proposition  to  cre 
ate  pretexts  whereby  to  force  into  existence  a  for 
eign  war  upon  a  basis  which  was  likely  to  set  one 
half  of  the  civilized  world  against  the  other  half. 
The  purpose  for  which  he  was  willing  to  do  this 
awful  thing  was :  to  paralyze  for  a  while  domestic 
discussions,  and  to  undo  and  leave  to  be  done  anew 
by  the  next  generation  all  that  vast  work  which  he 
himself,  and  the  President  whom  he  advised,  and 
the  leaders  of  the  great  multitude  whom  they  both 
represented,  had  for  years  been  engaged  in  prose 
cuting  with  all  the  might  that  was  in  them.  But 
the  explanation  is  simple:  like  many  another  at 
that  trying  moment,  the  Secretary  was  smitten 
with  sudden  panic  at  the  condition  which  had  been 
brought  about  so  largely  by  his  own  efforts.  It 
was  strictly  a  panic,  for  it  passed  away  rapidly  as 
panics  do. 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  279 

The  biographer  of  Mr.  Seward  may  fairly 
enough  glide  lightly  over  this  episode,  since  it  was 
nothing  more  than  an  episode;  but  one  who  writes 
of  Mr.  Lincoln  must,  in  justice,  call  attention  to 
this  spectacle  of  the  sage  statesman  from  whom, 
if  from  any  one,  this  "green  hand,"  this  inex 
perienced  President  must  seek  guidance,  thus  in 
deliberate  writing  pointing  out  a  course  which  was 
ridiculous  and  impossible,  and  which,  if  it  had  been 
possible,  would  have  been  an  intolerably  humiliat 
ing  retreat.  The  anxious  people,  who  thought 
that  their  untried  President  might,  upon  the  worst 
estimate  of  his  own  abilities,  get  on  fairly  well 
by  the  aid  of  wise  and  skilled  advisers,  would 
have  been  aghast  had  they  known  that,  inside  of 
the  government,  the  pending  question  was:  not 
whether  Mr.  Lincoln  would  accept  sound  in 
struction,  but  whether  he  would  have  sense  to 
recognize  bad  advice,  and  independence  to  reject 
it.  Before  Mr.  Seward  went  to  bed  on  that  night 
of  April  1,  he  was  perhaps  the  only  man  in  the 
country  who  knew  the  solution  of  this  problem. 
But  he  knew  it,  for  Mr.  Lincoln  had  already 
answered  his  letter.  It  had  not  taken  the  Presi 
dent  long!  The  Secretary's  extraordinary  offer 
to  assume  the  responsibility  of  pursuing  and  di 
recting  the  policy  of  the  government  was  rejected 
within  a  few  hours  after  it  was  made;  rejected 
not  offensively,  but  briefly,  clearly,  decisively,  anjJL^ 
without  thanks.  Concerning  the  proposed  polices, 
domestic  and  foreign,  the  President  said  as  little' 


280  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

as  was  called  for;  he  actually  did  not  even  refer 
to  the  scheme  for  inaugurating  gratuitously  a  war 
with  a  large  part  of  Europe,  in  order  for  a  while 
to  distract  attention  from  slavery. 

To  us,  to-day,  it  seems  that  the  President  could 
not  have  missed  a  course  so  obvious;  yet  Mr. 
Seward,  who  suggested  the  absurdity,  was  a  great 
statesman.  In  truth,  the  President  had  shown  not 
only  sense  but  nerve.  For  the  difference  between 
Se  ward's  past  opportunities  and  experience  and 
his  own  was  appreciated  by  him  as  fully  as  by  any 
one.  He  knew  perfectly  well  that  what  seemed 
the  less  was  controlling  what  seemed  the  greater 
when  he  over-ruled  his  secretary.  It  took  courage 
on  the  part  of  a  thoughtful  man  to  put  himself  in 
such  a  position.  Other  solemn  reflections  also 
could  not  be  avoided.  Not  less  interested  than 
any  other  citizen  in  the  fate  of  the  nation,  he  had 
also  a  personal  relation  to  the  ultimate  event  which 
was  exclusively  his  own.  For  he  himself  might 
be  called,  in  a  certain  sense,  the  very  cause  of  re 
bellion  ;  of  course  the  people  who  had  elected  him 
carried  the  real  responsibility ;  but  he  stood  as  the 
token  of  the  difference,  the  concrete  provocation 
to  the  fight.  The  South  had  said :  Abraham  Lin 
coln  brings  secession.  It  was  frightful  to  think 
that,  as  he  was  in  fact  the  signal,  so  posterity 
might  mistake  him  for  the  very  cause,  of  the  rend 
ing  of  a  great  nation,  the  failure  of  a  grand  exper 
iment.  It  might  be  that  this  destiny  was  before 
him,  for  the  outcome  of  this  struggle  no  one  could 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  281 

foretell :  it  might  be  his  sad  lot  to  mark  the  end  of 
the  line  of  Presidents  of  the  United  States.  Lin 
coln  was  not  a  man  who  could  escape  the  full 
weight  of  these  reflections,  and  it  is  to  be  remem 
bered  that  all  his  actions  were  taken  beneath  that 
weight.  It  was  a  strong  man,  then,  who  stood  up 
and  said,  This  is  my  load  and  I  will  carry  it;  and 
who  did  carry  it,  when  others  offered  to  shift  much 
of  it  upon  their  own  shoulders;  also  who  would 
not  give  an  hour's  thought  to  a  scheme  which 
promised  to  lift  it  away  entirely  and  to  leave  it  for 
some  other  who  by  and  by  should  come  after  him. 
It  is  worth  while  to  remember  that  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  the  most  advised  man,  often  the  worst  advised 
man,  in  the  annals  of  mankind.  The  torrent  must 
have  been  terribly  confusing!  Another  instance 
deserves  mention:  shortly  before  Mr.  Seward's 
strange  proposal,  Governor  Hicks,  distracted  at 
the  tumult  in  Maryland,  had  suggested  that  the 
quarrel  between  North  and  South  should  be  re 
ferred  to  Lord  Lyons  as  arbitrator !  It  was  diffi 
cult  to  know  whether  to  be  amused  or  resentful 
before  a  proposition  at  once  so  silly  and  so  igno 
minious.  Yet  it  came  from  an  important  official, 
and  it  was  only  one  instance  among  thousands. 
With  war  as  an  actuality,  such  vagaries  as  those 
of  Hicks  and  Seward  came  sharply  to  an  end. 
People  wondered  and  talked  somewhat  as  to  how 
long  hostilities  would  last,  how  much  they  would 
cost,  how  they  would  end ;  and  were  not  more  cor 
rect  in  these  speculations  than  they  had  been  in 


282  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

others.  But  though  the  day  of  gross  absurdities 
was  over,  the  era  of  advice  endured  permanently. 
That  peculiar  national  trait  whereby  every  Ameri 
can  knows  at  least  as  much  on  every  subject  what 
soever  as  is  known  by  any  other  living  man,  pro 
duced  its  full  results  during  the  war.  Every 
clergyman  and  humanitarian,  every  village  politi 
cian  and  every  city  wire-puller,  every  one  who 
conned  the  maps  of  Virginia  and  imbibed  the  mil 
itary  wisdom  of  the  newspapers,  every  merchant 
who  put  his  name  to  a  subscription  paper,  consid 
ered  it  his  privilege  and  his  duty  to  set  the  Presi 
dent  right  upon  every  question  of  moral  principle, 
of  politics,  of  strategy,  and  of  finance.  In  one 
point  of  view  it  was  not  flattering  that  he  should 
seem  to  stand  in  need  of  so  much  instruction ;  and 
this  was  equally  true  whether  it  came  bitterly,  as 
criticism  from  enemies,  or  sugar-coated,  as  advice 
from  friends.  That  friends  felt  obliged  to  advise 
so  much  was  in  itself  a  criticism.  Probably,  how 
ever,  Mr.  Lincoln  was  not  troubled  by  this  view, 
for  he  keenly  appreciated  the  idiosyncracies  as 
well  as  the  better  qualities  of  the  people.  They, 
however,  were  a  long  while  in  understanding  him 
sufficiently  to  recognize  that  there  was  never  a 
man  whom  it  was  less  worth  while  to  advise. 

Business  crowded  upon  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  the 
variety  and  novelty  of  it  was  without  limit.  On 
April  17  Jefferson  Davis  issued  a  proclamation 
offering  "letters  of  marque  and  reprisal"  to  own- 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  283 

ers  of  private  armed  vessels.  Two  days  later  the 
President  retorted  by  proclaiming  a  blockade  of 
Confederate  ports.1  Of  course  this  could  not  be 
made  effective  upon  the  moment.  On  March  4 
the  nominal  total  of  vessels  in  the  navy  was  90. 
Of  these,  69  were  classed  as  "available;  "  but  only 
42  were  actually  in  commission ;  and  even  of  these 
many  were  in  Southern  harbors,  and  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Confederates ;  many  more  were  upon 
foreign  and  distant  stations.  Indeed,  the  disper 
sion  was  so  great  that  it  was  commonly  charged  as 
having  been  intentionally  arranged  by  secessionist 
officials  under  Mr.  Buchanan.  Also  at  the  very 
moment  when  this  proclamation  was  being  read 
throughout  the  country,  the  great  navy  -  yard  of 
Gosport,  at  Norfolk,  Virginia,  "always  the  fav 
ored  depot "  of  the  government,  with  all  its  work 
shops  and  a  great  store  of  cannon  and  other  muni 
tions,  was  passing  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
Most  of  the  vessels  and  some  other  property  were 
destroyed  by  Federals  before  the  seizure  was  con 
summated;  nevertheless,  the  loss  was  severe. 
Moreover,  even  had  all  the  vessels  of  the  regular 
navy  been  present,  they  would  have  had  other  du 
ties  besides  lying  off  Southern  ports.  Blockading 
squadrons,  therefore,  had  to  be  improvised,  and 
orders  at  once  issued  for  the  purchase  and  equip 
ment  of  steam  vessels  from  the  merchant  marine 

1  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Florida,  Mississippi,  Lou 
isiana  and  Texas,  were  covered  by  this  proclamation;  on  April 
27,  North  Carolina  and  Virginia  were  added. 


284  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

and  the  coasting  service.  Fortunately  the  sum 
mer  season  was  at  hand,  so  that  these  makeshifts 
were  serviceable  for  many  months  during  which 
better  craft  were  rapidly  got  together  by  alteration 
and  building.  Three  thousand  miles  of  coast  and 
many  harbors  were  included  within  the  blockade 
limits,  and  were  distributed  into  departments  un 
der  different  commanders.  Each  commander  was 
instructed  to  declare  his  blockade  in  force  as  soon 
as  he  felt  able  to  make  it  tolerably  effective,  with 
the  expectation  of  rapidly  improving  its  efficiency. 
The  beginning  was,  therefore,  ragged,  and  was 
naturally  criticised  in  a  very  jealous  and  hostile 
spirit  by  those  foreign  nations  who  suffered  by  it. 
Dangerous  disputes  threatened  to  arise,  but  were 
fortunately  escaped,  and  in  a  surprisingly  short 
time  "Yankee"  enterprise  made  the  blockade  too 
thorough  for  question. 

Amid  the  first  haste  and  pressure  it  was  in 
geniously  suggested  that,  since  the  government 
claimed  jurisdiction  over  the  whole  country  and 
recognized  only  a  rebellion  strictly  so  called, 
therefore  the  President  could  by  proclamation 
simply  dose  ports  at  will.  Secretary  Welles 
favored  this  course,  and  in  the  extra  session  of 
the  summer  of  1861  Congress  passed  a  bill  giving 
authority  to  Mr.  Lincoln  to  pursue  it,  in  his  dis 
cretion.  Mr.  Seward,  with  better  judgment,  said 
that  it  might  be  legal,  but  would  certainly  be  un 
wise.  The  position  probably  could  have  been  suc 
cessfully  maintained  by  lawyers  before  a  bench  of 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  285 

judges;  but  to  have  relied  upon  it  in  the  teeth  of 
the  commercial  interests  and  unfriendly  sentiment 
of  England  and  France  would  have  been  a  fatal 
blunder.  Happily  it  was  avoided ;  and  the  Presi 
dent  had  the  shrewdness  to  keep  within  a  line 
which  shut  out  technical  discussion.  Already  he 
saw  that,  so  far  as  relations  with  foreigners  were 
concerned,  the  domestic  theory  of  a  rebellion, 
pure  and  simple,  must  be  very  greatly  modified. 
In  a  word,  that  which  began  as  rebellion  soon  de 
veloped  into  civil  war;  the  two  were  closely  akin, 
but  with  some  important  differences. 

Nice  points  of  domestic  constitutional  law  also 
arose  with  the  first  necessity  for  action,  opening 
the  broad  question  as  to  what  course  should  be 
pursued  in  doubtful  cases,  and  worse  still  in  those 
cases  where  the  government  could  not  fairly  claim 
the  benefit  of  a  real  doubt.  The  plain  truth  was 
that,  in  a  condition  faintly  contemplated  in  the 
Constitution,  many  things  not  permitted  by  the 
Constitution  must  be  done  to  preserve  the  Consti 
tution.  The  present  crisis  had  been  very  scantly 
and  vaguely  provided  for  by  "the  fathers."  The 
instant  that  action  became  necessary  to  save  the 
Union  under  the  Constitution  it  was  perfectly  ob 
vious  that  the  Constitution  must  be  stretched, 
transcended,  and  most  liberally  interlined,  in  a 
fashion  which  would  furnish  annoying  arguments 
to  the  disaffected.  The  President  looked  over  the 
situation,  and  decided,  in  the  proverbial  phrase, 
to  take  the  bull  by  the  horns;  that  which  clearly 


286  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

ought  to  be  done  he  would  do,  law  or  no  law, 
doubt  or  no  doubt.  He  would  have  faith  that  the 
people  would  sustain  him;  and  that  the  courts 
and  the  lawyers,  among  whose  functions  it  is  to 
see  to  it  that  laws  and  statutes  do  not  interfere  too 
seriously  with  the  convenience  of  the  community, 
would  arrive,  in  what  subtle  and  roundabout  way 
they  might  choose,  at  the  conclusion  that  whatever 
must  be  done  might  be  done.  These  learned  gen 
tlemen  did  their  duty,  and  developed  the  "war 
powers"  under  the  Constitution  in  a  manner 
equally  ingenious,  comical,  and  sensible.  But  the 
fundamental  basis  was  that  necessity  knows  no 
law ;  every  man  in  the  country  knew  this,  but  the 
well-intentioned  denied  it,  as  matter  of  policy, 
while  the  ill-intentioned  made  such  use  of  the  op 
portunities  thus  afforded  to  them  as  might  have 
been  expected.  Among  the  "war  Democrats," 
however,  there  was  at  least  ostensible  liberality. 

An  early  question  related  to  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus.  The  Maryland  legislature  was  to  meet  on 
April  26,  1861,  and  was  expected  to  guide  the 
State  in  the  direction  of  secession.  Many  influen 
tial  men  urged  the  President  to  arrest  the  members 
before  they  could  do  this.  He,  however,  conceived 
such  an  interference  with  a  state  government,  in 
the  present  condition  of  popular  feeling,  to  be  im 
politic.  "We  cannot  know  in  advance,"  he  said, 
"that  the  action  will  not  be  lawful  and  peaceful; " 
and  he  instructed  General  Scott  to  watch  them, 
and  in  case  they  should  make  a  movement  towards 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  287 

arraying  the  people  against  the  United  States,  to 
counteract  it  by  "the  bombardment  of  their  cities, 
and,  in  the  extremest  necessity,  the  suspension  of 
the  writ  of  habeas  corpus"  This  intimation  that 
the  suspension  of  the  venerated  writ  was  a  measure 
graver  than  even  bombarding  a  city,  surely  indi 
cated  sufficient  respect  for  laws  and  statutes.  The 
legislators  restrained  their  rebellious  ardor  and 
proved  the  wisdom  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  moderation. 
In  the  autumn,  however,  the  crisis  recurred,  and 
then  the  arrests  seemed  the  only  means  of  pre 
venting  the  passage  of  an  ordinance  of  secession. 
Accordingly  the  order  was  issued  and  executed. 
Public  opinion  upheld  it,  and  Governor  Hicks 
afterward  declared  his  belief  that  only  by  this 
action  had  Maryland  been  saved  from  destruction. 
The  privilege  of  habeas  corpus  could  obviously, 
however,  be  made  dangerously  serviceable  to  dis 
affected  citizens.  Therefore,  April  27,  the  Presi 
dent  instructed  General  Scott:  "If  at  any  point 
on  or  in  the  vicinity  of  any  military  line  which  is 
now,  or  which  shall  be,  used  between  the  city  of 
Philadelphia  and  the  city  of  Washington,  you  find 
it  necessary  to  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
for  the  public  safety,  you  .  .  .  are  authorized  to 
suspend  that  writ."  Several  weeks  elapsed  before 
action  was  taken  under  this  authority.  Then,  on 
May  25,  John  Merry  man,  recruiting  in  Maryland 
for  the  Confederate  service,  was  seized  and  impris 
oned  in  Fort  McIIenry.  Chief  Justice  Taney 
granted  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  General  Cad- 


288  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

walader  replied  that  he  held  Merryman  upon  a 
charge  of  treason,  and  that  he  had  authority  under 
the  President's  letter  to  suspend  the  writ.  The 
Chief  Justice  thereupon  issued  against  the  General 
an  attachment  for  contempt,  but  the  marshal  was 
refused  admittance  to  the  fort.  The  Chief  Justice 
then  filed  with  the  clerk,  and  also  sent  to  the 
President,  his  written  opinion,  in  which  he  said: 
"  I  understand  that  the  President  not  only  claims 
the  right  to  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  at 
his  discretion,  but  to  delegate  that  discretionary 
power  to  a  military  officer;"  whereas,  according 
to  the  view  of  his  Honor,  the  power  did  not  lie  even 
with  the  President  himself,  but  only  with  Con 
gress.  Warming  to  the  discussion,  he  used  pretty 
strong  language,  to  the  effect  that,  if  authority 
entrusted  to  other  departments  could  thus  "be 
usurped  by  the  military  power  at  its  discretion, 
the  people  .  .  .  are  no  longer  living  under  a  gov 
ernment  of  laws;  but  every  citizen  holds  life,  lib 
erty,  and  property  at  the  will  and  pleasure  of  the 
army  officer  in  whose  military  district  he  may 
happen  to  be  found."  It  was  unfortunate  that  the 
country  should  hear  such  phrases  launched  by  the 
Chief  Justice  against  the  President,  or  at  least 
against  acts  done  under  orders  of  the  President. 
Direct  retort  was  of  course  impossible,  and  the  dis 
pute  was  in  abeyance  for  a  short  time.1  But  the 

1  For  the  documents  in  this  case,  and  also  for  some  of  the  more 
famous  professional  opinions  thereon,  see  McPherson,  Hist,  of  Re 
bellion,  154  et  seq. ;  also  (of  course  from  the  side  of  the  Chief- 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  289 

predilections  of  the  judicial  hero  of  the  Dred  Scott 
decision  were  such  as  to  give  rise  to  grave  doubts 
as  to  whether  or  not  the  Union  could  be  saved  by 
any  process  which  would  not  often  run  counter  to 
his  ideas  of  the  law;  therefore  in  this  matter  the 
President  continued  to  exercise  the  useful  and 
probably  essential  power,  though  taking  care,  for 
the  future,  to  have  somewhat  more  regard  for  form. 
Thus,  on  May  10,  instead  of  simply  writing  a 
letter,  he  issued  through  the  State  Department  a 
proclamation,  authorizing  the  Federal  commander 
on  the  Florida  coast,  "if  he  shall  find  it  neces 
sary,  to  suspend  there  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus." 
In  due  time  the  assembling  of  Congress  gave 
Mr.  Lincoln  the  opportunity  to  present  his  side  of 
the  case.  In  his  Message  he  said  that  arrests,  and 
suspension  of  the  writ,  had  been  made  "very 
sparingly;"  and  that  if  authority  had  been 
stretched,  at  least  the  question  was  pertinent: 
"Are  all  the  laws  but  one  to  go  unexecuted,  and 
the  government  itself  to  go  to  pieces,  lest  that  one 
be  violated?  "  He,  however,  believed  that  in  fact 
this  question  was  not  presented  and  that  the  law 
had  not  been  violated.  "The  provision  of  the  Con 
stitution,  that  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  shall  not  be  suspended  unless  when,  in 
cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public  safety 
may  require  it,  is  equivalent  to  a  provision  that 
such  privilege  may  be  suspended  when,  in  cases  of 

Justice),  Tyler's  Taney,  420-431 ;  and  see  original  draft  of  the 
President's  Message  on  this  subject ;  N.  and  H.,  iv.  176. 


290  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public  safety  does  re 
quire  it."  As  between  Congress  and  the  Execu 
tive,  "the  Constitution  itself  is  silent  as  to  which 
or  who  is  to  exercise  the  power;  and  as  the  pro 
vision  was  plainly  made  for  a  dangerous  emergency 
it  cannot  be  believed  that  the  framers  of  the  instru 
ment  intended  that  in  every  case  the  danger 
should  run  its  course  until  Congress  could  be 
called  together,  the  very  assembling  of  which  might 
be  prevented,  as  was  intended  in  this  case  by  the 
rebellion." 

If  it  was  difficult,  it  was  also  undesirable  to 
confute  the  President's  logic.  The  necessity  for 
military  arrests  and  for  indefinite  detention  of  the 
arrested  persons  was  undeniable.  Congress  there 
fore  recognized  the  legality  of  what  had  been  done, 
and  the  power  was  frequently  exercised  thereafter, 
and  to  great  advantage.  Of  course  mistakes  oc 
curred  and  subordinates  made  some  arrests  which 
had  better  have  been  left  unmade;  but  these  bore 
only  upon  discretion  in  individual  cases,  not  upon 
inherent  right.  The  topic,  however,  was  in  itself 
a  tempting  one  not  only  for  the  seriously  disaf 
fected,  but  for  the  far  larger  body  of  the  quarrel 
some,  who  really  wanted  the  government  to  do  its 
work,  yet  maliciously  liked  to  make  the  process 
of  doing  it  just  as  difficult  and  as  disagreeable 
as  possible.  Later  on,  when  the  malcontent  class 
acquired  the  organization  of  a  distinct  political 
body,  no  other  charge  against  the  administration 
proved  so  plausible  and  so  continuously  service- 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  291 

able  as  this.  It  invited  to  florid  declamation 
profusely  illustrated  with  impressive  historical 
allusions,  and  to  the  free  use  of  vague  but  grand 
and  sonorous  phrases  concerning  "usurpation," 
"the  subjection  of  the  life,  liberty,  and  property 
of  every  citizen  to  the  mere  will  of  a  military 
commander,"  and  other  like  terrors.  Unfortu 
nately  men  much  more  deserving  of  respect  than 
the  Copperheads,  men  of  sound  loyalty  and  high 
ability,  but  of  anxious  and  conservative  tempera 
ment,  were  led  by  their  fears  to  criticise  severely 
arrests  of  men  who  were  as  dangerous  to  the 
government  as  if  they  had  been  soldiers  of  the 
Confederacy. 

May  3,  1861,  by  which  time  military  exigencies 
had  become  better  understood,  Mr.  Lincoln  called 
"into  the  service  of  the  United  States  42,034 
volunteers,"  and  directed  that  the  regular  army 
should  be  increased  by  an  aggregate  of  22,714 
officers  and  enlisted  men.  More  suffffestive  than 

OO 

the  mere  increase  was  the  fact  that  the  volunteers 
were  now  required  "to  serve  for  a  period  of  three 
years,  unless  sooner  discharged."  The  opinion  of 
the  government  as  to  the  magnitude  of  the  task  in 
hand  was  thus  for  the  first  time  conveyed  to  the 
people.  They  received  it  seriously  and  without 
faltering. 

July  4,  1861,  the  Thirty-seventh  Congress  met 
in  extra  session,  and  the  soundness  of  the  Presi 
dent's  judgment  in  setting  a  day  which  had  at  first 
been  condemned  as  too  distant  was  proved.  In 


292  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

the  interval,  nothing  had  been  lost  which  could 
have  been  saved  by  the  sitting  of  Congress ;  whil£, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  members  had  had  the  great 
advantage  of  having  time  to  think  soberly  con 
cerning  the  business  before  them,  and  to  learn  the 
temper  and  wishes  of  their  constituents. 

Mr.  Lincoln  took  great  pains  with  his  Message, 
which  he  felt  to  be  a  very  important  document. 
It  was  his  purpose  to  say  simply  what  events  had 
occurred,  what  questions  had  been  opened,  and 
what  necessities  had  arisen;  to  display  the  situa 
tion  and  to  state  facts  fairly  and  fully,  but  not 
apparently  to  argue  the  case  of  the  North.  Yet  it 
was  essential  for  him  so  to  do  this  that  no  doubt 
could  be  left  as  to  where  the  right  lay.  This 
peculiar  process  of  argument  by  statement  had 
constituted  his  special  strength  at  the  bar,  and  he 
now  gave  an  excellent  instance  of  it.  He  briefly 
sketched  the  condition  of  public  affairs  at  the  time 
when  he  assumed  the  government;  he  told  the 
story  of  Sumter,  and  of  the  peculiar  process 
whereby  Virginia  had  been  linked  to  the  Confed 
eracy.  With  a  tinge  of  irony  he  remarked  that 
whether  the  sudden  change  of  feeling  among  the 
members  of  the  Virginian  Convention  was  "wrought 
by  their  great  approval  of  the  assault  upon  Sum 
ter,  or  their  great  resentment  at  the  government's 
resistance  to  that  assault  is  not  definitely  known." 

He  explained  the  effect  of  the  neutrality  theory 
of  the  Border  States.  "This,"  he  said,  "would 
be  disunion  completed.  Figuratively  speaking,  it 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  293 

would  be  the  building  of  an  impassable  wall  along 
the  line  of  separation,  —  and  yet  not  quite  an  im 
passable  one,  for  under  the  guise  of  neutrality,  it 
would  tie  the  hands  of  the  Union  men,  and  freely 
pass  supplies  to  the  insurrectionists.  .  .  .  At  a 
stroke  it  would  take  all  the  trouble  off  the  hands 
of  secession,  except  what  proceeds  from  the  exter 
nal  blockade."  It  would  give  to  the  disunionists 
"disunion,  without  a  struggle  of  their  own." 

Of  the  blockade  and  the  calls  for  troops,  he 
said:  "These  measures,  whether  strictly  legal  or 
not,  were  ventured  upon  under  what  appeared  to 
be  a  popular  demand  and  a  public  necessity,  trust 
ing  then,  as  now,  that  Congress  would  ratify 
them."  At  the  same  time  he  stated  the  matter  ol 
the  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  which 
has  been  already  referred  to. 

Speaking  of  the  doctrine  that  secession  was 
lawful  under  the  Constitution,  and  that  it  was  not 
rebellion,  he  made  plain  the  genuine  significance 
of  the  issue  thus  raised:  "  It  presents  .  .  .  the 
question  whether  a  Constitutional  Eepublic  or 
Democracy,  a  government  of  the  people  by  the 
same  people,  can  or  cannot  maintain  its  territorial 
integrity  against  its  own  domestic  foes.  It  pre 
sents  the  question  whether  discontented  individ 
uals,  too  few  in  numbers  to  control  the  administra 
tion  according  to  the  organic  law  in  any  case,  can 
always,  upon  the  pretenses  made  in  this  case,  or 
any  other  pretenses,  or  arbitrarily  without  any 
pretense,  break  up  their  government,  and  thus 


294  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

practically  put  an  end  to  free  government  upon 
the  earth.  It  forces  us  to  ask:  Is  there  in  all 
Republics  this  inherent  fatal  weakness?  Must  a 
government  of  necessity  be  too  strong  for  the  lib 
erties  of  its  own  people,  or  too  weak  to  maintain 
its  own  existence?  "  The  Constitution  of  the  Con 
federacy  was  a  paraphrase  with  convenient  adap 
tations  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
A  significant  one  of  these  adaptations  was  the 
striking  out  of  the  first  three  words,  "We,  the 
people,"  and  the  substitution  of  the  words:  "We, 
the  deputies  of  the  sovereign  and  independent 
States."  "Why,"  said  Mr.  Lincoln,  "why  this 
deliberate  pressing  out  of  view  the  rights  of  men 
and  the  authority  of  the  people?  This  is  essen 
tially  a  people's  contest.  On  the  side  of  the 
Union  it  is  a  struggle  for  maintaining  in  the 
world  that  form  and  substance  of  government 
whose  leading  object  is  to  elevate  the  condition  of 
men  ...  to  afford  to  all  an  unfettered  start  and 
a  fair  chance  in  the  race  of  life.  .  .  .  This  is  the 
leading  object  of  the  government  for  whose  exist 
ence  we  contend.  I  am  most  happy  to  believe  that 
the  plain  people  understand  and  appreciate  this." 

Many  persons,  not  gifted  with  the  power  of 
thinking  clearly,  were  disturbed  at  what  seemed  to 
them  a  purpose  to  "invade"  and  to  "subjugate" 
sovereign  States,  —  as  though  a  government  could 
invade  its  own  country  or  subjugate  its  own  sub 
jects!  These  phrases,  he  said,  were  producing 
"uneasiness  in  the  minds  of  candid  men"  as  to 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  295 

what  would  be  the  course  of  the  government  toward 
the  Southern  States  after  the  suppression  of  the 
rebellion.  The  President  assured  them  that  he 
had  no  expectation  of  changing  the  views  set  forth 
in  his  inaugural  address;  that  he  desired  "to  pre 
serve  the  government,  that  it  may  be  administered 
for  all  as  it  was  administered  by  the  men  who 
made  it.  Loyal  citizens  everywhere  have  a  right 
to  expect  this,  .  .  .  and  the  government  has  no 
right  to  withhold  or  neglect  it.  It  is  not  perceived 
that  in  giving  it  there  is  any  coercion,  any  con 
quest,  or  any  subjugation." 

In  closing  he  said  that  it  was  with  the  deepest 
regret  that  he  had  used  the  war  power;  but  "in 
defense  of  the  government,  forced  upon  him,  he 
could  but  perform  this  duty  or  surrender  the  exist 
ence  of  the  government."  Compromise  would 
have  been  useless,  for  "no  popular  government  can 
long  survive  a  marked  precedent  that  those  who 
carry  an  election  can  only  save  the  government 
from  immediate  destruction  by  giving  up  the  main 
point  upon  which  the  people  gave  the  election." 
To  those  who  would  have  had  him  compromise  he 
explained  that  only  the  people  themselves,  not 
their  servants,  can  safely  reverse  their  own  delib 
erate  decisions.  He  had  no  power  to  agree  to 
divide  the  country  which  he  had  the  duty  to  gov 
ern.  "As  a  private  citizen  the  Executive  could 
not  have  consented  that  these  institutions  shall 
perish;  much  less  could  he,  in  betrayal  of  so  vast 
and  so  sacred  a  trust  as  these  free  people  have 


29()  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

confided  to  him.  He  felt  that  he  had  no  moral 
right  to  shrink,  nor  even  to  count  the  chances  of 
his  own  life  in  what  might  follow." 

The  only  direct  request  made  in  the  Message 
was  that,  to  make  "this  contest  a  short  and  decis 
ive  one,"  Congress  would  "place  at  the  control  of 
the  government  for  the  work  at  least  400,000  men, 
and  1400,000,000.  That  number  of  men  is  about 
one  tenth  of  those  of  proper  ages  within  the  re 
gions  where  apparently  all  are  willing  to  engage, 
and  the  sum  is  less  than  a  twenty -third  part  of  the 
money  value  owned  by  the  men  who  seem  ready 
to  devote  the  whole." 

The  Message  was  well  received  by  the  people,  as 
it  deserved  to  be. 

The  proceedings  of  Congress  can  only  be  re 
ferred  to  with  brevity.  Yet  a  mere  recital  of  the 
names  of  the  more  noteworthy  members  of  the 
Senate  and  the  House  must  be  intruded,  if  merely 
for  the  flavor  of  reminiscence  which  it  will  bring 
to  readers  who  recall  those  times.  In  the  Senate, 
upon  the  Republican  side,  there  were  Lyman 
Trumbull  from  Illinois,  James  Harlan  and  James 
W.  Grimes  from  Iowa,  William  P.  Fessenden 
from  Maine,  Charles  Sumner  and  Henry  Wilson 
from  Massachusetts,  Zachariah  Chandler  from 
Michigan,  John  P.  Hale  from  New  Hampshire, 
Benjamin  F.  Wade  from  Ohio,  and  John  Sher 
man,  who  was  elected  to  fill  the  vacancy  created 
by  the  appointment  of  Salmon  P.  Chase  to  the 
Treasury  Department,  David  Wilmot  from  Penn- 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  297 

sylvania,  filling  the  place  of  Simon  Cameron, 
Henry  B.  Anthony  from  Rhode  Island,  Andrew 
Johnson  from  Tennessee,  Jacob  Collamer  from 
Vermont,  and  James  R.  Doolittle  from  Wisconsin. 
On  the  Democratic  side,  there  were:  James  A. 
McDougall  of  California,  James  A.  Bayard  and 
William  Saulsbury  of  Delaware,  Jesse  D.  Bright 
of  Indiana,  who  was  expelled  February  5,  1862, 
John  C.  Breckenridge  of  Kentucky,  who  a  little 
later  openly  joined  the  Secessionists,  and  was  for 
mally  expelled  December  4,  1861;  he  was  suc 
ceeded  by  Garrett  Davis,  an  "American  or  Old 
Line  Whig,"  by  which  name  he  and  two  senators 
from  Maryland  preferred  to  be  described;  James 
W.  Nesmith  of  Oregon.  Lane  and  Pomeroy,  the 
first  Senators  from  the  free  State  of  Kansas,  were 
seated.  In  the  House  Galusha  A.  Grow,  of  Penn 
sylvania,  who  had  lately  knocked  down  Mr.  Keith 
of  South  Carolina  in  a  fisticuff  encounter  on  the 
floor  of  the  Chamber,  was  chosen  Speaker,  over 
Francis  P.  Blair,  Jr.,  of  Missouri.  Thaddeus 
Stevens  of  Pennsylvania  was  the  most  prominent 
man  in  the  body.  Among  many  familiar  names 
in  running  down  the  list  the  eye  lights  upon 
James  E.  English  of  Connecticut;  E.  B.  Wash- 
burne,  Isaac  N.  Arnold  and  Owen  Love  joy  of  Il 
linois;  Julian,  Voorhees,  and  Schuyler  Colfax  of 
Indiana;  Crittenden  of  Kentucky;  Roscoe  Conk- 
ling,  Reuben  E.  Fenton,  and  Erastus  Corning  of 
New  York;  George  H.  Pendleton,  Vallandigha: 
Ashley,  Shellabarger,  and  S.  S.  Cox  of  Ohio 


298  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

vode  of  Pennsylvania;  Maynard  of  Tennessee. 
The  members  came  together  in  very  good  temper; 
and  the  great  preponderance  of  Republicans  se 
cured  dispatch  in  the  conduct  of  business ;  for  the 
cliques  which  soon  produced  intestine  discomfort 
in  that  dominant  party  were  not  yet  developed. 
No  ordinary  legislation  was  entered  upon ;  but  in 
twenty-nine  working  days  seventy-six  public  Acts 
were  passed,  of  which  all  but  four  bore  directly 
upon  the  extraordinary  emergency.  The  demands 
of  the  President  were  met,  with  additions:  500,000 
men  and  1500,000,000  were  voted;  $207,000,000 
were  appropriated  to  the  army,  and  $56,000,000 
to  the  navy.  August  6  Congress  adjourned. 

The  law-makers  were  treated,  during  their  ses 
sion,  to  what  was  regarded,  in  the  inexperience  of 
those  days,  as  a  spectacle  of  real  war.  During  a 
couple  of  months  past  large  bodies  of  men  had 
been  gathering  together,  living  in  tents,  shoulder 
ing  guns  and  taking  the  name  of  armies.  General 
Butler  was  in  command  at  Fortress  Monroe,  and 
was  faced  by  Colonel  Magruder,  who  held  the 
peninsula  between  the  York  and  the  James  rivers. 
Early  in  June  the  lieutenants  of  these  two  com 
manders  performed  the  comical  fiasco  of  the  "bat 
tle  "  of  Big  Bethel.  In  this  skirmish  the  Federal 
regiments  fired  into  each  other,  and  then  retreated, 
while  the  Confederates  withdrew ;  but  in  language 
of  absurd  extravagance  the  Confederate  colonel 
reported  that  he  had  won  a  great  victory,  and 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  299 

Northern  men  flushed  beneath  the  ridicule  in 
curred  by  the  blunder  of  their  troops. 

A  smaller  affair  at  Vienna  was  more  ridiculous; 
several  hundred  soldiers,  aboard  a  train  of  cars, 
started  upon  a  reconnoissance,  as  if  it  had  been  a 
picnic.  The  Confederates  fired  upon  them  with  a 
couple  of  small  cannon,  and  they  hastily  took  to 
the  woods.  When  they  got  home  they  talked 
wisely  about  "masked  batteries."  But  the  shrewd 
ness  and  humor  of  the  people  were  not  thus  turned 
aside,  and  the  "masked  battery"  long  made  the 
point  of  many  a  bitter  jest. 

Up  the  river,  Harper's  Ferry  was  held  by 
"Stonewall"  Jackson,  who  was  soon  succeeded  by 
J.  E.  Johnston.  Confronting  and  watching  this 
force  was  General  Patterson,  at  Chambersburg, 
Pennsylvania,  with  a  body  of  men  rapidly  growing 
to  considerable  numbers  by  the  daily  coming  of 
recruits.  Not  very  far  away,  southeastward,  the 
main  body  of  the  Confederate  army,  under  Beaure- 
gard,  lay  at  Manassas,  and  the  main  body  of  the 
Federal  army,  under  McDowell,  was  encamped 
along  the  Potomac.  On  May  23  the  Northern  ad 
vance  crossed  that  river,  took  possession  of  Arling 
ton  Heights  and  of  Alexandria,  and  began  work 
upon  permanent  defensive  intrenchments  in  front 
of  the  capital. 

The  people  of  the  North  knew  nothing  about 
war  or  armies.  Wild  with  enthusiasm  and  excite 
ment,  they  cheered  the  departing  regiments,  which, 
as  they  vaguely  and  eagerly  fancied,  were  to  begin 


300  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

fighting  at  once.  Yet  it  was  true  that  no  one 
would  stake  his  money  on  a  "football  team" 
which  should  go  into  a  game  trained  in  a  time  so 
short  as  that  which  had  been  allowed  for  bringing 
into  condition  for  the  manoeuvres  and  battle-fields 
of  a  campaign  an  army  of  thirty  or  forty  thousand 
men,  with  staff  and  commissariat,  and  arms  of  in 
fantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  altogether  constitut 
ing  an  organization  vast,  difficult,  and  complex  in 
the  highest  degree  of  human  cooperation.  Never 
theless  "On  to  Richmond!"  rolled  up  the  imperi 
ous  cry  from  every  part  of  the  North.  The  gov 
ernment,  either  sharing  in  this  madness,  or  feeling 
that  it  must  be  yielded  to,  passed  the  word  to  the 
commander,  and  McDowell  very  reluctantly  obeyed 
orders  and  started  with  his  army  in  that  direction, 
—  not,  however,  with  any  real  hope  of  reaching 
this  nominal  objective;  for  he  was  an  intelligent 
man  and  a  good  .soldier,  and  was  perfectly  aware  of 
the  unfitness  of  his  army.  But  when,  protesting, 
he  suggested  that  his  troops  were  "green,"  he  was 
told  to  remember  that  the  Southern  troops  were  of 
the  same  tint;  for,  in  a  word,  the  North  was  bound 
to  have  a  fight,  and  would  by  no  means  endure 
that  the  three  months'  men  should  come  home  with 
out  doing  something  more  positive  than  merely 
preventing  the  capture  of  Washington. 

On  July  16,  therefore,  McDowell  began  his  ad 
vance,  having  with  him  about  35,000  men,  and  by 
the  19th  he  was  at  the  stream  of  Bull  Run,  behind 
which  the  Confederates  lay.  He  planned  his  bat- 


A  REAL  PRESIDENT.  301 

tie  skilfully,  and  began  his  attack  on  the  morning 
of  the  21st.  On  the  other  hand,  Beauregard  was 
at  the  double  disadvantage  of  misapprehending 
his  opponent's  purpose,  and  of  failing  to  get  his 
orders  conveyed  to  his  lieutenants  until  the  fight 
was  far  advanced.  The  result  was  that  at  the  be 
ginning  of  the  afternoon  the  Federals  had  almost 
won  a  victory  which  they  fully  deserved.  That 
they  did  not  finally  secure  it  was  due  to  the  ineffi 
ciency  of  General  Patterson.  This  general  had 
crossed  the  Potomac  a  few  days  before  and  had 
been  instructed  to  watch  Johnston,  who  had  drawn 
back  near  Winchester,  and  either  to  prevent  him 
from  moving  his  force  from  the  Shenandoah  Val 
ley  to  Manassas,  or,  failing  this,  to  keep  close  to 
him  and  unite  with  McDowell.  But  Patterson 
neither  detained  nor  followed  his  opponent.  On 
July  18  Beauregard  telegraphed  to  Johnston:  "If 
you  wish  to  help  me,  now  is  the  time."  If  Patter 
son  wished  to  help  McDowell,  then,  also,  was  the 
time.  The  Southern  general  seized  his  opportun 
ity,  and  the  Northern  general  let  his  opportunity 
go.  Johnston,  uninterrupted  and  unf  olio  wed  by 
Patterson,  brought  his  troops  in  from  Manassas 
Junction  upon  the  right  wing  of  the  Federals  at 
the  very  moment  and  crisis  when  the  battle  was 
actually  in  the  process  of  going  in  their  favor. 
Directly  all  was  changed.  Older  troops  would  not 
have  stood,  and  these  untried  ones  were  defeated 
as  soon  as  they  were  attacked.  Speedily  retreat 
became  rout,  and  rout  became  panic.  At  a  great 


302  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

speed  the  frightened  soldiers,  resolved  into  a  mere 
disorganized  mob  of  individuals,  made  their  way 
back  to  the  camps  on  the  Potomac ;  many  thought 
Washington  safer,  and  some  did  not  stop  short  of 
their  distant  Northern  homes. 

The  Southerners,  who  had  been  on  the  point  of 
running  away  when  the  Northerners  anticipated 
them  in  so  doing,  now  triumphed  immoderately, 
and  uttered  boastings  magniloquent  enough  for 
Homeric  heroes.  Yet  they  were,  as  General  John 
ston  said,  "almost  as  much  disorganized  by  victory 
as  were  the  Federals  by  defeat."  Many  of  them 
also  hastened  to  their  homes,  spreading  everywhere 
the  cheering  tidings  that  the  war  was  over  and  the 
South  had  won. 

In  point  of  fact,  it  was  a  stage  of  the  war  when 
defeat  was  more  wholesome  than  victory.  Fortu 
nately,  too,  the  North  was  not  even  momentarily 
discouraged.  The  people  had  sense  enough  to  see 
that  what  had  happened  was  precisely  what  should 
have  been  expected.  A  little  humiliated  at  their 
own  folly,  about  as  much  vexed  with  themselves  as 
angry  with  their  enemies,  they  turned  to  their 
work  in  a  new  spirit.  Persistence  displaced  excite 
ment,  as  three  years'  men  replaced  three  months' 
men.  The  people  settled  down  to  a  long,  hard 
task.  Besides  this,  they  had  now  some  idea  of 
what  was  necessary  to  be  done  in  order  to  succeed 
in  that  task.  Invaluable  lessons  had  been  learned, 
and  no  lives  which  were  lost  in  the  war  bore  fruit 
of  greater  usefulness  than  did  those  which  seemed 
to  have  been  foolishly  thrown  away  at  Bull  Run. 


CHAPTER   X. 

THE   FIRST   ACT    OF   THE   MCCLELLAN   DRAMA. 

ON  the  day  after  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  General 
George  B.  McClellan  was  summoned  to  Washing 
ton,  where  he  arrived  on  July  26.  On  the  25th 
he  had  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  army 
of  the  Potomac.  By  all  the  light  which  President 
Lincoln  had  at  the  time  of  making  this  appoint 
ment,  it  seemed  the  best  that  was  possible ;  and  in 
fact  it  was  so,  in  view  of  the  immediate  sphere  of 
usefulness  of  a  commanding  general  in  Virginia. 
McClellan  was  thirty-four  years  old,  of  vigorous 
physique  and  fine  address.  After  his  graduation 
at  West  Point,  in  1846,  he  was  attached  to  the 
Engineer  Corps;  he  served  through  the  Mexican 
War  and,  for  merit,  received  a  captaincy.  In 
1855  he  was  sent  by  Jefferson  Davis,  then  Secre 
tary  of  War,  to  Europe  to  study  the  organizing 
and  handling  of  armies  in  active  service ;  and  he 
was  for  a  while  at  the  British  headquarters  during 
the  siege  of  Sebastopol,  observing  their  system  in 
operation.  In  January,  1857,  he  resigned  from 
the  army;  but  with  the  first  threatenings  of  the 
civil  war  he  made  ready  to  play  an  active  part. 
April  23,  1861,  he  was  appointed  by  the  governor 


304  ASK  AH  AM  LINCOLN. 

of  Ohio  a  major-general,  with  command  of  all  the 
state  forces.  May  13,  by  an  order  from  the 
national  government,  he  took  command  of  the  De 
partment  of  the  Ohio,  in  which  shortly  afterward 
Western  Virginia  was  included.  He  found  the 
sturdy  mountaineers  of  this  inaccessible  region  for 
the  most  part  loyalists,  but  overawed  by  rebel 
troops,  and  toward  the  close  of  May,  upon  his  own 
sole  responsibility,  he  inaugurated  a  campaign  for 
their  relief.  In  this  he  had  the  good  fortune  to 
be  entirely  successful.  By  some  small  engage 
ments  he  cleared  the  country  of  armed  Secessionists 
and  returned  it  to  the  Union ;  and  in  so  doing  he 
showed  energy  and  good  tactical  ability.  These 
achievements,  which  later  in  the  war  would  have 
seemed  inconsiderable,  now  led  to  confidence  and 
promotion. 

In  his  new  and  exalted  position  McClellan  be 
came  commander  of  a  great  number  of  men,  but 
not  of  a  great  army.  The  agglomeration  of  civil 
ians,  who  had  run  away  from  Manassas  under  the 
impression  that  they  had  fought  and  lost  a  real 
battle,  was  utterly  disorganized  and  demoralized. 
Some  had  already  reached  the  sweet  safety  of  the 
villages  of  the  North;  others  were  lounging  in  the 
streets  of  Washington  and  swelling  the  receipts  of 
its  numerous  bar-rooms.  The  majority,  it  is  true, 
were  in  camp  across  the  Potomac,  but  in  no  con 
dition  to  render  service.  All,  having  been  enlisted 
for  three  months,  now  had  only  a  trifling  remnant 
of  so-called  military  life  before  them,  in  which  it 


FIRST  ACT   OF  THE  M^CLELLAN  DRAMA.    305 

seemed  to  many  hardly  worth  while  to  run  risks. 
The  new  call  for  volunteers  for  three  years  had 
just  gone  forth,  and  though  troops  began  to  arrive 
under  it  with  surprising  promptitude  and  many 
three  months'  men  reenlisted,  yet  a  long  time  had 
to  elapse  before  the  new  levies  were  all  on  hand. 
Thus  betwixt  departing  and  coming  hosts  Mc- 
Clellan's  duty  was  not  to  use  an  army,  but  to 
create  one. 

The  task  looked  immeasurable,  but  there  was 
a  fortunate  fitness  for  it  upon  both  sides.  The 
men  who  in  this  awful  crisis  were  answering  the 
summons  of  President  Lincoln  constituted  a  raw 
material  of  a  kind  such  as  never  poured  into  any 
camp  save  possibly  into  that  of  Cromwell.  For 
the  most  part  they  were  courageous,  intelligent, 
self-respecting  citizens,  who  were  under  the  noble 
compulsion  of  conscience  and  patriotism  in  leav 
ing  reputable  and  prosperous  callings  for  a  mili 
tary  career.  The  moral,  mental  and  physical 
average  of  such  a  body  of  men  was  a  long  way 
above  that  of  professional  armies,  and  insured 
readiness  in  acquiring  their  new  calling.  But  ad 
mirable  as  were  the  latent  possibilities,  and  apt 
as  each  individual  might  be,  these  multitudes  ar 
rived  wholly  uninstructed ;  few  had  even  so  much 
as  seen  a  real  soldier,  none  had  any  notion  at  all 
of  what  military  discipline  was,  or  how  to  handle 
arms,  or  to  manoeuvre,  or  to  take  care  of  their 
health.  Nor  could  they  easily  get  instruction 
in  these  things;  for  officers  knew  no  more  than 


306  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

privates;  indeed,  for  that  matter,  one  of  the 
great  difficulties  at  first  encountered  lay  in  the 
large  proportion  of  utterly  unfit  men  who  had  suc 
ceeded  in  getting  commissions,  and  who  had  to  be 
toilfully  eliminated. 

That  which  was  to  be  done,  McClellan  was  well 
able  to  do.  He  had  a  passion  for  organization, 
and  fine  capacity  for  work;  he  showed  tact  and 
skill  in  dealing  with  subordinates ;  he  had  a  thor 
ough  knowledge  and  a  high  ideal  of  what  an  army 
should  be.  He  seemed  the  Genius  of  Order  as  he 
educated  and  arranged  the  chaotic  gathering  of 
human  beings,  who  came  before  him  to  be  trans 
muted  from  farmers,  merchants,  clerks,  shop-keep 
ers  and  what  not  into  soldiers  of  all  arms  and  into 
leaders  of  soldiers.  To  that  host  in  chrysalis  he 
was  what  each  skilful  drill-master  is  to  his  awk 
ward  squad.  Under  his  influence  privates  learned 
how  to  obey  and  officers  how  to  command;  each 
individual  merged  the  sense  of  individuality  in 
that  of  homogeneousness  and  cohesion,  until  the 
original  loose  association  of  units  became  one 
grand  unit  endowed  with  the  solidarity  and  ma 
chine-like  quality  of  an  efficient  army.  Patient 
labor  produced  a  result  so  excellent  that  General 
Meade  said  long  afterward :  "  Had  there  been  no 
McClellan  there  could  have  been  no  Grant,  for 
the  army  made  no  essential  improvement  under 
any  of  his  successors." 

That  the  formation  of  this  great  complex  ma 
chine  was  indispensable,  and  that  it  would  take 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  MCCLELLAN  DRAMA.     307 

much  time,  were  facts  which  the  disaster  at  Bull 
Run  had  compelled  both  the  administration  and 
the  people  to  appreciate  moderately  well.  Accord 
ingly  they  resolutely  set  themselves  to  be  patient. 
The  cry  of  "On  to  Richmond  "  no  longer  sounded 
through  the  land,  and  the  restraint  imposed  by  the 
excited  masses  upon  their  own  ardor  was  the 
strongest  evidence  of  their  profound  earnestness. 
In  a  steady  stream  they  poured  men  and  material 
into  the  camps  in  Virginia,  and  they  heard  with 
satisfaction  of  the  advance  of  the  levies  in  dis 
cipline  and  soldierly  efficiency.  For  a  while  the 
scene  was  pleasant  and  without  danger.  "It  was," 
says  Arnold,  describing  that  of  which  he  had  been 
an  eye-witness,  "the  era  of  brilliant  reviews  and 
magnificent  military  displays,  of  parades,  festive 
parties  and  junketings."  Members  of  Congress 
found  excursions  to  the  camps  attractive  for  them 
selves  and  their  visitors.  Glancing  arms,  new 
uniforms,  drill,  and  music  constituted  a  fine  show. 
Thus  the  rest  of  the  summer  passed  away,  and 
autumn  came  and  was  passing  too.  Then  here 
and  there  signs  of  impatience  began  again  to  be 
manifested.  It  was  observed  with  discontent  that 
the  glorious  days  of  the  Indian  Summer,  the  per 
fect  season  for  military  operations,  were  gliding 
by  as  tranquilly  as  if  there  were  not  a  great  war 
on  hand,  and  still  the  citizen  at  home  read  each 
morning  in  his  newspaper  the  stereotyped  bulletin, 
"All  quiet  on  the  Potomac;"  the  phrase  passed 
into  a  byword  and  a  sneer.  By  this  time,  too, 


308  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

to  a  nation  which  had  not  European  standards  of 
excellence,  the  army  seemed  to  have  reached  a  high 
state  of  efficiency,  and  to  be  abundantly  able  to 
take  the  field.  Why  did  not  its  commander  move? 
Amid  all  the  drilling  and  band-playing  the  troops 
had  been  doing  hard  work ;  a  chain  of  strong  for 
tifications  scientifically  constructed  had  been  com 
pleted  around  the  capital  and  rendered  it  easy  of 
defense.  It  could  be  left  in  safety.  Why,  then, 
was  it  not  left?  Why  did  the  troops  still  linger? 
For  a  moment  this  monotony  was  interrupted 
by  the  ill-conducted  engagement  at  Ball's  Bluff. 
On  October  21  nearly  2000  troops  were  sent 
across  the  Potomac  by  the  local  commander,  with 
the  foolish  expectation  of  achieving  something 
brilliant.1  The  actual  result  was  that  they  were 
corralled  in  an  open  field ;  in  their  rear  the  precipi 
tous  bank  dropped  sharply  to  the  river,  upon  which 
floated  only  the  two  or  three  little  boats  which  had 
ferried  them  across  in  small  parties;  in  front  and 
flank  from  the  shelter  of  thick  woods  an  outnum 
bering  force  of  rebels  poured  a  steady  fire  upon 
them.  They  were  in  a  cruel  snare,  and  suffered 
terribly  in  killed  and  drowned,  wounded  and  cap 
tured.  The  affair  was,  and  the  country  at  once 
saw  that  it  was,  a  gross  blunder.  The  responsi 
bility  lay  upon  General  Stone  and  Colonel  Baker. 
Stone,  a  military  man  by  education,  deserved  cen- 

1  A  reconnoissance  or  "slight  demonstration"  ordered  for  the 
day  before  by  McClellan  had  been  completed,  and  is  not  to  be 
confounded  with  this  movement,  for  which  he  was  not  responsible. 


FIRST  ACT  OF   THE  MCCLELLAN  DRAMA.    309 

sure,  but  he  was  treated  in  a  manner  so  cruel,  so 
unjust  and  so  disproportionate  to  Ms  deserts  that 
his  error  has  been  condoned  in  sympathy  for  his 
wrongs.  The  injustice  was  chargeable  chiefly  to 
Stanton,  in  part  to  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  War.  Apparently  Mr.  Lincoln  desired  to 
know  as  little  as  possible  about  a  wrong  which  he 
could  not  set  right  without  injury  to  the  public  in 
terests.  He  said  to  Stanton  concerning  the  arrest : 
"I  suppose  you  have  good  reasons  for  it,  and  hav 
ing  good  reasons  I  am  glad  I  knew  nothing  of  it 
until  it  was  done."  To  General  Stone  himself  he 
said  that,  if  he  should  tell  all  he  knew  about  it,  he 
should  not  tell  much.  Colonel  Baker,  Senator 
from  Oregon,  a  personal  friend  of  the  President, 
a  brilliant  orator,  and  a  man  beloved  and  admired 
by  all  who  knew  him,  was  a  favorable  specimen  of 
the  great  body  of  new  civilian  officers.  While 
brimming  over  with  gallantry  and  enthusiasm,  he 
was  entirely  ignorant  of  the  military  art.  In  the 
conduct  of  this  enterprise  a  considerable  discretion 
had  been  reposed  in  him,  and  he  had,  as  was  alto 
gether  natural,  failed  in  everything  except  courage. 
But  as  he  paid  with  his  life  on  the  battle-field  the 
penalty  of  his  daring  and  his  inexperience,  he 
was  thought  of  only  with  tenderness  and  regret. 

This  skirmish  illustrated  the  scant  trust  which 
could  yet  be  reposed  in  the  skill  and  judgment  of 
subordinate  officers.  The  men  behaved  with  en 
couraging  spirit  and  constancy  under  severe  trial. 
But  could  a  commander  venture  upon  a  campaign 


310  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

with  brigadier-generals  and  colonels  so  unfit    to 
assume  responsibility? 

Nevertheless  impatience  hardly  received  a  mo 
mentary  check  from  this  lesson.  With  some  in 
consistency  people  placed  unlimited  confidence  in 
McClellan's  capacity  to  beat  the  enemy,  but  no 
confidence  at  all  in  his  judgment  as  to  the  feasi 
bility  of  a  forward  movement.  The  grumbling 
did  not,  however,  indicate  that  faith  in  him  waa 
shaken,  for  just  now  he  was  given  promotion  by 
Mr.  Lincoln,  and  it  met  with  general  approval. 
For  some  time  past  it  had  been  a  cause  of  discom 
fort  that  he  did  not  get  on  altogether  smoothly 
with  General  Scott;  the  elder  was  irascible  and 
jealous,  the  younger  certainly  not  submissive.  At 
last,  on  October  31,  the  old  veteran  regretfully 
but  quite  wisely  availed  himself  of  his  right  to 
be  placed  upon  the  retired  list,  and  immediately, 
November  1,  General  McClellan  succeeded  him 
in  the  distinguished  position  of  Commander-in- 
Chief  (under  the  President)  of  all  the  armies  of 
the  United  States.  On  the  same  day  Mr.  Lincoln 
courteously  hastened  out  to  headquarters  to  make 
in  person  congratulations  which  were  unquestion 
ably  as  sincere  as  they  were  generous.  Every  one 
felt  that  a  magnificent  opportunity  was  given  to  a 
favorite  general.  But  unfortunately  among  all  his 
admirers  there  was  not  one  who  believed  in  him 
quite  so  fully  as  he  believed  in  himself;  he  lost  all 
sense  of  perspective  and  proportion,  and  felt  upon 
a  pinnacle  from  which  he  could  look  down  even 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  M^'CLELLAN  DRAMA.    311 

on  a  president.1  Being  in  this  masterful  temper, 
he  haughtily  disregarded  the  growing  demand  for 
an  advance.  On  the  other  hand  the  politicians, 
always  eager  to  minister  to  the  gratification  of  the 
people,  began  to  be  importunate;  they  harried  the 
President,  and  went  out  to  camp  to  prick  their 
civilian  spurs  into  the  General  himself.  But  Mc- 
Clellan  had  a  soldierly  contempt  for  such  inter 
meddling  in  matters  military,  and  was  wholly  un- 
impressible.  When  Senator  Wade  said  that  an 
unsuccessful  battle  was  preferable  to  delay,  for 
that  a  defeat  would  easily  be  repaired  by  swarm 
ing  recruits,  the  General  tartly  replied  that  he 
preferred  a  few  recruits  before  a  victory  to  a  great 
many  after  a  defeat.  But  however  cleverly  and 
fairly  the  military  man  might  counter  upon  the 
politician,  there  was  no  doubt  that  discontent  was 
developing  dangerously.  The  people  had  consci 
entiously  intended  to  do  their  part  fully,  and  a 
large  proportion  of  them  now  sincerely  believed 
that  they  had  done  it.  They  knew  that  they  had 
been  lavish  of  men,  money,  and  supplies ;  and  they 
thought  that  they  had  been  not  less  liberal  of 
time;  wherefore  they  rebelled  against  the  contrary 
opinion  of  the  general,  whose  ideal  of  a  trust 
worthy  army  had  by  no  means  been  reached,  and 
who,  being  of  a  stubborn  temperament,  would  not 
stir  till  it  had  been. 

It  is  difficult  to  satisfy  one's  self  of  the  real  fit- 

1  For  example,  see  his  Own  Story,  82 ;  but,  unfortunately,  one 
may  refer  to  that  book  passim  for  evidence  of  the  statement. 


312  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

ness  of  the  army  to  move  at  or  about  this  time,  — 
that  is  to  say,  in  or  near  the  month  of  November, 
1861,  —  for  the  evidence  is  mixed  and  conflicting. 
The  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  as 
serted  that  "the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  well 
armed  and  equipped  and  had  reached  a  high  state 
of  discipline  by  the  last  of  September  or  first  of 
October;  "but  the  Committee  was  not  composed 
of  experts.  Less  florid  commendation  is  given  by 
the  Comte  de  Paris,  of  date  October  15.  Mc- 
Clellan  himself  said:  "It  certainly  was  not  till 
late  in  November  that  the  army  was  in  any  con 
dition  to  move,  nor  even  then  were  they  capable 
of  assaulting  intrenched  positions."  At  that  time 
winter  was  at  hand,  and  advance  was  said  to  be 
impracticable.  That  these  statements  were  as  fa 
vorable  as  possible  seems  probable ;  for  it  is  famil 
iar  knowledge  that  the  call  for  these  troops  did 
not  issue  until  July,  that  at  the  close  of  November 
the  recruits  were  still  continuing  "to  pour  in,  to 
be  assigned  and  equipped  and  instructed;"1  that 
many  came  unarmed  or  with  useless  weapons ;  and 
that  these  "civilians,  suddenly  called  to  arms  as 
soldiers  and  officers,  did  not  take  kindly  to  the 
subordination  and  restraints  of  the  camp."2  Now 
McClellan's  temperament  did  not  lead  him  to  run 
risks  in  the  effort  to  force  achievements  with 
means  of  dubious  adequacy.  His  purpose  was  to 
create  a  machine  perfect  in  every  part,  sure  and 
irresistible  in  operation,  and  then  to  set  it  in  mo- 

i  N-  aud  H.,  iv.  469.  2  Ibid.  v.  140. 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  M^'CLELLAN  DRAMA.    313 

tion  with  a  certainty  of  success.  He  wrote  to  Lin 
coln:  "I  have  ever  regarded  our  true  policy  as 
being  that  of  fully  preparing  ourselves,  and  then 
seeking  for  the  most  decisive  results."1  Under 
favoring  circumstances  this  plan  might  have  been 
the  best.  But  circumstances  were  not  favoring. 
Neither  he  nor  the  government  itself,  nor  indeed 
both  together,  could  afford  long  or  far  to  disre 
gard  popular  feeling.  Before  the  close  of  Novem 
ber  that  popular  feeling  was  such  that  the  people 
would  have  endured  without  flinching  the  discour 
agement  of  a  defeat,  but  would  not  endure  the 
severe  tax  of  inaction,  and  from  this  time  forth 
their  impatience  gathered  volume  until  it  became 
a  controlling  element  in  the  situation.  Them 
selves  intending  to  be  reasonable,  they  grew  more 
and  more  convinced  that  McClellan  was  unreason 
able.  General  and  people  confronted  each  other: 
the  North  would  fight,  at  the  risk  of  defeat;  Mc 
Clellan  would  not  fight,  because  he  was  not  sure  to 
win.  Any  one  who  comprehended  the  conditions, 
the  institutions  of  the  country,  the  character  of  the 
nation,  especially  its  temper  concerning  the  pres 
ent  conflict,  also  the  necessities  beneath  which 
that  conflict  must  be  waged,  if  it  was  to  be  waged 
at  all,  would  have  seen  that  the  people  must  be 
deferred  to.  The  question  was  not  whether  they 
were  right  or  wrong.  Assuming  them  to  be 
wrong,  it  would  still  be  a  mistake  to  withstand 
them  beyond  a  certain  point.  If  yielding  to  them 

1  Letter  to  Lincoln,  Feb.  3,  1862. 


314  ABKAHAM  LINCOLN. 

should  result  in  disastrous  consequences,  they  must 
be  called  upon  to  rally,  and  could  be  trusted  to  do 
so,  instructed  but  undismayed  by  their  experience. 
All  this  McClellan  utterly  failed  to  appreciate, 
thereby  leading  Mr.  Swinton  very  justly  to  remark 
that  he  was  lacking  in  "the  statesmanlike  qualities 
that  enter  into  the  composition  of  a  great  gen 
eral."1 

On  the  other  hand,  no  man  ever  lived  more 
capable  than  Mr.  Lincoln  of  precisely  appreciating 
the  present  facts,  or  more  sure  to  avoid  those  pecu 
liar  blunders  which  entrapped  the  military  com 
mander.  He  was  very  loyal  in  living  up  to  his 
pledge  to  give  the  general  full  support,  and  by  his 
conduct  during  many  months  to  come  he  proved 
his  readiness  to  abide  to  the  last  possible  point. 
He  knew,  however,  with  unerring  accuracy  just 
where  that  last  point  lay,  and  he  saw  with  dis 
quietude  that  it  was  being  approached  too  rapidly. 
He  was  getting  sufficient  knowledge  of  McClellan 's 
character  to  see  that  the  day  was  not  distant  when 
he  must  interfere.  Meantime  he  kept  his  sensi 
tive  finger  upon  the  popular  pulse,  as  an  expert 
physician  watches  a  patient  in  a  fever.  With  the 
growth  of  the  impatience  his  anxiety  grew,  for 
the  people's  war  would  not  be  successfully  fought 
by  a  dissatisfied  people.  Repeatedly  he  tested  the 

1  Army  of  Potomac,  97.  Swinton  says :  "  He  should  have  made 
the  lightest  possible  draft  on  the  indulgence  of  the  people."  Ibid., 
69.  General  Webb  says :  "He  drew  too  heavily  upon  the  faith  of 
the  public."  The  Peninsula,  12. 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  MCCLELLAN  DRAMA.     315 

situation  in  the  hope  that  a  movement  could  be 
forced  without  undue  imprudence;  but  he  was 
always  met  by  objections  from  McClellan.  In 
weighing  the  Northern  and  the  Southern  armies 
against  each  other,  the  general  perhaps  underval 
ued  his  own  resources  and  certainly  overvalued 
those  of  his  opponent.  He  believed  that  the  Con 
federate  "discipline  and  drill  were  far  better  than 
our  own;"  wherein  he  was  probably  in  error,  for 
General  Lee  admitted  that,  while  the  Southerners 
would  always  fight  well,  they  were  refractory  under 
discipline.  Moreover,  they  were  at  this  time  very 
ill  provided  with  equipment  and  transportation. 
Also  McClellan  said  that  the  Southern  army  had 
thrown  up  intrenchments  at  Manassas  and  Centre- 
ville,  and  therefore  the  "problem  was  to  attack 
victorious  and  finely  drilled  troops  in  intrench- 
ment."  But  the  most  discouraging  and  inexplic 
able  assertion,  which  he  emphatically  reiterated, 
concerned  the  relative  numerical  strength.  He 
not  only  declared  that  he  himself  could  not  put 
into  the  field  the  numbers  shown  by  the  official 
returns  to  be  with  him,  but  also  he  exaggerated 
the  Southern  numbers  till  he  became  extravagant 
to  the  point  of  absurdity.  So  it  had  been  from 
the  outset,  and  so  it  continued  to  be  to  the  time 
when  he  was  at  last  relieved  of  his  command. 
Thus,  on  August  15,  he  conceived  himself  to  be 
"in  a  terrible  place ;  the  enemy  have  three  or  four 
times  my  force."  September  9  he  imagined  John 
ston  to  have  130,000  men,  against  his  own  85,000; 


316  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

and  he  argued  that  Johnston  could  move  upon 
Baltimore  a  column  100,000  strong,  which  he 
could  meet  with  only  60,000  or  70,000.  Later 
in  October  he  marked  the  Confederates  up  to 
150,000.  He  estimated  his  own  requirement  at 
a  "total  effective  force"  of  208,000  men,  which 
implied  "an  aggregate,  present  and  absent,  of 
about  240,000  men."  Of  these  he  designed 
150,000  as  a  "column  of  active  operations;"  the 
rest  were  for  garrisons  and  guards.  He  said  that 
in  fact  he  had  a  gross  aggregate  of  168,318,  and 
the  "force  present  for  duty  was  147,695."  Since 
the  garrisons  and  the  guards  were  a  fixed  number, 
the  reduction  fell  wholly  upon  the  movable  col 
umn,  and  reduced  "the  number  disposable  for  an 
advance  to  76,285."  Thus  he  made  himself  out 
to  be  fatally  over-matched.  But  he  was  exces 
sively  in  error.  In  the  autumn  Johnston's  effec 
tive  force  was  only  41,000  men,  and  on  December 
1,  1861,  it  was  47,000.! 

Such  comparisons,  advanced  with  positiveness 
by  the  highest  authority,  puzzled  Mr.  Lincoln. 
They  seemed  very  strange,  yet  he  could  not  dis 
prove  them,  and  was  therefore  obliged  to  face  the 
perplexing  choice  which  was  mercilessly  set  before 
him:  "either  to  go  into  winter  quarters,  or  to  as 
sume  the  offensive  with  forces  greatly  inferior  in 

1  The  Southern  generals  had  a  similar  propensity  to  over-esti 
mate  the  opposing-  force;  e.  g.,  Johnston's  Narrative,  108,  where 
he  puts  the  Northern  force  at  140,000,  when  in  fact  it  was  58,000; 
and  on  p.  112  his  statement  is  even  worse. 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  M^CLELLAN  DRAMA.     317 

number"  to  what  was  "desirable  and  necessary." 
"If  political  considerations  render  the  first  course 
unadvisable,  the  second  alone  remains."  The 
general's  most  cheering  admission  was  that,  by 
stripping  all  other  armies  down  to  the  lowest 
numbers  absolutely  necessary  for  a  strict  defensive, 
and  by  concentrating  all  the  forces  of  the  nation 
and  all  the  attention  of  the  government  upon  "the 
vital  point "  in  Virginia,  it  might  yet  be  possible 
for  this  "main  army,  whose  destiny  it  [was]  to 
decide  the  controversy,  ...  to  move  with  a  rea 
sonable  prospect  of  success  before  the  winter  is 
fairly  upon  us."  A  direct  assertion  of  impossi 
bility,  provocative  of  denial  or  discussion,  would 
have  been  less  disheartening. 

In  passing,  it  may  be  remarked  that  McClel- 
lan's  prevision  that  the  ultimate  arbitrament  of 
the  struggle  must  occur  in  Virginia  was  correct. 
But  in  another  point  he  was  wrong,  and  unfortu 
nately  this  was  of  more  immediate  consequence, 
because  it  corroborated  him  in  his  purpose  to  delay 
till  he  could  make  success  a  certainty.  He  hoped 
that  when  he  moved,  he  should  be  able  to  win  one 
or  two  overwhelming  victories,  to  capture  Kich- 
mond,  and  to  crush  the  rebellion  in  a  few  weeks. 
It  was  a  brilliant  and  captivating  programme,1 
but  impracticable  and  undesirable.  Even  had  the 

1  The  Southerners  also  had  the  same  notion,  hoping  by  one 
great  victory  to  discourage  and  convince  the  North  and  make 
peace  on  the  basis  of  independence ;  e.  g.,  see  Johnston's  Narr., 
113,  115.  Grant  likewise  had  the  notion  of  a  decisive  battle. 
Memoirs^  i.  368. 


318  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Southerners  been  quelled  by  so  great  a  disaster, 
—  which  was  not  likely,  —  they  would  not  have 
been  thoroughly  conquered,  nor  would  slavery 
have  been  disposed  of,  and  both  these  events  were 
indispensable  to  a  definitive  peace  between  the  two 
sections.  Whether  the  President  shared  this  no 
tion  of  his  general  is  not  evident.  Apparently  he 
was  not  putting  his  mind  upon  theories  reaching 
into  the  future  so  much  as  he  was  devoting  his 
whole  thought  to  dealing  with  the  urgent  prob 
lems  of  the  present.  If  this  was  the  case,  he  was 
pursuing  the  wise  and  sound  course.  In  the  situ 
ation,  it  was  more  desirable  to  fight  a  great  battle 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment  than  to  await  a 
great  victory  many  months  hence. 

It  is  commonplace  wisdom  that  it  is  foolish  for 
a  civilian  to  undertake  the  direction  of  a  war. 
Yet  our  Constitution  ordains  that  "the  President 
shall  be  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy 
of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  militia  of  the  sev 
eral  States,  when  called  into  the  actual  service  of 
the  United  States."  It  is  not  supposable  that  the 
delegates  who  suggested  this  function,  or  the  peo 
ple  who  ordained  it,  anticipated  that  presidents 
generally  would  be  men  skilled  in  military  sci 
ence.  Therefore  Mr.  Lincoln  could  not  escape 
the  obligation  on  the  ground  of  uiifitness  for  the 
duty  which  was  imperatively  placed  upon  him.  It 
might  be  true  that  to  set  him  in  charge  of  military 
operations  was  like  ordering  a  merchant  to  paint 
a  picture  or  a  jockey  to  sail  a  ship,  but  it  was  also 


FIBST  ACT  OF  THE  M^CLELLAN  DRAMA.     319 

true  that  he  was  so  set  in  charge.  He  could  not 
shirk  it,  nor  did  he  try  to  shirk  it.  In  conse 
quence  hostile  critics  have  dealt  mercilessly  with 
his  actions,  and  the  history  of  this  winter  and 
spring  of  1861-62  is  a  painful  and  confusing  story 
of  bitter  controversy  and  crimination.  Further  it 
is  to  be  remembered  that,  apart  from  the  obliga 
tion  imposed  on  the  President  by  the  Constitution, 
it  was  true  that  if  civilians  could  not  make  rapid 
progress  in  the  military  art,  the  war  might  as  well 
be  abandoned.  They  were  already  supposed  to  be 
doing  so;  General  Banks,  a  politician,  and  Gen 
eral  Butler,  a  lawyer,  were  already  conducting 
important  movements.  Still  it  remains  undeniable 
that  finally  it  was  only  the  professional  soldiers 
who,  undergoing  successfully  the  severe  test  of 
time,  composed  the  illustrious  front  rank  of  strate 
gists  when  the  close  of  the  war  left  every  man  in 
his  established  place.  In  discussing  this  perplex 
ing  period,  extremists  upon  one  side  attribute  the 
miscarriages  and  failure  of  McClellan's  campaign 
to  ceaseless,  thwarting  interference  by  the  Presi 
dent,  the  Secretary  of  War  and  other  civil  offi 
cials.  Extremists  upon  the  other  side  allege  the 
marvel  that  a  sudden  development  of  unerring 
judgment  upon  every  question  involving  the  prac 
tical  application  of  military  science  took  place  on 
Mr.  Lincoln's  part.1  Perhaps  the  truth  lies  be 
tween  the  disputants,  but  it  is  not  likely  ever  to 

1  The  position  taken  by  Messrs.  Nicolay  and  Hay,  I  think,  fully 
warrants  this  language. 


320  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

be  definitely  agreed  upon  so  long  as  the  contro 
versy  excites  interest;  for  the  discussion  bristles 
with  ifs,  and  where  this  is  the  case  no  advocate 
can  be  irremediably  vanquished. 

It  seems  right,  at  this  place,  to  note  one  fact 
concerning  Mr.   Lincoln   which   ought  not  to  be 
overlooked  and  which  cannot  be  denied.     This  is 
his  entire  political  unselfishness,  the  rarest  moral 
quality  among  men  in  public  life.     In  those  days 
of   trouble    and  distrust   slanders  were  rife  in  a 
degree  which  can  hardly  be  appreciated  by  men 
whose  experience  has  been  only  with  quieter  times. 
Sometimes  purposes  and  sometimes  methods  were 
assailed;  and  those  prominent  in  civil  life,  and  a 
few  also  in  military  life,  were  believed  to  be  art 
fully  and  darkly  seeking  to  interlace  their  personal 
political  fortunes  in  the  web  of  public  affairs,  nat 
urally  subordinating  the  latter  fabric.   Alliances, 
enmities,   intrigues,   schemes,   and   every  form    of 
putting  the  interest  of  self  before  that  of  the  na 
tion,    were   insinuated   with  a   bitter  malevolence 
unknown  except  amid  such  abnormal  conditions. 
The  few  who  escaped  charges  of  this  kind  were  be 
lieved  to  cherish  their  own  peculiar  fanaticisms, 
desires,  and  purposes  concerning  the  object  and 
results  of  the  struggle,  which  they  were  resolved 
to  satisfy  at  almost  any  cost  and  by  almost  any 
means.       While    posterity    is    endeavoring    very 
wisely  to  discredit  and  to  forget  a  great  part  of 
these  painful  criminations,  it  is  cheering  to  find 
that  no  effort  has  to  be  made  to  forget  anything 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  M^CLELLAN  DRAMA.     321 

about  the  President.  In  his  case  injurious  gossip 
has  long  since  died  away  and  been  buried.  What 
ever  may  be  said  of  him  in  other  respects,  at  least 
the  purity  and  the  singleness  of  his  patriotism 
shine  brilliant  and  luminous  through  all  this  cloud- 
dust  of  derogation.  By  his  position  he  had  more 
at  stake,  both  in  his  lifetime  and  before  the  tri 
bunal  of  the  future,  than  any  other  person  in  the 
country.  But  there  was  only  one  idea  in  his 
mind,  and  that  was,  — not  that  he  should  save  the 
country,  but,  that  the  country  should  be  saved. 
Not  the  faintest  shadow  of  self  ever  fell  for  an  in 
stant  across  this  simple  purpose.  He  was  intent 
to  play  his  part  out  faithfully,  with  all  the  ability 
he  could  Jbring  to  it ;  but  any  one  else,  who  could, 
might  win  and  wear  the  title  of  savior.  He  chiefly 
cared  that  the  saving  should  be  done.  Never 
once  did  he  manipulate  any  covert  magnet  to  draw 
toward  himself  the  credit  or  the  glory  of  a  measure 
or  a  move.  To  his  own  future  he  seemed  to  give 
no  thought.  It  would  be  unjust  to  allow  the  dread 
of  appearing  to  utter  eulogy  rather  than  historic 
truth  to  betray  a  biographer  into  overlooking  this 
genuine  magnanimity. 

It  was  in  December,  1861,  that  Congress  created 
the  famous  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
to  some  of  whose  doings  it  has  already  been  neces 
sary  to  allude.  The  gentlemen  who  were  placed 
upon  it  were  selected  partly  of  course  for  political 
reasons,  and  were  all  men  who  had  made  them- 


322  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

selves  conspicuous  for  their  enthusiasm  and  vehe 
mence;  not  one  of  them  had  any  military  know 
ledge.  The  Committee  magnified  its  office  almost 
beyond  limit,  —  investigated  everything;  haled 
whom  it  chose  to  testify  before  it;  made  reports, 
expressed  opinions,  insisted  upon  policies  and 
measures  in  matters  military;  and  all  with  a 
dictatorial  assumption  and  self-confidence  which 
could  not  be  devoid  of  effect,  although  every  one 
knew  that  each  individual  member  was  absolutely 
without  fitness  for  this  business.  So  the  Commit 
tee  made  itself  a  great  power,  and  therefore  also 
a  great  complication,  in  the  war -machinery ;  and 
though  it  was  sometimes  useful,  yet,  upon  a  final 
balancing  of  its  long  account,  it  failed  to  justify 
its  existence,  as,  indeed,  was  to  have  been  expected 
from  the  outset.1  In  the  present  discussions  con 
cerning  an  advance  of  the  army,  its  members  stren 
uously  insisted  upon  immediate  action,  and  their 
official  influence  brought  much  strength  to  that 
side. 

The  first  act  indicating  an  intention  011  the 
part  of  the  President  to  interfere  occurred  almost 
simultaneously  with  the  beginning  of  the  general's 
illness.  About  December  21,  1861,  he  handed  to 
McClellan  a  brief  memorandum:  "If  it  were  de 
termined  to  make  a  forward  movement  of  the  army 
of  the  Potomac,  without  awaiting  further  increase 

1  General  Palfrey  says  of  this  committee  that  "  the  worst  spirit 
of  the  Inquisition  characterized  their  doings."  The  Antietam  and 
•Fredericksburg  (Campaigns  of  Civil  War  Series),  182. 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  M^CLELLAN  DRAMA.    323 

of  numbers  or  better  drill  and  discipline,  how  long- 
would  it  require  to  actually  get  in  motion  ?  After 
leaving  all  that  would  be  necessary,  how  many 
troops  could  join  the  movement  from  southwest  of 
the  river?  How  many  from  northeast  of  it?" 
Then  he  proceeded  briefly  to  hint  rather  than  dis 
tinctly  to  suggest  that  plan  of  a  direct  advance  by 
way  of  Centreville  and  Manassas,  which  later  on 
he  persistently  advocated.  Ten  days  elapsed  be 
fore  McClellan  returned  answers,  which  then  came 
in  a  shape  too  curt  to  be  respectful.  Almost  im 
mediately  afterward  the  general  fell  ill,  an  occur 
rence  which  seemed  to  his  detractors  a  most  aggra 
vating  and  unjustifiable  intervention  of  Nature 
herself  in  behalf  of  his  policy  of  delay. 

On  January  10  a  dispatch  from  General  Halleck 
represented  in  his  department  also  a  condition  of 
check  and  helplessness.  Lincoln  noted  upon  it: 
"Exceedingly  discouraging.  As  everywhere  else, 
nothing  can  be  done."  Yet  something  must  be 
done,  for  the  game  was  not  to  be  abandoned.  Un 
der  this  pressure,  on  this  same  day,  he  visited  Mc 
Clellan,  but  could  not  see  him ;  nor  could  he  get 
any  definite  idea  how  long  might  be  the  duration 
of  the  typhoid  fever,  the  lingering  and  uncertain 
disease  which  had  laid  the  general  low.  Accord 
ingly  he  summoned  General  McDowell  and  Gen 
eral  Franklin  to  discuss  with  him  that  evening  the 
military  situation.  The  Secretaries  of  State  and 
of  the  Treasury,  and  the  Assistant 
War  also  came.  The  President,  says 


324  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

"was  greatly  disturbed  at  the  state  of  affairs," 
"'was  in  great  distress,"  and  said  that,  "if  some 
thing  was  not  done  soon,  the  bottom  would  be  out 
of  the  whole  affair;  and  if  General  McClellan  did 
not  want  to  use  the  army,  he  would  like  to  '  bowow 
it) '  provided  he  could  see  how  it  could  be  made  to 
do  something."  The  two  generals  were  directed 
to  inform  themselves  concerning  the  "actual  con 
dition  of  the  army,"  and  to  come  again  the  next 
day.  Conferences  followed  on  January  11  and  12, 
Postmaster-General  Blair  and  General  Meigs  be 
ing  added  to  the  council.  The  Postmaster-General 
condemned  a  direct  advance  as  "strategically  de 
fective,"  while  Chase  descanted  on  the  "moral 
power  "  of  a  victory.  The  picture  of  the  two  civ 
ilians  injecting  their  military  suggestions  is  not 
reassuring.  Meigs  is  somewhat  vaguely  reported 
to  have  favored  a  "battle  in  front." 

McDowell  and  Franklin  had  not  felt  justified  in 
communicating  these  occurrences  to  McClellan, 
because  the  President  had  marked  his  order  to 
them  "private  and  confidential."  But  the  com 
mander  heard  rumors  of  what  was  going  forward,1 
and  on  January  12  he  came  from  his  sick-room 
to  see  the  President;  he  was  "looking  quite  well," 
and  apparently  was  "able  to  assume  the  charge  of 
the  army."  The  apparition  put  a  different  com 
plexion  upon  the  pending  discussions.  On  the 
13th  the  same  gentlemen  met,  but  now  with  the 
addition  of  General  McClellan.  The  situation 

1  Through  Stauton ;  McClellan,  Own  Story,  156. 


FIRST  ACT   OF  THE  MCCLELLAN  DRAMA.    o25 

was  embarrassing.  McClellan  took  scant  pains  to 
conceal  his  resentment.  McDowell,  at  the  request 
of  the  President,  explained  what  he  thought  could 
be  done,  closing  "by  saying  something  apolo 
getic;"  to  which  McClellan  replied,  "somewhat 
coldly  if  not  curtly:  'You  are  entitled  to  have 
any  opinion  you  please. ' '  Secretary  Chase,  a 
leader  among  the  anti-McClellanites,  bluntly  asked 
the  general  to  explain  his  military  plans  in  detail; 
but  McClellan  declined  to  be  interrogated  except 
by  the  President,  or  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  who 
was  not  present.  Finally,  according  to  McClel 
lan 's  account,  which  differs  a  little  but  not  essen 
tially  from  that  of  McDowell,  Mr.  Lincoln  sug 
gested  :  that  he  should  tell  what  his  plans  were. 
McClellan  replied,  in  substance,  that  this  would 
be  imprudent  and  seemed  unnecessary,  and  that  he 
would  only  give  information  if  the  President  would 
order  him  in  writing  to  do  so,  and  would  assume 
the  responsibility  for  the  results.2  McDowell  adds 
(but  McClellan  does  not),  that  the  President  then 
asked  McClellan  "if  he  had  counted  upon  any  par 
ticular  time;  he  did  not  ask  what  that  time  was, 
but  had  he  in  his  own  mind  any  particular  time 
fixed,  when  a  movement  could  be  commenced.  He 
replied,  he  had.  'Then,'  rejoined  the  President, 
'I  will  adjourn  this  meeting.''  This  unfortu- 

1  Only  a  few  days  before  this  time  Lincoln  had  said  that  he 
had   no   "right"   to   insist   upon   knowing   the  general's   plans. 
Julian,  Polit.  Recoil,  201. 

2  It  appears  that  he  feared  that  what  he  said  would  leak  out, 
and  ultimately  reach  the  enemy. 


326  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

nate  episode  aggravated  the  discord,  and  removed 
confidence  and  cooperation  farther  away  than  ever 
before. 

The  absence  of  the  Secretary  of  War  from  these 
meetings  was  due  to  the  fact  that  a  change  in  the 
War  Department  was  in  process  contemporane 
ously  with  them.  The  President  had  been  allowed 
to  understand  that  Mr.  Cameron  did  not  find  his 
duties  agreeable,  and  might  prefer  a  diplomatic 
post.  Accordingly,  with  no  show  of  reluctance, 
Mr.  Lincoln,  on  January  11,  1862,  offered  to  Mr. 
Cameron  the  post  of  Minister  to  Russia.  It  was 
promptly  accepted,  and  on  January  13  Edwin  M. 
Stanton  was  nominated  and  confirmed  to  fill  the 
vacancy.1  The  selection  was  a  striking  instance 
of  the  utter  absence  of  vindictiveness  which  so  dis 
tinguished  Mr.  Lincoln,  who,  in  fact,  was  simply 
insensible  to  personal  feeling  as  an  influence.  In 
choosing  incumbents  for  public  trusts,  he  knew  no 
foe,  perhaps  no  friend;  but  as  dispassionately  as 
if  he  were  manoeuvring  pieces  on  a  chessboard,  he 
considered  only  which  available  piece  would  serve 
best  in  the  square  which  he  had  to  fill.  In  1859 
he  and  Stanton  had  met  as  associate  counsel  in 
perhaps  the  most  important  law-suit  in  which  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  ever  been  concerned,  and  Stanton 
had  treated  Lincoln  with  his  habitual  insolence.2 

1  For  an  interesting1  account  of  these  incidents,  from  Secretary 
Chase's  Diary,  see  Warden,  401. 

'2  Lamon,  332 ;  Herndon,  353-50 ;  N.  and  H.  try  to  mitigate  this 
story,  v.  133. 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  M^CLELLAN  DRAMA.    327 

Later,  in  the  trying  months  which  closed  the  year 
1861,  Stanton  had  abused  the  administration  with 
violence,  and  had  carried  his  revilings  of  the  Pres 
ident  even  to  the  point  of  coarse  personal  insults.1 
No  man,  not  being  a  rebel,  had  less  right  to  expect 
an  invitation  to  become  an  adviser  of  the  Presi 
dent;  and  most  men,  who  had  felt  or  expressed 
the  opinions  held  by  Mr.  Stanton,  would  have  had 
scruples  or  delicacy  about  coining  into  the  close 
relationship  of  confidential  adviser  with  the  object 
of  their  contempt;  but  neither  scruples  nor  deli 
cacy  delayed  him;  his  acceptance  was  prompt.2 

So  Mr.  Lincoln  had  chosen  his  Secretary  solely 
upon  the  belief  of  the  peculiar  fitness  of  the  indi 
vidual  for  the  special  duties  of  the  war  office. 
Upon  the  whole  the  choice  was  wisely  made,  and 
was  evidence  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  insight  into  the 
aptitudes  and  the  uses  of  men.  Stanton 's  abilities 
commanded  some  respect,  though  his  character 
never  excited  either  respect  or  liking;  just  now, 
however,  all  his  good  qualities  and  many  of  his 
faults  seemed  precisely  adapted  to  the  present  re 
quirements  of  his  Department.  He  had  been  a 
Democrat,  but  was  now  zealous  to  extremity  in  pa 
triotism  ;  in  his  dealings  with  men  he  was  capable 
of  much  duplicity,  yet  in  matters  of  business  he 
was  rigidly  honest,  and  it  was  his  pleasure  to  pro 
tect  the  Treasury  against  the  contractors ;  he  loved 

1  He  did  not  always  feel  his  tongue  tied  afterward  by  the  obli 
gations  of  office ;  e.  g. ,  see  Julian,  Polit.  Recoil.,  210. 

2  For  a  singular  tale,  see  McClellan,  Own  Story,  153. 


328  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

work,  and  never  wearied  amid  the  driest  and  most 
exacting  toil;  lie  was  prompt  and  decisive  rather 
than  judicial  or  correct  in  his  judgments  concern 
ing  men  and  things ;  he  was  arbitrary,  harsh,  bad- 
tempered,  and  impulsive ;  he  often  committed  acts 
of  injustice  or  cruelty,  for  which  he  rarely  made 
amends  and  still  more  rarely  seemed  disturbed  by 
remorse  or  regret.  These  traits  bore  hard  upon 
individuals;  but  ready  and  unscrupulous  severity 
was  supposed  to  have  its  usefulness  in  a  civil  war. 
Many  a  time  he  taxed  the  forbearance  of  the  Presi 
dent  to  a  degree  that  would  have  seemed  to  trans 
cend  the  uttermost  limit  of  human  patience,  if  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  not  taken  these  occasions  to  show  to 
the  world  how  forbearing  and  patient  it  is  possible 
for  man  to  be.  But  those  who  knew  the  relations 
of  the  two  men  are  agreed  that  Stanton,  however 
brow-beating  he  was  to  others,  recognized  a  mas 
ter  in  the  President,  and  though  often  grumbling 
and  insolent,  always  submitted  if  a  crisis  came. 
Undoubtedly  Mr.  Lincoln  was  the  only  ruler 
known  to  history  who  could  have  cooperated  for 
years  with  such  a  minister.  He  succeeded  in  do 
ing  so  because  he  believed  it  to  be  for  the  good  of 
the  cause,  to  which  he  could  easily  subordinate  all 
personal  considerations;  and  posterity,  agreeing 
with  him,  concedes  to  Stanton  credit  for  efficiency 
in  the  conduct  of  his  department. 

It  is  worth  while  here  to  pause  long  enough  to 
read  part  of  a  letter  which,  on  this  same  crowded 
thirteenth  day  of  January,  1862,  the  President  sent 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  MCCLELLAN  DRAMA.     329 

to  General  Halleck,  in  the  West:  "For  my  own 
views :  I  have  not  offered,  and  do  not  now  offer, 
them  as  orders;  and  while  I  am  glad  to  have  them 
respectfully  considered,  I  would  blame  you  to  fol 
low  them  contrary  to  your  own  clear  judgment, 
unless  I  should  put  them  in  the  form  of  orders. 
.  .  .  With  this  preliminary,  I  state  my  general 
idea  of  this  war  to  be  that  we  have  the  greater 
numbers  and  the  enemy  has  the  greater  facility 
of  concentrating  forces  upon  points  of  collision ; 
that  we  must  fail  unless  we  can  find  some  way  of 
making  our  advantage  an  overmatch  for  his ;  and 
that  this  can  only  be  done  by  menacing  him  with 
superior  forces  at  different  points  at  the  same 
time,  so  that  we  can  safely  attack  one  or  both 
if  he  makes  no  change;  and  if  he  weakens  one 
to  strengthen  the  other,  forbear  to  attack  the 
strengthened  one,  but  seize  and  hold  the  weakened 
one,  gaining  so  much." 

In  a  personal  point  of  view  this  short  letter  is 
pregnant  with  interest  and  suggestion.  The  writ 
er's  sad  face,  eloquent  of  the  charge  and  burden 
of  one  of  the  most  awful  destinies  of  human-kind, 
rises  before  us  as  we  read  the  expression  of  his 
modest  self-distrust  amid  the  strange  duties  of 
military  affairs.  But  closely  following  this  comes 
the  intimation  that  in  due  time  "orders"  will 
come.  Such  was  the  quiet,  unflinching  way  in 
which  Lincoln  always  faced  every  test,  apparently 
with  a  tranquil  and  assured  faith  that,  whatever 
might  seem  his  lack  of  fitting  preparation,  his  best 


330  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

would  be  adequate  to  the  occasion.  The  habit  has 
led  many  to  fancy  that  he  believed  himself  di 
vinely  chosen,  and  therefore  sure  of  infallible  guid 
ance;  but  it  is  observable  far  back,  almost  from 
the  beginning  of  his  life ;  it  was  a  trait  of  mind 
and  character,  nothing  else.  The  letter  closes 
with  a  broad  general  theory  concerning  the  war, 
wrought  out  by  that  careful  process  of  thinking 
whereby  he  was  wont  to  make  his  way  to  the  big, 
simple  and  fundamental  truth.  The  whole  is  worth 
holding  in  memory  through  the  narrative  of  the 
coming  weeks. 

The  conference  of  January  13  developed  a  seri 
ous  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  plan  of  cam 
paign,  whenever  a  campaign  should  be  entered 
upon.  The  President's  notion,  already  shadowed 
forth  in  his  memorandum  of  December,  was,  to 
move  directly  upon  the  rebel  army  at  Centreville 
and  Manassas  and  to  press  it  back  upon  Rich 
mond,  with  the  purpose  of  capturing  that  city. 
But  McClellan  presented  as  his  project  a  move 
ment  by  Urbana  and  West  Point,  using  the  York 
River  as  a  base  of  supplies.  General  McDowell 
and  Secretary  Chase  favored  the  President's  plan; 
General  Franklin  and  Postmaster  Blair  thought 
better  of  McClellan 's.  The  President  had  a 
strong  fancy  for  his  own  scheme,  because  by  it  the 
Union  army  was  kept  between  the  enemy  and 
Washington;  and  therefore  the  supreme  point  of 
importance,  the  safety  of  the  national  capital,  was 
ensured.  The  discussion,  which  was  thus  opened 


FIRST  ACT   OF  THE  MCCLELLAN  DRAMA.     331 

and  which  remained  long  unsettled,  had,  among 
other  ill  effects,  that  of  sustaining  the  vexatious 
delay.  While  the  anti  -  McClellan  faction  —  for 
the  matter  was  becoming  one  of  factions l  —  grew 
louder  in  denunciation  of  his  inaction  and  fastened 
upon  him  the  contemptuous  nickname  of  "the 
Virginia  creeper,"  the  friends  of  the  general  re 
torted  that  the  President,  meddling  in  what  he 
did  not  understand,  would  not  let  the  military  com 
mander  manage  the  war. 

Nevertheless  Mr.  Lincoln,  dispassionate  and 
fair-minded  as  usual,  allowed  neither  their  per 
sonal  difference  of  opinion  nor  this  abusive  outcry 
to  inveigle  into  his  mind  any  prejudice  against 
McClellan.  The  Southerner  who,  in  February, 
1861,  predicted  that  Lincoln  "would  do  his  own 
thinking,"  read  character  well.  Lincoln  was  now 
doing  precisely  this  thing,  in  his  silent,  thorough, 
independent  way,  neither  provoked  by  McClellan 's 

1  In  fact,  the  feeling-  against  McClellan  was  getting  so  strong 
that  some  of  his  enemies  were  wild  enough  about  this  time  to 
accuse  him  of  disloyalty.  He  himself  narrates  a  dramatic  tale, 
which  would  seem  incredible  if  his  veracity  were  not  beyond 
question,  of  an  interview,  occurring  March  8,  1862,  in  which  the 
President  told  him,  apparently  with  the  air  of  expecting  an  ex 
planation,  that  he  was  charged  with  laying  his  plans  with  the 
traitorous  intent  of  leaving  Washington  defenseless.  McClellan' s 
Own  Story,  195.  On  the  other  hand  McClellan  retaliated  by  be 
lieving  that  his  detractors  wished,  for  political  and  personal  mo 
tives,  to  prevent  the  war  from  being  brought  to  an  early  and 
successful  close,  and  that  they  intentionally  withheld  from  him 
the  means  of  success ;  also  that  Stanton  especially  sought  by  un 
derhand  means  to  sow  misunderstanding  between  him  and  the 
President.  Ibid.  195, 


332  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

cavalier  assumption  of  superior  knowledge,  nor 
alarmed  by  the  danger  of  offending  the  politicians. 
In  fact,  he  decided  to  go  counter  to  both  the  dis 
putants;  for  he  resolved,  on  the  one  hand,  to  com 
pel  McClellan  to  act;  on  the  other,  to  maintain 
him  in  his  command.  He  did  not,  however,  aban 
don  his  own  plan  of  campaign.  On  January  27, 
as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army,  he  issued  his 
"General  War  Order  No.  1."  In  this  he  di 
rected  "that  the  22d  day  of  February,  1862,  be 
the  day  for  a  general  movement  of  the  land  and 
naval  forces  of  the  United  States  against  the  in 
surgent  forces;"  and  said  that  heads  of  depart 
ments  and  military  and  naval  commanders  would 
"be  held  to  their  strict  and  full  reponsibilities  for 
prompt  execution  of  this  order."  By  this  he  prac 
tically  repudiated  McClellan 's  scheme,  because 
transportation  and  other  preparations  for  pursuing 
the  route  by  Urbana  could  not  be  made  ready  by 
the  date  named. 

Critics  of  the  President  have  pointed  to  this 
document  as  a  fine  instance  of  the  follies  to  be  ex 
pected  from  a  civil  ruler  who  conducts  a  war.  To 
order  an  advance  all  along  a  line  from  the  Missis 
sippi  to  the  Atlantic,  upon  a  day  certain,  without 
regard  to  differing  local  conditions  and  exigencies, 
and  to  notify  the  enemy  of  the  purpose  nearly  a 
month  beforehand,  were  acts  preposterous  accord 
ing  to  military  science.  But  the  criticism  was  not 
so  fair  as  it  was  obvious.  The  order  really  bore 
in  part  the  character  of  a  manifesto ;  to  the  people 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  MCCLELLAN  DRAMA.     333 

of  the  North,  whose  confidence  must  be  kept  and 
their  spirit  sustained,  it  said  that  the  administra 
tion  meant  action  at  once;  to  commanding  officers 
it  was  a  fillip,  warning  them  to  bestir  themselves, 
obstacles  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.  It  was 
a  reveille.  Further,  in  a  general  way  it  undoubt 
edly  laid  out  a  sound  plan  of  campaign,  substan 
tially  in  accordance  with  that  which  McClellan 
also  was  evolving,  viz. :  to  press  the  enemy  all 
along  the  western  and  middle  line,  and  thus  to 
prevent  his  making  too  formidable  a  concentration 
in  Virginia.  In  the  end,  however,  practicable  or 
impracticable,  wise  or  foolish,  the  order  was  never 
fulfilled.  The  armies  in  Virginia  did  nothing  till 
many  weeks  after  the  anniversary  of  Washington's 
birthday;  whereas,  in  the  West,  Admiral  Foote 
and  General  Grant  did  not  conceive  that  they  were 
enforced  to  rest  in  idleness  until  that  historic  date. 
Before  it  arrived  they  had  performed  the  brilliant 
exploits  of  capturing  Fort  Henry  and  Fort  Donel- 
son. 

On  January  31  the  President  issued  "Special 
War  Order  No.  1,"  directing  the  army  of  the 
Potomac  to  seize  and  occupy  "a  point  upon  the 
railroad  southwestward  of  what  is  known  as  Ma- 
nassas  Junction;  .  .  .  the  expedition  to  move  be 
fore  or  on  the  22d  day  of  February  next."  This 
was  the  distinct,  as  the  general  order  had  been 
the  indirect,  adoption  of  his  own  plan  of  cam 
paign,  and  the  over-ruling  of  that  of  the  general. 
McClellan  at  once  remonstrated,  and  the  two  rival 


334  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

plans  thus  came  face  to  face  for  immediate  and 
definitive  settlement.  It  must  be  assumed  that 
the  President's  order  had  been  really  designed 
only  to  force  exactly  this  issue ;  for  on  February 
3,  so  soon  as  he  received  the  remonstrance,  he  in 
vited  argument  from  the  general  by  writing  to 
him  a  letter  which  foreshadowed  an  open-minded 
reception  for  views  opposed  to  his  own :  — 

"If  you  will  give  satisfactory  answers  to  the 
following  questions,  I  shall  gladly  yield  my  plan 
to  yours :  — 

"1st.  Does  not  your  plan  involve  a  greatly 
larger  expenditure  of  time  and  money  than  mine  ? 

"2d.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  certain  by  your 
plan  than  mine? 

"3d.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  valuable  by 
your  plan  than  mine? 

"4th.  In  fact,  would  it  not  be  less  valuable  in 
this:  that  it  would  break  no  great  line  of  the 
enemy's  communications,  while  mine  would? 

"5th.  In  case  of  disaster  would  not  a  retreat  be 
more  difficult  by  your  plan  than  mine  ?  " 

To  these  queries  McClellan  replied  by  a  long 
and  elaborate  exposition  of  his  views.  He  said 
that,  if  the  President's  plan  should  be  pursued 
successfully,  the  "results  would  be  confined  to  the 
possession  of  the  field  of  battle,  the  evacuation  of 
the  line  of  the  upper  Potomac  by  the  enemy,  and 
the  moral  effect  of  the  victory."  On  the  other 
hand,  a  movement  in  force  by  the  route  which  he 
advocated  "obliges  the  enemy  to  abandon  his  in- 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  M^CLELLAN  DRAMA.    335 

trenched  position  at  Manassas,  in  order  to  hasten 
to  cover  Richmond  and  Norfolk."  That  is  to 
say,  he  expected  to  achieve  by  a  mano3uvre  what 
the  President  designed  to  effect  by  a  battle,  to 
be  fought  by  inexperienced  troops  against  an 
intrenched  enemy.  He  continued:  "This  move 
ment,  if  successful,  gives  us  the  capital,  the  com 
munications,  the  supplies,  of  the  rebels;  Norfolk 
would  fall ;  all  the  waters  of  the  Chesapeake  would 
be  ours ;  all  Virginia  would  be  in  our  power,  and 
the  enemy  forced  to  abandon  Tennessee  and  North 
Carolina.  The  alternative  presented  to  the  enemy 
would  be,  to  beat  us  in  a  position  selected  by 
ourselves,  disperse,  or  pass  beneath  the  Caudine 
forks."  In  case  of  defeat,  the  Union  army  would 
have  a  "perfectly  secure  retreat  down  the  Penin 
sula  upon  Fort  Monroe."  "This  letter,"  he  af 
terward  wrote,  "must  have  produced  some  effect 
upon  the  mind  of  the  President !  "  The  slur  was 
unjust.  The  President  now  and  always  considered 
the  views  of  the  general  with  a  liberality  of  mind 
rarely  to  be  met  with  in  any  man,  and  certainly 
never  in  McClellan  himself.  In  this  instance  the 
letter  did  in  fact  produce  so  much  "effect  upon 
the  mind  of  the  President "  that  he  prepared  to 
yield  views  which  he  held  very  strongly  to  views 
which  he  was  charged  with  not  being  able  to  un 
derstand  and  which  he  certainly  could  not  bring 
himself  actually  to  believe  in. 

Yet  before  quite  taking  this  step  he  demanded 
that  a  council  of  the  generals  of  division  should  be 


336  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

summoned  to  express  their  opinions.  This  was 
done,  with  the  result  that  McDowell,  Sunnier, 
Heintzelman  and  Barnard  voted  against  McClel- 
lan's  plan;  Keyes  voted  for  it,  with  the  proviso 
"that  no  change  should  be  made  until  the  rebels 
were  driven  from  their  batteries  on  the  Potomac." 
Fitz-John  Porter,  Franklin,  W.  F.  Smith,  Mc- 
Call,  Blanker,  Andrew  Porter,  and  Naglee  (of 
Hooker's  division)  voted  for  it.  Stanton  after 
ward  said  of  this:  "We  saw  ten  generals  afraid 
to  fight."  The  insult,  delivered  in  the  snug  per 
sonal  safety  which  was  suspected  to  be  very  dear 
to  Stanton,  was  ridiculous  as  aimed  at  men  who 
soon  handled  some  of  the  most  desperate  battles  of 
the  war;  but  it  is  interesting  as  an  expression  of 
the  unreasoning  bitterness  of  the  controversy  then 
waging  over  the  situation  in  Virginia,  a  contro 
versy  causing  animosities  vastly  more  fierce  than 
any  between  Union  soldiers  and  Confederates, 
animosities  which  have  unfortunately  lasted  longer, 
and  which  can  never  be  brought  to  the  like  final 
and  conclusive  arbitrament.  The  purely  military 
question  quickly  became  snarled  up  with  politics 
and  was  reduced  to  very  inferior  proportions  in 
the  noxious  competition.  "Politics  entered  and 
strategy  retired,"  says  General  Webb,  too  truly. 
McClellan  himself  conceived  that  the  politicians 
were  leagued  to  destroy  him  and  would  rather  see 
him  discredited  than  the  rebels  whipped.  In  later 
days  the  strong  partisan  loves  and  hatreds  of  our 
historical  writers  have  perpetuated  and  increased 
all  this  bad  blood,  confusion,  and  obscurity. 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  MCCLELLAN  DRAMA.     337 

The  action  of  the  council  of  generals  was  con 
clusive.  The  President  accepted  McClellan's 
plan.  Therein  he  did  right;  for  undeniably  it 
was  his  duty  to  allow  his  own  inexperience  to  be 
controlled  by  the  deliberate  opinion  of  the  best 
military  experts  in  the  country;  and  this  fact  is 
wholly  independent  of  any  opinion  concerning  the 
intrinsic  or  the  comparative  merits  of  the  plans 
themselves.  Indeed  Mr.  Lincoln  had  never  ex 
pressed  positive  disapproval  of  McClellan's  plan 
per  se,  but  only  had  been  alarmed  at  what  seemed 
to  him  its  indirect  result  in  exposing  the  capital. 
To  cover  this  point,  he  now  made  an  imperative 
preliminary  condition  that  this  safety  should  be 
placed  beyond  a  question.  He  was  emphatic  and 
distinct  in  reiterating  this  proviso,  as  fundamental. 
The  preponderance  of  professional  testimony,  from 
that  day  to  this,  has  been  to  the  effect  that  Mc 
Clellan's  strategy  was  sound  and  able,  and  that 
Mr.  Lincoln's  anxiety  for  the  capital  was  ground 
less.  But  in  spite  of  all  argument,  and  though 
military  men  may  shed  ink  as  if  it  were  mere 
blood,  in  spite  even  of  the  contempt  and  almost 
ridicule  which  the  President  incurred  at  the  pen 
of  McClellan,1  the  civilian  will  retain  a  lurking 
sympathy  with  the  President's  preference.  It  is 
impossible  not  to  reflect  that  precisely  in  propor- 

1  McClellan  afterward  wrote  that  the  administration  "had 
neither  courage  nor  military  insight  to  understand  the  effect  of 
the  plan  I  desired  to  carry  out."  Own  Story,  194.  This  is  per 
haps  a  mild  example  of  many  remarks  to  the  same  purport  which 
fell  from  the  general  at  one  time  and  another. 


338  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

tion  as  the  safety  of  the  capital,  for  many  weight} 
reasons,  immeasurably  outweighed  any  other  pos 
sible  consideration  in  the  minds  of  the  Northern 
ers,  so  the  desire  to  capture  it  would  be  equally 
overmastering  in  the  estimation  of  the  Southern 
ers.  Why  might  not  the  rebels  permit  McClellan 
to  march  into  Richmond,  provided  that  at  the 
same  time  they  were  marching  into  Washington? 
Why  might  they  not,  in  the  language  afterward 
used  by  General  Lee,  "swap  Queens"?  They 
would  have  a  thousand-fold  the  better  of  the  ex 
change.  The  Northern  Queen  was  an  incalcula 
bly  more  valuable  piece  on  the  board  than  was 
her  Southern  rival.  With  the  Northern  govern 
ment  in  flight,  Maryland  would  go  to  the  Confed 
eracy,  and  European  recognition  would  be  sure 
and  immediate ;  and  these  two  facts  might,  almost 
surely  would,  be  conclusive  against  the  Northern 
cause.  Moreover,  memory  will  obstinately  bring 
up  the  fact  that  long  afterward,  when  General 
Grant  was  pursuing  a  route  to  Richmond  strategi 
cally  not  dissimilar  to  that  proposed  by  McClel- 
lan,  and  when  all  the  circumstances  made  the  dan 
ger  of  a  successful  attack  upon  Washington  much 
less  than  it  was  in  the  spring  of  1862,  the  rebels 
actually  all  but  captured  the  city;  and  it  was 
saved  not  alone  by  a  rapidity  of  movement  which 
would  have  been  impossible  in  the  early  stages  of 
the  war,  but  also  by  what  must  be  called  the  aid 
of  good  luck.  It  is  difficult  to  see  why  General 
Jackson  in  1862  might  not  have  played  in  fatal 


FIRST  ACT   OF  THE  MCCLELLAN  DRAMA.     339 

earnest  a  game  which  in  1864  General  Early 
played  merely  for  the  chances.  Pondering  upon 
these  things  it  is  probable  that  no  array  of  military 
scientists  will  ever  persuade  the  non-military  world 
that  Mr.  Lincoln  was  so  timid  or  so  dull-witted 
or  so  unreasonable  as  General  McClellan  declared 
him  to  be. 

Another  consideration  is  suggested  by  some  re 
marks  of  Mr.  Swinton.  It  is  tolerably  obvious 
that,  whether  McClellan 's  plan  was  or  was  not 
the  better,  the  President's  plan  was  entirely  possi 
ble;  all  that  could  be  said  against  it  was,  that 
it  promised  somewhat  poorer  results  at  somewhat 
higher  cost.  This  being  the  case,  and  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  the  President's  disquietude  concern 
ing  Washington  was  so  profound  and  his  distrust 
of  McClellan 's  plan  so  ineradicable,  it  would  have 
been  much  better  to  have  had  the  yielding  come 
from  the  general  than  from  the  President.  A  man 
of  less  stubborn  temper  and  of  broader  intellect 
than  belonged  to  McClellan  would  have  appre 
ciated  this.  In  fact,  it  was  in  a  certain  sense 
even  poor  generalship  to  enter  upon  a  campaign 
of  such  magnitude,  when  a  thorough  and  hearty 
cooperation  was  really  not  to  be  expected.  For 
after  all  might  be  ostensibly  settled  and  agreed 
upon,  and  however  honest  might  be  Mr.  Lincoln's 
intentions  to  support  the  commanding  general, 
one  thing  still  remained  certain:  that  the  safety 
of  the  capital  was  Mr.  Lincoln's  weightiest  re 
sponsibility,  that  it  was  a  matter  concernin 


340  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

he  was  sensitively  anxious,  and  that  he  was  per 
fectly  sure  in  any  moment  of  alarm  concerning 
that  safety  to  ensure  it  by  any  means  in  his  power 
and  at  any  sacrifice  whatsoever.  In  a  word,  that 
which  soon  did  happen  was  precisely  that  which 
ought  to  have  been  foreseen  as  likely  to  happen. 
For  it  was  entirely  obvious  that  Mr.  Lincoln  did 
not  abandon  his  own  scheme  because  his  own  rea 
son  was  convinced  of  the  excellence  of  McClel- 
lan's;  in  fact  he  never  was  and  never  pretended 
to  be  thus  convinced.  To  his  mind  McClellan's 
reasoning  never  overcame  his  own  reasoning;  he 
only  gave  way  before  professional  authority;  and, 
while  he  sincerely  meant  to  give  McClellan  the 
most  efficient  aid  and  backing  in  his  power,  the 
anxiety  about  Washington  rested  immovable  in 
his  thought.  If  the  two  interests  should  ever,  in 
his  opinion,  come  into  competition,  no  one  could 
doubt  which  would  be  sacrificed.  To  push  for 
ward  the  Peninsula  Campaign  under  these  condi 
tions  was  a  terrible  mistake  of  judgment  on  Mc 
Clellan's  part.  Far  better  would  it  have  been  to 
have  taken  the  Manassas  route;  for  even  if  its  in 
herent  demerits  were  really  so  great  as  McClellan 
had  depicted,  they  would  have  been  more  than 
offset  by  preserving  the  undiminished  cooperation 
of  the  administration.  The  personal  elements  in 
the  problem  ought  to  have  been  conclusive. 

An  indication  of  the  error  of  forcing  the  Presi 
dent  into  a  course  not  commended  by  his  judg 
ment,  in  a  matter  where  his  responsibility  was  so 


FIltST  ACT  OF   THE  M^CLELLAN  DRAMA.     341 

grave,  was  seen  immediately.  On  March  8  he 
issued  General  War  Order  No.  3 :  That  no  change 
of  base  should  be  made  "without  leaving  in  and 
about  Washington  such  a  force  as,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  general-in-chief  and  the  commanders  of 
army  corps,  shall  leave  said  city  entirely  secure;" 
that  not  more  than  two  corps  (about  50,000  men) 
should  be  moved  en  route  for  a  new  base  until  the 
Potomac,  below  Washington,  should  be  freed  from 
the  Confederate  batteries ;  that  any  movement  of 
the  army  via  Chesapeake  Bay  should  begin  as 
early  as  March  18,  and  that  the  general-in-chief 
should  be  "responsible  that  it  moves  as  early  as 
that  day."  This  greatly  aggravated  McClellan's 
dissatisfaction;  for  it  expressed  the  survival  of 
the  President's  anxiety,  it  hampered  the  general, 
and  by  its  last  clause  it  placed  upon  him  a  respon 
sibility  not  properly  his  own. 

Yet  at  this  very  moment  weighty  evidence  came 
to  impeach  the  soundness  of  McClellan's  opinion 
concerning  the  military  situation.  On  February 
27  Secretary  Chase  wrote  that  the  time  had  come 
for  dealing  decisively  with  the  "army  in  front  of 
us,"  which  he  conceived  to  be  already  so  weakened 
that  "a  victory  over  it  is  deprived  of  half  its 
honor."  Not  many  days  after  this  writing,  the 
civilian  strategists,  the  President  and  his  friends, 
seemed  entitled  to  triumph.  For  on  March  7,  8, 
and  9,  the  North  was  astonished  by  news  of  the 
evacuation  of  Manassas  by  Johnston.  At  once  the 
cry  of  McClellan's  assailants  went  up:  If  McClel- 


342  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Ian  had  only  moved  upon  the  place  !  What  a 
cheap  victory  he  would  have  won,  and  attended 
with  what  invaluable  "moral  effects"  !  Yet,  for 
sooth,  he  had  been  afraid  to  move  upon  these 
very  intrenched  positions  which  it  now  appeared 
that  the  Confederates  dared  not  hold  even  when 
unthreatened !  But  McClellan  retorted  that  the 
rebels  had  taken  this  backward  step  precisely  be 
cause  they  had  got  some  hint  of  his  designs  for  ad 
vancing  by  Urban  a,  and  that  it  was  the  exact 
fulfilment,  though  inconveniently  premature,  of  his 
predictions.  This  explanation,  however,  wholly 
failed  to  prevent  the  civilian  mind  from  believing 
that  a  great  point  had  been  scored  on  behalf  of  the 
President's  plan.  Further  than  this,  there  were 
many  persons,  including  even  a  majority  of  the 
members  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  who  did  not  content  themselves  with  mere 
abuse  of  McClellan 's  military  intelligence,  but 
who  actually  charged  him  with  being  disaffected 
and  nearly,  if  not  quite,  a  traitor.  None  the  less 
Mr.  Lincoln  generously  and  patiently  adhered  to 
his  agreement  to  let  McClellan  have  his  own  way. 
Precisely  at  the  same  time  that  this  evacuation 
of  Manassas  gave  to  McClellan 's  enemies  an  argu 
ment  against  him  which  they  deemed  fair  and 
forcible  and  he  deemed  unfair  and  ignorant,  two 
other  occurrences  added  to  the  strain  of  the  situa 
tion.  McClellan  immediately  put  his  entire  force 
in  motion  towards  the  lines  abandoned  by  the  Con 
federates,  not  with  the  design  of  pressing  the  re- 


FIRST  ACT  OF  THE  MCCLELLAN  DRAMA.    343 

treating  foe,  which  the  "almost  impassable  roads" 
prevented,  but  to  strip  off  redundancies  and  to 
train  the  troops  in  marching.  On  March  11,  im 
mediately  after  he  had  started,  the  President 
issued  his  Special  War  Order  No.  3 :  "Major-Gen 
eral  McClellan  having  personally  taken  the  field 
at  the  head  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  ...  he 
is  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  other  military 
departments,  he  retaining  command  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Potomac."  McClellan  at  once  wrote 
that  he  should  continue  to  "work  just  as  cheerfully 
as  before;  "  but  he  felt  that  the  removal  was  very 
unhandsomely  made  just  as  he  was  entering  upon 
active  operations.  Lincoln  on  the  other  hand  un 
doubtedly  looked  upon  it  in  precisely  the  opposite 
light,  and  conceived  that  the  opportunity  of  the 
moment  deprived  of  any  apparent  sting  a  change 
which  he  had  determined  to  make.  The  duties 
which  were  thus  taken  from  McClellan  were  as 
sumed  during  several  months  by  Mr.  Stanton. 
He  was  utterly  incompetent  for  them,  and  whether 
or  not  it  was  wise  to  displace  the  general,  it  was 
certainly  very  unwise  to  let  the  Secretary  practi 
cally  succeed  him.1  The  way  in  which,  both  at 
the  East  and  West,  our  forces  were  distributed 
into  many  independent  commands  with  no  com 
petent  chief  who  could  compel  all  to  cooperate 
and  to  become  subsidiary  to  one  comprehensive 
scheme,  was  a  serious  mistake  in  general  policy, 
1  See  remarks  of  Mr.  Elaine,  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  i.  368. 


344  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

which  cost  very  dear  before  it  was  recognized.1 
McClellan  had  made  some  efforts  to  effect  this 
combination  or  unity  in  purpose,  but  Stanton  gave 
no  indication  even  of  understanding  that  it  was 
desirable. 

The  other  matter  was  the  division  of  the  army 
of  the  Potomac  into  four  army  corps,  to  be  com 
manded  respectively  by  the  four  senior  generals 
of  division,  viz.,  McDowell,  Simmer,  Heintzelman 
and  Keyes.  The  propriety  of  this  action  had 
been  for  some  time  under  consideration,  and  the 
step  was  now  forced  upon  Mr.  Lincoln  by  the 
strenuous  insistance  of  the  Committee  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  War.  That  so  large  an  army  required 
organization  by  corps  was  admitted;  but  McClel 
lan  had  desired  to  defer  the  arrangement  until  his 
generals  of  division  should  have  had  some  actual 
experience  in  the  field,  whereby  their  comparative 
fitness  for  higher  responsibilities  could  be  mea 
sured.  An  incapable  corps  commander  was  a 
much  more  dangerous  man  than  an  incapable  com 
mander  of  a  division  or  brigade.  The  com 
mander  naturally  felt  the  action,  now  taken  by  the 
President,  to  be  a  slight,  and  he  attributed  it  to 
pressure  by  the  band  of  civilian  advisers  whose  un 
tiring  hostility  he  returned  with  unutterable  con 
tempt.  Not  only  was  the  taking  of  the  step  at 
this  time  contrary  to  his  advice,  but  he  was  not 

1  E.  <?.,  McClellan,  Eep.  (per  Keyes),  82;  Grant,  Mem.,  I  322; 
and  indeed  all  writers  agree  upon  this. 


FIRST  ACT   OF   THE  MWLELLAN  DRAMA.     345 

even  consulted  in  the  selection  of  his  own  subordi 
nates,  who  were  set  in  these  important  positions 
by  the  blind  rule  of  seniority,  and  not  in  accord 
ance  with  his  opinion  of  comparative  merit.  His 
irritation  was  perhaps  not  entirely  unjustifiable. 


CHAPTER   XI. 

MILITARY   MATTERS    OUTSIDE   OF   VIRGINIA. 

THE  man  who  first  raised  the  cry  "  On  to  Rich- 
inond"  uttered  the  formula  of  the  war.  Rich 
mond  was  the  gage  of  victory.  Thus  it  happened, 
as  has  been  seen,  that  every  one  at  the  North, 
from  the  President  down,  had  his  attention  fast 
bound  to  the  melancholy  procession  of  delays  and 
miscarriages  in  Virginia.  At  the  West  there 
were  important  things  to  be  done;  the  States  of 
Kentucky,  Tennessee,  and  Missouri,  trembling  in 
the  balance,  were  to  be  lost  or  won  for  the  Union ; 
the  passage  down  the  Mississippi  to  the  Gulf  was 
at  stake,  and  with  it  the  prosperity  and  develop 
ment  of  the  boundless  regions  of  the  Northwest. 
Surely  these  were  interests  of  some  moment,  and 
worthy  of  liberal  expenditure  of  thought  and  en 
ergy,  men  and  money;  yet  the  swarm  of  politi 
cians  gave  them  only  side  glances,  being  unable  for 
many  minutes  in  any  day  to  withdraw  their  eyes 
from  the  Old  Dominion.  The  consequence  was 
that  at  the  East  matters  military  and  matters  polit 
ical,  generals  and  "public  men"  of  all  varieties 
were  mixed  in  a  snarl  of  back-biting  and  quarrel 
ling,  which  presented  a  spectacle  most  melancholy 


MILITARY  MATTERS  OUTSIDE  OF  VIRGINIA.     347 

and  discouraging.  On  the  other  hand  the  West 
throve  surprisingly  well  in  the  absence  of  politi 
cal  nourishment,  and  certain  local  commanders 
achieved  cheering  successes  without  any  aid  from 
the  military  civilians  of  Washington.  The  con 
trast  seems  suggestive,  yet  perhaps  it  is  incorrect 
to  attach  to  these  facts  any  sinister  significance,  or 
any  connection  of  cause  and  effect.  Other  reasons 
than  civilian  assistance  may  account  for  the  Vir 
ginia  failures,  while  Western  successes  may  have 
been  won  in  spite  of  neglect  rather  than  by  reason 
of  it.  Still,  simply  as  naked  facts,  these  things 
were  so. 

Upon  occurrences  outside  of  Virginia  Mr.  Lin 
coln  bestowed  more  thought  than  was  fashionable 
in  Washington,  and  maintained  an  oversight 
strongly  in  contrast  to  the  indifference  of  those 
who  seemed  to  recognize  no  other  duty  than  to 
discuss  the  demerits  of  General  McClellan.  The 
President  had  at  least  the  good  sense  to  see  the 
value  of  unity  of  plan  and  cooperation  along  the 
whole  line,  from  the  Atlantic  seaboard  to  the  ex 
treme  West.  Also  at  the  West  as  at  the  East  he 
was  bent  upon  advancing,  pressing  the  enemy, 
and  doing  something  positive.  He  had  not  occa 
sion  to  use  the  spur  at  the  West  either  so  often  or 
so  severely  as  at  the  East ;  yet  Halleck  and  Buell 
needed  it  and  got  it  more  than  once.  The  West 
ern  commanders,  like  those  at  the  East,  and  with 
better  reason,  were  importunate  for  more  men  and 
more  equipment.  The  President  could  not,  by 


348  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

any  effort,  meet  their  requirements.  He  wrote  to 
McClernand  after  the  battle  of  Belmont :  "  Much, 
very  much,  goes  undone ;  but  it  is  because  we  have 
not  the  power  to  do  it  faster  than  we  do."  Some 
troops  were  without  arms;  but,  he  said,  "the  plain 
matter  of  fact  is,  our  good  people  have  rushed  to 
the  rescue  of  the  government  faster  than  the  gov 
ernment  can  find  arms  to  put  in  their  hands." 
Yet,  withal,  it  is  true  that  Mr.  Lincoln's  actual 
interferences  at  the  South  and  West  were  so  occa 
sional  and  incidental,  that,  since  this  writing  is  a 
biography  of  him  and  not  a  history  of  the  war, 
there  is  need  only  for  a  list  of  the  events  which 
were  befalling  outside  of  that  absorbing  domain 
which  lay  around  the  rival  capitals. 

Along  the  southern  Atlantic  coast  some  rather 
easy  successes  were  rapidly  won.  August  29, 
1861,  Hatteras  Inlet  was  taken,  with  little  fight 
ing.  November  7,  Port  Royal  followed.  Lying 
nearly  midway  between  Charleston  and  Savannah, 
and  being  a  very  fine  harbor,  this  was  a  prize  of 
value.  January  7,  1862,  General  Burnside  was 
directed  to  ta,ke  command  of  the  Department  of 
North  Carolina.  February  8,  Roanoke  Island 
was  seized  by  the  Federal  forces.  March  14,  New- 
bern  fell.  April  11,  Fort  Pulaski,  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Savannah  River,  was  taken.  April  26, 
Beaufort  was  occupied.  The  blockade  of  the 
other  Atlantic  ports  having  long  since  been  made 
effective,  the  Eastern  seaboard  thus  early  became 
a  prison  wall  for  the  Confederacy. 


MILITARY  MATTERS  OUTSIDE  OF  VIRGINIA.     349 

At  the  extreme  West  Missouri  gave  the  President 
some  trouble.  The  bushwhacking  citizens  of  that 
frontier  State,  divided  not  unequally  between  the 
Union  and  Disunion  sides,  entered  upon  an  irregu 
lar  but  energetic  warfare  with  ready  zeal  if  not 
actually  with  pleasure.  Northerners  in  general 
hardly  paused  to  read  the  newspaper  accounts  of 
ihese  rough  encounters;  but  the  President  was 
iuuch  concerned  to  save  the  State.  As  it  lay  over 
against  Illinois  along  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  and  for  the  most  part  above  the  important 
strategic  point  where  Cairo  controls  the  junction  of 
that  river  with  the  Ohio,  possession  of  it  appeared 
to  him  exceedingly  desirable.  In  the  hope  of 
helping  matters  forward,  on  July  3,  1861,  he 
created  the  Department  of  the  West,  and  placed 
it  under  command  of  General  Fremont.  But  the 
choice  proved  unfortunate.  Fremont  soon  showed 
himself  inefficient  and  troublesome.  At  first  the 
President  endeavored  to  allay  the  local  bicker 
ings;  on  September  9,  1861,  he  wrote  to  General 
Hunter :  "  General  Fremont  needs  assistance  which 
it  is  difficult  to  give  him.  He  is  losing  the  confi 
dence  of  men  near  him.  .  .  .  His  cardinal  mistake 
is  that  he  isolates  himself ;  ...  he  does  not  know 
what  is  going  on.  ...  He  needs  to  have  by  his 
side  a  man  of  large  experience.  Will  you  not,  for 
me,  take  that  place  ?  Your  rank  is  one  grade  too 
high;  .  .  .  but  will  you  not  serve  the  country, 
and  oblige  me,  by  taking  it  voluntarily?  "  Kindly 
consideration,  however,  was  thrown  away  upon 


350  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Fremont,  whose  self-esteem  was  so  great  that  he 
could  not  see  that  he  ought  to  be  grateful,  or  that 
he  must  be  subordinate.  He  owed  his  appoint 
ment  largely  to  the  friendly  urgency  of  the  Blair 
family,  and  now  Postmaster- General  Blair,  puz 
zled  at  the  disagreeable  stories  about  him,  went  to 
St.  Louis  on  an  errand  of  investigation.  Fremont 
promptly  placed  him  under  arrest.  At  the  same 
time  Mrs.  Fremont  was  journeying  to  Washington, 
where  she  had  an  extraordinary  interview  with  the 
President.  "She  sought  an  audience  with  me  at 
midnight,"  wrote  Lincoln,  uand  taxed  me  so  vio 
lently  with  many  things  that  I  had  to  exercise  all 
the  awkward  tact  I  have  to  avoid  quarrelling  with 
her.  .  .  .  She  more  than  once  intimated  that  if 
General  Fremont  should  decide  to  try  conclusions 
with  me,  he  could  set  up  for  himself."  Naturally 
the  angry  lady's  threats  of  treason,  instead  of  seem 
ing  a  palliation  of  her  husband's  shortcomings, 
tended  to  made  his  displacement  more  inevitable. 
Yet  the  necessity  of  being  rid  of  him  was  unfortu 
nate,  because  he  was  the  pet  hero  of  the  Abolition 
ists,  who  stood  by  him  without  the  slightest  regard 
to  reason.  Lincoln  was  loath  to  offend  them,  but 
he  felt  that  he  had  no  choice,  and  therefore  ordered 
the  removal.  He  preserved,  however,  that  habit 
ual  strange  freedom  from  personal  resentment 
which  made  his  feelings,  like  his  action,  seem  to 
be  strictly  official.  After  the  matter  was  all  over 
he  uttered  a  fair  judgment:  "I  thought  well  of 
Fremont.  Even  now  I  think  well  of  his  impulses. 


MILITARY  MATTERS  OUTSIDE  OF  VIRGINIA.     351 

I  only  think  he  is  the  prey  of  wicked  and  design 
ing  men ;  and  I  think  he  has  absolutely  no  military 
capacity."  For  a  short  while  General  Hunter 
filled  Fremont's  place,  until,  in  November,  Gen 
eral  Henry  W.  Halleck  was  assigned  to  command 
the  Department  of  Missouri.  In  February,  1862, 
General  Curtis  drove  the  only  regular  and  consid 
erable  rebel  force  across  the  border  into  Arkansas ; 
and  soon  afterward,  March  7  and  8,  within  this 
latter  State,  he  won  the  victory  of  Pea  Ridge. 

In  Tennessee  the  vote  upon  secession  had  indi 
cated  that  more  than  two  thirds  of  the  dwellers  in 
the  mountainous  eastern  region  were  Unionists. 
Mr.  Lincoln  had  it  much  at  heart  to  sustain  these 
men,  and  aside  from  the  personal  feeling  of  loyalty 
to  them  it  was  also  a  point  of  great  military  con 
sequence  to  hold  this  district.  Near  the  boundary 
separating  the  northeastern  corner  of  the  State  from 
Kentucky,  the  famous  Cumberland  Gap  gave  pas 
sage  through  the  Cumberland  Mountains  for  the 
East  Tennessee  and  Virginia  Railroad,  "the  artery 
that  supplied  the  rebellion."  The  President  saw, 
as  many  others  did,  and  appreciated  much  more 
than  others  seemed  to  do,  the  desirability  of  gain 
ing  this  place.  To  hold  it  would  be  to  cut  in 
halves,  between  east  and  west,  the  northern  line  of 
the  Confederacy.  In  the  early  days  a  movement 
towards  the  Gap  seemed  imprudent  in  face  of 
Kentucky's  theory  of  "neutrality."  But  this  fool 
ish  notion  was  in  time  effectually  disposed  of  by 
the  Confederates.  Unable  to  resist  the  temptation 


352  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

offered  by  the  important  position  of  Columbus  at 
the  western  end  of  the  State  on  the  Mississippi 
River,  they  seized  that  place  in  September,  1861. 
The  state  legislature,  incensed  at  the  intrusion, 
immediately  embraced  the  Union  cause  and  wel 
comed  the  Union  forces  within  the  state  lines. 

This  action  opened  the  way  for  the  President  to 
make  strenuous  efforts  for  the  protection  of  the 
East  Tennesseeans  and  the  possession  of  the  Gap. 
In  his  annual  Message  he  urged  upon  Congress  the 
construction  of  a  military  railroad  to  the  Gap,  and 
afterward  appeared  in  person  to  advocate  this 
measure  before  a  committee  of  the  Senate.  If  the 
place  had  been  in  Virginia,  he  might  have  gained 
for  his  project  an  attention  which,  as  matters  stood, 
the  politicians  never  accorded  to  it.  He  also  en 
deavored  to  stir  to  action  General  Buell,  who  com 
manded  in  Kentucky.  Buell,  an  appointee  and 
personal  friend  of  General  McClellan,  resembled 
his  chief  somewhat  too  closely  both  in  character 
and  history.  Just  as  Mr.  Lincoln  had  to  prick 
McClellan  in  Virginia,  he  now  had  to  prick  Buell 
in  Kentucky,  and  just  as  McClellan  failed  to  re 
spond  in  Virginia,  Buell  also  failed  in  Kentucky. 
Further,  Buell,  like  McClellan,  had  with  him  a 
force  very  much  greater  than  that  before  him ;  but 
Buell,  like  McClellan,  would  not  admit  that  his 
troops  were  in  condition  to  move.  The  result  was 
that  Jefferson  Davis,  more  active  to  protect  a  cru 
cial  point  than  the  North  was  to  assail  it,  in  De 
cember,  1861,  sent  into  East  Tennessee  a  force 


MILITARY  MATTERS  OUTSIDE  OF  VIRGINIA.     353 

which  imprisoned,  deported,  and  hanged  the  loyal 
residents  there,  harried  the  country  without  mercy, 
and  held  it  with  the  iron  hand.  The  poor  moun 
taineers,  with  good  reason,  concluded  that  the  hos 
tility  of  the  South  was  a  terribly  serious  evil, 
whereas  the  friendship  of  the  North  was  a  sadly 
useless  good.  The  President  was  bitterly  cha 
grined;  although  certainly  the  blame  did  not  rest 
with  him.  Then  the  parallel  between  Buell  and 
McClellan  was  continued  even  one  step  further; 
for  Buell  at  last  intimated  that  he  did  not  approve 
of  the  plan  of  campaign  suggested  for  him,  but 
thought  it  would  be  better  tactics  to  move  upon 
Nashville.  It  so  happened,  however,  that  when 
he  expressed  these  views  McClellan  was  comman- 
der-in-chief  of  all  the  armies,  and  that  general, 
being  little  tolerant  of  criticism  from  subordinates 
when  he  himself  was  the  superior,  responded  very 
tartly  and  imperiously.  Lincoln,  on  the  other 
hand,  according  to  his  wont,  wrote  modestly: 
"Your  dispatch  .  .  .  disappoints  and  distresses 
me.  ...  I  am  not  competent  to  criticise  your 
views."  Then,  in  the  rest  of  the  letter,  he  main 
tained  with  convincing  clearness  both  the  military 
and  the  political  soundness  of  his  own  opinions. 

In  offset  of  this  disappointment  caused  by  Bu 
ell' s  inaction,  the  western  end  of  Kentucky  became 
the  theatre  of  gratifying  operations.  So  soon  as 
policy  ceased  to  compel  recognition  of  the  "neu 
trality  "  of  the  State,  General  Grant,  on  Septem 
ber  6,  1861,  entered  Paducah  at  the  confluence  of 


354  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

the  Ohio  and  Tennessee  rivers.  By  this  move  he 
checked  the  water  communication  hitherto  freely 
used  by  the  rebels,  and  neutralized  the  advantage 
which  they  had  expected  to  gain  by  their  posses 
sion  of  Columbus.  But  this  was  only  a  first  and 
easy  step.  Further  to  the  southward,  just  within 
the  boundaries  of  Tennessee,  lay  Fort  Henry  on 
the  Tennessee  River  and  Fort  Donelson  on  the 
Cumberland,  presenting  a  kind  of  temptation 
which  Grant  was  less  able  to  resist  than  were  most 
of  the  Union  generals  at  this  time.  Accordingly 
he  arranged  with  Admiral  Foote,  who  commanded 
the  new  gunboats  on  the  Mississippi,  for  a  joint 
excursion  against  these  places.  On  February  6, 
Fort  Henry  fell,  chiefly  through  the  work  of  the 
river  navy.  Ten  days  later,  February  16,  Fort 
Donelson  was  taken,  the  laurels  on  this  occasion 
falling  to  the  land  forces.  Floyd  and  Pillow  were 
in  the  place  when  the  Federals  came  to  it,  but 
when  they  saw  that  capture  was  inevitable,  they 
furtively  slipped  away  and  thus  shifted  upon  Gen 
eral  Buckner  the  humiliation  of  the  surrender. 
This  mean  behavior  excited  the  bitter  resentment 
of  that  general,  which  was  not  alleviated  by  what 
followed.  For  when  he  proposed  to  discuss  terms 
of  capitulation,  General  Grant  made  that  famous 
reply  which  gave  rise  to  his  popular  nickname: 
"No  terms  except  unconditional  and  immediate 
surrender  can  be  accepted.  I  propose  to  move 
immediately  upon  your  works." 

Halleck  telegraphed  the  pleasant  news  that  the 


MILITARY  MATTERS  OUTSIDE  OF  VIRGINIA.     355 

capture  of  Fort  Douelson  carried  with  it  "12,000 
to  15,000  prisoners,  including  Generals  Buckner 
and  Bushrod  R.  Johnson,  also  about  20,000  stands 
of  arms,  48  pieces  of  artillery,  17  heavy  guns, 
from  2000  to  4000  horses,  and  large  quantities 
of  commissary  stores."  He  also  advised:  "Make 
Buell,  Grant,  and  Pope  major-generals  of  volun 
teers,  and  give  me  command  in  the  West.  I  ask 
this  in  return  for  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson." 
Halleck  was  one  of  those  who  expect  to  reap 
where  others  sow.  The  achievements  of  Grant 
and  Foote  also  led  him,  by  some  strange  process 
of  reasoning,  to  conclude  that  General  C.  W. 
Smith  was  the  most  able  general  in  his  depart 
ment. 

Congress,  highly  gratified  at  these  cheering 
events,  ordered  a  grand  illumination  at  Washing 
ton  for  February  22 ;  but  the  death  of  the  Presi 
dent's  little  son,  at  the  White  House,  a  day  or 
two  before  that  date,  checked  a  rejoicing,  which 
in  other  respects  also  would  not  have  been  alto 
gether  timely. 

The  Federal  possession  of  these  two  forts  ren 
dered  Columbus  untenable  for  the  Confederates, 
and  on  March  2  they  evacuated  it.  This  was 
followed  by  the  fall  of  New  Madrid  on  March  13, 
and  of  Island  No.  10  on  April  7.  At  the  latter 
place  between  6000  and  7000  Confederates  sur 
rendered.  Thus  was  the  Federal  wedge  being 
driven  steadily  deeper  down  the  channel  of  the 
Mississippi. 


356  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

Soon  after  this  good  service  of  the  gunboats  on 
the  Western  rivers,  the  salt  water  navy  came  in  for 
its  share  of  glory.  On  March  8  the  ram  Virginia, 
late  Merrimac,  which  had  been  taking  on  her  mys 
terious  iron  raiment  at  the  Norfolk  navy  yard, 
issued  from  her  concealment,  an  ugly  and  clumsy, 
but  also  a  novel  and  terrible  monster.  Straight 
she  steamed  against  the  frigate  Cumberland,  and 
with  one  fell  rush  cut  the  poor  wooden  vessel  in 
halves  and  sent  her,  with  all  on  board,  to  the 
bottom  of  the  sea.  Turning  then,  she  mercilessly 
battered  the  frigate  Congress,  drove  her  ashore, 
and  burned  her.  All  this  while  the  shot  which 
had  rained  upon  her  iron  sides  had  rolled  off  harm 
less,  and  she  returned  to  her  anchorage,  having  her 
prow  broken  by  impact  with  the  Cumberland,  but 
otherwise  unhurt.  Her  armor  had  stood  the  test, 
and  now  the  Federal  government  contemplated 
with  grave  anxiety  the  further  possible  achieve 
ments  of  this  strange  and  potent  destroyer. 

But  the  death  of  the  Merrimac  was  to  follow 
close  upon  her  birth ;  she  was  the  portent  of  a  few 
weeks  only.  For,  during  a  short  time  past,  there 
had  been  also  rapidly  building  in  a  Connecticut 
yard  the  Northern  marvel,  the  famous  Monitor. 
When  the  ingenious  Swede,  John  Ericsson,  pro 
posed  his  scheme  for  an  impregnable  floating  bat 
tery,  his  hearers  were  divided  between  distrust 
and  hope;  but  fortunately  the  President's  favor 
able  opinion  secured  the  trial  of  the  experiment. 
The  work  was  zealously  pushed,  and  the  artisans 


MILITARY  MATTERS  OUTSIDE  OF  VIRGINIA.     357 

actually  went  to  sea  with  the  craft  in  order  to 
finish  her  as  she  made  her  voyage  southward.  It 
was  well  that  such  haste  was  made,  for  she  came 
into  Hampton  Roads  actually  by  the  light  of  the 
burning  Congress.  On  the  next  day,  being  Sun 
day,  March  9,  the  Southern  monster  again  steamed 
forth,  intending  this  time  to  make  the  Minnesota 
her  prey;  but  a  little  boat,  that  looked  like  a 
"cheese-box  "  afloat,  pushed  forward  to  interfere 
with  this  plan.  Then  occurred  a  duel  which,  in 
the  annals  of  naval  science,  ranks  as  the  most  im 
portant  engagement  which  ever  took  place.  It  did 
not  actually  result  in  the  destruction  of  the  Merri- 
mac  then  and  there,  for,  though  much  battered, 
she  was  able  to  make  her  way  back  to  the  friendly 
shelter  of  the  Norfolk  yard.  But  she  was  more 
than  neutralized;  it  was  evident  that  the  Mon 
itor  was  the  better  craft  of  the  two,  and  that  in  a 
combat  a  outrance  she  would  win.  The  signifi 
cance  of  this  day's  work  on  the  waters  of  Virginia 
cannot  be  exaggerated.  By  the  armor-clad  Merri- 
mac  and  the  Monitor  there  was  accomplished  in 
the  course  of  an  hour  a  revolution  which  differ 
entiated  the  naval  warfare  of  the  past  from  that 
of  the  future  by  a  chasm  as  great  as  that  which 
separated  the  ancient  Greek  trireme  from  the 
flagship  of  Lord  Nelson. 

As  early  as  the  middle  of  November,  1861,  Mr. 
Lincoln  was  discussing  the  feasibility  of  capturing 
New  Orleans.  Already  Ship  Island,  off  the  Mis 
sissippi  coast,  with  its  uncompleted  equipment,  had 


358  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

been  seized  as  a  Gulf  station,  and  could  be  used  as 
a  base.  The  naval  force  was  prepared  as  rapidly 
as  possible,  but  it  was  not  until  February  3  that 
Captain  Farragut,  the  commander  of  the  expedi 
tion,  steamed  out  of  Hampton  Roads  in  his  flag 
ship,  the  screw  steam  sloop  Hartford.  On  April 
18  he  began  to  bombard  forts  St.  Philip  and  Jack 
son,  which  lie  on  the  river  banks  seventy -five 
miles  below  New  Orleans,  guarding  the  approach. 
Soon,  becoming  impatient  of  this  tardy  process,  he 
resolved  upon  the  bold  and  original  enterprise  of 
running  by  the  forts.  This  he  achieved  in  the 
night  of  April  24;  and  on  April  27  the  stars  and 
stripes  floated  over  the  Mint  in  New  Orleans. 
Still  two  days  of  shilly-shallying  on  the  part  of 
the  mayor  ensued,  delaying  a  formal  surrender, 
until  Farragut,  who  had  no  fancy  for  nonsense, 
sharply  put  a  stop  to  it,  and  New  Orleans,  in  form 
and  substance,  passed  under  Northern  control. 
On  April  28  the  two  forts,  isolated  by  what  had 
taken  place,  surrendered.  On  May  1  General 
Butler  began  in  the  city  that  efficient  regime  which 
so  exasperated  the  men  of  the  South.  On  May  7 
Baton  Rouge,  the  state  capital,  was  occupied, 
without  resistance;  and  Natchez  followed  in  the 
procession  on  May  12. 

With  one  Union  fleet  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  and  another  at  Island  No.  10,  and  the  Un 
ion  army  not  far  from  the  river-side  in  Kentucky 
and  Tennessee,  the  opening  and  repossession  of 
the  whole  stream  by  the  Federals  became  a  thing 


MILITARY  MATTERS  OUTSIDE  OF  VIRGINIA.    359 

which  ought  soon  to  be  achieved.  On  June  5  the 
gunboat  fleet  from  up  the  river  came  down  to 
within  two  miles  of  Memphis,  engaged  in  a  hard 
fight  and  won  a  complete  victory,  and  on  the  next 
day  Memphis  was  held  by  the  Union  troops. 
Farragut,  also,  working  in  his  usual  style,  forced 
his  way  up  to  Vicksburg,  and  exchanged  shots 
with  the  Confederate  batteries  on  the  bluffs.  He 
found,  however,  that  without  the  cooperation  of  a 
land  force  he  could  do  nothing,  and  had  to  drop 
back  again  to  New  Orleans,  arriving  there  on  June 
1.  In  a  few  weeks  he  returned  in  stronger  force, 
and  on  June  27  he  was  bombarding  the  rebel 
works.  On  June  28,  repeating  the  operation 
which  had  been  so  successful  below  New  Orleans, 
he  ran  some  of  his  vessels  by  the  batteries  and  got 
above  the  city.  But  there  was  still  no  army  on 
the  land,  and  so  the  vessels  which  had  run  by,  up 
stream,  had  to  make  the  dangerous  gauntlet  again, 
down  stream,  and  a  second  time  the  fleet  de 
scended  to  New  Orleans. 

General  Halleck  had  arrived  at  St.  Louis  on 
November  18,  1861,  to  take  command  of  the  West 
ern  Department.  Perhaps  a  more  energetic  com 
mander  would  have  been  found  ready  to  cooperate 
with  Farragut  at  Vicksburg  by  the  end  of  June, 
1862 ;  for  matters  had  been  going  excellently  with 
the  Unionists  northeast  of  that  place  and  it  would 
seem  that  a  powerful  and  victorious  army  might 
have  been  moving  thither  during  that  month. 
Early  in  March,  however,  General  Halleck  re- 


360  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

ported  that  Grant's  army  was  as  much  demoralized 
by  victory  as  the  army  at  Bull  Run  had  been  by 
defeat.  He  said  that  Grant  "richly  deserved" 
censure,  and  that  he  himself  was  worn  out  by 
Grant's  neglect  and  inefficiency.  By  such  charges 
he  obtained  from  McClellan  orders  relieving  Gen 
eral  Grant  from  duty,  ordering  an  investigation-, 
and  even  authorizing  his  arrest.  But  a  few  days 
later,  March  13,  more  correct  information  caused 
the  reversal  of  these  orders,  and  March  17  found 
Grant  again  in  command.  He  at  once  began  to 
busy  himself  with  arrangements  for  moving  upon 
Corinth.  General  Buell,  meanwhile,  after  sus 
taining  McClellan 's  rebuke  and  being  taught  his 
place,  had  afterward  been  successful  in  obtaining 
for  his  own  plan  preference  over  that  of  the  ad 
ministration,  had  easily  possessed  himself  of  Nash-  , 
ville  toward  the  end  of  February,  and  was  now 
ready  to  march  westward  and  cooperate  with  Gen 
eral  Grant  in  this  enterprise.  Corinth,  lying  just 
across  the  Mississippi  border,  was  "the  great 
strategic  position  "  at  this  part  of  the  West.  The 
Mobile  and  Ohio  railroad  ran  through  it,  north 
and  south;  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad 
passed  through,  east  and  west.  If  it  could  be  taken 
and  held,  it  would  leave  as  the  only  connection 
open  through  the  Confederacy  from  the  Missis 
sippi  River  to  the  Atlantic  coast  the  railroad  line 
which  started  from  Vicksburg.  The  Confederates 
also  had  shown  their  estimation  of  Corinth  by  for 
tifying  it  strongly,  and  manifesting  plainly  their 


MILITARY  MATTERS  OUTSIDE  OF  VIRGINIA.    361 

determination  to  fight  a  great  battle  to  hold  it. 
Grant,  aiming  towards  it,  had  his  army  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee, 
and  there  awaited  Buell,  who  was  moving  thither 
from  Nashville  with  40,000  men.  Such  being  the 
status,  Grant  expected  General  A.  S.  Johnston 
bo  await  in  his  intrench  ments  the  assault  of  the 
Union  army.  But  Johnston,  in  an  aggressive  mood, 
laid  well  and  boldly  his  plan  to  whip  Grant  before 
Buell  could  join  him,  then  to  whip  Buell,  and, 
having  thus  disposed  of  the  Northern  forces  in 
detail,  to  carry  the  war  up  to,  or  even  across,  the 
Ohio.  So  he  came  suddenly  out  from  Corinth  and 
marched  straight  upon  Pittsburg  Landing,  and 
precipitated  that  famous  battle  which  has  been 
named  after  the  church  of  Shiloh,  because  about 
that  church  the  most  desperate  and  bloody  fighting 
was  done. 

The  conflict  began  on  Sunday,  April  6,  and 
lasted  all  day.  There  was  not  much  plan  about 
it;  the  troops  went  at  each  other  somewhat  indis 
criminately  and  did  simple  stubborn  fighting.  The 
Federals  lost  much  ground  all  along  their  line,  and 
were  crowded  back  towards  the  river.  Some  say 
that  the  Confederates  closed  that  day  on  the  way 
to  victory;  but  General  Grant  says  that  he  felt 
assured  of  winning  on  Monday,  and  that  he  in 
structed  all  his  division  commanders  to  open  with 
an  assault  in  the  morning.  The  doubt,  if  doubt 
there  was,  was  settled  by  the  arrival  of  General 
Buell,  whose  fresh  forces,  coming  in  as  good  an 


362  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

hour  as  the  Prussians  came  at  Waterloo,  were  put 
in  during  the  evening  upon  the  Federal  left.  On 
Sunday  the  Confederates  had  greatly  outnumbered 
the  Federals,  but  this  reinforcement  reversed  the 
proportions,  so  that  on  Monday  the  Federals  were 
in  the  greater  force.  Again  the  conflict  was  fierce 
and  obstinate,  but  again  the  greater  numbers 
whipped  the  smaller,  and  by  afternoon  the  Con 
federates  were  in  full  retreat.  Shiloh,  says  Gen 
eral  Grant,  "  was  the  severest  battle  fought  at 
the  West  during  the  war,  and  but  few  in  the 
East  equalled  it  for  hard,  determined  fighting." 
It  ended  in  a  complete  Union  victory.  General  A. 
S.  Johnston  was  killed  and  Beauregard  retreated 
to  Corinth,  while  the  North  first  exulted  because 
he  was  compelled  to  do  so,  and  then  grumbled  be 
cause  he  was  allowed  to  do  so.  It  was  soon  said 
that  Grant  had  been  surprised,  that  he  was  entitled 
to  no  credit  for  winning  clumsily  a  battle  which  he 
had  not  expected  to  fight,  and  that  he  was  blame 
worthy  for  not  following  up  the  retreating  foe 
more  sharply.  The  discussion  survives  among 
those  quarrels  of  the  war  in  which  the  disputants 
have  fought  over  again  the  contested  field,  with 
harmless  fierceness,  and  without  any  especial  result. 
Congress  took  up  the  dispute,  and  did  a  vast  deal 
of  talking,  in  the  course  of  which  there  occurred 
one  sensible  remark.  This  was  made  by  Mr.  Rich 
ardson,  of  Illinois,  who  said  that  the  armies  would 
get  along  much  better  if  the  Riot  Act  could  be 
read,  and  the  members  of  Congress  dispersed  and 
sent  home. 


MILITARY  MATTERS  OUTSIDE  OF  VIRGINIA.    363 

General  Grant  found  that  General  Halleck  was 
even  more  obstinately  in  the  way  of  his  winning 
any  success  than  were  the  Confederates  themselves. 
As  Commander  of  the  Department,  Halleck  now 
conceived  that  it  was  his  fair  privilege  to  do  the 
visible  taking  of  that  conspicuous  prize  which  his 
lieutenant  had  brought  within  sure  reach.  Ac 
cordingly,  on  April  11,  he  arrived  and  assumed 
command  for  the  purpose  of  moving  on  Corinth. 
Still  he  was  sedulous  in  his  endeavors  to  neglect, 
suppress,  and  even  insult  General  Grant,  whom 
he  put  nominally  second  in  command,  but  practi 
cally  reduced  to  insignificance,  until  Grant,  find 
ing  his  position  " unendurable,"  asked  to  be  re 
lieved.  This  conduct  on  the  part  of  Halleck  has 
of  course  been  attributed  to  jealousy;  but  more 
probably  it  was  due  chiefly  to  the  personal  preju 
dice  of  a  dull  man,  perhaps  a  little  stimulated  by 
a  natural  desire  for  reputation.  Having  taken 
charge  of  the  advance,  he  conducted  it  slowly  and 
cautiously,  intrenching  as  he  went,  and  moving 
with  pick  and  shovel,  in  the  phrase  of  General 
Sherman,  who  commanded  a  division  in  the  army. 
"The  movement,"  says  General  Grant,  "was  a 
siege  from  the  start  to  the  close."  Such  tactics 
had  not  hitherto  been  tried  at  the  West,  and  ap 
parently  did  not  meet  approval.  There  were  only 
about  twenty-two  miles  to  be  traversed,  yet  four 
weeks  elapsed  in  the  process.  The  army  started 
on  April  30 ;  twice  Pope  got  near  the  enemy,  first 
on  May  4,  and  again  on  May  8,  and  each  time  he 


364  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

was  ordered  back.  It  was  actually  May  28,  ac 
cording  to  General  Grant,  when  k'the  investment 
of  Corinth  was  complete,  or  as  complete  as  it  was 
ever  made."  But  already,  on  May  26,  Beaure- 
gard  had  issued  orders  for  evacuating  the  place, 
which  was  accomplished  with  much  skill.  On 
May  30  Halleck  drew  up  his  army  in  battle  array 
and  "announced  in  orders  that  there  was  every 
indication  that  our  left  was  to  be  attacked  that 
morning."  A  few  hours  later  his  troops  marched 
unopposed  into  empty  works. 

Halleck  now  commanded  in  Corinth  a  powerful 
army,  —  the  forces  of  Grant,  Buell,  and  Pope, 
combined,  —  not  far  from  100,000  strong,  and 
he  was  threatened  by  no  Southern  force  at  all  able 
to  face  him.  According  to  the  views  of  General 
Grant,  he  had  great  opportunities;  and  among 
these  certainly  was  the  advance  of  a  strong  column 
upon  Vicksburg.  If  he  could  be  induced  to  do 
this  it  seemed  reasonable  to  expect  that  he  and 
Farragut  together  would  be  able  to  open  the  whole 
Mississippi  River  and  to  cut  the  last  remaining 
east  -  and  -  west  line  of  railroad  communication. 
But  he  did  nothing,  and  ultimately  the  disposition 
made  of  this  splendid  collection  of  troops  was  to 
distribute  and  dissipate  it  in  such  a  manner  that 
the  loss  of  the  points  already  gained  became  much 
more  probable  than  the  acquisition  of  others. 

Early  in  July,  as  has  been  elsewhere  said,  Hal 
leck  was  called  to  Washington  to  take  the  place  of 
general-in-chief  of  all  the  armies  of  the  North; 


MILITARY  MATTERS  OUTSIDE  OF  VIRGINIA.    365 

and  at  this  point  perhaps  it  is  worth  while  to  de 
vote  a  paragraph  to  comparing  the  retirement  of 
McClellan  with  the  promotion  of  Halleek.  Some 
similarities  and  dissimilarities  in  their  careers  are 
striking.  The  dissimilarities  were :  that  McClellan 
had  organized  the  finest  army  which  the  country 
had  yet  seen,  or  was  to  see ;  also  that  he  had  at 
least  made  a  plan  for  a  great  campaign ;  and  he 
had  not  suppressed  any  one  abler  than  himself; 
that  Halleek  on  the  other  hand  had  done  little 
to  organize  an  army  or  to  plan  a  campaign,  had 
failed  to  find  out  the  qualities  of  General  W.  T. 
Sherman,  who  was  in  his  Department,  and  had 
done  all  in  his  power  to  drive  General  Grant  into 
retirement.  The  similarities  are  more  worthy  of 
observation.  Each  general  had  wearied  the  ad 
ministration  with  demands  for  reinforcements 
when  each  already  outnumbered  his  opponent  so 
much  that  it  was  almost  disgraceful  to  desire"  to 
increase  the  odds.  If  McClellan  had  been  repre- 
hensibly  slow  in  moving  upon  Yorktown,  and  had 
blundered  by  besieging  instead  of  trying  an  assault, 
certainly  the  snail-like  approach  upon  Corinth  had 
been  equally  deliberate  and  wasteful  of  time  and 
opportunity;  and  if  McClellan  had  marched  into 
deserted  intrenchmeiits  so  also  had  Halleek.  If 
McClellan  had  captured  "Quaker  guns"  at  Ma- 
nassas,  Halleek  had  found  the  like  peaceful  wea 
pons  frowning  from  the  ramparts  of  Corinth.  If 
McClellan  had  held  inactive  a  powerful  force  when 
it  ought  to  have  been  marching  to  Manassas. 


366  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

leek  had  also  held  inactive  another  powerful  force, 
a  part  of  which  might  have  helped  to  take  Vicks- 
burg.  If  the  records  of  these  two  men  were  stated 
in  parallel  columns,  it  would  be  difficult  to  see 
why  one  should  have  been  taken  and  the  other 
left.  But  the  explanation  exists  and  is  instruc 
tive,  and  it  is  wholly  for  the  sake  of  the  expla 
nation  that  the  comparison  has  been  made.  Mc- 
Clellan  was  "in  politics,"  and  Halleck  was  not; 
McClellan,  therefore,  had  a  host  of  active,  un 
sparing  enemies  in  Washington,  which  Halleck 
had  not;  the  Virginia  field  of  operations  was  cease 
lessly  and  microscopically  inspected;  the  Western 
field  attracted  occasional  glances  not  conducive  to 
a  full  knowledge.  Halleck,  as  commander  in  a  de 
partment  where  victories  were  won,  seemed  to  have 
won  the  victories,  and  no  politicians  cared  to  deny 
his  right  to  the  glory;  whereas  the  politicians 
whose  hatred  of  McClellan  had,  by  the  admission 
of  one  of  themselves,  become  a  mania,1  were  en 
tirely  happy  to  have  any  one  set  over  his  head, 
and  would  not  imperil  their  pleasure  by  too  close 
an  inspection  of  the  new  aspirant's  merits.  These 
remarks  are  not  designed  to  have  any  significance 
upon  the  merits  or  demerits  of  McClellan,  which 
have  been  elsewhere  discussed,  nor  upon  the  merits 
or  demerits  of  Halleck,  which  are  not  worth  dis 
cussing;  but  they  are  made  simply  because  they 
afford  so  forcible  an  illustration  of  certain  import 
ant  conditions  at  Washington  at  this  time.  The 
1  Geo.  W.  Julian,  Polit.  Recoil.,  204. 


MILITARY  MATTERS  OUTSIDE  OF  VIRGINIA.    367 

truth  is  that  the  ensnarlment  of  the  Eastern  mili 
tary  affairs  with  politics  made  success  in  that  field 
impossible  for  the  North.  The  condition  made  it 
practically  inevitable  that  a  Union  commander  in 
Virginia  should  have  his  thoughts  at  least  as  much 
occupied  with  the  members  of  Congress  in  the  capi 
tal  behind  him  as  with  the  Confederate  soldiers  in 
camp  before  him.  Such  division  of  his  attention 
was  ruinous.  At  and  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
rebellion  the  South  had  expected  to  be  aided  effi 
ciently  by  a  great  body  of  sympathizers  at  the 
North.  As  yet  they  had  been  disappointed  in  this; 
but  almost  simultaneously  with  this  disappointment 
they  were  surprised  by  a  valuable  and  unexpected 
Assistance,  growing  out  of  the  open  feuds,  the  cov 
ert  malice,  the  bad  blood,  the  partisanship,  and 
the  wire-pulling  introduced  by  the  loyal  political 
fraternity  into  campaigning  business.  The  quar 
relling  politicians  were  doing,  very  efficiently,  the 
work  which  Southern  sympathizers  had  been  ex 
pected  to  do. 


CHAPTER   XII. 

FOREIGN   AFFAIRS. 

To  the  people  who  had  been  engaged  in  chang 
ing  Illinois  from  a  wilderness  into  a  civilized 
State,  Europe  had  been  an  abstraction,  a  mere  col 
ored  spot  upon  a  map,  which  in  their  lives  meant 
nothing.  Though  England  had  been  the  home  of 
their  ancestors,  it  was  really  less  interesting  than 
the  west  coast  of  Africa,  which  was  the  home  of 
the  negroes;  for  the  negroes  were  just  now  of 
vastly  more  consequence  than  the  ancestors.  So 
even  Dahomey  had  some  claim  to  be  regarded  as  a 
more  important  place  than  Great  Britain,  and  the 
early  settlers  wasted  little  thought  on  the  affairs  of 
Queen  Victoria.  Amid  these  conditions,  absorbed 
even  more  than  his  neighbors  in  the  exciting  ques 
tions  of  domestic  politics,  and  having  no  tastes  or 
pursuits  which  guided  his  thoughts  abroad,  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  never  had  occasion  to  consider  the 
foreign  relations  of  the  United  States,  up  to  the 
time  when  he  was  suddenly  obliged  to  take  an  ac 
tive  part  in  managing  them. 

At  an  early  stage  of  the  civil  dissensions  each 
side  hoped  for  the  good-will  of  England.  For 
obvious  reasons  that  island  counted  to  the  United 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS.  369 

States  for  more  than  the  whole  continent  of  Eu 
rope;  indeed,  the  continental  nations  were  likely 
to  await  and  to  follow  her  lead.  Southern  orators, 
advocating  secession,  assured  their  hearers  that 
"King  Cotton"  would  be  the  supreme  power,  and 
would  compel  that  realm  of  spinners  and  weavers 
to  friendship  if  not  to  alliance  with  the  Confeder 
acy.  Northern  men,  on  the  other  hand,  expressed 
confidence  that  a  people  with  the  record  of  Eng 
lishmen  against  slavery  would  not  countenance  a 
war  conducted  in  behalf  of  that  institution;  nor 
did  they  allow  their  hopes  to  be  at  all  impaired 
by  the  consideration  that,  in  order  to  found  them 
upon  this  support,  they  had  to  overlook  the  fact 
that  they  were  at  the  same  time  distinctly  declar 
ing  that  slavery  really  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
war,  in  which  only  and  strictly  the  question  of 
the  Union,  the  integrity  of  the  nation,  was  at 
stake.  When  the  issue  was  pressing  for  actual 
decision,  each  side  was  disappointed;  and  each 
found  that  it  had  counted  upon  a  motive  which 
fell  far  short  of  exerting  the  anticipated  influence. 
It  was,  of  course,  the  case  that  England  suffered 
much  from  the  short  supply  of  cotton;  but  she 
made  shift  to  procure  it  elsewhere,  while  the  work 
ing  people,  sympathizing  with  the  North,  were 
surprisingly  patient.  Thus  the  political  pressure 
arising  from  commercial  distress  was  much  less 
than  had  been  expected,  and  the  South  learned 
that  cotton  was  only  a  spurious  monarch.  Not 
less  did  the  North  find  itself  deceived;  for  the 


370  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

upper  and  middle  classes  of  Great  Britain  ap 
peared  absolutely  indifferent  to  the  humanitarian 
element  which,  as  they  were  assured,  underlay  the 
struggle.  Perhaps  they  were  not  to  be  blamed. for 
setting  aside  these  assurances  and  accepting  in 
place  thereof  the  belief  that  the  American  leaders 
spoke  the  truth  when  they  solemnly  told  the  North 
that  the  question  at  issue  was  purely  and  simply 
of  "the  Union."  The  unfortunate  fact  was  that  it 
was  necessary  to  say  one  thing  to  Englishmen  and 
a  different  thing  to  Americans. 

That  which  really  did  inspire  the  feelings  and 
the  wishes,  and  which  did  influence,  though  it 
could  not  be  permitted  fully  to  control,  the  action 
of  England,  had  not  been  counted  upon  by  either 
section  of  the  country;  perhaps  its  existence  had 
not  been  appreciated.  This  was  the  intense  dis 
like  felt  for  the  American  Republic  by  nearly  all 
Englishmen  who  were  above  the  social  grade  of 
mechanics  and  mill  operatives.  The  extent  and 
force  of  this  antipathy  and  even  contempt  were  for 
the  first  time  given  free  expression  under  the  irre 
sistible  provocation  which  arose  out  of  the  delight 
ful  likelihood  of  the  destruction  of  the  United 
States.  The  situation  at  least  gave  to  the  people 
of  that  imperilled  country  a  chance  to  find  out  in 
what  estimation  they  were  held  across  the  water. 
The  behavior  of  the  English  government  and  the 
attitude  of  the  English  press  during  the  early  part 
of  the  Civil  War  have  been  ascribed  by  different 
historians  to  one  or  another  dignified  political  or 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS.  371 

commercial  motive.  But  while  these  influences 
were  certainly  not  absent,  yet  the  English  news 
papers  poured  an  inundating  flood  of  evidence  to 
show  that  genuine  and  deep-seated  dislike,  not  to 
say  downright  hatred,  was  by  very  much  the  prin 
cipal  motive.  This  truth  is  so  painful  and  unfor 
tunate  that  many  have  thought  best  to  suppress  or 
deny  it;  but  no  historian  is  entitled  to  use  such 
discretion.  From  an  early  period,  therefore,  in 
the  administration  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  he  and  Mr. 
Seward  had  to  endeavor  to  preserve  friendly  rela 
tions  with  a  power  which,  if  she  could  only  make 
entirely  sure  of  the  worldly  wisdom  of  yielding  to 
her  wishes,  would  instantly  recognize  the  indepen 
dence  of  the  South.  This  being  the  case,  it  was 
matter  for  regret  that  the  rules  of  international 
law  concerning  blockades,  contraband  of  war,  and 
rights  of  neutrals  were  perilously  vague  and  un 
settled. 

Earl l  Russell  was  at  this  time  in  charge  of 
her  Majesty's  foreign  affairs.  Because  in  matters 
domestic  he  was  liberal-minded,  Americans  had 
been  inclined  to  expect  his  good-will ;  but  he  now 
disappointed  them  by  appearing  to  share  the  preju 
dices  of  his  class  against  the  Republic.  A  series 
of  events  soon  revealed  his  temper.  So  soon  as 
there  purported  to  be  a  Confederacy,  an  under 
standing  had  been  reached  betwixt  him  and  the 
French  Emperor  that  both  powers  should  take  the 

1  Lord  John  Russell  was  raised  to  the  peerage,  as  Earl  Rus 
sell,  just  after  this  time,  i.  e.,in  July,  1861. 


372  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

same  course  as  to  recognizing  it.  About  May  1 
lie  admitted  three  Southern  commissioners  to  an 
audience  with  him,  though  not  " officially."  May, 
13  there  was  published  a  proclamation,  whereby 
Queen  Victoria  charged  and  commanded  all  her 
"loving  subjects  to  observe  a  strict  neutrality1"  in 
and  during  the  hostilities,  which  had  "unhappily 
commenced  between  the  government  of  the  United 
States  and  certain  States  styling  themselves  'the 
Confederate  States  of  America. ' '  This  action  — 
this  assumption  of  a  position  of  "neutrality,"  as 
between  enemies — taken  while  the  "hostilities" 
had  extended  only  to  the  single  incident  of  Fort 
Sumter,  gave  surprise  and  some  offense  to  the 
North.  It  was  a  recognition  of  belligerency ;  that 
is  to  say,  while  not  in  any  other  respects  recogniz 
ing  the  revolting  States  as  an  independent  power, 
it  accorded  to  them  the  rights  of  a  belligerent. 
The  magnitude  very  quickly  reached  by  the  strug 
gle  would  have  made  this  step  necessary  and 
proper,  so  that  if  England  had  only  gone  a  trifle 
more  slowly,  she  would  soon  have  reached  the  same 
point  without  exciting  any  anger;  but  now  the 
North  felt  that  the  Queen's  government  had  been 
altogether  too  forward  in  assuming  this  position  at 
a  time  when  the  question  of  a  real  war  was  still  in 
embryo.  Moreover,  the  unfriendliness  was  aggra 
vated  by  the  fact  that  the  proclamation  was  issued 
almost  at  the  very  hour  of  the  arrival  in  London 
of  Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  the  new  minister 
sent  by  Mr.  Lincoln  to  the  Court  of  St.  James. 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS.  373 

It  seemed,  therefore,  not  open  to  reasonable  doubt 
that  Earl  Russell  had  purposely  hastened  to  take 
his  position  before  he  could  hear  from  the  Lincoln 
administration . 

When  Mr.  Seward  got  news  of  this,  his  temper 
gave  way;  so  that,  being  still  new  to  diplomacy, 
he  wrote  a  dispatch  to  Mr.  Adams  wherein  oc 
curred  words  and  phrases  not  so  carefully  selected 
as  they  should  have  been.  He  carried  it  to  Mr. 
Lincoln,  and  soon  received  it  back  revised  and 
corrected,  instructively.  A  priori,  one  would 
have  anticipated  the  converse  of  this. 

The  essential  points  of  the  paper  were :  — 

That  Mr.  Adams  would  "desist  from  all  inter 
course  whatever,  unofficial  as  well  as  official,  with 
the  British  government,  so  long  as  it  shall  con 
tinue  intercourse  of  either  kind  with  the  domestic 
enemies  of  this  country." 

That  the  United  States  had  a  "right  to  expect  a 
more  independent  if  not  a  more  friendly  course  " 
than  was  indicated  by  the  understanding  between 
England  and  France;  but  that  Mr.  Adams  would 
"take  no  notice  of  that  or  any  other  alliance." 

He  was  to  pass  by  the  question  as  to  whether  the 
blockade  must  be  respected  in  case  it  should  not 
be  maintained  by  a  competent  force,  and  was  to 
state  that  the  "blockade  is  now,  and  will  continue 
to  be,  so  maintained,  and  therefore  we  expect  it  to 
be  respected." 

As  to  recognition  of  the  Confederacy,  either  by 
publishing  an  acknowledgment  of  its  sovereignty, 


374  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

or  officially  receiving  its  representatives,  he  was 
to  inform  the  Earl  that  "no  one  of  these  proceed 
ings  will  pass  unquestioned."  Also,  he  might 
suggest  that  "a  concession  of  belligerent  rights  is 
liable  to  be  construed  as  a  recognition"  of  the 
Confederate  States.  Recognition,  he  was  to  say, 
could  be  based  only  on  the  assumption  that  these 
States  were  a  self  -  sustaining  power.  But  now, 
after  long  forbearance,  the  United  States  having 
set  their  forces  in  motion  to  suppress  the  insurrec 
tion,  "the  true  character  of  the  pretended  new 
state  is  at  once  revealed.  It  is  seen  to  be  a  power 
existing  in  pronunciamento  only.  It  has  never 
won  a  field.  It  has  obtained  no  forts  that  were 
not  virtually  betrayed  into  its  hands  or  seized  in 
breach  of  trust.  It  commands  not  a  single  port  on 
the  coast,  nor  any  highway  out  from  its  pretended 
capital  by  land.  Under  these  circumstances, 
Great  Britain  is  called  upon  to  intervene,  and  give 
it  body  and  independence  by  resisting  our  mea 
sures  of  suppression.  British  recognition  would 
be  British  intervention  to  create  within  our  own 
territory  a  hostile  state  by  overthrowing  this  Re 
public  itself."  In  Mr.  Seward's  draft  a  menacing 
sentence  followed  these  words,  but  Mr.  Lincoln 
drew  his  pen  through  it. 

Mr.  Adams  was  to  say  that  the  treatment  of  in 
surgent  privateers  was  "a  question  exclusively  our 
own,"  and  that  we  intended  to  treat  them  as  pi 
rates.1  If  Great  Britain  should  recognize  them  as 

1  An  effort  was  made  to  carry  out  this  theory  in  the  case  of  the 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS.  375 

lawful  belligerents  and  give  them  shelter,  "the 
laws  of  nations  afford  an  adequate  and  proper 
remedy;  "  -  "and  we  shall  avail  ourselves  of  it," 
added  Mr.  Seward;  but  again  Mr.  Lincoln's  pru 
dent  pen  went  through  these  words  of  provocation. 

Finally  Mr.  Adams  was  instructed  to  offer  the 
adhesion  of  the  United  States  to  the  famous  Decla 
ration  of  the  Congress  of  Paris,  of  1856,  which 
concerned  sundry  matters  of  neutrality. 

The  letter  ended  with  two  paragraphs  of  that 
patriotic  rodomontade  which  seems  eminently 
adapted  to  domestic  consumption  in  the  United 
States,  but  which,  if  it  ever  came  beneath  the  eye 
of  the  British  minister,  probably  produced  an 
effect  very  different  from  that  which  was  aimed  at. 
Mr.  Lincoln  had  the  good  taste  to  write  on  the 
margin:  "Drop  all  from  this  line  to  the  end;  "  but 
later  he  was  induced  to  permit  the  nonsense  to 
stand,  since  it  was  really  harmless. 

The  amendments  made  by  the  President  in  point 
of  quantity  were  trifling,  but  in  respect  of  im 
portance  were  very  great.  All  that  he  did  was 
here  and  there  to  change  or  to  omit  a  phrase, 
which  established  no  position,  but  which  in  the 
strained  state  of  feeling  might  have  had  serious 
results.  The  condition  calls  to  mind  the  descrip 
tion  of  the  summit  of  the  Alleghany  ridge,  where 
the  impulses  given  by  almost  imperceptible  in- 

crew  of  the  privateer  Savannah  ;  but  the  jury  failed  to  agree,  and 
the  attempt  was  not  afterward  renewed,  privateersmen  being  ex 
changed  like  other  prisoners  of  war. 


376  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

equalities  in  the  surface  of  the  rock  have  for  their 
ultimate  result  the  dispatching  of  mighty  ravers 
either  through  the  Atlantic  slope  to  the  ocean,  or 
down  the  Mississippi  Valley  to  the  Gulf  of  Mex 
ico.  A  few  adjectives,  two  or  three  ever  so  little 
sentences,  in  this  dispatch,  might  have  led  to  peace 
or  to  war ;  and  peace  or  war  with  England  almost 
surely  meant,  respectively,  Union  or  Disunion  in 
the  United  States.  In  fact,  no  more  important 
state  paper  was  issued  by  Mr.  Seward.  It  estab 
lished  our  relations  with  Great  Britain,  and  by 
consequence  also  with  France  and  with  the  rest  of 
Europe,  during  the  whole  period  of  the  Civil  War. 
Its  positions,  moderate  in  themselves,  and  reso 
lutely  laid  down,  were  never  materially  departed 
from.  The  English  minister  did  not  afterward 
give  either  official  or  unofficial  audiences  to  ac 
credited  rebel  emissaries;  the  blockade  was  main 
tained  by  a  force  so  competent  that  the  British 
government  acquiesced  in  it;  no  recognition  of  the 
Confederacy  was  ever  made,  either  in  the  ways 
prohibited  or  in  any  way  whatsoever;  it  is  true 
that  bitter  controversies  arose  concerning  Confed 
erate  privateers,  and  to  some  extent  England 
failed  to  meet  our  position  in  this  matter ;  but  it 
was  rather  the  application  of  our  rule  than  the  rule 
itself  which  was  in  dispute;  and  she  afterward, 
under  the  Geneva  award,  made  full  payment  for 
her  derelictions.  The  behavior  and  the  proposal 
of  terms,  which  constituted  a  practical  exclusion  of 
the  United  States  from  the  benefits  of  the  Treaty 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS.  377 

of  Paris,  certainly  involved  something  of  indig 
nity  ;  but  in  this  the  country  had  no  actual  rights  ; 
and  to  speak  frankly,  since  she  had  refused  to  come 
in  when  invited,  she  could  hardly  complain  of  an 
inhospitable  reception  when,  under  the  influence  of 
immediate  and  stringent  self-interest,  her  diploma 
tists  saw  fit  to  change  their  course.  So,  on  the 
whole,  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  delicate  and  novel 
business  in  the  untried  department  of  foreign  diplo 
macy  was  managed  with  great  skill,  under  trying 
circumstances.  A  few  months  later,  in  his  Message 
to  Congress,  at  the  beginning  of  December,  1861, 
the  President  referred  to  our  foreign  relations  in 
the  following  paragraphs :  - 

"The  disloyal  citizens  of  the  United  States,  who 
have  offered  the  ruin  of  our  country  in  return  for 
the  aid  and  comfort  which  they  have  invoked 
abroad,  have  received  less  patronage  and  encour 
agement  than  they  probably  expected.  If  it  were 
just  to  suppose,  as  the  insurgents  have  seemed  to 
assume,  that  foreign  nations,  in  this  case,  discard 
ing  all  moral,  social,  and  treaty  obligations,  would 
act  solely  and  selfishly  for  the  speedy  restoration 
of  commerce  including  especially  the  acquisition  of 
cotton,  those  nations  appear  as  yet  not  to  have  seen 
their  way  to  their  object  more  directly  or  clearly 
through  the  destruction  than  through  the  preserva 
tion  of  the  Union.  If  we  could  dare  to  believe 
that  foreign  nations  are  actuated  by  no  higher 
principle  than  this,  I  am  quite  sure  a  sound  argu 
ment  could  be  made  to  show  them  that  they  can 


378  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

reach  their  aim  more  readily  and  easily  by  aiding 
to  crush  this  rebellion  than  by  giving  encourage 
ment  to  it. 

"The  principal  lever  relied  on  by  these  insur 
gents  for  exciting  foreign  nations  to  hostility 
against  us,  as  already  intimated,  is  the  embarrass 
ment  of  commerce.  Those  nations,  however,  not 
improbably  saw  from  the  first  that  it  was  the 
Union  which  made  as  well  our  foreign  as  our  do 
mestic  commerce.  They  can  scarcely  have  failed 
to  perceive  that  the  effort  for  disunion  produces 
the  existing  difficulty;  and  that  one  strong  nation 
promises  more  durable  peace  and  a  more  extensive, 
valuable,  and  reliable  commerce  than  can  the  same 
nation  broken  into  hostile  fragments. 

"It  is  not  my  purpose  to  review  our  discussions 
with  foreign  States;  because,  whatever  might  be 
their  wishes  or  dispositions,  the  integrity  of  our 
country  and  the  stability  of  our  government  mainly 
depend  not  upon  them  but  on  the  loyalty,  virtue, 
patriotism  and  intelligence  of  the  American  people. 
The  correspondence  itself  with  the  usual  reserva 
tions  is  herewith  submitted.  I  venture  to  hope  it 
will  appear  that  we  have  practiced  prudence  and 
liberality  toward  foreign  Powers,  averting  causes 
of  irritation,  and  with  firmness  maintaining  our 
own  rights  and  honor." 

While  this  carefully  measured  language  cer 
tainly  fell  far  short  of  expressing  indifference  con 
cerning  European  action,  it  was  equally  far  from 
betraying  any  sense  of  awe  or  dependence  as 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS.  379 

towards  the  great  nations  across  the  Atlantic. 
Yet  in  fact  beneath  its  self-contained  moderation 
there  unquestionably  was  politic  concealment  of 
very  profound  anxiety.  Since  the  war  did  in  fact 
maintain  to  the  end  an  entirely  domestic  character, 
it  is  now  difficult  fully  to  appreciate  the  apprehen 
sions  which  were  felt,  especially  in  its  earlier  stages, 
lest  England  or  France  or  both  might  interfere 
with  conclusive  effect  in  favor  of  the  Confederacy. 
It  was  very  well  for  Mr.  Lincoln  to  state  the  mat 
ter  in  such  a  way  that  it  would  seem  an  unworthy 
act  upon  their  part  to  encourage  a  rebellion,  espe 
cially  a  pro-slavery  rebellion;  and  very  well  for 
him  also  to  suggest  that  their  commerce  could  be 
better  conducted  with  one  nation  than  with  two. 
In  plain  fact,  they  were  considering  nothing  more 
lofty  than  their  own  material  interests,  and  upon 
this  point  their  distinguished  statesmen  did  not 
feel  the  need  of  seeking  information  or  advice 
from  the  Western  lawyer,  who  had  just  been  so 
freakishly  picked  out  of  a  frontier  town  to  take 
charge  of  the  destinies  of  the  United  States.  The 
only  matter  which  they  contemplated  with  some 
interest,  and  upon  which  they  could  gather  enlight 
enment  from  his  words,  related  to  the  greater  or 
less  degree  of  firmness  and  confidence  with  which 
he  was  likely  to  meet  them ;  for  even  in  their  eyes 
this  must  be  admitted  to  constitute  one  of  the 
elements  in  the  situation.  It  was,  therefore,  for 
tunate  that  Mr.  Lincoln  successfully  avoided  an 
appearance  either  of  alarm  or  of  defiance. 


380  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

But  difficult  as  it  may  have  been  skilfully  to 
compose  the  sentences  of  the  message  so  far  as  it 
concerned  foreign  relationships,  some  occurrences 
were  taking  place  at  this  very  time  of  the  compo 
sition,  which  reduced  verbal  manoeuvring  to  insig 
nificance.  A  sudden  and  unexpected  menace  was 
happily  turned  into  a  substantial  aid  and  advan 
tage;  and  the  administration,  not  long  after  it 
had  firmly  declared  its  resolution  to  maintain  its 
clear  and  lawful  rights,  was  given  the  opportunity 
greatly  to  strengthen  its  position  by  an  event 
which,  at  first,  seemed  untoward  enough.  In  the 
face  of  very  severe  temptation  to  do  otherwise,  it 
had  the  good  sense  to  seize  this  opportunity  and  to 
show  that  it  had  upon  its  own  part  the  will  not 
only  to  respect,  but  to  construe  liberally  as  against 
itself,  the  rights  of  neutrals ;  also  that  it  had  the 
power  to  enforce  its  will,  upon  the  instant,  even  at 
the  cost  of  bitterly  disappointing  the  whole  body 
of  loyal  citizens  in  the  very  hour  of  their  rejoicing. 

The  story  of  Mason  and  Slidell  is  familiar: 
accredited  as  envoys  of  the  Confederacy  to  Eng 
land  and  France,  in  the  autumn  of  1861,  they  ran 
the  blockade  -at  Charleston  and  came  to  Havana. 
There  they  did  not  conceal  their  purpose  to  sail 
for  England,  by  the  British  royal  mail  steamship 
Trent,  on  November  7.  Captain  Wilkes  of  the 
United  States  steam  sloop  of  war  San  Jacinto, 
hearing  all  this,  lay  in  wait  in  the  Bahama  Chan 
nel,  sighted  the  Trent  on  November  8,  fired  a  shot 
across  her  bows,  and  brought  her  to.  He  then  sent 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS.  381 

on  board  a  force  of  marines  to  search  her  and 
fetch  off  the  rebels.  This  was  done  against  the 
angry  protests  of  the  Englishman,  and  with  such 
slight  force  as  constituted  technical  compulsion, 
but  without  violence.  The  Trent  was  then  left 
to  proceed  on  her  voyage.  The  envoys,  or  "mis 
sionaries,"  as  they  were  called  by  way  of  avoid 
ing  the  recognition  of  an  official  character,  were 
soon  in  confinement  in  Fort  Warren,  in  Boston 
Harbor. 

Everywhere  at  the  North  the  news  produced  an 
outburst  of  joy  and  triumph.  Captain  Wilkes 
was  the  hero  of  the  hour,  and  received  every  kind 
of  honor  and  compliment.  The  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  wrote  to  him  a  letter  of  congratulation,  de 
claring  that  his  conduct  was  "marked  by  intelli 
gence,  ability,  decision,  and  firmness,  and  has  the 
emphatic  approval  of  this  Department."  Secre 
tary  Stan  ton  was  outspoken  in  his  praise.  When 
Congress  convened,  on  December  1,  almost  the 
first  thing  done  by  the  House  of  Representatives 
was  to  hurry  through  a  vote  of  thanks  to  the  cap 
tain  for  his  "brave,  adroit,  and  patriotic  conduct." 
The  newspaper  press,  public  meetings,  private  con 
versation  throughout  the  country,  all  reechoed 
these  joyous  sentiments.  The  people  were  in  a 
fever  of  pleasurable  excitement.  It  called  for 
some  nerve  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr. 
Seward  suddenly  to  plunge  them  into  a  chilling 
bath  of  disappointment. 

Statements  differ  as  to  what  was  Mr.  Se ward's 


382  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

earliest  opinion  in  the  matter.1  But  all  writers 
agree  that  Mr.  Lincoln  did  not  move  with  the  cur 
rent  of  triumph.  Pie  was  scarcely  even  non-com- 
mittal.  On  the  contrary,  he  is  said  at  once  to 
have  remarked  that  it  did  not  look  right  to  stop 
the  vessel  of  a  friendly  power  on  the  high  seas  and 
take  passengers  out  of  her;  that  he  did  not  under 
stand  whence  Captain  Wilkes  derived  authority  to 
turn  his  quarter-deck  into  a  court  of  admiralty; 
that  he  was  afraid  the  captives  might  prove  to  be 
white  elephants  on  our  hands ;  that  we  had  fought 
Great  Britain  on  the  ground  of  like  doings  upon 
her  part,  and  that  now  we  must  stick  to  American 
principles;  that  if  England  insisted  upon  our  sur 
rendering  the  prisoners,  we  must  do  so,  and  must 
apologize,  and  so  bind  her  over  to  keep  the  peace 
in  relation  to  neutrals,  and  to  admit  that  she  had 
been  wrong  for  sixty  years. 

The  English  demand  came  quickly,  forcibly, 
and  almost  offensively.  The  news,  brought  to 
England  by  the  Trent,  set  the  whole  nation  in  a 
blaze  of  fury,  —  and  naturally  enough,  it  must  be 
admitted.  The  government  sent  out  to  the  navy- 
yards  orders  to  make  immediate  preparations  for 
war;  the  newspapers  were  filled  with  abuse  and 
menace  against  the  United  States;  the  extrava 
gance  of  their  language  will  not  be  imagined  with- 

1  Mr.  Welles  declares  that  Seward  at  first  opposed  the  surren 
der  ;  but  Mr.  Chittenden  asserts  that  he  knows  that  Mr.  Seward's 
first  opinion  coincided  with  his  later  action  ;  see  Mr.  Welles's  Lin 
coln  and  Seward,  and  Chittenden' s  Recollections,  148. 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS.  383 

out  actual  reference  to  their  pages.  Lord  Pal- 
merston  hastily  sketched  a  dispatch  to  Lord 
Lyons,  the  British  minister  at  Washington,  de 
manding  instant  reparation,  but  couched  in  lan 
guage  so  threatening  and  insolent  as  to  make  com 
pliance  scarcely  possible.  Fortunately,  in  like 
manner  as  Mr.  Seward  had  taken  to  Mr.  Lincoln 
his  letter  of  instructions  to  Mr.  Adams,  so  Lord 
Palmerston  also  felt  obliged  to  lay  his  missive 
before  the  Queen,  and  the  results  in  both  cases 
were  alike ;  for  once  at  least  royalty  did  a  good 
turn  to  the  American  Republic.  Prince  Albert, 
ill  with  the  disease  which  only  a  few  days  later 
carried  him  to  his  grave,  labored  hard  over  that 
important  document,  with  the  result  that  the  royal 
desire  to  eliminate  passion  sufficiently  to  make  a 
peaceable  settlement  possible  was  made  unmistak 
ably  plain,  and  therefore  the  letter,  as  ultimately 
revised  by  Earl  Russell,  though  still  disagreeably 
peremptory  in  tone,  left  room  for  the  United 
States  to  set  itself  right  without  loss  of  self-re 
spect.  The  most  annoying  feature  was  that  Great 
Britain  insisted  upon  instant  action;  if  Lord 
Lyons  did  not  receive  a  favorable  reply  within 
seven  days  after  formally  preferring  his  demand 
for  reparation,  he  was  to  call  for  his  passports. 
In  other  words  delay  by  diplomatic  correspondence 
and  such  ordinary  shilly-shallying  meant  war.  As 
the  London  "Times"  expressed  it,  America  was 
not  to  be  allowed  "to  retain  what  she  had  taken 
from  us,  at  the  cheap  price  of  an  interminable  cor 
respondence." 


384  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

December  19  this  dispatch  reached  Lord  Lyons; 
he  talked  its  contents  over  with  Mr.  Seward,  in 
formally,  and  deferred  the  formal  communication 
until  the  23d.  Mr.  Lincoln  drew  up  a  proposal 
for  submission  to  arbitration.  But  it  could  not 
be  considered;  the  instructions  to  Lord  Lyons 
gave  no  time  and  no  discretion.  It  was  aggra 
vating  to  concede  what  was  demanded  under  such 
pressure;  but  the  President,  as  has  been  said, 
had  already  expressed  his  opinion  upon  the  cardi 
nal  point:  that  England  had  the  strength  of  the 
case.  Moreover  he  remarked,  with  good  common 
sense:  "One  war  at  a  time."  So  it  was  settled 
that  the  emissaries  must  be  surrendered.  The 
"prime  minister  of  the  Northern  States  of  Amer 
ica,"  as  the  London  Times  insultingly  called  Mr. 
Seward,  was  wise  enough  to  agree ;  for,  under  the 
circumstances,  to  allow  discourtesy  to  induce  war 
was  unjustifiable.  On  December  25  a  long  Cabi 
net  council  was  held,  and  the  draft  of  Se ward's 
reply  was  accepted,  though  with  sore  reluctance. 
The  necessity  was  cruel,  but  fortunately  it  was  not 
humiliating;  for  the  President  had  pointed  to  the 
road  of  honorable  exit  in  those  words  which  Mr. 
Lossing  heard  uttered  by  him  on  the  very  day  that 
the  news  arrived.  In  1812  the  United  States  had 
fought  with  England  because  she  had  insisted,  and 
they  had  denied,  that  she  had  the  right  to  stop 
their  vessels  on  the  high  seas,  to  search  them,  and 
to  take  from  them  British  subjects  found  on  board 
them.  Mr.  Seward  now  said  that  the  country  still 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS.  385 

adhered  to  the  ancient  principle  for  which  it  had 
once  fought,  and  was  glad  to  find  England  re 
nouncing  her  old  -  time  error.  Captain  Wilkes, 
not  acting  under  instructions,  had  made  a  mistake. 
If  he  had  captured  the  Trent  and  brought  her  in 
for  adjudication  as  prize  in  our  admiralty  courts,  a 
case  might  have  been  maintained  and  the  prisoners 
held.  He  had  refrained  from  this  course,  out  of 
kindly  consideration  for  the  many  innocent  persons 
to  whom  it  would  have  caused  serious  inconven 
ience;  and  since  England  elected  to  stand  upon 
the  strict  rights  which  his  humane  conduct  gave  to 
her,  the  United  States  must  be  bound  by  their 
own  principles  at  any  cost  to  themselves.  Ac 
cordingly  the  "envoys"  were  handed  over  to  the 
commander  of  the  English  gunboat  Rinaldo,  at 
Provincetown,  on  January  1,  1862. 

The  decision  of  the  President  and  the  Secretary 
of  State  was  thoroughly  wise.  Much  hung  upon 
it;  "no  one,"  says  Arnold,  "can  calculate  the  re 
sults  which  would  have  followed  upon  a  refusal  to 
surrender  these  men."  An  almost  certain  result 
would  have  been  a  war  with  England;  and  a 
highly  probable  result  would  have  been  that  ere 
long  France  also  would  find  pretext  for  hostilities, 
since  she  was  committed  to  friendship  with  Eng 
land  in  this  matter,  and  'moreover  the  Emperor 
seemed  to  have  a  restless  desire  to  interfere  against 
the  North.  What  then  would  have  been  the  like 
lihood  of  ultimate  success  in  that  domestic  strug 
gle,  which,  by  itself,  though  it  did  not  exhaust, 


386  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

yet  very  severely  taxed  both  Northern  endurance 
and  Northern  resources?  It  is  fair  also  to  these 
two  men  to  say  that,  in  reaching  their  decision, 
instead  of  receiving  aid  or  encouragement  from 
outside,  they  had  the  reverse.  Popular  feeling 
may  be  estimated  from  the  utterances  which,  even 
after  there  had  been  time  for  reflection,  were 
made  by  men  whose  positions  curbed  them  with 
the  grave  responsibilities  of  leadership.  In  the 
House  of  Representatives  Owen  Love  joy  pledged 
himself  to  "inextinguishable  hatred"  of  Great 
Britain,  and  promised  to  bequeath  it  as  a  legacy 
to  his  children;  and,  while  he  was  not  engaging 
in  the  war  for  the  integrity  of  his  own  country, 
he  vowed  that  if  a  war  with  England  should 
come,  he  would  "carry  a  musket"  in  it.  Sen 
ator  Hale,  in  thunderous  oratory,  notified  the 
members  of  the  administration  that  if  they  would 
"not  listen  to  the  voice  of  the  people,  they  would 
find  themselves  engulfed  in  a  fire  that  would  con 
sume  them  like  stubble;  they  would  be  helpless 
before  a  power  that  would  hurl  them  from  their 
places."  The  great  majority  at  the  North,  though 
perhaps  incapable  of  such  felicity  of  expression, 
was  undoubtedly  not  very  much  misrepresented  by 
the  vindictive  representative  and  the  exuberant 
senator.  Yet  a  brief  period,  in  which  to  consider 
the  logic  of  the  position,  sufficed  to  bring  nearly 
all  to  intelligent  conclusions ;  and  then  it  was  seen 
that  what  had  been  done  had  been  rightly  and 
wisely  done.  There  was  even  a  sense  of  pride  in 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS.  387 

doing  fairly  and  honestly,  without  the  shuffling- 
evasions  of  diplomacy,  an  act  of  strict  right;  and 
the  harder  the  act  the  greater  was  the  honor.  The 
behavior  of  the  people  was  generous  and  intelli 
gent,  and  greatly  strengthened  the  government  in 
the  eyes  of  foreigners.  By  the  fulness  and  readi 
ness  of  this  reparation  England  was  put  under  a 
moral  obligation  to  treat  the  United  States  as  hon 
orably  as  the  United  States  treated  her.  She  did 
not  do  so,  it  is  true;  but  in  more  ways  than  one 
she  ultimately  paid  for  not  doing  so.  At  any 
rate,  for  the  time  being,  after  this  action  it  would 
have  been  nothing  less  than  indecent  for  her  to 
recognize  the  Confederacy  at  once;  and  a  little 
later  prudence  had  the  like  restraining  effect.  Yet 
though  recognition  and  war  were  avoided  they 
never  entirely  ceased  to  threaten,  and  Mr.  Chit- 
tenden  is  perfectly  correct  in  saying  that  "every 
act  of  our  government  was  performed  under  the 
impending  danger  of  a  recognition  of  the  Confed 
eracy,  a  disregard  of  the  blockade,  and  the  actual 
intervention  of  Great  Britain  in  our  attempt  to 
suppress  an  insurrection  upon  our  own  territory." 


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WILL  INCREASE  TO  SO  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY     AND     TO     $1.OO     ON     THE    SEVENTH     DAY 
OVERDUE. 

FFR    1*1    •*ri4C 

I  •  „•••      »  c* 

liny     5    194G 

riuv      *-* 

NOV^7 

\e^ 

-;      v^ 

V^ 

v:,^C^  DC 

cr   l*8* 

otu 

i-.-ii-'  

LD  21-100m-7,'39(402s) 

YB  44884 


7 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


